Dynamics of counter accounts and accountability in the advancement of human rights and sustainable development in an arena by Denedo, Mercy Ejaita
 Dynamics of counter accounts and accountability in the 
advancement of human rights and sustainable development in 
an arena 
 
 
 
Mercy Ejaita Denedo 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Heriot-Watt University 
School of Social Sciences 
Department of Accountancy, Economics and Finance 
 
 
November 2017 
 
 
The copyright in this thesis is owned by the author. Any quotation from the thesis or use of any of 
the information contained in it must acknowledge this thesis as the source of the quotation or 
information." 
 
i 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study connected counter accounting and dialogic accountability approach and extended 
dialogic accountability and engagement theories to the dynamic inverted conflict arena 
framework and linked these to the lifecycle and pathways to conflict resolution. The historical 
use of diverse typologies of counter accounts in the Niger Delta conflict arenas in bridging, 
building and driving effective dialogic actions, accountability and governance reforms were 
explored. This study was able to understand the lifecycle of the conflicts in the Niger Delta, and 
how the engagements of radical and reforming stakeholders across different arenas adopted 
diverse campaigning strategies to initiate diverse practice of freedom in order to resolve these 
conflicts. Qualitative methods comprising a mix of documentary analysis from different sources 
of information, 57 semi-structured interviews and field visits were adopted. The 57 semi-
structured interviews adopted a mix of face-to-face, focus groups, telephone and skype interviews 
with the corporation, international advocacy NGOs, local advocacy NGOs, developmental NGOs, 
the regulators and the community stakeholders. This study mapped out the history of the use of 
counter accounts through a documentary qualitative analysis in problematizing the conflicts in 
the Niger Delta in order to locate and make sense of these interviews. This study revealed that 
counter accounts were used to speak truth to power and to conscientized the marginalised groups 
to demand accounts and inclusive engagements. Counter accounts, its technologies and activism 
were used to perpetuate, escalate, confront the powerful arena participants, counter-act and co-
operate with other arena participants at the regional, national and international arenas to bring 
about transformative reforms in the local arenas. This study revealed that accountability by the 
powerful stakeholders should not be through discourses for wealth maximisation but through 
inclusive stakeholders’ engagement and moral actions towards advancing human rights and 
sustainable environment. Thus, understanding the motivations, desired outcomes and limitations 
of advocacy NGOs’ use of counter accounts reinforces the need for policymakers, corporations 
and public-sector organisations to ensure political and power dynamics are inclusive to protect 
human rights and sustainable development especially in an arena prone to conflicts.  
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND OF THIS STUDY 
“In what kind of world do you want current and future people to live?   
Do you want them to live in a world characterized by social justice? Or 
would you be happy for them to live in a world riven by social conflict, 
where ‘justice’ is only available to a few members of society? Do you 
want them to live in a world where nature provides what is needed to 
sustain life? Or would you be satisfied for them to live in a world where 
the ecosphere had been damaged to the extent that life is lived at the 
margins of existence, where weather patterns have become so unsettled 
that storms regularly kill many people, the supply of food and water is 
erratic, and many species of plants, animals and insects have become 
extinct? Do you want them to live in an economically prosperous world 
where all needs are met? Or would you be satisfied for them to live in a 
world where the economy had failed and they were therefore unable to 
enjoy a prosperous life where wellbeing was enhanced?” (Bebbington et 
al., 2014, p.3). 
1.1. THE RATIONALE OF THE STUDY (MOTIVATION) 
These are substantial questions that require genuine answers because corporations do not 
operate in vacuums; there are stakeholders, whose past, present and future interests are 
paramount to the advancement of their operations (Gray and Bebbington, 2003; Bakan, 
2005; Archel et al., 2011). It is important for corporations to extend beyond conventional 
accounting, (which focuses on satisfying the wealth maximisation objectives of the 
providers of capital) to the contemporary or “new accounting(s)” concept (Brown et al., 
2015; Brown, 2009; Bebbington et al., 2007). These new accountings are envisaged to 
serve the wider social, economic and environmental aspects of corporates’ activities on 
society (Thomson and Bebbington, 2005) as it is important for corporations to ensure that 
their business plans, transactions and operating activities do not constitute risk or impinge 
on the human rights of their stakeholders and the society (Gallhofer et al., 2011; Sikka, 
2011; Killian, 2010; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). 
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Hopwood (2009, p.433) asserted that “as changes occur in our concepts and focus of 
accountability for the environment, the demands for different flows of information, 
accounting and otherwise are also likely to grow.”  This is because accounting has the 
potential to reconstruct societal views by inscribing values on everyday lives (Brown, 
2009; Gray et al., 2014a, b; Cooper et al., 2005). If accounting has the potential to inscribe 
values, there is a need for research that recognises the dynamics of the plurality of 
accounting information and its institutionalisation through diverse engagement processes. 
A study that transcends beyond financial reporting to an engagement-oriented 
accountability research that evaluates the responsiveness of corporations to human rights 
problems, social and environmental issues that are material to the society (Gray and Gray, 
2011; Thomson et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2015; Tregidga et al., 2015, 2012; O’Dwyer 
and Unerman, 2016; Grubnic et al., 2015; Vinnari and Laine, 2017; Gallhofer et al., 2015, 
2011). Studies that evaluate the appropriate level of accountability, transparency, 
governance and business and human rights (BHR) recognition associated with corporate 
activities and the ability of stakeholders to live sustainably (Lauwo et al., 2016; Belal et 
al., 2015; Killian, 2010; Tregidga, 2013, 2017). 
Interdisciplinary research in accounting has employed different theories and 
methodologies to explain and address societal, cultural, political, institutional and 
ecological issues. This field of study has recognised an exponential increase over the last 
30 years (Parker and Guthrie, 2014 p.1219) in the number of voluntary guiding principles, 
frameworks or codes of conduct aim to help corporations implement strategies and 
principles of social responsibility and sustainable development (Erro and Sanchez, 2012). 
In addition, the development and growth of social movement groups, such as the non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) have helped to enhance these field of research (Laine 
and Vinnari, 2017; Tregidga, 2017). For instance, their aspirations for a clean and healthy 
environment, advancement of human rights, ethical investment for transnational 
companies and other business enterprises, employees’ health and safety issues, 
elimination of forced and child labour, corporate social responsibility, climate 
change/global warming issues, elimination of gender discriminations in employment, 
corruption, deforestation, pollution and land degradation have enhanced this field of 
research (Parker, 2011; Thomson et al., 2015; Dey et al., 2011; Dey and Gibbon, 2014; 
Apostol, 2015; Sikka, 2011). 
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In addition, several discourses in the field of interdisciplinary research (e.g. law, CSR, 
accounting, business ethics) have focused on the regulation of multinational companies, 
and on the social and environmental impacts of their activities on the societies and 
environments where they operate (Spence, 2009; Panda, 2013; Wettstein, 2012a; 
Joutsenvirta, 2011; Burnett and Welford, 2007). MNCs have been accused of complicity 
with the government of their host countries on the violation of human rights and the 
destruction of the environment (Boyle, 2012; Mujih, 2008; Ruggie, 2013). This is because 
majority of the outstanding violations of human rights by the host government and those 
related to MNCs occur in developing countries where national laws and regulatory 
mechanisms are ineffective in ensuring that corporations adhere to laws, their duty to 
respect human rights and any felt moral duty to be socially and environmentally 
responsible (Belal et al., 2015; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). 
Due to the impact of MNCs on the global economic growth and development, numerous 
calls have been made for them to be socially responsible, particularly in developing 
countries (Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Ruggie, 2013; Boyle, 2012; Christian-Aid, 
2004; Alawattage and Wickramasighne, 2009; Sikka, 2011; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016; 
Islam and McPhail, 2011; Sinkovics et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, one of the largest corporate citizenship and sustainability initiative to ensure 
that corporations are socially responsible is the United Nation Global Compact (UNGC). 
An extensive network of participants such as corporations, trade unions, governments, 
academic participants, public sectors, civil society organisations, and UN agencies 
endorses the UNGC. Bennie et al., (2007) claimed that “the UN is an important arena for 
external actors such as environmental advocacy groups and other non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) that are politically inﬂuential and frequently critical of large 
corporations.” For instance, Amnesty International, Platform, Christian Aid, The Corner 
House, Human Rights Watch, Global Witness, ActionAid, World Wildlife Fund (WWF), 
Greenpeace had launched series of worldwide campaigns using the 10 universal principles 
of the UNGC to demonstrate how transnational corporations and governments avoid their 
responsibilities towards complying with these principles, thereby violating the 
fundamental rights of the other stakeholders to life, education, water, justice, safe and 
healthy environment, work and earn a living, sustainable intergenerational environment 
and development (Amunwa, 2011; Amnesty International, 2009; Albin-Lackey, 2007; 
Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007; Christian Aid, 2004). 
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The Ruggie’s guiding principles on business and human rights (GPBHR) endorsed in 
2011 is another significant milestone and framework towards the development of 
sustainable policies, corporate social and environmental practices, accountability, 
transparency and access by the citizen to effective remedy when their fundamental rights 
are violated. This framework comprises three (3) pillars ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
(Ruggie, 2013). The framework re-affirms the State or government responsibility under 
the international human rights law1 as propounded in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948, and customary law to protect and refrain from violating the rights of its 
citizen by ensuring that the right-holders enjoy those rights (Ruggie, 2013; Bishop, 2012; 
Lindsay et al., 2013). The State is subsequently expected to enact a framework embracing 
Ruggie’s guiding principles, with which multinational and national corporations will 
protect and respect human rights (Chetty, 2011; Frankental, 2011).  
The guiding principles require that businesses respect human rights and ensure that they 
are not complicit in human right abuses (Boyle, 2012; Wettstein, 2012a; Li and 
McKernan, 2016). This corporate responsibility to respect human right implies that 
corporations should avoid any infringement of human rights and should effectively and 
efficiently address human rights impact in which the business is involved either locally or 
internationally, particularly in relation to its operations, products and services (Ruggie, 
2013; Gallhofer et al., 2011). The third pillar emphasized the need for greater access by 
victims of human rights violations to seek effective judicial and non-judicial remedy and 
this is associated with the State duty and corporate responsibility to protect and respect 
human rights (United Nations, 2013a; Boyle, 2012; McPhail and McKernan, 2011; Gray 
and Gray, 2011; Cooper et al., 2011). The guiding principles require that businesses 
comprehensively report on their human rights activities either in their financial or 
sustainability reports after adopting a due diligence process to ensure its implementation 
(Lindsay et al., 2013; McPhail and Adams, 2016; Ruggie, 2013). However, research has 
shown that most businesses do not provide detailed information on their progress and 
                                                          
1 International human rights law include the International Bill of Human Rights, which comprise the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1976. International Labour Organisation (ILO)’s 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights to Work, Covenant on Human Rights, the Global Compacts, African 
Charter on Human Rights, GPBHRs (Cassel and Ramasastry, 2015). The UDHR could be seen as the foundation for 
international laws on human rights. It provides the tentacle for subsequent laws or guidelines on human rights. 
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impacts on human rights (United Nations, n.d.) and often do not respect the human rights 
of the indigenous people where they operate (Belal et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017; Lauwo 
et al., 2016; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Killian, 2010).     
 
1.2. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
There have been growing pressure on multinational corporations (MNCs) to conduct their 
business in a responsible manner without fuelling conflicts and violence resulting in the 
violation of human rights and constituting harm to the wellbeing of the communities 
where they operate (Belal et al., 2015; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Tregidga, 2017; 
Lauwo et al., 2014; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2016). In addition, it has been argued that while 
pursuing profit maximisation; MNCs do not consider the social and environmental effects 
of this pursuit on the people and communities where they operate (Thomson et al., 2015; 
Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Killian, 2010; United Nations, 2015; Sikka, 2011; Amunwa, 
2011; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). Countries such as the United Kingdom, Demark and the 
Netherlands have established national action plans on BHR. For instance, in September 
2013, the United Kingdom produced its UK’s Business and Human Rights Action Plan 
geared towards implementing the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGP) (Croser, 
2014). Whilst these Action Plan has been welcomed by some civil society groups, 
concerns were raised by a coalition of NGOs called the CORE (corporate responsibility 
coalition). The CORE called on the UK government to eliminate the barriers in its judicial 
system that allows UK companies to act with impunity beyond its borders and 
subsequently, prevent non-indigenes from seeking redress and justice in the UK when 
MNCs registered in the UK violate fundamental rights of stakeholders where they operate 
(Croser, 2014). Similarly, the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR) 
called on the US government to enact a national action plan to curb the abuse of human 
rights by MNCs (ICAR, 2014). These request for the respect of human rights by 
corporations support Ruggie (2013) assertion that the direct implications for human rights 
are poorly understood by corporations because corporate laws, directors’ duties and 
reporting requirements directly shape what companies do and how they do them, and their 
impacts have not been critically evaluated and understood.  
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Accounting profession integrates all aspects of business operations which facilitate 
globalisation and the global business organisation, but it appears to ignore corporate 
violations of human rights, particularly in emerging economies (Gouldson and 
Bebbington, 2007; Wild and Mares, 2011; Sikka, 2011; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Gray 
and Gray, 2011; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). However, McPhail (2012, p.3) claimed 
‘…there has been a renaissance in professional ethics both within the accounting 
profession and beyond, and there has also been a significant engagement by the profession 
with the notion of sustainability. It is also becoming increasingly apparent that any 
discussion of sustainability cannot be disassociated from a consideration of human rights.’  
Thus, whilst there exist numerous and important literature on the State, the environment, 
human rights, social and environmental accounting; there are few studies in accounting 
that have evaluated why human rights issues have not been embedded in corporate social 
reports given the high political profile of the BHR discourse  or studies that evaluated 
whether existing frameworks have contributed to the lack of prominence of human rights 
in corporate practices or corporate stakeholders’ engagement practices in developing 
countries. Furthermore, there are few studies on the impacts of counter accounts and how 
counter-accounts are used for the emancipation, advancement of human rights, to drive 
dialogic accountability, sustainable environment and development from the perspective 
of multiple stakeholders. Nevertheless, Sikka (2011, p.825) asserted that “a focus on 
human rights can reinvigorate accounting, corporate governance and CSR research and 
can help strengthen democracy, public accountability and provide a better world.” 
Therefore, this exploratory case study aims to contribute to studies on how human rights 
issues could be integrated with corporate accountability through the use of counter 
accounts, from the lens of dialogic accountability with data collected from the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria. 
 
1.3.      PERSONAL MOTIVATION FOR THIS STUDY 
The author’s aspiration to undertake a doctorate degree in accounting was stimulated 
during her undergraduate programme in accounting at the Delta State University, Nigeria. 
Initially, the author was interested in understanding the relationship between capital 
structure and corporate social performance on corporate financial performance. However, 
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after the author’s undergraduate degree, the author was fortunate to be offered a 
scholarship by the Delta State Government to study for an MSc in Accounting and 
Financial Analysis. During the MSc programme, particularly during the Strategic 
Management Accounting and Decision making and problem-solving modules, the 
author’s perspective on accounting changed. The author became interested in corporate 
disclosures on their social and environmental practices.  Prior to this, the author was aware 
of MOSOP’s campaign through the leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa. MOSOP’s campaigned 
for resource control, inclusive accountability and environmental remediation in 
Ogoniland. However, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni were murdered by the 
military government of Nigeria in 1995. As a result of their death, the reaction in the 
international arena escalated what was a partisan local campaign into series of 
international campaigns for environmental protection and remediation, corporate 
accountability, effective governance, and social justice for the human rights of the Ogonis 
and the Niger Delta  (see section 6.1). 
Furthermore, the need to explore corporate disclosures on their social and environmental 
practices for her doctoral studies was further inspired by the author’s preliminary studies 
on social and environmental accounting during her MSc programme. This enabled the 
author to critically reflect on conducting a research on social and environmental issues in 
Nigeria. At the initial phase of the doctoral programme, the author proposed to examine 
the disclosure practices of oil corporations operating in the Niger Delta but after extensive 
studies of corporate social reports and the presentation of her proposed project in 
workshops, the author was inspired to explore what was actually not disclosed by the 
corporations but where published by advocacy NGOs to engage the corporations and the 
regulators in dialogues by giving voice to the plights of the Niger Deltan. After exploring 
what was published by the advocacy NGOs and the corporations, the author became 
interested in exploring the implications of these accounts from the perspectives of all the 
stakeholders including the community stakeholders in the Niger Delta. 
It is also pertinent to state that the author was further inspired to conduct this research 
when she realised that the accounting literature published in Nigeria do not consider 
accounting as inclusive rather accounting was viewed as a “calculative” discourse for 
profitability/shareholders’ wealth maximisation. During the early phase of this study, the 
author could not identify any meaningful accounting literature that addressed social and 
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environmental issues in the Niger Delta. The author was left to ponder on the implications 
of accounting, and social and environmental issues that affects the ability of others to live 
in a healthy environment. Thus, the author considered this study as an opportunity to 
establish the connection between accounting, social and environmental issues in the Niger 
Delta of Nigeria. The study enabled the author to contribute and make visible the 
campaigns for inclusive accountability, effective accountability and governance, and 
effective environmental remediation, the protection and respect of human rights of the 
current generation, which could affect the well-being of future generations. 
Finally, as a Niger Delta indigene, this study has exposed the author to the deep-rooted 
conflicts and the implications on current generation and the potential implications on 
future generations if the problems explored in this study are not addressed. This study 
revealed that corporate reporting could be considered as partial and are designed to satisfy 
the need of stakeholders with direct agency relationship with the corporate 
wealth maximisation objective. 
 
1.4. AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
This research focus on counter accounting and accountability processes and production 
in the advancement of human right and sustainable development in an arena. This study 
aims to explore how the use of counter accounts and actions contributed towards driving 
inclusive stakeholders’ dialogue and accountability geared towards the attainment of a 
healthy environment, inclusive and justice driven society. Previous studies have revealed 
that civil society groups help to reflectively evaluate the governance and accountability 
system in relation to human rights and sustainable development (Apostol, 2015; Thomson 
et al., 2015; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Spence, 2009; Tregidga, 2017; Vinnari 
and Laine, 2017; Gray et al., 2014b; Gallhofer et al., 2011, 2006; Dey et al., 2011; 
Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Dey and Gibbon, 2014; Rodrigue, 2014). Besides 
revealing problematic governance and unsustainable practices, the civil society groups 
help close governance gaps by creating nuanced accountability frameworks to evaluate 
and monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of governance and accounting systems. 
Therefore, this study explores how socio, economic, political, cultural and ethical 
understandings of human rights in a conflict arena is covered by counter accounting, 
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governance and accountability mechanisms. This study would help in contextualizing 
how human rights are evaluated and embedded in corporate responsibility and 
governance regimes from the perspectives of advocacy NGOs (local and international), 
developmental NGOs, corporations, regulators (NOSDRA and DPR) and community 
stakeholders with reference to the high social, economic and environmental impacts that 
governance and corporate practices have had in recent years on the fundamental rights of 
the indigenous people. 
Conducting an exploratory case study enabled the author to observe, interpret and reflect 
on how counter accounts are constructed by the stakeholders’ interactions towards 
promoting emancipation and advancement of the human rights accountability discourse. 
According to (Gallhofer et al., 2006; Thomson et al., 2015; Dey et al., 2011; Gray et al., 
2014b; Sikka, 2011; Tregidga et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 2017) a 
critical exploration of counter accounting within the accounting literature is worthwhile 
because it can highlight the significant ideas and practices that can enhance accounting 
research, (intra)intergenerational equity and sustainable development. 
Finally, a dialogic accountability and inverted arena framework is developed that enabled 
the author to explore and evaluate how various stakeholders interact to bring about 
emancipatory organisational and regulatory changes within the Niger Delta (Brown et al., 
2015; Brown, 2009; Bebbington et al., 2007; Bebbington and Thomson, 2005, 2004; 
Brown and Dillard, 2015a, b; Dillard and Yuthas, 2013; Dillard and Roslender, 2011; 
Blackburn et al., 2014; Dillard, 2016, 2014; Gray et al., 2014a, b). Therefore, this research 
sought to evaluate the accountability and governance gaps, and relationships among the 
various stakeholders operating within the Niger Delta in relation to human rights and 
sustainable development. This dialogic accountability and inverted arena approach 
provided valuable insights into how the various actors interacted to promote and enhance 
institutional and regulatory changes geared towards the advancement of human rights and 
sustainable practices within this region by evaluating the impacts of the existing 
accounting framework on human rights within the critical, social and environmental 
accounting discourse towards the advancement of human rights and sustainable practices 
within this region. 
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1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study extends prior research on external accounting (Gallhofer et al., 2006; Thomson 
et al., 2015; Dey et al., 2011; Dey and Gibbon, 2014; Apostol, 2015; Georgakopoulos and 
Thomson, 2008; Gray et al., 2014b; Sikka, 2011; Tregidga et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017; 
Vinnari and Laine, 2017) by exploring the use and construction of counter accounting in 
the Niger Delta arena. It explored how counter accounts have facilitated stakeholders’ 
dialogue and engagement in the advancement of human rights and sustainable 
development in the Niger Delta arena of Nigeria. This research provided answers to the 
following questions 
a. Why are counter accounts produced to address and drive accountability, 
advancement of human rights and sustainable development within the Niger Delta 
conflict arena? 
b. Why, and how the arena participants perceive accountability and governance 
gaps, and how this impacts on their counter accounting production? 
c. How are counter accounts used to bridge accountability, governance gaps for the 
advancement of human rights and sustainable development from the perspective 
of the advocacy NGOs against corporate and governance practices within this 
arena? 
d. To what extent does dialogic accountability framework explain the perceived 
effectiveness of counter accounts for the advancement of human rights within 
their arena?  
 
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This section provides an overview of this thesis to enable potential readers and users of 
this thesis to understand the connection between the chapters and how they are used to 
address the research questions. This thesis is structured as follows: 
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Chapter 1 the background of this study highlights the motivations of this interdisciplinary 
study, the nature and scope of the research problem, the aim of this study and the research 
questions addressed in this thesis. 
Chapter 2 sets the scene and clarifies why the Niger Delta arena was chosen for this 
study. 
Chapter 3 explores the relationship between human rights and accountability. This 
chapter address the notion of human rights and how it could be inferred from the role of 
the State, corporate and other business enterprises in accordance with the Guiding 
Principles and other international treaties. In addition, it explores how human rights 
discourse affects corporate accountability and evaluated the relationship between human 
rights accountability and sustainable development.  
Chapter 4 explores the relationship between accountability, counter accounting, dialogic 
accountability and engagement theory – dialogic theory of action. It examines how 
different counter accounts had been considered problematizing tools that give voices to 
the marginalised, and consider the criticisms of counter accounts. This chapter connects 
counter accounting and dialogic accountability approach and extends dialogic 
accountability and engagement theory to the dynamic inverted conflict arena framework. 
This was further developed into a dynamic lifecycle and pathways to conflict resolution 
model. The literature review was used to identify the methodology and methods adopted 
in this study. 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the methodological assumptions that influence the 
research method and data analysis process adopted. It discusses the rationale for using a 
case study to address the research questions through qualitative methods comprising a mix 
of qualitative content analysis, semi-structured interviews, focus groups and field visits. 
 Chapter 6 addresses the first research questions by conducting a historic documentary 
content analysis of counter accounts and counter-counter accounts in the Delta arena. A 
brief timeline of the conflicts addressed by the counter accounts is introduced in this 
chapter and discusses how these conflicts escalated from a local dialogue for 
accountability and institutional change on human right violations and resource control to 
national conflicts for accountability and subsequently to international counter accounting 
for governance and organisational change.  
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Chapter 7 explores the second question in this thesis. Specifically, this chapter applies 
the dynamic inverted conflict arena model developed in chapter 4 to flesh out the 
accountability engagements among the arena stakeholders and how counter accounting 
draws the discourse for human rights, accountability, governance, inequality of power and 
ownership structure, sustainable development and emancipatory changes.  
Chapter 8 address the third research question of this thesis. This chapter explores how 
counter accounting technologies were used to build networks for human rights, 
accountability, governance, engagement and sustainable development which bridge 
human rights, accountability, governance and stakeholders’ engagement gaps within an 
arena to give voices to the marginalised groups and the need for sustainable development.  
Chapter 9 address the last research question of this thesis. In this chapter, the emphasis 
was placed on dialogic accountability to theoretically explore the implication of 
accountability and counter accounting in driving the discourse for the protection and 
respect of human rights, equality of power, inclusive ownership structure, effective 
accountability and governance mechanism for sustainable development within the Delta 
arena. This chapter draws extensively on the empirical evidence from chapter 6, 7 and 8 
and lifecycle and pathways to conflict resolutions particularly the dialogic accountability 
in chapter 4 to explore the implications of this framework in the Delta arena.  
Finally, Chapter 10 summarises the overall findings of this study, the contributions to 
knowledge, the implications of this study for practice, the limitations of this study and the 
potential future research pathways. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT - MAPPING THE EMPIRICAL TERRAIN  
 
2.0.  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter sets the scene and clarifies why the Niger Delta arena was chosen for this 
study.  
 
2.1. THE PARADOX OF PLENTY 
Nigeria is in West Africa. It is often referred to as the ‘Giant of Africa’ due to its economy 
and population, which was estimated as 177.1 million (World Fact Book, 2014). In April 
2014, the country’s GDP was estimated at $509.9bn surpassing South Africa and 
subsequently becoming the 26th biggest economy in the world (Magnowski, 2014; 
Provost, 2014; Aljazeera, 2014; Emejo, 2014). Nigeria is a rich country endowed with 
natural resources such as petroleum, gas, tin, iron, ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead and 
zinc. It has a growing textile and leather industry. Its agricultural products include palm 
oil, groundnuts, cocoa, cotton, rubber, coconut, citrus fruits, maize and abundance of 
arable land, which can guarantee sustainable economic growth (OPEC, 2013; United 
Nations 2013). It is the twelfth largest oil producing country in the world (BBC, 2014; 
Economist.com, 2014; World Fact Book, 2014). 
The Nigerian economy is geared towards the production of two primary products: cocoa 
and crude oil (Amunwa, 2011; United Nations, 2013a). It has 2800 oil producing wells, 
about 37.139million barrels of proven oil reserves, 5118billion cubic metres of proven 
natural gas, produces about 1954.1million barrels of oil per day in 2012, 84845million 
standard cubic metres of natural gas while 13182million standard cubic metres was 
estimated as flared natural gas in 2012 (OPEC, 2013; OECD et al., 2013). From 1980 to 
2010, oil revenue contributed an average of 76% from the extractive sector to the 
Federation Account2 while cocoa contributed 35% of earnings from the non-extractive 
sector, thereby making it a mono-product rentier state (Omeje, 2006; United Nations, 
                                                          
2 The Federation Account is an account managed at the Federal level that captures federally collected revenue from the 
extractive and non-extractive sectors and sales. The revenue collected is monthly distributed by the Federal Accounts 
Allocations Committee to the Federal, State and Local Government (Daniel, 2013).   
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2013a). The income from the oil revenue accounts for about 97% of revenue generated 
from total export earnings and the gross receipts from oil sales was $142,521million in 
2012 but 70.8% of Nigerians survived on less than $1 per day (OPEC, 2013; CBN, 2013; 
Amaeshi and Ogbechie, 2010). Consequently, it is suffering from the ‘Dutch disease’- 
over dependency on the oil sector, in which little or no attention is specifically ascribed 
to other promising sectors such as the agricultural and manufacturing, making 
diversification difficult (Karl, 2005, p.23). 
Subsequently, its vast income and growth do not translate into employment and 
emancipation from poverty because the sector propelling this income is capital and 
technology-intensive (Karl, 2005; Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010). Furthermore, much of 
the revenue has been squandered or syphoned into projects that do not contribute towards 
human capital development and sustainable growth (Amaeshi and Ogbechie, 2010). The 
head of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) claimed that the 
country lost as much as $380 billion to corruption and waste between 1960 and 1999 
(Albin-Lackey, 2007). 
The Niger Delta region is located on the southern coast of Nigeria. This region comprises 
the nine oil-producing State out of the 36 states in Nigeria. These states include Abia, 
Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and River State (Amunwa, 
2011; United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2006). It has a total land area 
of about 112,110sq. kilometres and 185 local government areas out of the 774 local 
government areas in Nigeria (Ebegbulem et al., 2013; NDDC, 2005). This region’s 
natural resource includes crude oil, viable deposits of hydrocarbon and gas reserves, 
medium to coarse unconsolidated sandstone, limestone, clay, silt, shale and peat 
(Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010). This region has been attractive to multinationals and other 
indigenous oil companies because of its natural resource endowment, particularly crude 
oil. There are 33 oil producing companies which include major MNCs such as Shell, 
ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, Eni, Total, Petrobras, ConocoPhillips, Allied Energy, 
Statoil, Afren, Addax Petroleum, Sahara Group, Equator Exploration, and other 
indigenous oil companies such as Oando, Allied Energy, Amni International, First 
Hydrocarbon. It was estimated that about 90% of the offshore oil exploratory and 
extractive facilities are located close to communities while the remaining are onshore 
facilities (Amunwa, 2011). 
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2.2. THE EMERGENCE OF THE ABUNDANT WEALTH, COULD WE ACCOUNT FOR IT? 
Crude oil was first discovered in 1956 by Shell D’Arcy at Oloibiri Bayelsa State in the 
Niger Delta (Nwilo and Badejo, 2012). Nigeria began commercial exploration of crude 
oil in 1958 and joined the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1971 
(OPEC, 2014a). The exploration of oil was extended to oil multinationals through four 
types of contractual frameworks through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC), on behalf of the Nigerian government. This contractual framework includes the 
joint operating agreement (JOA), production sharing contracts (PSC), service contracts 
(SC), and memorandum of understanding (MoU) (NAPIMS, 2014; Ebegbulem et al., 
2013). 
The Niger Delta is one of the world productive oil fields but despite this wealth beneath 
their feet, the region is considered the poorest relative to other regions in Nigeria and 
other oil-producing countries (World Bank, 1999; UNEP, 2011). (Karl 2005, p.21-22) 
argued that these remains a paradox or “resource curse” or “the devil’s excrement”. 
Despite the oil industry contribution to the growth and development of Nigeria, 
unsustainable oil exploratory and extractive activities have rendered this region one of 
the five worse petroleum damaged ecosystems in the world (Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 
2010). Kafada (2012b, p.19) claimed that “studies have shown that the quantity of oil 
spilled over 50 years was at least 9-13 million barrels, which is equivalent to 50 Exxon 
Valdez spills.” 
90% of the indigenous people in the Delta region depend on natural resources as their 
major source of income. However, oil spillage has led to the destruction of their agrarian 
land, sources of drinking and cooking water, mangrove forest, rivers and creeks resulting 
in the reduction of fish, crabs, periwinkles, molluscs and birds, and the complete 
relocation of some communities from their ancestral home (Christian-Aids, 2004; Ross, 
2013; UNDP, 2006). This region endowed and once renowned for its diverse ecosystem 
is now known as an ‘ecological wasteland’, where the indigene that depend on its 
ecosystem can rarely survive (Amunwa, 2011; Kadafa, 2012a, b). According to Christian 
Aid (2004), Amnesty International (2009) and UNEP (2011), oil spills are left untreated 
for months and any subsequent remediation is of poor quality resulting in the pollution of 
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water and land, which expose the indigenous people to unacceptable high risks of 
illnesses and diseases, and diminished biodiversity for the Delta. Despite government and 
corporate claims of social investments in the Delta the local communities have; limited 
access to electricity or clean water; hospital buildings where no patient had ever been 
treated; school buildings where no lesson had ever been taught; women’s centres where 
no meeting had ever been held; and a garri (cassava root) processing plant where no garri 
has been processed (Christian Aid, 2004; Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010). 
Despite the income generated from oil, the indigenes of the Delta believe that they have 
been deprived and highly marginalised by the Nigerian government and the oil 
corporations (Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010). They claimed the resources from this region 
had been used to develop and transform other regions within the country. Yet, the problem 
of abject poverty, deprivation and neglect within the Delta remains an obvious reality 
(Amnesty International, 2009; Amunwa, 2011; Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010). The level 
of poverty in this region was described as ‘poverty qua poverty’, a term coined by Ikejiaku 
(2009, p.16) to describe practical absolute poverty where people find it difficult to satisfy 
their basic needs, such as food, clothing, shelter and education beyond primary school 
level. 
 
2.3. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE OIL INDUSTRY 
The oil industry has had a significant presence for over fifty-seven years within the Delta. 
The oil and gas industry remains central to the Nigerian economy because it had 
contributed tremendously to the growth and development of the nation. The oil sector is 
controlled through joint venture agreements between the Federal Government represented 
by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and multinational corporations 
(NNPC, 2015). Currently, there are six joint venture agreements as illustrated below  
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Table 1: Nigerian Joint Venture Operations 
Sole Operator Joint Venture Agreement Area of operations 
   
Shell Petroleum 
Development 
Company (SPDC) 
NNPC 55%, 30% SPDC, Elf 
10% and Agip 5% 
Operates largely onshore on dry land or 
in the mangrove swamp 
   
Chevron, Nigeria  NNPC 60% and Chevron 40% Operates within the oil fields located in 
the Warri region west of the Niger River 
and as well as offshore in shallow waters 
   
Mobil, Nigeria  NNPC 60% and Mobil 40% Operates in shallow water of Akwa Ibom 
State of the Niger Delta region. 
   
Agip, Nigeria NNPC 60%; Agip 20% and 
Philips Petroleum 20% 
Operates from small onshore fields. 
   
Elf, Nigeria NNPC 60% and Elf 40% Operates onshore and coastal offshore 
   
Texaco, Nigeria NNPC 60%, Texaco 20% and 
Chevron 20% 
 
Operates from five offshore fields 
 
Source: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). 
 
The Federal government through the NNPC is required to share the cost of operations 
with the MNCs because of the joint venture agreements and the Federal government 
through the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR). The DPR is also required to 
provide an oversight role, act as a licencing and regulatory agency within the oil and 
mining industry (Amnesty International, 2011). Amnesty International (2009, p.42) 
claimed that   
“It is not uncommon for a government to be a partner in a business that it regulates. 
However, unless robust, independent regulatory and oversight mechanisms are in 
place, conflicts of interest can result in violations of human rights.” 
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2.4. GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY PRACTICES TO ACCOUNT FOR THE OIL 
WEALTH 
Exceptionally poor governance and accountability practices, and corruption have 
contributed to the endemic poverty within this region (Amnesty International, 2009; 
UNDP, 2006; Bob, 2005). The governance of the oil industry in the Niger Delta has been 
characterised as lacking transparency and accountability over basic information, such as 
the amount of oil revenues generated, and royalties collected by NNPC from the 
corporations. The governance of the oil sector is shrouded in secrecy, typified by private 
exchanges between corporations and government, with limited disclosures to the other 
stakeholder groups/ the public (BBC, 2014; Chigbo, 2013). This is part of the reasons for 
the conflict for resource control and agitations for infrastructures such as an effective 
means of transportation, road, clean water supply, housing, health care system, electricity 
supply, education, and other basic amenities of life, including diverse employment 
opportunities.  
Agitation by the indigenous people for a share of the oil wealth led to the rapid growth of 
civil society groups and social movements within this region (Amnesty International, 
2009; UNDP, 2006; Christian-Aid, 2004). Tactics employed by these civil society groups 
and the social movements to campaign for change included demonstrations and public 
campaigns, petitions, counter accounts, collaborating with international NGOs and 
supranational organisations, mobilization of communities, legal actions against the oil 
companies and occasional non-violent occupation of oil installations (Holligan, 2013; 
Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010). However, the government and the oil companies have 
often deployed armed security guard to protect the oil installations or to suppress the 
campaigns (Amunwa, 2011; Okonta and Douglas, 2003).  
In order to eradicate the conflicts and crisis within this region and ensure good 
governance, the federal government increased the financial allocation from the Federation 
Accounts for the Delta to 13% in 2000 from 3% in 1992 (Idemudia, 2010). Historically, 
it established developmental agencies such as the Niger Delta Development Board 
(NDDB) in 1960, the Presidential Task Force between 1979 and 1983, the Oil Mineral 
Areas Producing Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992, the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000, and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
(MDNA) in 2008 (MDNA, 2011). These agencies were established to serve as mediators 
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between the oil-producing communities and the oil companies; and were provided with 
substantial financial resources to resolve the problem of under-development and poverty 
within this region (Isumonah, 2015; Omotola, 2007). However, Omotola (2007) and 
Idemudia (2010) argued that although there had been a slightly positive impact on this 
region but they remain largely inadequate. These inadequacies are due to the incidence 
of corruption, misappropriation of funds and the inability to account for funds at their 
disposal, poor planning, limited capacity, and irregularity in the disbursement of funding, 
bottleneck bureaucracies, and limited communities’ involvement in the implementation 
of developmental projects. 
 
2.5. CSR, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ISSUE IN THE DELTA 
It has been claimed that CSR has not had a significant impact in the Niger Delta arena, 
especially in relation to sustainable engagement and environment, sustainable 
development and on human rights (Idemudia, 2007). CSR practices by corporations 
within this region have been a contentious issue among advocacy NGOs and other 
stakeholders because they consider CSR as purely voluntary. Corporations that claim to 
be CSR oriented are not obliged to respect human rights or to be socially and 
environmentally responsible (Emeseh and Songi, 2014). In the Delta, environmental 
pollution is considered a violation of human rights and this affects the fundamental rights 
of the indigenous people. Supranational organisations and advocacy NGOs have 
extensively documented corporate and government violations of human rights from oil 
spills and gas flaring in the Delta. For instance, environmental degradation affects the 
way of life of the people in relation to health and especially on the contamination of water 
used for cooking, drinking, washing and bathing (UNDP, 2006; UNEP, 2011). 
Furthermore, gas flaring and oil spill pollution contains volatile organic compounds such 
as benzene pollutants that affect the health of the indigenous people. They argued that gas 
flaring in the Delta is a reminder that the operators value profit maximisation at the 
expense of the indigenous people’s economic, environmental and health concerns 
(Amnesty International, 2009, 2014; Social Action, 2009a; UNDP, 2006; UNEP, 2011). 
Critics have claimed governance regimes in the Delta have not been effective in 
implementing environmental oversight function to control and restrain the activities of 
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corporations (Amnesty International, 2013, 2009; Amunwa, 2011; Steiner, 2010). For 
instance, it was alleged that regulators have not enforced the mandatory requirements for 
oil and gas corporations to prepare and publish environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
of their operations to evaluate the socio, economic and health impacts before their 
commencement. For example, in Gbemre vs Shell case 2001, the plaintiff claimed no EIA 
was conducted on the gas flaring operations (see chapter 7). The plaintiff alleged that 
Shell did not obtain a valid gas-flaring EIA certificate before the commencement of gas 
flaring operations within this community as required in the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Act 19923. They argued that this resulted in chronic respiratory diseases, 
reduced fish and crop production, acidic rain corroding rooftops and sources of water 
within this community. For instance, the Environmental Assessment Act 1992, 2(2-3) 
claimed  
“Where the extent, nature or location of a proposed project or activity is such that 
is likely to significantly affect the environment, its EIA shall be undertaken in 
accordance with the provisions of this decree. The criterion and procedure under 
this decree shall be used to determine whether an activity is likely to significantly 
affect the environment and is therefore subject to an EIA.” 
The lack of an adequate EIA may not only result in environmental pollution and 
degradation but could affect the cultural rights of the indigenous communities to their 
property. This court case established the basis on which environmental pollution could be 
linked to the right to life because gas flaring was declared unconstitutional and a breach 
of the fundamental right to life (Amnesty International, 2009; Steiner, 2010). Despite the 
court ruling that Shell should immediately stop gas flaring, the reverse is obvious in the 
Niger Delta till date (Social Action, 2009a; Steiner, 2010; UNEP, 2011).   
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The Environmental Impact Assessment Act (1992) was enacted to protect the Nigerian environment from pollution 
and degradation. However, whether this Act had been extensively implemented should be the focus for future research 
in the accountability literature on African countries. 
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2.6. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this chapter was to set the scene for this study by establishing the cause 
for the absence of an effective accountability, governance, engagement and sustainable 
development that resulted in human rights violations within the Niger Delta arena. This 
chapter briefly addressed what the paradox of plenty means in the Niger Delta context. 
This chapter could be seen as clarifying why the Delta was chosen as a case study.  
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CHAPTER 3:  MAPPING THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ACCOUNTING 
LITERATURE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
“Business enterprises may undertake other commitments or 
activities to support and promote human rights, which may 
contribute to the enjoyment of rights. But this does not offset 
a failure to respect human rights throughout their 
operations.” United Nations (2011, p.13). 
3.0. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to explore the relationship between human rights, 
accountability and corporations in particular how corporate responsibility for human 
rights could be established from the role of State and other business enterprises from the 
GPBHR and other international treaties. It explores how the BHRs discourse affects 
corporate accountability and sustainable development. 
 
3.1. THE NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS INFERRED FROM STATES’ DUTY AND 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY  
Human rights are described by Amnesty International (2005, p.8) as “those rights that 
people have as a consequence of being human. They do not need to be given, bought, 
earned or inherited. Human rights are those basic standards without which people cannot 
live in dignity.” This could be deduced as humans are intrinsically shaped by their human 
rights and without humans, there would not be the bearers of human rights (Paisey and 
Paisey, 2012). Paisey and Paisey (2012, p.20) argued that to hold a right implies that all 
right holders would treat and have a reciprocal duty to be treated in conformity with the 
universal standards of their human rights. They claimed the language of human rights 
stresses rights rather than obligations to enforce and ensure the human rights are protected 
and respected. This implies that individual’s human rights to live in dignity should not be 
squashed due to the absence of the duty or obligation to enforce and ensure human rights 
are not violated. However, within the context of this study, Ruggie (2008, 2011, 2013) 
could be argued to have delineated the obligation to enforce and ensure the protection and 
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respect of human rights on the State and the corporations. Ruggie4 (2008) identified the 
human rights responsibilities of the State, corporations and business enterprise using a 
framework titled “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human 
Rights.” He posited that corporations have a responsibility to respect human rights in their 
operations whether or not compelled by law to do so. Furthermore, Ruggie (2008) 
asserted that it is the duty of the State to protect and promote the rule of law in their 
jurisdiction. It is their primary duty to ensure equality before the law, prevent, investigate, 
punish and establish channels through which its citizen could seek (non)judicial redress 
when their human rights are violated. However, corporations are required to comply with 
the implementation of national laws along with the respect for the fundamental rights of 
the citizen in any jurisdiction it operates.  
States are required to protect the human rights of its citizens, especially from third parties 
including corporations and the other business enterprises by ensuring that the national 
laws are effective and implementable. Moreover, States are not required by international 
human rights law to regulate the MNCs’ extraterritorial activities. Hence, MNCs cannot 
be formally held accountable by the government where they are registered for 
extraterritorial human rights abuses perpetrated outside the States where they are 
registered, except where violations are committed by or against their nationals (Ruggie, 
2013; de Schutter, 2004). This is because MNCs enjoy impunity due to the foreign direct 
investment agreements with their host government, when they invest in other countries 
other than where they are registered (de Schutter, 2004; Sikka, 2011; Lauwo and 
Otusanya, 2014). Sikka (2011), and Lauwo and Otusanya (2014) recognised that 
corporations engaging in transnational activities, especially in the extractive industries 
through a subsidiary have been accused of complicity with their host government in the 
violation of human rights, especially in developing countries. For instance, see the case 
of Shell and Ogoni people in Nigeria, Kiobel vs Shell; Gbemre vs Shell; Bodo 
communities vs Shell; Coca-Cola and the villagers of Plachimada in India; British 
                                                          
4 In 2005, the United Nations (UN) Commission on Human Rights (now Human Rights Council) created a mandate 
that the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan should appoint an expert as his special representative to critically evaluate 
the issue of ‘human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises.’  Annan appointed Professor 
John Ruggie, who developed the ‘Protect Respect and Remedy’ framework in 2008. After extensive consultations with 
key stakeholders, he developed the ‘guiding principles on business and human rights.’ The GPBHRs comprises of 31 
principles. Principles 1-10 cover the ‘State duty to protect human rights’; Principles 11-24 contain ‘the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights’ and Principles 25-31 address the ‘access to remedy’ for victims or affected 
communities (Cassle and Ramasastry, 2015; United Nations, 2011). 
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American Tobacco and Kenyan farmers; SERAP and Coca-cola, NBC in Nigeria; Chad-
Cameroon oil and pipeline; Barrick Gold Mine in Tanzania (Frankental, 2015; Channel, 
2014; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Sikka, 2011; Christian Aid, 2004; Coale, 2002).  
This is because developing countries lack the capacity to control the activities of MNCs. 
Consequently, they approve foreign investment agreements with stringent stabilisation 
clauses that do not stipulate the penalty for human rights violation on its citizens and to 
its environment (Sikka, 2011). Furthermore, their inability to enforce their national laws 
could be because of weak governance and slack enforcement systems, corruption or 
simply due to a nested or clustered relationship between MNCs and the host government 
(Arnold, 2010; Boyle, 2012; Christian-Aid, 2004). Nevertheless, corporations are 
expected to play a vital role in sustainable development, but the States are required to its 
capacity to effectively enforce its human right and developmental regulations to ensure 
sustained development (Sikka, 2011; Lauwo et al., 2016). According to the Brundtland 
Report (1987, p.51) “economic growth always brings risk of environmental damage” but 
the onus is on the State or policymakers to ensure economic growths are guided by the 
notion of sustainability in the protection and respect of human rights, and sustainable 
development.   
Regardless of any legal licences issued by the State to the corporations to operate within 
its jurisdiction, they still require the social licence to operate from their immediate 
communities of operations in order for their extractive/operating licence to be recognised 
(Cassle and Ramasastry, 2015; Ruggie, 2013). Cassle and Ramasastry (2015, p.ES2) 
asserted that “while the business responsibility to respect human rights arises partly from 
existing law, it rests more generally on the basic expectation society has of business, 
which is part of a company’s social license to operate.” Therefore, to minimise the 
inability of the host government at enforcing its laws (governance gaps), the 
responsibility to respect human rights was imposed on the corporations. The corporations’ 
responsibilities to respect human rights was deemed to be achievable where the 
immediate local communities, where MNCs operate confer the social licence to operate 
on the corporations (Cassle and Ramasastry, 2015; Paisey and Paisey, 2012; Ruggie, 
2013). Paisey and Paisey (2012, p.23) argued that although human rights are vested on 
individuals, but they are possessed in relation to a community, and they are constructed 
and defined by the mutual responsibility and commitment of the community and the 
stakeholders they engage. The informal social licence to drive a mutual responsibility and 
commitment towards the respect of human rights could be established through a process 
25 
 
 
of inclusive stakeholders’ dialogue and CSR practices with the communities, and not 
through reporting their human rights practices as specified in the International Bill of 
Human Rights (IBHRs), Global Compact and the Guiding Principles5 (see McPhail and 
Adams, 2016).  Ruggie (2013, p.21-22) summarised and classify the human rights that 
should be protected and respected as non-labour rights and labour rights as shown in 
Table 2 below 
 
Table 2: Universally Recognised Rights under the International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR). 
Non-labour Rights Impacted Labour Rights impacted 
Right to life, 
liberty and 
security of the 
person. 
Right of peaceful 
assembly. 
Right to privacy. Freedom of 
association. 
Right to equal pay 
for equal work. 
Freedom from 
torture or cruel, 
inhumane or 
degrading 
treatment. 
Right to marry 
and form a 
family. 
Right to social 
security. 
Right to organize 
and participate in 
collective 
bargaining. 
Right to equality 
at work. 
Equal recognition 
and protection 
under the law. 
Freedom of 
thought, 
conscience and 
religion. 
Right to an 
adequate standard 
of living 
(including food, 
clothing and 
housing). 
Right to non-
discrimination. 
Right to just and 
favourable 
remuneration. 
Right to a fair 
trial. 
Right to hold 
opinions, 
freedom of 
information and 
expression. 
Right to physical 
and mental 
health; access to 
medical services. 
 
Abolition of 
slavery and 
forced labour. 
Right to a safe 
work 
environment. 
Right to self-
determination. 
Right to political 
life. 
Right to 
education. 
Abolition of child 
labour. 
Right to rest and 
leisure. 
Freedom of 
movement. 
Minority rights to 
culture, religious 
practice and 
language. 
Right to 
participate in 
cultural life, the 
benefits of 
scientific 
progress and 
protection of 
authorial 
interests. 
Right to work. Right to family 
life. 
Source: adapted from Ruggie (2013, p.19-22). 
                                                          
5 The UN Guiding Principles recognized the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The 
International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR) which comprises the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in identifying the human rights alleged to have been violated (Ruggie, 2013). 
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Cassle and Ramasastry (2015, p.ES2) asserted that the business responsibility for human 
rights is that ‘companies should not violate human rights’ and ‘should exercise due 
diligence to anticipate and avoid or mitigate adverse impacts on human rights arising from 
their activities.’ Corporations are expected to critically evaluate the positive and negative 
social, economic, political and the cultural impact of their potential and ongoing 
investment projects on human rights before embarking or continuing with them to avoid 
human rights abuse. Consequently, the social license to operate can be given through a 
wide-ranging inclusive stakeholders’ dialogue and engagement with the local 
communities in order to maximise the positive impact and minimise the negative impact 
of potential investment project on human rights and sustainable development.  
Arnold (2010) and others argued that it is essential for corporations to understand that the 
requirement of the United Nations (UN) GPBHRs to respect human rights on their 
operations is an ethical or moral responsibility that should be recognised and implemented 
in its daily activities. This moral responsibility argument highlights that human rights are 
ethical obligations that should be adhered to by corporations and other business 
enterprises. When such ethical or moral obligations to respect human rights are 
incorporated into its operations, this conscious effort to respect human rights could 
influence its reputation, the performance of its share price, profitability, and its daily 
management functions such as human resources, security of assets and personnel, 
community engagement and supply chains either nationally or globally (Cragg, 2012). 
Therefore, human rights of stakeholders are a necessary cost of doing business, which 
could influence the reputation and profitability of the business enterprise regardless of 
whether the duty to respect human rights are recognised and enforced by the host nation 
(Arnold, 2010).   
 
3.2. HOW THE BUSINESS HUMAN RIGHTS (BHR) DISCOURSE AFFECTS CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Researchers claimed the human rights discourse on corporate accountability should drive 
corporate governance and consequently influence corporate accountability practices and 
CSR activities (McPhail, 2013; Wettstein, 2012b; Muchlinski, 2012). Human rights 
discourse on corporations is a mechanism to hold corporations and other business 
enterprises to account for human rights violations across the globe. For instance, research 
has revealed the endemic involvement of MNCs on human right violations, especially 
among the indigenous communities where they operate (Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; 
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Amnesty International, 2014; Sikka, 2011; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016; Christian Aid, 
2004). MNCs are often criticised by being held accountable for human right violations 
by local communities and human rights advocacy NGOs, who often encapsulate their 
criticisms on moral grounds. This is because human rights advocacy NGOs, which could 
appeal to other stakeholders’ moral perspectives often have the capability to damage the 
reputation of the MNCs (Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Frankental, 2011; 
Joutsenvirta, 2011).  
Moreover, access to remedy for human rights violation was argued to be absent or limited 
for citizens whose rights had been violated by corporate and governance practices 
particularly in developing countries, which the Ruggie’s framework strived to address 
through the GPBHRs. The GPBHRs attempts to bridge ‘governance gaps’ by offering 
legal remedies for victims of human rights violations and to instil a moral duty to respect 
human rights on MNCs operating extraterritorially regardless of the (in)effectiveness of 
the regulatory frameworks (Fasterling and Demuijnck, 2013). Nevertheless, the question 
of whether this framework would be adequate or whether a legal global binding treaty to 
protect and respect human rights by States, MNCs and other business enterprise is 
required is still being discussed at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC)6 
(Cassle, 2015; Shetty, 2015; Blackburn, 2017). A binding treaty could enable victims of 
human rights violations where the State could not hold the corporations accountable for 
the violation of human rights conducted on its territory to its citizens, to seek judicial 
                                                          
6 The business and human rights accountability is not mandatory, and corporations could choose not to respect human 
rights. At the 26th session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, two resolutions were adopted. The first 
resolution was presented by Ecuador and South Africa government to ‘establish an open-ended intergovernmental 
working group with the mandate to elaborate an international legally binding instrument on MNCs and Other Business 
Enterprises with respect to human rights.’ While the second resolution was a request submitted by Norway and 
supported by other countries that the UN Working Group should ‘prepare a report considering, among other things, the 
benefits and limitations of legally binding instruments’ (BHRRC, n.d.). Consequently, the first UN Intergovernmental 
Working Group convened on the 6-10 July 2015 at Geneva to critically discuss the BHR binding treaty (BHRRC, 
2015). Where the States, the civil society organisations and the corporations unanimously accept this latter deliberation; 
this could result in the establishment of an international court where victims or affected communities could seek a 
binding and effective judicial remedy against States and corporations outside their jurisdiction (Blackburn, 2017). 
Furthermore, the adoption of a legally binding treaty could result in companies’ executives being prosecuted for human 
rights violations at an international criminal court (Cassle and Ramasastry, 2015).  
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remedy under the international human rights law across the globe, especially in the home 
state of the corporations (Blackburn, 2017; Ramasastry, 2015; Muchlinski, 2012). 
However, one could assert that corporate accountability was to shareholders according to 
the Milton Friedman’s school of thought but accounting and sustainability, business 
ethics, law and other literature have argued that corporate accountability should be to 
other stakeholders (Muchlinski, 2012; Gray, 1992; Chen, 1975). These stakeholders have 
the socioeconomic responsibility to demand accountability from corporations (McBarnet, 
2004) including through CSR reports or other environmental disclosures (EDs). Research 
has proven that some corporations accept CSR or EDs not because they want to be 
responsible and responsive to societal and stakeholders’ demand for accountability, rather 
they embark on CSR or EDs to recreate and reinforce their corporate reputation, manage 
stakeholders’ perception and legitimize their business activities (Farache and Perks, 2010; 
Boiral, 2013; Cho et al., 2015). Furthermore, as CSR does not have a defined systematic, 
democratic, and legislative framework and is a voluntary practice, corporations have the 
liberty and discretion to define CSR in their own interest (Gray et al., 1995a; Cho et al., 
2015). However, because of the potential human rights impact of MNCs’ operations 
across the globe on its stakeholders, there is a shift in corporate disclosures from 
socioeconomic reporting to/and include human rights reporting (McPhail and Adams, 
2016). Nevertheless, corporate disclosure and CSRs’ practices without a critical approach 
to avoid human rights violations would not address the negative impact of such violations 
on the citizens whose rights have been violated.   
The human rights violations by corporations on the indigenous people, where they operate 
could be material to their going concern. The abuse of rights could result in legal and 
economic consequences for all stakeholders, especially the shareholders. These 
consequences could occur where due diligence procedures7 were not adopted to control 
the human rights violation risk from an investment project in the form of conducting 
adequate EIAs before the commencement of their operations, or while conducting their 
business (Fasterling and Demuijnck, 2013). According to Taylor (2011, p.27), the due 
                                                          
7 The due diligence procedures are often conducted to reduce ‘human rights violation risk, commercial risk and 
sustainable development risk’ stemming from the investment contracts to the corporation and on its stakeholders 
(Fasterling and Demuijnck, 2013; Muchlinksi, 2012; United Nations, 2011). An effective stakeholders’ driven due 
diligence procedure would help mitigate potential and long-term human rights risk, commercial risk and sustainable 
development risk (Fasterling and Demuijnck, 2013; Taylor et al., 2009). 
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diligence procedures “for human rights risk are intended to provide businesses with the 
empirical information necessary to reconcile the market-driven demands of doing 
business with the social expectations driving the demand for respecting human rights.” 
The human rights due diligence assessment according to the Ruggie’s Framework simply 
centres on the corporate policies and practices surrounding its CSR, also geared at driving 
sustainable development through their respect for human rights. This would enable 
management to effectively collect and analyse information for sustainable decision-
making on how to respect human rights and represent a socially responsible business 
enterprise. This adherence to the due diligence procedure could bridge ‘governance and 
accountability gaps’ by changing the way regulatory institutions and corporations define 
its fiduciary duties by incorporating other stakeholders into its governance and 
accountability systems (Lindsay et al., 2013; Muchlinski, 2012). Where human rights, 
ethical investment and sustainable development objectives are incorporated into 
accounting information systems to bridge the ‘accountability and governance gaps’ and 
to ensure the effectiveness of the due diligence procedures, it could create the platform 
for a stakeholders’ dialogic engagement. 
Corporate accountability for human rights was not initially linked to the duty of the State 
to protect the human rights of its citizens under international human rights laws, for 
instance, the UDHR, 1948 (Muchlinski, 2012). Nevertheless, because of the shift in the 
concept of human rights through the UN Global Compact and Ruggie’s framework, the 
moral responsibility to respect human rights and ensure adequate procedures to avoid 
human rights violations was indirectly conferred on corporations. Consequently, they are 
required to adopt and interpret the UDHR and domestic laws in the manner that 
distinctively relate to their business sphere of influence (Chandler, 2009). Secondly, the 
moral duty to respect human rights exists independently of the national regulations 
protecting human rights (United Nations, 2011; Arnold, 2010). Thirdly, corporate duty to 
respect human rights by avoiding human rights risk is not a legal requirement under 
international human rights laws but could be seen as informing the legal form of the 
corporation and the need to define its legitimate functional limits to minimise the 
commercial risk that could emerge from human rights risk (Muchlinski, 2012). Although, 
corporate responsibility towards the achievement of the UDHR was not specified but the 
duty of care for human rights are conferred on ‘every individual and organ of society’ 
(United Nations, 1948) [emphasis added]. This is an indicator that corporate 
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responsibility for wealth maximisation is much more complex than its economic model 
but extend towards a stakeholder-based model that transcends its corporate 
governance/laws. Such responsibility to prevent human rights risk could be envisaged as 
being imposed on the corporations and its governance mechanism (Muchlinski, 2012).  
Hence, the author postulates that the corporation could be considered is a distinct organ 
of the society, without which the State’s social wealth creation and economic 
maximisation benefits towards its citizens might not be achievable. Furthermore, a strict 
adherence to human rights as specified in the International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR) 
is a way of protecting the vulnerable indigenous people and communities from human 
rights violation by ‘every individual and organs of the society.’ However, Muchlinski 
(2012, p.146) claimed that “corporate responsibility to respect human rights is based on 
a moral duty and not merely on an instrumental political or legal duty.” According to him, 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights by adopting an adequate due diligence 
procedure is a moral or ethical duty of care to prevent or minimise human rights risk and 
it should flow through its corporate culture and structures.  
According to the United Nations (2011, p.18) “human rights due diligence can be 
included within broader enterprise risk management systems, provided that it goes 
beyond simply identifying and managing material risks to the company itself, to include 
risks to rights-holders.” A conceptual approach to human rights risk management would 
merely be a step in the right direction but an extensive proactive and inclusive 
stakeholders’ dialogue and engagement would ensure the actualisation of the human 
rights risk accountability policies (Wettstein, 2012; United Nations, 2011). Corporations 
should be willing to account for human rights against a specified accountability 
benchmark (see Table 2, p.25) after stakeholders’ dialogue and engagement. According 
to Frankental and House (2000, p.11) “human rights protection is the business of business, 
just as it is of every individual and organ of society. It is a matter of upholding 
international standards, supporting corporate reputation and licence to operate managing 
risk, and contributing to a stable investment climate based on equitable and sustainable 
development.”  
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3.3. HUMAN RIGHTS, ACCOUNTABILITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  
An increasing awareness of the human rights discourse is gradually creeping into CSR, 
business ethics and the critical accounting literature (see Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; 
Emeseh and Songi, 2014; Hazelton, 2013; McPhail, 2013; Wettstein, 2012b; McPhail and 
McKernan, 2011; Wild and Mares, 2011; Gallhofer et al., 2011; Chetty, 2011; Frankental, 
2011; Sikka, 2011; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016; McPhail and Ferguson, 2016; McPhail et 
al., 2016; McPhail and Adams, 2016; Li and McKernan, 2016; Posner, 2016; Sinkovics 
et al., 2016; O’Brien and Dhanarajan, 2016; Islam and McPhail, 2011; Gray and Gray, 
2011; Cooper et al., 2011; Whelan et al., 2009). Cooper et al., (2011) contend that the 
human rights discourse has been considered “in many guises” in the corporate social 
accounting and accountability literature but Gallhofer et al., (2011 p.772) argued that 
“this area is under-researched” in the accounting literature because it has not captured the 
diverse, conflicting perspectives of repressed interests or other stakeholders’ groups. A 
discourse on human rights is envisaged as representing the voices and rights of other 
stakeholders that had been captured by the shareholders’ wealth maximisation regardless 
of the acclaimed benefit of the CSR activities of the corporation to the other stakeholders 
(Cooper et al., 2011; McPhail and Ferguson, 2016).  
The emergence of the human rights discourse in the accounting research literature is 
justified because corporate profit maximisation objectives often have negative impacts on 
the human rights of the other stakeholders, who are not necessarily the shareholders 
(Ruggie, 2013; Gray and Gray, 2011; Islam and McPhail, 2011; Siddiqui and Uddin, 
2016). This argument suggests that CSR practices and reporting have played a green-
washing role in favour of the powerful stakeholders at the expense of implementing 
regulations (Spence, 2009; Gallhofer et al., 2011). For instance, Gallhofer et al., (2011, 
p.773) posited that “corporations have embraced various dimensions of CSR in strategies 
of regulatory capture so as to displace or avoid alternative, tougher, regulations” and thus 
seeing the regulators as an issue to be “managed” (Spence, 2009). This was intensified 
by weak governance system to hold corporations accountable for the violations of human 
rights (Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Belal et al., 2015; Sikka, 2011; Whelan et al., 2009). 
For instance, Siddiqui and Uddin (2016) examined the state-business connection’s 
response to human rights violations of workers in the ready-made garments (RMG) 
factories in Bangladesh despite the ratification of the UN guiding principles by the 
government and the corporations. They discovered that there was a gap between the 
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ratification, respect and prevention of human rights abuse of RMG’s workers due to the 
dysfunctional democratic system resulting in poor governance and accountability 
frameworks which led to an autocratic governance structure in Bangladesh. Their findings 
provided evidence to support Lauwo and Otusanya (2014) and Sikka (2011) studies that 
identified problematic state-corporate accountability relationships emerging from 
stabilization clauses in foreign direct investments agreement on the human rights of 
indigenous people in developing countries. These studies revealed that there were 
tensions in the implementation of the human rights frameworks between the corporations 
and States for the benefits of the local people where MNOCs operated in developing 
countries. They argued that this nexus created accountability and governance gaps. 
Whilst the human rights discourse has significant implications for corporate responsibility 
and accountability, it also has significant implications for sustainable development 
(Bebbington and Larrinaga, 2014; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; McPhail and 
Ferguson, 2016; Unerman and Chapman, 2014). Therefore, it would be difficult to 
consider the responsibility of the State or corporate accountability for human rights 
without acknowledging the demand for sustainable development. This is because a 
consistent drive for sustainable environment and development could be a measure 
through which the human rights responsibility discourse on States and corporations could 
be explored. For instance, the Brundtland Report (1987, p.54) asserted that sustainable 
development is the “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Consequently, 
human rights protection is an underlying concept of sustainable development because it 
defines the wellbeing of the present and future generations (Grubnic et al., 2015; Weiss, 
1992). For instance, the environment does not exist as a sphere without the interactions 
of human existence and activities, likewise human cannot exist without their 
environment. Therefore, safe and healthy environment is a pre-condition for the survival 
of humanity, and without a healthy environment; there would be no social, economic and 
environmental development, which would subsequently affect sustainable development. 
Environmental pollution or unsustainable practices would not only be a violation of 
human rights but the intersection between environmental pollution or unsustainable 
practices and human rights violation would be an enormous hindrance to sustainable 
development. For instance, an environmental pollution resulting from gas flaring or oil 
spill, which resulted in the inability of the indigenous people to exist and develops their 
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means of livelihood would not only result in human rights violation but would hinder 
sustainable development. The inability of humanity to meet its current need from its 
environment is a violation of their human rights as highlighted in the UDHR (1948), 
which could subsequently result in poverty and thereby jeopardize the future generations’ 
ability to meet their needs (Weiss, 1992). 
According to Unerman and Chapman (2014, p.387), accounting for sustainable 
development requires the expansion of the traditional or economically oriented 
management and financial accounting systems to manage the direct or indirect 
interactions or impacts between an organisation, the society in which it operates and the 
natural environment. These impacts could be positive or negative and could affect the 
corporations’ going concern objectives and the social, economic and environmental 
interactions among its stakeholders. This could affect the economic and power structures 
within a neoliberal system which inflicts unsustainable and human rights harm on the 
indigenous people and communities. Understanding how human rights issues could 
influence the outcome of organisational policies and practices is a paramount requirement 
in ensuring an effective stakeholders’ engagement, sustainable development, CSR, 
human rights and reputational risk management (McPhail, 2013; McPhail and McKernan, 
2011; Gray and Gray, 2011; Sikka, 2011).  
The notion of human rights is a significant discourse for not only internal control systems 
but form an integral part of the external human rights monitoring and accountability 
mechanisms on affected individuals, local communities and future generations (Chetty, 
2011; Cooper et al., 2011; Frankental, 2011). Consequently, accountability is paramount 
in preventing human rights violations because it could establish the frameworks through 
which stakeholders ensure due diligence procedures are efficiently and effectively 
operationalized. In as much as the guiding principles define the role of the State, 
corporations and other business enterprises on human rights, accountability would ensure 
that the human rights agenda is adopted and geared towards sustainable development 
(McPhail and Ferguson, 2016; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
3.4. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this chapter was to explore the interplay between human rights and 
accountability. This chapter explored how human rights was inferred from the role of the 
State, corporate and other business enterprises following the GPBHRs; and other 
international treaties. In addition, it explored how human rights discourse affects 
corporate accountability. It evaluated the relationship between human rights, 
accountability, and sustainable development. The next chapter critically discussed what 
dialogic accountability and engagement theory is and is not, the implication of dialogic 
accountability for counter accounting and human rights.  
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CHAPTER 4: MAPPING THE PERSPECTIVE OF ACCOUNTING LITERATURE: 
ACCOUNTING AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
4.0.  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter explores accountability as an underlying element of counter accounts in the 
advancement of human rights and sustainable development. It explores the historical 
development of counter accounts and human rights, and how they are problematizing 
tools that give voices to the marginalised. It captures the criticisms of counter accounts 
and the typologies of counter accounts. This chapter connects counter accounting with 
dialogic accountability concept. This chapter extends the dialogic accountability and 
engagement theory to dynamic conflict arena framework, which was further incorporated 
into the lifecycle and pathways to conflict resolution framework to identify the 
methodology and methods adopted in this study to address the research questions. 
 
4.1. CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS  
4.1.1. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACCOUNTING: RELATIONAL FRAMEWORK  
Bovens (2007, p.448) claimed that “accountability is one of those golden concepts” that 
is used in political discourse because it conveys an image of transparency and 
trustworthiness. He claimed that it is difficult to expand on the notion of accountability 
because it is one of those evocative powerful instruments that can be used “to patch up 
rambling argument, to evoke an image of trustworthiness, fidelity and justice, or to hold 
critics at bay” (p.449). It could be distinctively seen as an impression management tool 
adopted by corporations and policymakers to create an atmosphere of transparency and 
trustworthiness. It is a broad concept that embraces other distinct concepts such as 
transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsiveness, responsibility, and integrity 
(Bovens, 2010, 2007).  
However, Koppell (2005) argued that organisations could endeavour to be accountable in 
the wrong sense while attempting to be accountable to meeting conflicting expectations 
that are impaired or not geared to a distinct objective. He labelled this action as ‘multiple 
accountabilities disorder’ (MAD) (p.95). His definition of accountability was developed 
to challenge an organisation or corporation that attempts to be accountable to multiple 
conflicting expectations. He asserted that any corporation suffering from MAD swings 
between behaviours that are compatible with the conflicting notion of accountability. 
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MAD occurs when a corporation endeavours to comply with the directives of its 
principals and concomitantly attempt to yield to the demands of its clients. In the end, 
such corporations would struggle to meet these conflicting demands. According to 
Koppell (2005), accountability was distinctively linked to the nature of government, its 
role in setting policies, and the relationship between the elected government 
representatives and the civil servants in implementing its policies. Furthermore, 
accountability could be envisaged in another context as the relationship between actors. 
Accountability by an organisation or government to multiple parties represent a shift in 
responsibility from its traditional stewardship to a more dynamic accountability 
mechanism.  
However, the responsibilities placed on corporations to conduct their business ethically 
resulted in the growth of regulated and non-regulated constraints on their corporate 
powers, which tentatively drive corporations to account to a large spectrum of 
stakeholders (McPhail, 2013; Benston, 1982; Cho et al., 2010; Deegan and Islam, 2014; 
Messner, 2009; Robert, 2009; Ogden and Clarke, 2005; Tregidga and Milne, 2006). One 
obligatory means through which corporations give accounts of their stewardship is 
through the publication of financial statements and other reports to their stakeholders 
(Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006). This accountability is often due to market regulations, 
profit and share price wealth maximisation and if they fail to publish such accounts to 
their stakeholders, they might be sanctioned for violating the corporate laws governing 
their activities. Nevertheless, corporations do not and are not expected to operate in a 
vacuum. There are societies such as the consumers, employees, communities, government 
and other stakeholders such as the media, trade unions, advocacy and developmental 
NGOs that give corporations their identities. Sometimes, these corporations do operate in 
manners that cause significant damage to the ecosystem and the societies (Apostol, 2015; 
Bebbington et al., 2014; Adams, 2004). However, how effective are the financial reports 
in providing analytical and descriptive accounts of the social, environmental and 
economic stance of the corporations, where the ecosystem and the societies had been 
extensively damaged because of their activities?  
There is no mistaken fact that there had been moral and ethical fallout on how 
transnational corporations operate, especially in developing countries (Belal et al., 2015; 
Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Sikka, 2011; Amunwa, 2011; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016; 
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Gallhofer et al., 2011; Amnesty International, 2009). The paradox of corporations 
operating across borders and being subjected to the national laws of their subsidiary 
companies in developing countries call for a critical evaluation of the notion of 
accountability. This is partly because subsidiary companies are argued to be a legal entity 
and distinct from their parent companies. However, where the national laws of the 
subsidiary companies are ineffective, how should accountability be constructed and 
discharged (McPhail, 2013; Frankental, 2011; de Schutter, 2016; Lopez and Shea, 2016). 
Despite the confusion about what laws should apply to corporations operating across 
borders, the pragmatic requirement for corporations to give account and ‘whom’, ‘when’, 
‘where’ and ‘how’ to be held accountable cannot be overemphasized. This is because it 
is expedient for stakeholders to demand accountability from corporations without 
acknowledging the constraints inherent in requesting for accounts, even when there are 
no obvious fiduciary obligations on corporations to be accountable (Messner, 2009; Belal 
and Owen, 2007; Cooper and Owen, 2007). 
There is no precise definition of Accountability because it evolves in relation to social, 
political and cultural context (Shenkin and Coulson, 2007; Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010) 
and its definition ranges from the provision of financial reports to managerial, political, 
public, professional and personal reports (Sinclair, 1995; Pupovac and Moerman, 2017; 
Mulgan, 2000).  Gray et al. (2014a, p.50) defined accountability as “the duty to provide 
an account or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible.” They claimed 
accountability has two crucial components which occur because of the relationship 
between two or more parties and the discharge mechanism is defined by the social, 
cultural, political and moral context in which the relationship is exhibited (Gray et al. 
2014a, p.50). For instance, there is a form of accountability that requires the publication 
of financial reports which reveals the financial position and performance of an 
organisation (Messner, 2009). Accountability, when viewed through this accounting lens 
is a normative art of collecting, recording, classifying, summarizing, communicating and 
interpreting transactions and events with a monetary value (Atrill and McLaney, 2011; 
Young, 2006). This accounting information assists the internal users of financial and 
management accounting reports to measure and control the activities and the decision-
making processes of the organisation on a daily basis (Bebbington and Thomson, 2007). 
For instance, accounting information is used to determine the cost and price of a product, 
to create budgets, to measure the operational efficiency of a production line against 
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another, to identify operational reward, performance and motivational mechanisms; and 
to evaluate the viability of a capital investment projects. Also, this information is required 
by the shareholders, other lenders of fund and the regulators to measure the profitability 
and performance of an organisation to make feasible decisions.  
However, Shearer (2002; p.570) argued that “it is necessary to broaden the scope of 
accounting to reflect the moral responsibility that is owed by the economic agents to 
parties other than the entity’s owners.” This implies that there are other forms of 
accountability, which the corporations, the State or an economic agent owed other 
stakeholders, who are not necessarily the shareholders. This form of accountability is 
evaluated on their ethical and moral stance (Bebbington et al., 2007; Frankental, 2011; 
Parker, 2014; Adams, 2004). For instance, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006, p.349) asserted 
that this form of ‘accountability’ is envisioned as a ‘vital mechanism of control to give 
visibility to previously invisible’ unethical activities, thereby providing stakeholders with 
accountable information to demand, challenge and react to the unethical actions of the 
corporations and government. Messner (2009) claimed that this form of accountability 
requires the accountor to discursively explain and take responsibility for their behaviour 
beyond the discharge of their stewardship function. This form of accountability has the 
emancipatory capacity to drive change within societies (Gray, 2013; Gallhofer and 
Haslam, 2003; Brown, 2009; Gray et al., 2014b; Roberts, 1996). Therefore, ‘to account’ 
and ‘to discharge accountabilities’ means different things to different people because of 
the emancipatory, contextual and regulatory requirement in accounting and 
accountability. 
There is a distinction between accountability and accounting, although both revolve 
around the dissemination of information for decision-making. However, what is common 
to all the dimensions of accountability is the ‘relational right of accountability’ (Gray et 
al., 2014a; Brown, 2009; Bovens, 2007; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006; Koppell, 2005; 
Dubnick, 2002). This relational right of accountability enable stakeholders such as 
individuals, groups and civil society groups, who had been adversely affected by the 
(un)ethical activities of corporations to demand accountability geared toward an 
organisational and transformative change. The relational right of accountability enable 
stakeholders to communicate with a significant sense of purpose geared towards 
addressing a particular phenomenon. For instance, accountability enables you to evaluate 
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the governance systems in relation to human rights, sustainable development and 
stakeholders’ dialogue and engagement. The relational right of accountability would 
enable stakeholders to critically explore the extent with which the governance systems 
influence and reinforce the accountability systems (vice versa) because a notable change 
in the governance mechanism might result in a momentous change in the accountability 
mechanisms (vice versa) for human rights and sustainable development.  
When the relational right of accountability are strongly established, it drives Bovens’ 
(2007) concept of ‘narrow accountability’, Koppell’s (2005) concept of ‘multiple 
accountabilities disorder’ and Dubnick’s (2002) concept of ‘social transactions to 
operate’ and Bebbington et al. (2007); Brown and Dillard (2015) notion of ‘dialogic 
accountability and engagement’8. Relational right of accountability often result in counter 
accounting and stakeholders dialogue with the main aim of providing stakeholders with 
a dialogic voice within an arena to drive organisational and policy change (Blackburn et 
al., 2014; Brown, 2009; Dey et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2015; Gray et al., 2014b). 
 
4.1.2. DIALOGIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENGAGEMENT THEORY 
4.1.2.1 DIALOGIC THEORY OF ACTION(S): AN EMANCIPATORY FRAMEWORK IN AN 
UNSUSTAINABLE ARENA 
Gray et al., (2014a) and Everett (2004) stipulated that accounting help construct the world 
because it is a language of engagement that shape realities and it could be used as a means 
of oppressive domination resulting in the exclusion of the others. How we frame and 
evaluate the world is constructed by nature, economic and everyday realities of events or 
engagement. For instance, management and the powerful stakeholders use accounting 
information and reports (which is a language of engagement or accountability) to reflect 
the realities of feasible investment projects but this perspective of the world ignores other 
stakeholders; and do not take account of externalities surrounding ethical investment, 
multiplicity of socio-economic-political perspectives, human right issues affecting the 
other stakeholders and community resource management such as environmental 
degradation, pollution, carbon footprints (Gray, 2002; Benston, 1982; Gallhofer and 
Haslam, 2003). Where externalities such as ethical issues are incorporated into this 
                                                          
8 It is pertinent to establish that the author often refers to relational accountability or dialogic accountability perspective 
interchangeably in this study. They refer to the right to dialogically demand and receive accounts of conducts from 
stakeholders within the arena. 
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accountability discourse, it helps reconstruct our perception of everyday realities 
(Blackburn et al., 2014; Bebbington et al., 2007; Vinnari and Dillard, 2016). The 
incorporation of these externalities, which should capture issues affecting the other 
stakeholders into accounting could create a dialogic language of engagement that 
recognises the transformative role of social and power relations among stakeholders, and 
that would enable stakeholders to understand their everyday realities. This is because the 
dialogic language of accounting or engagement is envisaged to have a moral and ethical 
character that transform social and power relations into discourses that considers the 
externalities effect on the other stakeholders (Schweiker, 1993; Shearer, 2002; Adams, 
2004; Killian, 2010; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007; Messner, 2009; Gray, 1995a). 
The dialogic accountability or engagement theory was elucidated by Thomson and 
Bebbington, (2004, 2005) and Bebbington et al., (2007) as a way of improving or 
ensuring authentic engagements to facilitate an emancipatory and sustainable social and 
environmental transformations. For instance, Bebbington et al., (2007, p.357) argued that 
the dialogic approach to accountability and engagement was envisaged as a framework 
that would address or minimise the negative consequences of globalisation resulting in 
catastrophic social and environmental harm, particularly changes in corporate and 
governance powers and how these powers are exercised to violate human, social, cultural, 
economic, political and environmental rights of the other stakeholders. The shift in the 
power structure to corporations, particularly because of globalisation and economic neo-
liberalisation (see chapter 3) resulted in increased economic growth and environmental 
damage to the other stakeholders. This shift in power relations was argued to have 
diminished the ability of government to effectively govern and regulate the corporations 
because corporations have been accused of complicity with the government on the 
destruction of the ecosystems and in the violation of human rights (see chapter 3, 6, 7 
and 8) (Bakan, 2005; Rowell et al., 2005; McPhail and Ferguson, 2016; Ramasastry, 
2015). For instance, Gouldson and Bebbington (2007, p.7) argued that the shift in power 
relations on the role of the State implies that the State becomes the “facilitator or the 
enabler state” with a view to creating economic conditions that enabled the corporations 
to directly govern or regulate its economic activities while the State has limited regulatory 
space to regulate.  
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On this premise, Bebbington et al. (2007, p.357) argued that “it is within this context that 
there is an increasing interest in how corporations and other social institutions are held 
accountable for their actions and how this process may lead to their actions being less 
socially and environmentally damaging. This concern is especially focused on 
accountability to other social groups, not governments and their agencies.” Bebbington 
et al., (2007, p.357) draw on the philosophical argument of dialogic theorists such as 
Freire (1970, 1994, 1998), Bakhtin (1981, 1984) and Giroux (1983, 1994), Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985), Mouck (1995), Mouffe (2000, 2005) and others, to argue for a dialogic 
engagement that recognise the language of accountability, governance and engagement 
as a demystifying or mediating power relations that denounce oppressive hegemony for 
social and transformative changes (Everett, 2004; Gallhofer et al., 2015). They were able 
to establish the potential of dialogic processes in transforming accountability relations 
through the establishment of a fluid relationship between the corporations, governance 
and the other stakeholders having “voice and agency” to drive the respect of human rights 
and sustainable environment (Bebbington et al., 2007, p.358; Contrafatto et al., 2015; 
McPhail and Ferguson, 2016). Bebbington et al., (2007) envisaged that the adoption of 
dialogic processes as enshrined in the dialogic theorists discourse would enable the other 
stakeholders to have significant voice and power of agency to receive and give accounts 
of conducts, with the aspiration that the corporations or governance regimes would be 
able to learn from the other stakeholders with or without a direct agency relationships to 
influence accountability, governance and engagement for human rights and sustainable 
environment (Brown and Dillard, 2013a, b; Blackburn et al., 2014; Killian, 2010; Gray 
et al., 1995; Vinnari and Dillard, 2016). However, Gouldson and Bebbington (2007) 
argued that the emancipatory potential of the dialogic processes could be managerially 
and institutionally captured by the corporations or the powerful stakeholders to legitimize 
their wealth maximisation objective, thereby limiting the potential of the dialogic 
processes to facilitate sustainable and transformative reforms that would protect the 
ecosystem and the wellbeing of the other stakeholders (Owen et al., 2000, 2001; 
O’Dwyer, 2003; Baker, 2010). The capturing of the dialogic processes influences the 
dynamics of the account(ability), “inclusive” engagement and the role of the governance 
regime for the advancement of the fundamental rights and sustainable developmental 
need of the marginalised stakeholders’ group (McPhail and Ferguson, 2016; Siddiqui and 
Uddin, 2016). This is because the corporations and the governance regimes might portray 
their engagement activities with the other stakeholders as being socially and 
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environmentally responsible while promoting their legitimate objective of wealth 
maximisation. 
In addition, attracting the interest of all the stakeholders including the oppressed group in 
a transformative dialogue could be difficult because stakeholders often identify with the 
groups that would promote their cause or their state of freedom against the communal 
pursuit of freedom or accountability and engagement (Freire, 2002; Bebbington et al., 
2007). This could be envisaged as the drivers of the managerially or institutionally 
captured phenomenon in this case study (see chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9) where the corporations 
adopt self-governing structures to prevent reputational risk by appearing to be socially 
responsible and responsive in securing the social license of the other stakeholders despite 
promoting their legitimate activities (Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007; Baker, 2010; 
O’Dwyer, 2003). Hence, the ability of all the stakeholders to collectively engage becomes 
the deciding criteria for the emancipatory potential of dialogic actions in advancing 
human rights and sustainable development within controversial arenas (Georgakopoulos 
and Thomson, 2008; Killian, 2010; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014). Nevertheless, 
Bebbington et al., (2007, p.360) argued that the dialogic approach is “often seen as more 
legitimate because the involvement of various publics creates the possibility of the 
inclusion of previously marginalized groups.” This creates a state of consciousness or 
what Freire (2002)9 termed “conscientization” implying a state of awareness (education) 
that enable stakeholders to reflect and critique their dehumanizing everyday realities in 
exchange for the emancipatory practice of freedom through transformative dialogic 
actions. This creats a platform for shared responsibility and ownership (co-ownership) of 
the accountability and governance gaps that affect the ability of the stakeholders to live 
sustainably, thereby making them “co-authors in their collective actions” (Bebbington et 
al. 2007, p.364; Brown et al., 2015; Contrafatto et al., 2015).  
Bebbington et al. (2007) argued that conscientization involves exposing and reflecting on 
the invisible or silent factors that impinge on the human rights of specific groups. 
Conscientization involves re-examining and problematizing the limiting situations in 
light of new feasibility or understanding, representing and re-narrating the existing 
                                                          
9 The author absolutely agrees with Contrafatto et al., (2015, p.119) that it is not possible to summarize the full richness 
and complex nuances of Freire’s dialogic theory in a single paper and it is not even feasible in a single thesis.  
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limiting situations by allowing the co-evaluation of the perception of previous 
conceptualisations in identifying possible dialogical and transformative outcomes that 
would improve the lived lives of the oppressed stakeholders’ group. Conscientization 
opens up and broadens out the horizon of stakeholders’ perception by enabling them to 
perceive reality differently and through this mechanism, they discover the dialectic 
relations between their prior and transformed realities (Freire, 2002, p.115). For instance, 
Freire (2002, p.88) argued that  
“Dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name 
the world. Hence, dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the 
world and those who do not wish this naming-between those who deny others the 
right to speak their world and those whose right to speak has been denied them. 
Those who have been denied their primordial right to speak their world must first 
reclaim this right and prevent the continuation of the dehumanizing aggression.” 
Thus, Thomson and Bebbington (2005, p.509) building on lllich (1971) and Freire’s work 
argued that conscientization/education creates the state of consciousness or awareness of 
the world and the need for an emancipatory practice of freedom. Thomson and 
Bebbington (2005) argued that education has three roles: constitutive role, that revealed 
what we know about the world; an oppressive role, that enables us to understand if 
unequal power relations should be sustained or changed and the transformative role, 
which emphasized a dialectic potential to change the dominant hegemony through 
problematisation, education and dialogic engagement with the powerful stakeholders. 
Conscientization becomes an empowering process where disenfranchised people or 
groups could bring about an emancipatory change in the social-economic-cultural order 
through a dynamic and interactive dialogue for sustainable transformation and sustainable 
accountability with stakeholders (Bebbington et al., 2007; Contrafatto et al., 2015; Gray 
et al., 2014b; Dillard and Roslender, 2011). According to Thomson and Bebbington 
(2005, p.511), the state of consciousness becomes a “double-edged sword” that binds 
stakeholders and liberate the oppressed from their “limit-situations” through a “limit-
acts” directed at negating, overcoming the limiting situations and in giving the oppressed 
a significant voice to engage (Freire, 2002, pp.99-103). For instance, Freire (2002, p.88) 
argued that 
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“Human existence cannot be silent, nor can it be nourished by false words, but 
only by true words, with which men and women transform the world. To exist, 
humanly, is to name the world, to change it. Once named, the world in its turn 
reappears to the namers as a problem and requires of them a new naming. Human 
beings are not built in silence, but in a word, in work, in action-reflection.”  
The state of naming the world involve the reflective re-examination of prior actions and 
accounts to establish a new understanding in problematising and evaluating subsequent 
dialogue and actions to transform the existing situation of the oppressed (Bebbington et 
al., 2007 p.364; Killian, 2010; Contrafatto et al., 2015). The transformation of limit-
situations through dialogic engagement that enhances human rights and sustainable 
environmental needs of the oppressed is established through a “profound love for the 
world and for people” through which the stakeholders consistently recreate their 
worldview of (un)sustainable practices and actions (Freire, 2002, p.89). Freire (2002) 
postulated that for authentic-emancipatory dialogue to exist among the stakeholders, the 
stakeholders (in this case study the corporations, the government, the advocacy NGOs, 
the developmental NGOs, the regulatory agencies and the communities) would consider 
themselves as co-owners of the truth and knowledge, and their critical contribution to 
sustainable transformation and accountability should be considered as relevant to the 
dialogue. He argued that for transformative dialogue and engagement to exist no group 
should be portrayed as the elite or powerful group and the other stakeholders’ groups as 
“these people or the great unwashed” to avoid a “submerged state of consciousness” 
which create slogans that increase the fear of freedom (pp.90, 95). He argued that the 
absence of class categorisation would create a climate of mutual trust and hope through 
an authentic-transformative communal dialogue, “which leads the dialoguers into ever 
closer partnership in the naming of the world” (p.91). However, Freire (2002, pp.91-92) 
contended that hope is rooted in man’s incompletion and this enables them to search for 
justice and sustainable transformation through critical thinking and communal dialogues, 
but hopelessness is argued as a form of dehumanizing silence, a state of denying the world 
and fleeing from it even when there are platforms for dialogue. This is because authentic-
transformative dialogue for accountability, inclusive engagement and effective 
governance cannot be conducted in the absence of love, humility, faith, hope and critical 
thinking (pp.87-92). In the wake of naïve thinking by the oppressed, lack of faith in their 
abilities to transform their world and in the absence of true education/conscientization, 
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the dialogue without a sense of profound love, humility, hope and critical thinking would 
yield little or no impact in transforming the dominant hegemony. For instance, Freire 
(2002, p.92-93) argued that  
“Without dialogue, there is no communication, and without communication, there 
can be no true educations… Thus, the dialogical character of education as the 
practice of freedom does not begin when the teacher-student meets with the 
students-teachers in a pedagogical situation, but rather when the former first ask 
herself or himself what she or he will dialogue with the latter about.” 
He argued that the dialogic character of education as a practice of freedom revealed that 
humans exist in a world which they constantly want to recreate and transform, particularly 
through dialogue. He claimed that this conscious awareness implies that the oppressed 
would act in support of the transformative changes they proposed to overcome their 
limiting situations by infusing their worldview and their creative presence with the 
worldviews of the other stakeholders to facilitate transformative sustainable changes 
(p.98-99). He argued that it is not the limit-situations (in this case study, the limit-
situations could be viewed as -human rights violations through environmental pollution 
and ineffective implementation of regulatory frameworks with its negative impact on 
[inter]intragenerational equity and development) that create a climate or sense of 
hopelessness rather it is the historical and socially constructed realities of the oppressed 
on the limiting situations. The historical and socially constructed realities could appear as 
insurmountable barriers to their human rights and sustainable development thereby 
creating a sense of hopelessness (p.99, 103). However, as humans critically embodied 
themselves in dialogic actions, Freire argued that this climate of hopelessness would 
result in a climate of hope and confidence, which would enable the stakeholders to 
overcome their existing limiting situations.  
On the other hand, Freire argued that when the limiting situations are not distinctively 
understood by the stakeholders, the corresponding response or dialogic actions cannot 
“authentically nor critically” resolve them (p.102). When the limiting situations are not 
critically and authentically resolved through effective dialogic actions and accountability, 
the stakeholders would be unable to move beyond the limiting situations to discover that 
beyond this problem “lies an untested feasibility” implicit for their sustainable 
transformation and development (p.102). Particularly, Freire (2002, p.104) argued that  
46 
 
 
“When people lack a critical understanding of their reality, apprehending it in 
fragments which they do not perceive as interacting constituent elements of the 
whole, they cannot truly know that reality. To truly know it, they would have to 
reverse their starting point: they would need to have a total vision of the context 
[untested future feasibility] in order to subsequently separate and isolate its 
constituent elements and by means of this analysis achieve a clearer perception of 
the whole [of their reality and the untested future feasibility].” [emphasis added] 
He argued that those that are threatened by the liberating potential of the untested future 
feasibility of the possible realities would want the current submerging and limiting 
situations of the oppressed to persist in order to prevent the materialisation of the untested 
transformative feasibility. Could this be true in the Niger Delta? How did the oppressed 
stakeholders resolve the limiting situations? What are the emancipatory outcomes from 
educating the oppressed community stakeholders by the advocacy NGOs in the Delta? 
Could the limiting situations be resolved through the continuous conscientization of the 
community stakeholders by the advocacy NGOs to enable them to visualize or construct 
the positive untested future feasibility of their everyday realities through thematic 
investigation of their everyday realities? Reflecting on Freire’s theory of dialogic action 
(2002), he argued that transformative changes should not be expected from the oppressor 
rather it could emerge from external structures outside the systems to conscientize the 
oppressed to engage the oppressors to address the limiting situations. In this case study, 
could the advocacy NGOs be envisaged as the external structures, who possess the 
knowledge, resources and access to other sources of power to intervene on behalf of the 
marginalised group with the restricted power to enforce transformative changes? Could 
the advocacy NGOs, shareholders’ groups and recognised supranational human rights 
organisations be construed as the dialogic experts helping to open up the limiting 
situations to establish a formal and informal structure for dialogic accountability and 
engagement among the arena participants to address the conflicts emerging from 
unsustainable practices and human rights violations?  
As evidenced in Contrafatto et al., (2015) study of dialogic accounts co-produced by the 
Peruvian pupils and teachers through the conscientization project of an activist NGOs – 
GlobalEd. Contrafatto et al., (2015, p.120) reflecting on the work of Freire argued that it 
is through this profound love for the world and for people or in their terms “sympathetic 
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relationships that external activists are able to connect, participate and comprehend the 
world of the community”. They argued that as mutual understandings develop between 
the activist NGOs, the Peruvian people and teachers through dialogue and observations, 
the external activists, in conjunction with the local activists, compiled an initial series of 
accounts (codifications) of key aspects of the community’s everyday realities (p.120). 
These compilations of the typologies of accounts included pictures, photographs, 
calendars, videos, stories, songs, exhibitions, and plays were to serve constitutive, 
oppressive and transformative roles. As a constitutive role, the pupils and the teachers 
were educated to understand their realities. As an oppressive role, the typologies of 
accounts enabled the pupils and the teachers to decide if the unsustainable aspect of their 
lives should be sustained or changed while the transformative role serve as a dialectic 
problematization of the unsustainable thinking and practices between the pupils, teachers 
and the external activist NGO to facilitate a more sustainable thinking and alternatives 
(Thomson and Bebbington, 2004, 2005; Bebbington et al., 2007; Cooper et al., 2005; 
Gray et al., 2014b). However, as highlighted by Freire (2002) and Contrafatto et al., 
(2015), there is the risk that the advocacy NGOs may impose their ideologies and values 
on the oppressed groups they are conscientizing, thereby dominating or taking over the 
dialogic processes with their ideologies.  
Nevertheless, Bebbington et al., (2007, p.364) argued that this dialogic education and 
engagement is “intended to bring about emancipatory change to the social order, using 
educative projects designed to facilitate conscientization and reflexive dialogue with 
different actors.” Furthermore, they posited that if the change is to occur, the oppressor 
and the marginalised voices need to be liberated through a similar conscientization 
process that is aimed at liberating the oppressed, and it should be geared towards enabling 
the oppressor to recognise the dehumanizing and destructive nature of their actions 
(p.364). The problematization of unsustainable oppressive practices, the educative 
projects to liberate the oppressed and the outcome of the dialogic engagements are 
envisaged as co-produced or co-evolving reflective process to produce knowledge, ideas, 
actions to confront, resist and resolve the unequal power relations, accountability and 
governance gaps within a controversial arena. Thus, the educative potential of dialogic 
actions is aimed at transforming the social and political controversies in order to constitute 
new discourses that could examine, challenge and resolve the limiting situations or 
controversies (Freire, 2002; Gallhofer et al., 2015, 2006; Contrafatto et al., 2015). 
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4.1.2.2. DIALOGIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENGAGEMENT 
The accountability and engagement discourse from dialogic actions is concerned with the 
co-evolving responsibility or right to give and receive information that would result in 
emancipatory changes, which could include the rebalancing of the power differences and 
conflicts of interest among the stakeholders or social groups in alignment with dialogic 
and democratic ideologies and values (Dillard and Brown, 2012; Brown, 2009; Thomson 
and Bebbington, 2005). These dialogic engagement lens does not define the 
accountability boundaries when giving or receiving accounts rather it emerges as a result 
of counter and deliberative dialogues which are informed by arguments and other forms 
of evidence, which could explore and challenge disparate accountability possibilities 
(Brown, 2009; Dillard and Yuthas, 2013). Bebbington et al., (2007, p.367) claimed “they 
draw upon dialogic processes, non-finalizable and enriched with different perspectives as 
a way of expanding meaning and understanding.” Dialogic actions/engagement is situated 
within the pluralistic premise that the prevailing powers, conflicts of interest or 
conflicting and competing perspectives would be resolved through stakeholders’ 
democratic and deliberative dialogues (Brown et al., 2015; Gallhofer et al., 2015, 2011; 
Brown, 2009; Vinnari and Dillard, 2016). Dillard and Yuthas (2013, p.114) claimed this 
dialogic accountability or what MacIntosh (2002) referred to as ‘heteroglossic 
accounting’ “views accounting more like an ongoing conversation among competing 
interests that hold different perspectives about the empirical phenomena themselves.” 
Dialogics recognise that stakeholders’ groups within an arena have diversified values and 
belief systems, diversified expectations and requires different accounting information to 
challenge corporate’ accounting information systems (AIS). This implies that the 
accounting information needs of these disparate stakeholders cannot be sufficiently 
addressed through calculative accountability but through heteroglossic or pluralistic or 
emancipatory and participatory accountability platforms that recognises inclusiveness in 
the advancement of human rights and sustainable development.  
Furthermore, the dialogic discourse could be envisaged as a move beyond the 
stakeholders’ theory by incorporating ‘socio-economic-cultural systems’ to ask 
sustainable questions, problematize and challenge the unsustainable and inhumane 
practices within an arena that provide a more transparent response embedded within a 
continuous dialogue and emancipatory praxis (Contrafatto et al., 2015; Dillard and 
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Roslender, 2011; Bebbington et al., 2007; Spence, 2009). For instance, Brown (2009, 
pp.324-328) developed a conceptual framework10 to identify and enforce the nature of 
democratic and deliberative stakeholders’ dialogue and engagement evolving from a 
monolithic dialogue into a critical dialogic (pluralistic) and accountability framework as 
follows:  
i. Recognise multiple ideological orientations: It recognised the need of 
differentiated perspectives for an effective dialogue by encouraging 
individuals and groups to engage in democratic interaction. 
ii. Avoid monetary reductionism: it recognised that dialogic engagements among 
stakeholders should not be reduced to a single bottom-line dehumanizing 
agenda rather dialogic accounting should provide data that would enable 
stakeholders to make meaningful decisions. 
iii. Be open about the subjective and contestable nature of calculations: it 
recognised the need for critical and transparent information between those 
with more power and those with less power. For instance, Dillard and Brown 
(2012) argued that it requires recognising differentiated perspective and the 
role of experts in enabling oppressed groups to construct their realities in order 
to facilitate a transformative dialogue. 
iv. Enable accessibility for non-experts: it requires that stakeholders should be 
able to attest to the credibility of information received from the other 
stakeholders and their voices heard in facilitating transformative dialogic 
changes. 
v. Ensure effective participatory processes: recognise the establishment of an 
effective democratic and deliberative platform to enable stakeholders to 
construct their own realities of events as well as make meaningful decisions. 
vi. Be attentive to power relations: the conceptual framework recognised the 
distinct attention to power and social relations differences. The recognition of 
power and social relations differences would ensure that marginalized groups 
                                                          
10 This framework is similar to the due diligence risk based approach for human rights by United Nations (2011) and 
Taylor, Zandvliet and Forouhar, (2009), and the polyvocal citizenship by Gray et al., (1997). 
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are included in the dialogic processes, and their concerns and values are not 
reduced to monetary calculations. 
vii. Recognise the transformative potential of dialogic accounting: the conceptual 
framework recognised the reflective and reconstructive potential of dialogic 
accounting in bringing transformative changes within an arena. 
viii. Resist new forms of monologism: this conceptual framework recognised the 
need to resist the banking or calculative accountability and engagement 
approach by interpreting and challenging monologism to replace it with a 
critical dialogism where democratic structures are constructed, evaluated, 
reinforced and change through inclusive dialogic engagements (Dillard and 
Brown, 2012; Freire, 2002; Thomson and Bebbington, 2004, 2005). 
On this backdrop, the accounting information that would result in emancipatory changes 
should be established on ethical and moral stance, reflective counter and participatory 
dialogue (Dillard, 2014; Dillard and Yuthas, 2013; Thomson and Bebbington, 2005). 
However, where the role of corporations and the States as accountable agents on the 
advancement of human rights are not defined, the drive for emancipatory accountability 
practices within an arena would normally emanate from the civil societies (United 
Nations, 2011; Gallhofer et al., 2011; Sikka, 2011; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008). 
The civil societies drive for accountability would not only change the ‘greenwashing’ 
practices of corporations but could also influence their environmental and human rights 
practices (Spence, 2009). For example, in 2008, World Wildlife Fund (WWF) rebuked 
Shell for misleading consumers over its environmental advertisement that two of its 
Canadian oil sand projects were sustainable projects for the future. This campaign was 
portrayed as misleading by the British Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), which 
claimed that Shell’s advert on the Canadian oil sand projects was a greenwashing attempt 
to mislead consumers on its unsustainable oil production practices and the advert was 
banned. ASA claimed after the campaign trails by WWF that Shell should not have used 
the word “sustainable” because it was a “vague and ambiguous term” without a 
substantial proof that Shell was effectively managing its carbon emissions from the 
Canadian oil sand projects in order to reduce its impact on climate change (Sweney, 2008; 
Swaine, 2008). Thus, the civil societies engagement for inclusive and transformative 
accountability could reconstruct stakeholders’ knowledge and perception of 
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(un)sustainable social and environmental practices that would drive a genuine dialogue 
among the stakeholders to transform the unsustainable practices and thinking (Spence, 
2009; Gray et al., 2014b; Thomson and Bebbington, 2005). 
Moreover, other scholars may view this pluralistic or critical dialogics as a naïve or 
narrow practice that tend to promote western democracy to resist capitalism and 
globalisation because it is linked to deliberative and participatory democracy geared 
towards restructuring the public and private sectors (Bebbington et al., 2007; Spence, 
2009; Gallhofer et al., 2006; Li and McKernan, 2016). Bebbington et al. (2007 p.367) 
claimed “the central aim is to foster a more critically reflective political process as the 
basis for ongoing transformative dialogue between citizens.” Furthermore, critical 
dialogics could enable participants to critically evaluate the extent to which organisational 
or institutional change has evolved (Brown, 2009; Dillard and Yuthas, 2013; Thomson 
and Bebbington, 2004, 2005; Gray, 2006). The incorporation of diversified and 
marginalized voices or competing perspectives into conversations for sustainable 
practices within an arena would ensure that the views of indigenous people and other 
affected stakeholders are critically expressed via the dialogic accountability framework.  
The existence of a dialogic accountability platform should result in a shift in the power 
to demand and disseminate information from the corporation to the stakeholders. Dialogic 
engagement implies that in constructing the ‘accounts’, the stakeholders or societies or 
marginalised groups are co-producers in the governance and accountability processes and 
relationships (Brown, 2009; O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009; Georgakopoulos and 
Thomson, 2008; Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2009). This emphasized Thomson and 
Bebbington (2005, p.525) argument that if the power to demand and disseminate account 
should reside with the corporation, there would be limited stakeholders’ dialogue and 
engagement. The qualities of stakeholders’ dialogue and engagement would influence the 
accounting information systems (in relation to what would be disclosed, how it would be 
disclosed and when it would be disclosed) that would exist between the accountor and the 
accountee (Dillard and Yuthas, 2013; Blackburn et al., 2014). Therefore, notion of power 
and transparency are essential tools in developing accountability framework because it 
promotes the need for trust when multiple accountability systems are involved (Robert, 
2009; Messner, 2009; Shearer, 2002). The power relationship between corporations and 
stakeholders influence how accountability is internalised and experienced. However, the 
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co-production of dialogic accounts by the accountor and the accountee could transform 
their everyday realities and reconstruct the power relations (Thomson and Bebbington, 
2005; Contrafatto et al., 2015; Cooper and Owen, 2007; Bovens, 2007; Parker, 2014). 
 
4.1.2.3. INTERIM CONCLUSION ON CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Despite the importance of accountability, the implications of being seen and held 
accountable arguably are often ambiguous (Sinclair, 1999; Robert, 2009; Parker, 2014). 
Sinclair (1995, p.220) claimed that “to increase accountability, we need to understand 
how it is constructed by, extracted from, those who are held accountable.” According to 
Sinclair (1995, p.221) and Gray et al., (2014b), accountability could be something a 
person feels, something a person has the obligatory requirement to fulfil, something a 
person exchange for authority or something that is imagined or an artefact. The act of 
accountability according to Gray et al., (2014b) and Sinclair (1995) becomes important 
when the ethical and moral dimension of responsibility and power to give and receive an 
account of conducts are revealed and known to stakeholders. Accountability drives the 
ideological perspective from the impact of the business on the societies to the societies 
impact on the businesses (Brown and Fraser, 2006; Tregidga and Milne, 2006; Dillard, 
2014). The societies impacts on businesses according to Chen (1975) is the primary 
stewardship responsibility of management, and that performance should be evaluated in 
terms of profit and it impacts on social objectives. The inter-relationship between the 
societies (public interest) and corporations or the responsiveness of the corporations to 
the societal interest by considering its natural, social and economic systems will 
necessitate dialogic/pluralistic accountability and policies implementation (Brown and 
Fraser, 2006; Spence, 2009; Lehman, 2002).   
Dillard (2014, p.238) envisaged this on-going inter-relationship as the “ethics of 
accountability”, in which the accountor act within and as a responsible member of a 
community, receive the rules and regulation of the community to which the accountor 
belongs, request, process and communicate information; and in-turn the accountee has 
the responsibility to hold the accountor to give an account. Accountability cannot rely 
only on the discharge of information but should have the virtue to facilitate the 
implementation of communicative and purposeful actions (Cooper and Owen, 2007; 
Messner, 2009; Tregidga, 2017). This explicitly connotes that the conception of human 
right accountability cannot rely only on the discharge of information but should have the 
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mechanism for societies whose rights had been violated to seek dialogic and purposeful 
judicial and non-judicial remedies (United Nations, 2011; McPhail and Adams, 2016; 
McPhail and Ferguson, 2016).  
However, there is a growing concern on the ability of the State to enforce the laws, when 
the human rights of indigenous people and other stakeholders had been violated due to 
the bilateral foreign investment agreements and unsustainable practices between the 
corporations and the State (see chapter 3). Consequently, the rhetorical question is who 
should be held accountable for the violation of human rights in the societies where there 
is a bilateral agreement between the regulators (State) and the corporations. These 
bilateral agreements tentatively pose a challenge to the role of the State and the 
corporations on the implementation of regulatory standards and the advancement of 
human rights, and the capacity of the societies to manage the adverse negative 
consequences of such agreements (Sikka, 2011; Lauwo et al., 2016). This is because 
where there are conflicts of interests among stakeholders, re-aligning such relationships 
and the notions of accountability cannot be structurally redefined. Consequently, where 
there is a conflict of interest, the transition of power and responsibilities from the State to 
the corporations to embrace accountability should emerge from the relational, 
emancipatory and stakeholders’ dialogue and engagement (McPhail and Ferguson, 2016). 
The exploration of the notion of human rights, sustainable development and 
accountability would be a fallacy without the relational accountability and stakeholders’ 
dialogue to address human rights violations and to ensure effective implementation of the 
GPBHRs. What happens when relational accountability and stakeholders’ dialogue is not 
possible in countries where corruption and violations of human rights are the norms of 
business activities? Assistance from other social actors could be necessary to build the 
capacities of marginalised groups to demand accountability and drive stakeholders’ 
dialogues and engagements. Such dialogue could emerge from the civil societies’ 
pressure for change and accountability on the State, corporations, and the societies 
(Spence, 2009; Apostol, 2015; Thomson et al., 2015; Ruggie, 2007). For instance, Ruggie 
(2007, p.3) argued that “while governments representing the public interest must play key 
roles [in ensuring human rights are not violated], they need to be joined by other social 
actors and to utilise other social institutions [to place a significant amount of pressure on 
all stakeholders in ensuring that the basic human rights are not abused] to achieve this 
goal…” [emphasis added].  
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However, Gray and Gray (2011) claimed that relying on the NGOs to reduce the 
“accountability gap” created by the shareholders’ maximisation objective is 
“unreasonable” and “improper” because of their size and insufficient funds. Despite, 
these limitations, the author argued that you have to categorise the NGOs by evaluating 
their motivations and funding (e.g. developmental and advocacy NGOs), their ideologies 
and their relationship to the phenomenon, before they can be (not)relied on to bridge 
accountability and governance gaps (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Jontsenvirta, 2011). 
Nevertheless, can we trust the environmental and human rights advocacy NGOs through 
their reporting strategies, symbolic activism and their exclusive global reputations to 
project human rights abuses and unsustainable practices to challenge and disrupt 
corporate reputation, profitability, power and legitimacy? Or can we trust the 
developmental NGOs to problematize and project human rights abuses and unsustainable 
practices to challenge and disrupt corporate reputation, profitability, power and 
legitimacy whilst recognising their dependence on the corporations? For instance, Kneip 
(2013, p.190) argued that advocacy NGOs or social movement activists “take on the role 
of civil society’s critical voice… (to) raise concerns over the social injustice they perceive 
in the current interconnection of international political and economic decisions.” 
Consequently, the author argues that the social movement activists could be relied on to 
reduce the ‘accountability and governance gaps’ (not necessarily all of the identified 
accountability and governance problems) but to initiate systematic, partisan, contra-
governing and dialogic counter accounts and engagement around accountability and 
human right discourse among stakeholders that could bridge or reduce the governance 
and accountability gaps (Apostol, 2015; Brown, 2009; Bebbington et al., 2007; Gallhofer 
et al., 2006; Thomson et al., 2015; Dey et al., 2011). Kneip (2013), den Hond and de 
Bakker (2007), Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2014) and Joutsenvirta (2011) revealed that 
it is easier for corporations to address unsustainable practices problematized by the social 
movement activists to protect their reputation and profitability. These social movement 
activists would not only problematize these unsustainable human rights and 
developmental practices but could reconstruct the perceptions of the local, regional, 
national and international audiences to seek judicial or non-judicial remedies for the 
affected individuals or groups (Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007; Frankental, 2015, 2011; 
Joutsenvirta, 2011; Kneip, 2013; Apostol, 2015; Sweney, 2008). Consequently, it is 
expedient to explore how external accounts/counter accounts prepared by these social 
movement activists bridge or try to reduce the accountability and governance gaps. 
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Furthermore, it is expedient to explore how such accounts are reflected in institutional or 
organisational processes and practices to address unsustainable practices that affect the 
ability of other stakeholders to live sustainably.   
 
4.2.  COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
4.2.1. COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMATIZING TOOL FOR THE 
MARGINALISED VOICES 
In the academic literature, external accounts have been referred to using many different 
terms, including social audits (Medawar, 1976), anti-reports (Ridgers, 1979), 
deindustrialisation or plant closure audits (Harte and Owen, 1987), silent accounts (Gray, 
1997), shadow accounts (Dey, 2007; Tregidga, 2017), heteroglossic accounts (MacIntosh 
and Baker, 2002), reporting-performance portrayal gaps (Adams, 2004), social accounts 
(Cooper et al., 2005), dialogic accounts (Bebbington et al., 2007), counter accounts 
(Gallhofer et al., 2006; Vinnari and Laine, 2017), anti-accounts (Spence, 2009), polylogic 
accounts (Brown and Dillard, 2013), surrogate accounting (Belal et al., 2015; 
Rubenstein, 2007) new accounts (Gray et al., 2014b) and stakeholder-related information 
(Rodrigue, 2014). In the 1970s and 1980s, external accounts prepared by Social Audits 
Ltd and Counter Information Services arguably paved way for modern counter accounts 
(Dey and Gibbon, 2014; Gray, 2001; Medawar, 1976). These counter accounts in the 
1970s and 1980s, as evidenced in the work of Social Audit Ltd were published to 
highlight the disclosure gaps between what the corporations disclosed, what they 
suppressed by not disclosing to reveal their impacts on the social and environmental 
ability of the others to live sustainably (Medawar, 1976; Dey et al., 2011; Adams, 2004; 
Spence, 2009; Dey and Gibbon, 2014).  
It is pertinent to clarify that although they have been generally classified under external 
accounting terminology but Dey and Gibbon (2014), Boyce (2014), Collison et al., 
(2010), Spence (2009), Thomson et al., (2015) and Gray et al., (2014a) have argued that 
they are often not the same in scope, depth, in the entity targeted (which could be the 
corporations, public sector organisations, regulators, a government proposal, a nation and 
so on) and the type of evidence used for their engagement. For instance, silent accounts 
are generated from the corporate accounts to create an alternative and meaningful nugget 
or piece of the social account by recreating the readily available information from the 
corporate accounts as a means of generating more social disclosure from the corporations. 
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Silent accounts are aimed at giving visibilities to public and formal information that were 
not substantially disclosed by the corporations but could affect other stakeholders’ social, 
environmental and economic wellbeing (Dey and Gibbon, 2014; Boyce, 2014; Collison 
et al., 2010; Gray et al., 2014b). Another example is shadow accounts, which are 
unofficial and oppositional accounts prepared by independent organisations from wider 
sources of information other than the corporate accounts. Shadow accounts are prepared 
using the same official reporting categories and subject headings as stated in the targeted 
organisation’s corporate social responsibility reporting format (see Adams, 2004; Boyce, 
2014; Dey and Gibbon, 2014; Collison et al., 2010; Rodrigue, 2014; Tregidga, 2017). 
However, Gallhofer et al., (2006) notion of counter accounting, a form of external 
accounting is interchangeably used with Thomson et al., (2015)’s notion of external 
accounting in this study to understand how the social movement activists problematize, 
challenge and confront dominant and unequal power relations. The terminology counter 
accounting is used to explore how the social movement activists delegitimised corporate 
and governance unsustainable practices to radically facilitate an emancipatory dialogue, 
transformative organisational and institutional changes for the benefit of the oppressed 
groups (Bebbington et al., 2007; Boyce, 2014; Cooper et al., 2005; Dey and Gibbon, 
2014; Dey et al., 2011; Spence, 2009; Gray et al., 2014a; Everett, 2004). 
Thomson et al., (2015, p.810) defined external accounts as accounts “produced by, or on 
behalf of, individuals who are beyond, or outside the control of the entity that is the 
subject of the account.” Counter account creates alternative representations of 
organisations’ conduct from the perspective of the oppressed or marginalised group by 
constructing and communicating new visibilities and knowledge of the existing limiting 
situations to oppose and to change the existing limiting situations regarded as socially and 
environmentally harmful or undesirable (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Alawattage and 
Wickramasinghe, 2009; Cooper et al., 2005; Spence, 2009; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007). 
Thomson et al., (2015) argued that by problematizing entities’ harmful conducts from the 
perspective of oppressed groups on their ecological and social impact, counter accounts 
can “make thinkable and governable those issues currently regarded as unthinkable and 
ungovernable by those in power” (p.810). Furthermore, counter accounts are posited to 
be embedded within the struggles for equal power relations, resource control (partial or 
complete) and the ability to effectively govern. Thus, they constitute or form part of a 
complex evolving assemblages of activists’ external accounting practices to problematize 
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and link the unsustainable and unacceptable practices among different actors and in 
different arenas to facilitate transformative changes on behalf of the oppressed group 
(Dey et al., 2011; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Dey and Gibbon, 2014; Everett, 
2004; Spence, 2009).   
Furthermore, Gallhofer et al., (2006, pp.681-682) argued that counter accounts are 
“information and reporting systems employed by groups such as campaigners and 
activists with a view to promoting their causes or countering or challenging the prevailing 
official and hegemonic position.” They argued that counter accounting is an emancipatory 
practice that embraces and value democratic principles and practices to challenge and 
overcome the problematic corporate and governance practices. They postulated that 
counter accounts have been ongoing as a matter of principle and practice. For instance, 
studies revealed that counter accounting was used in 1661 by John Evelyn to problematize 
the causes and consequences of air pollution in London to bring about an emancipatory 
change (Solomon and Thomson, 2012; Environmental Protection UK, 2011; Jenner, 
1995; Evelyn, 1661). Environmental Protection, UK (2011) claimed London had been 
suffering from the intensive and destructive smog of smoke as early as 1273 but John 
Evelyn was the first to problematize and communicate the cause, effects and possible 
solutions to the problem of air pollution to the parliament. This revealed that counter 
account in the 17th century was used to advocate greater accountability and environmental 
responsiveness from the policymakers and from the organisation that made use of sea-
coal (Solomon and Thomson, 2012).  
In 1853, another record of counter account was prepared by Frederick Braithwaite, a civil 
engineer to problematize and communicate the state of industrial emissions and pollution 
of the River Wandle in England (Solomon and Thomson, 2009). Solomon and Thomson 
(2009) claimed Frederick’s counter account evaluated the quality of the water, river flow 
rate, water use, pollutants, and sources of pollution from its origin at Carshalton and 
Croydon to its intersection with the River Thames at Wandsworth. Braithwaite’s counter 
accounts problematized and conceptualised the damages caused by profit-driven 
organisations on the welfare of other stakeholders. This revealed how counter accounts 
based on systematic, factual, reliable, and verifiable evidence was used to construct 
legitimate demands for accountability and intervention from a professional body that may 
not have the direct powers to influence individual and corporate activities.  
58 
 
 
In the 90s and 21st, advocacy NGOs and campaigning individuals published counter 
accounts to challenge the absence of formal governance and accountability systems 
designed to respect and protect human rights and sustainable development by triggering 
interventions from those with the power to resolve the abuse of human rights arising from 
globalisation (Gallhofer et al., 2006; Christian Aid, 2004; Amnesty International 2009). 
They are often used to fill the perceived gaps in accountable information, evidence or 
knowledge needed to democratically govern the corporations and the society (Brown, 
2009; Apostol, 2015; Tregidga, 2017). The underlining purpose of counter accounts 
prepared by these organisations were to problematize and communicate the failure of 
corporations and governments to act appropriately and discharge accurate account to the 
societies (Gray et al., 2014; Cooper et al., 2005; Tregidga et al., 2015; Kneip, 2013; Cho 
et al., 2015). Counter accounts not only reveal what corporations suppressed by not 
disclosing but often they provide insights into the social and environmental perspectives 
of the other stakeholders without direct agency relationships with the corporations 
(Adams, 2004; Vinnari and Laine, 2017; Thomson et al., 2015).  
Counter accounts are often used to reveal to the views of the marginalised voices in order 
to problematize, communicate and challenge corporate and governance unethical actions 
(Apostol, 2015; Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017). Counter accounts were mostly 
embedded within a struggle for power, absolute or partial control of resources and 
governance to challenge corporations and government to legitimately act differently 
regardless of their resources or profit-making intentions (Gray, 2001; Boiral, 2013; 
Arnold and Hammond, 1994). Often, they bridged the governance and multiple 
accountabilities disorder gaps in relation to human rights violations and unsustainable 
practices within a controversial arena (O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009; Koppell, 2005). 
Counter accounts could help close governance gaps by creating nuance accountability 
framework to evaluate and monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of the governance 
and AIS (Blackburn et al., 2014; Dillard and Yuthas, 2013). Counter accounts contribute 
to an evolving assemblage of accounts that can holistically problematise, and present 
alternatives with the potential for those involved in a conflict to collectively move towards 
a resolution (Thomson et al., 2015; Gallhofer et al., 2006). It could be used as a bridge 
between different arenas facilitating conflict escalation and resolution, informed by the 
advocacy NGOs’ political and campaigning strategies to speak truth to power, to create 
new visibilities and to initiate practices of freedom to address inequalities of power and 
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social status in any conflict arenas (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Spence, 2009; 
Tregidga, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 2017). 
Dey and Gibbon (2014) claimed external accounts are produced to highlight the social 
and environmental impacts of an organisation on others by external individuals and 
organisations such as campaigning NGOs and the media. Counter accounts are prepared 
on the premise that there is a problem either in relation to accountability or unsustainable 
practices that should be addressed by the stakeholders or corporations or governments. 
External accounts are produced by a large spectrum of organisations such as the 
accounting entity itself, political institutions, civil society, the media and sections of the 
general public within conflict arenas to expose the social and environmental impacts of 
an organisation or governance on the other stakeholders (Arnold and Hammond, 1994; 
Apostol, 2015). In conflict arenas, advocacy NGOs often incorporate their experience and 
expertise from past conflicts to help legitimatize and frame the problems faced by the 
local communities or the general public in other conflict arenas to increase the 
possibilities of mitigating current problems or prevent future negative consequences, 
thereby serving as a mediating instruments to challenge and address unsustainable 
practices and to speak truth to power (Joutsenvirta, 2011; Kneip, 2013; Gray et al., 2014b; 
Miller and O’Leary, 2007). Counter accounts have the potential to translate the problems, 
consequences, and practical solutions of one arena engagement into everyday actions, 
values and cultures of other arena participants to enable wider dialogue, knowledge 
exchange, co-operative engagement and emancipatory changes (Bebbington et al., 2007; 
Dillard and Roslender, 2011; Gallhofer et al., 2006).  
Dey et al., (2011, p.64) argued that “shadow accounting can be viewed as a technology 
that measures, creates, make visible, represents, and communicates evidence in contested 
arenas characterised by multiple (often contradictory) reports, prepared alignment with 
different institutional and ideological rules.” This form of accounting creates, measures, 
problematizes and communicates the negative impact of a phenomenon on a section of 
the oppressed group or section to act as a catalyst for change. It has the potential to invoke 
and enforce dialogic and emancipatory changes that would transform the underlining 
philosophies and structures of the State and corporations, despite its partiality (Shenkin 
and Coulson, 2007; Everett, 2004; Paisey and Paisey, 2006). Other accounting 
researchers have argued that counter accounting is explicitly partial or biased and 
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selective because it is a folk-political thinking rhetoric designed to oppose capitalism 
(Gray and Gray, 2011; Li and McKernan, 2016; Spence, 2009; Medawar, 1976). For 
instance, Spence (2009, p.219) argued that  
“The information provided by these anti-accounts is partial and selective. This 
partiality, it has in common with corporate social accounting. However, …there 
are a number of key differences between the information presented by anti-
accounts and…by corporate self-reporting and that arguably give the former the 
moral high ground. Firstly, these anti-accounts do not pretend to be objective or 
neutral. They are transparent about their partisan nature, making it clear from the 
outset what the political agenda is that underlies that accounts. In contrast, 
corporate social accounting projects a myth of objectivity and completeness. […] 
Secondly,…anti-accounts…attempt to open up dialogue by exposing 
contradictions and conflicts. In contrast, corporate social accounting attempts to 
either deny conflicts outright or mystify them by bringing them together within 
the higher unification of the business case…where social and environmental 
concerns can be managed away. In sum, the anti-accounts offered by civil society 
organisations…democratically consider the role of corporate power.” 
Regardless of Counter accounts partiality in opposing globalization or capitalism, 
emancipation from oppressive unsustainable practices and human rights violations should 
not be expected to emerge from the corporations and the stakeholders with direct agency 
relations with the governance mechanisms (Spence, 2009; Freire, 2002; Gallhofer et al., 
2006; Dey et al., 2011). Emancipatory transformation from oppressive unsustainable 
practices could emerge from the transformative engagement of experts or civil society 
with the capacity to challenge oppressive vested interests by problematising unsustainable 
practices and speaking truth to power along with enlightening and empowering the 
oppressed to demand dialogic change (Contrafatto et al., 2015; Brown, 2009; Bebbington 
et al., 2007; Gray et al., 2014b). For instance, Spence (2009, p.215) citing Fineman (1996) 
and Fineman and Clarke (1996) argued that  
“…managerial decisions are wired to consider only what makes good business 
sense and that it is only when managers are shocked or forced to feel fear, shame 
or embarrassment from antagonistic stakeholders (such as campaign groups or 
regulatory agencies) that a meaningful level of organisational greening might 
61 
 
 
occur. Even where regulation does succeed in being implemented and 
enforcement measures are in place, businesses often find it more in their interest 
to spend time searching for legal loopholes to avoid compliance than in actually 
meeting regulatory requirements… Rather…regulatory demands…are translated 
into technical management issues… Businesses respond to coercive pressures, not 
to environmental or social issues for what they are in themselves.” 
Thus, counter accounts have the potential to give voice to the marginalised individuals 
and communities by problematizing unsustainable social, economic, environmental and 
human rights violations within an arena by relocating and reframing the conflicts within 
an arena to another arena to allow participants within that arena to challenge and change 
the power dynamics in the conflict arena, thereby overcoming any obstacles to the 
achievement of their alternative solutions (which is evident in this case study) (O’Sullivan 
and O’Dwyer, 2009; Georgakopoulous and Thomson, 2008). Counter accounts could be 
used to escalate conflicts from an arena (particularly when a resolution could not be 
reached) to another arena where the distribution of power and disciplinary sanctions are 
effective to hold perpetrators of human rights and the environment accountable in an 
arena where they are considered unacceptable (Gallhofer et al., 2006; Cooper et al., 2005; 
Bebbington and Thomson, 2007; Tregidga, 2017). 
These accounts often capture [information unearthed by civil society (shadow 
accounting) or information disclosed by the corporations but which suppresses the 
enormity of the impact of such information on the other stakeholders social and 
environmental rights (silent account)] and challenge the hegemony of the States and 
corporate powers; provide the platform for stakeholders’ dialogues, democratic and 
emancipatory changes (Apostol, 2015; Dey and Gibbon, 2014; Collison et al., 2010; 
Bebbington et al., 2007). These dialogues could result in emancipatory changes leading 
to justice, freedom, growth, equality, redistribution, and deployment of resources towards 
a just cause, healthy compensatory packages, living standard and welfare that promote 
good life (Gallhofer et al., 2011, 2006; Sikka, 2006; Arnold and Hammond, 1994).  
Dialogic processes could occur when corporations and the States come under an intense 
scrutiny of their corporate practices with adverse social, ethical and environmental 
impacts on people’s livelihood and consumption patterns (Thomson et al., 2015; Burchell 
and Cook, 2013a, b). For instance, Thomson et al., (2015) developed a dynamic arena 
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framework to theoretically explore the use of external accounts by Action on Smoking 
and Health (ASH) UK between 1999 through 2010 against British American Tobacco 
(BAT). Thomson et al., (2015) argued that ASH adopted an assemblage of activists’ 
strategies involving different actors to communicate, de-legitimise and to confront the 
tobacco industry by demanding stricter regulations on tobacco production, consumption 
and governance. They argued that ASHs’ external accounts form part of complex 
assemblages of symbolic activism to engage multiple stakeholders, facilitate cooperation 
and support of ASH’s vision of a transformed tobacco industry, governance, practices 
and technology (p.811).  In their analysis, they observed that ASH adopted a large 
spectrum of awareness raising strategies such as publicity stunts, protest, customer and 
shareholders’ pressure, lobbying, advertising, forming coalitions with other activist 
groups, coalitions with medical and other professional institutions, conducting scientific 
research to educate local, national and international audiences to problematize the 
unacceptability of tobacco production, consumption and governance. ASH activisms 
were geared to problematize, perpetuate and escalate the conflict on tobacco to provide 
possible solutions to the harmful effects of tobacco smoking on individuals’ health and 
corporate practices (Thomson et al., 2015).  
Thomson et al., (2015, p.813) identified four broad categories of external accounts 
deployed by ASH as part of an assemblage of symbolic activism (systematic, partisan, 
contra-governing and dialogic counter accounts) to problematize and communicate 
unsustainable practices to different audiences and arenas depending on who is deemed to 
be responsible, what is targeted to be de-legitimised and who is deemed to be able to 
resolve the problem (see also Apostol, 2015; O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009; Cooper et 
al., 2005; Tregidga, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 2017). Thomson et al., (2015) argued that 
systematic external accounts are intended to challenge specific unacceptable practices of 
an organisation’s practices within a functioning governance and accountability system. 
According to them, systematic counter accounts are systematically published to trigger 
disciplinary actions by the governance regimes to resolve the problem by sanctioning the 
corporation for its unsustainable and unacceptable practices. They argued that systematic 
counter accounts are published to assist in the effective operation of the existing 
governance systems and could consist of accounts on plant emissions provided to the 
environmental regulators or evidence of safety risks of a product sent to the regulatory 
authorities (p.813).  
63 
 
 
On the other hand, Thomson et al., (2015) argued that the partisan external accounts are 
intended to communicate, confront, de-institutionalise and de-legitimise specific 
organisational conducts or governance regime(s) problematic to the effective 
implementation of regulatory frameworks to those with significant power to reform the 
problematic governance systems not fit for purpose. They argued that partisan accounts 
often emphasize the moral and ethical viewpoint to shift the focus of engagement from 
the governance regime or organisation to those with the power to change the rules and 
modes of engagement or enforcement because they are often geared towards escalating 
the conflicts from one location to another to cause reputational damage and/or material 
reforms in regulatory practices deemed unacceptable (p.814). They argued that partisan 
accounts could encourage shareholders to disinvest in corporations, consumers to boycott 
products and services, regulators to expand their power to control the corporations 
because the emphasis was laid on broader actions directed at getting the governance right 
(p.814-817).  
Thomson et al., (2015) also identified contra-governing external accounts, which are 
counter accounts intended to radically confront, challenge, escalate the conflict and 
transform the underlying ideologies of the existing governance regime to facilitate 
structural changes in the redistribution of power and resources necessary for an effective 
governance regime. They argued that the focus of these accounts are on transforming the 
power dynamics of the regulatory regime to make them effective in regulating 
corporations by adopting specific scientific discourses for their legitimacy (p.814-817). 
They argued that the systematic, partisan and contra-governing external accounts could 
be considered as useful tactics of counter-actions deployed by activists to problematize 
unsustainable corporate and governance practices (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Kneip, 
2013; Joutsenvirta, 2011; Spence, 2009; Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). 
Finally, Thomson et al., (2015) argued that dialogic external accounts are accounts 
included in dialogic accountability and engagement processes to co-problematize existing 
ways of governing and limiting situations to provide genuine democratic and dialogic 
solutions to facilitate emancipatory changes and new forms of governing that capture the 
voices of the marginalised groups (Contrafatto et al., 2015; Burchell and Cook, 2013a, 
b). They argued that dialogic accounts are accounts that are inclusive and represent 
multiple perspectives or diversities of interests within a prevailing governance regime to 
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dialogically resolve a problematic existing unsustainable and unacceptable corporate or 
governance practices (p.814). They postulated that dialogic counter accounts emphasize 
the “need for multiple accounts – including organisational-centred accounts as well as a 
variety of external accounts-that can authentically reconstruct this diversity of interests” 
(p.814). However, in their typologies, dialogic counter accounts was theoretically 
considered without any substantial empirical evidence to support their argument. 
Nevertheless, dialogic counter account could only be feasible through the intervention of 
an external or local activist group with knowledge, resources and access to other sources 
of power to intervene on behalf of the oppressed or marginalised stakeholders by 
facilitating an inclusive and transformative engagement that capture the voices of the 
oppressed stakeholders (Brown, 2009; Freire, 2002; Contrafatto et al., 2015).   
ASH counter accounts were a pragmatic starting point for the dialogic processes within 
the controversial arenas to establish a new form of praxis towards tobacco consumption 
and governance. Thomson et al., (2015) claimed that this form of engagement or 
campaigns contributed to changes in obvious legislations on tobacco such as bans on 
smoking in public places in the UK and other countries and the introduction of 
standardized packages for tobacco products. ASH’s engagement placed tobacco 
consumption and production within a space that is under consistent surveillance and 
political discourse across national and international regulatory boarders (Thomson et al., 
2015; Moerman and van der Laan, 2005).  
ASH’s activism corroborates Rodrigue, 2014; O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009; Spence, 
2009; Dey et al., 2011 and Bebbington et al., 2007 claims that constructing counter 
accounts on contextual issues often introduce and drive an informed dialogic thinking and 
engagement practices that are more genuinely based on sustainable social and 
environmental change. They are constructed to expose any contradicting artefacts based 
on evidence-based analysis geared towards disseminating alternative solutions that are 
capable of re-aligning objectives, norms and values around different stakeholders’ 
interests and to transform the societies (Joutsenvirta, 2011, Kneip, 2013; Tregidga, 2017; 
Cooper et al., 2005). Counter account is an attempt to open up a dialogic space where 
corporations can ‘refute’ or produce ‘counter-counter accounts’ or ‘co-operate’ with the 
civil society groups (Thomson et al., 2015; Gallhofer et al., 2006; Laine and Vinnari, 
2017; Tregidga, 2017).  
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Thus, counter accounts could be used to challenge the political neoliberalism ideology 
that claims to value democracy, the society, drive freedom and equality (Moerman and 
van der Laan, 2005; Adams, 2004; Sikka, 2011; Rodrigue, 2014). Neoliberalism drives 
globalisation but subsequently was argued to have failed to uphold its vision for a justice-
driven society, thereby leading to exploitation and inequalities rather than transform 
corporate behaviours in alignment with societal and ethical responsibilities (Everett, 
2004; Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007; Sikka, 2006). This support Sikka (2011, p.811) 
assertion that “the triumph of neoliberalism and the associated increase in corporate 
influence on the daily lives of the people and their right to food, water, shelter, security, 
paid employment, safety at work, clean and non-discriminatory environment has 
deepened calls for greater corporate accountability.” He claimed that rather than align 
corporate conduct with the basic human rights as stated in the UDHR and ensuring 
democratic control of corporations, corporate’s response has been to expand the scope of 
their financial reports to embrace CSR reports, which are a poor medium of human right 
accountability. The corporate reports are often published for legitimacy purposes to 
enable corporations to enhance its corporate reputation and shareholder value (O’Dwyer, 
2005, 2003; Deagan, 2002; Spence, 2009). Legitimacy theory posits that corporations 
disclose information to be seen as acting in a socially responsible fashion from the 
perspective of the society (O’Donovan, 2002; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Deegan 2002; 
Deegan et al., 2002; Deegan and Islam, 2014; Cho and Patten, 2007; Archel et al., 2009). 
However, Belal et al., (2015) and Spence, (2009) argued that regardless of whether the 
corporation produces the finest and coherent set of social accounts, it accounts fail to 
reflect an organisations’ economic transactions that impact negatively on the society, it 
would render such an account less useful. On the other hand, Accounting in the 21st 
century could be considered to serve all stakeholders including stakeholders without a 
direct agency relationship with the corporation (Messner, 2009; Shenkin and Coulson, 
2007; Robert, 2009; Parker, 2014). This tentatively drives accounting from just 
shareholders’ wealth maximisation position to a strong support for an inclusive 
stakeholders accounting (Brown, 2009; Gray et al, 2009; Gouldson and Bebbington, 
2007; Blackburn et al., 2014; Spence, 2009).  
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4.2.2. COUNTER ACCOUNTING AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A DIALOGIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
APPROACH  
Brown (2009) asserted that accounting has the potential to reconstruct social worlds. It is 
a mechanism through which individuals and groups’ perception are shaped and 
accounting could be a medium through which the non-shareholders could demand 
accounts of conducts from the corporations or the powerful stakeholders. Brown (2009) 
argued that accounting impacts significantly on the everyday life of stakeholders, through 
its influence on economic, social exchange and the mediation of conflicts. This implies 
that dialogic accounting could be used to recognise and include the diversity of interests 
of the various stakeholders, especially in a conflict arena where human rights had been 
violated (Thomson et al., 2015; Ball, 2007). This supports Gray (2013) assertion that an 
environmental account should be designed to discharge accountability, which reflects 
environmental matters implicated by the corporations’ activities and concurrently 
embraces societal and human rights.  
Corporations have focused on disseminating information regarding corporate practices 
and processes that might impinge on the communities and the societies. This information 
is usually disseminated through stand-alone CSR reports, sustainability reports and other 
social and environmental reporting (SER) mediums (Moneva et al., 2006; Archel et al., 
2009; Cormier and Gordon, 2001). Despite, these commendable practices, research such 
as Burchell and Cook, 2013b; Baker, 2010; Gray, 2006; O’Dwyer, 2005, 2003; 
O’Donovan, 2002; Owen et al., 2000 revealed that these hegemonic practices represent a 
comparatively weak form of engagement, based largely on the notion of managerial 
capture. This weak form of engagement occurs because of the legal requirements by the 
companies act to account or engage with the powerful stakeholders rather than through 
an inclusive stakeholder platform with stakeholders who may not have any form of 
structural social contractual obligations with the corporation. The social contractual 
obligations to these stakeholders group might not be legally recognised, let alone 
addressed in the corporate governance and policymaking system of the corporations 
(Unerman and Bennett, 2004; Cooper and Owen, 2007).  
To emphasize the need for stakeholders’ dialogic “counter” accounting, (O’Dwyer, 2003) 
critically analysed 29 in-depth interviews conducted with senior executives employed by 
Irish companies to understand the motives for the CSR reports prepared by corporations 
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to act in a socially responsible manner. His analysis, which was a response to Owen et 
al., (2000) concept of “managerial capture” emphasized that accountability and 
transparency to stakeholders were of little or no importance when compared to 
shareholders’ wealth maximisation objective. “Managerial Capture” refers to a concept 
where management takes control of the entire process of stakeholders’ engagement by 
collecting and disseminating information that would advance their corporate reputation 
rather than being transparent and accountable to the wider stakeholders. Prior research 
has argued that corporations have hijacked the social and environmental issues that affect 
stakeholders and translate them into economic issues that positively impact on 
shareholders’ value thereby resisting the stakeholders’ desired change (Power, 1991 as 
cited by O’Dwyer, 2003; Spence, 2009). O’Dwyer (2003) examined the nature of CSR 
and its implication on social accountants’ intention which is centred on values, human 
right and social justice to seek greater corporate accountability to societies. According to 
him, the social accountant’s conception of CSR has the capacity to liberate and empower 
the other stakeholders. Hence, “managerial capture” of the social and environmental 
accounting discourse has rendered its potential to liberate and empower redundant 
(O’Dwyer, 2003; Owen et al., 2000). Baker (2010, p.848) argued that “the best way to 
promote accountability is to understand what prevents it.” In his argument, he laid 
emphasis on extensive stakeholders’ dialogue, engagement practices and the 
implementation of any stakeholder engagement outcome as a means of improving 
accountability that had been underpinned by the “managerial capture” concept. On the 
other hand, O’Dywer (2003) could be criticized as focusing purely on managerial capture 
but evidence from the author’s fieldwork and empirical findings revealed that there are 
other forms of capture such as regulatory or governance capture (Grant, 2011; Chalmers 
et al., 2012).  
O’Donovan (2002) argued that the corporation is a social creation and its operational 
success depends on the ability of societies to recognise that it is socially (ir)responsible 
and (ir)responsive. This social contract between the corporations and the societies suggest 
that while the main objective of the corporation is to make a profit, it must be seen to be 
socially responsible by all stakeholders. Cormier and Gordon (2001, p.589) asserted that 
“where an organisation is successful in meeting such contracts, this leads to congruence 
between the organisation and the society.” A breach of this indirect responsibility 
tentatively leads to conflicts of interest within societies and among the stakeholders 
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because such social contract is seen as the bedrock for the inclusion of social preferences 
into corporate activities (Cormier and Gordon, 2001). The process of addressing this 
conflict would lead to the production of external/counter accounts to challenge unequal 
power relations, the need to give accurate accounts and be socially responsible (Thomson 
et al., 2015; Dey, 2007; Gallhofer, et al., 2006; Spence, 2009).  
Furthermore, empirical research revealed that when corporation discloses social and 
environmental reports, they are produced to resist substantial and meaningful changes in 
their corporate practices (Spence, 2009; Tregidga and Milne, 2006; Adams, 2004; 
Livesey and Kearins, 2002). For instance, Adams (2004) explored the extent with which 
corporate reporting in Alpha reflected ethical, social and environmental issues to the other 
stakeholders’ groups, who influenced and/or are influenced by the corporation and its 
activities. These other stakeholder groups included consumers, community, government, 
the media, employees, civil societies such as the trade union and reforming NGOs such 
as Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth. These other stakeholders’ groups were 
structured to fight for a common interest, which was distinct from Alpha’s interest. She 
claimed there was an ethical, social and environmental reporting-performance-portrayal-
gap between Alpha’s reporting and the externally available and perceived stakeholders’ 
group information of such company. She highlighted issues such as the discharge of 
chemical pollutants into the sea to cause environmental damage and the environmental 
impact of its product – yeganam and zetok on human were not mentioned in the 
corporation’s reports from 1993-1999 but were readily available in the media, which 
shaped the perception of the other stakeholder groups and subsequently their demand for 
accountability. She argued that the sustainability report produced by Alpha did not reflect 
environmental sustainability to the non-powerful stakeholder groups rather it reflected 
the sustainability of the business to its powerful stakeholder. She asserted that the 
sustainability reports by Alpha explicitly revealed that an environmental improvement 
would be based on the financial costs required for such an engagement and benefits of 
such engagement (p.744). Finally, Adams (2004) claimed that Alpha reports did not 
inclusively highlight its accountability to these non-powerful stakeholder groups.  
Furthermore, corporations often announce their contribution toward conserving our 
planet by reducing their carbon footprints and unsustainable production practices. If 
indeed these assertions are true, previous studies have revealed that these announcements 
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were merely for self-promotion and image enhancement purposes and not for 
sustainability (Apostol, 2015; Cho et al., 2010; Ogden and Clarke, 2005; Baker, 2010; 
Adams 2004; O’Donovan, 2002; Buhr, 1998; Gray et al., 1995b). These announcements 
do not transcend into the corporate governance system of the corporations, thereby does 
not make the corporation socio-economically responsible. Moreover, Buhr (1998, p.165) 
claimed this assertion enabled the corporations to appear to its stakeholders as doing the 
“right things” as against doing the “wrong things.” Corporate practices of appearing to be 
socially responsible are often used in shaping stakeholders’ perception but previous 
research has revealed that it does not result in any significant organisational change 
towards sustainability and accountability because the demand for sustainable practices 
and inclusive accountability are perceived as problematic activities by the corporations 
(Cho et al., 2010, 2015; Deegan and Islam, 2014; Ogden and Clarke, 2005). Social and 
environmental disclosures by corporations was argued as being selectively tailored to 
reveal the “good news” and to obfuscate the “bad news” in order to enhance their image 
and to shape the perception of stakeholders on their corporate sustainable performance 
(Cho et al., 2010, 2015; Tregidga and Milne, 2006; Ogden and Clarke, 2005). For 
instance, Tregidga and Milne (2006) evaluated the social and environmental reports of 
Watercare Services Ltd, an award-winning environmental reporting corporation. 
Tregidga and Milne, (2006) observed a significant and deliberate drift in the disclosure 
language of Watercare from “sustainable management” to “sustainable development” to 
portray the corporations as engaging in dialogue with the other stakeholders in order to 
manage their identity and to shape their engagement with their stakeholders. Tregidga 
and Milne claimed that this form of engagement was implicated by their concern for 
profitability and social engagement, which was a significant effort towards promoting the 
business-as-usual strategy.  
Thomson and Bebbington (2005, p.517) claimed that if accountability “…flows from a 
stakeholder engagement process then the reporting will be good, or at least better than it 
would have been if it hadn’t taken place.” The quality of the reporting that emerge from 
the stakeholders’ engagement would outweigh the monologic accounts because the voices 
of the oppressed groups would have been incorporated into the engagement mechanism 
to challenge the unequal power relations and to influence the dominant hegemony 
(Bebbington et al., 2007; Collison et al., 2010; Spence, 2009). Dialogic accountability 
recognizes that dialogue with the powerful stakeholders requires “oppositional forms of 
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talk” (counter accounts, counter-actions and counter-audit) to destabilize the dominant 
hegemony or expose contradictions within the arena, thereby proffering the potential to 
bring “hidden transcripts” (truths) to the surface (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown et al., 
2015; Tregidga, 2017). 
 
4.3. EXTENDING DIALOGIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENGAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE WITH 
AN INSIGHT INTO THE DYNAMIC CONFLICT ARENA FRAMEWORK 
This study adopts the conflict arena (Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008, 2012; 
Thomson et al., 2015; Renn, 1992) to capture dialogic and counter accounting 
engagements of the participants of a case study that escalated into different conflict arenas. 
The conflict arena was described as a metaphor that represent the symbolic location of 
engagements associated with social, political and contested nature of a controversy that 
affect and is affected by the collective decisions of different arena participants’ ideologies, 
rationalities, values and intentions (Renn, 1992; Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Dey and 
Russell, 2014; Smith et al., 2010; Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2013, 2017). It is 
considered that different arena participants, such as political institutions, rule enforcers, 
corporations, local and international advocacy NGOs, developmental NGOs, 
shareholders’ activist groups, community stakeholders, the general public and the media, 
interact and use their social resources such as social influence, money, power, value, 
reputation, knowledge and evidence to pursue their objectives and to influence the 
collective outcomes and decisions within the arena (Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008, 
2012; Tregidga, 2013). An arena study is considered appropriate for this study to 
understand and analyse or make sense of the struggle for transformative changes, complex 
issues and interactions surrounding the giving and receiving of accounts, which enabled 
the arena participants to adopt different engagement tactics to seek sustainable outcomes 
in accordance with their values and ideologies (Thomson et al., 2015; Renn, 1992). 
The arena concept was introduced into the accounting literature by Georgakopoulos and 
Thomson (2008) to explore the dynamic engagement and social reporting interplay among 
stakeholders of the Scottish salmon farming industry by using a single conflict arena 
model (Thomson et al., 2015). Georgakopoulos and Thomson (2008) argued that 
stakeholders within the arena used multiple accounts to disseminate unsustainable 
practices of the salmon farming industry and the ineffectiveness of the regulatory system 
to protect the consumers and the ecosystems from degradation. This arena metaphor was 
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used to understand the contested dynamics of these multiple accounts among the arena 
participants where salmon was farmed (pp.1120-1121). Furthermore, this framework was 
used to explore the effectiveness of multiple accounts or evidence as a form of 
sustainability reform agenda. They asserted that the interactions and the utilisation of such 
multiple accounts became complex when there were multiple stakeholders’ engagements; 
thereby resulting in multiple accountabilities disorder (MAD) (Koppell, 2005). 
Stakeholders were assumed to adopt diverse and complex tools or social resources to 
enforce change and afterwards adopt the same instruments to evaluate their contribution 
to the emancipatory change processes within the arena. These social resources were 
argued to influence structural rule processes and the interactions within the arena 
(Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008). Within the salmon farming arena, three (3) forms 
of accounts were expected – compliance account (determined by the rules, sanctions 
avoided and rewards of the specific regulatory regime), legitimating (impression 
management) account and counter-account (problem and context specific) prepared by 
independent organisations on behalf of the others, opposing the activities of the powerful 
stakeholders to address power imbalance (Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008, p.1122-
1123). They argued that the formal governance processes required an account indicating 
compliance by the powerful stakeholders (companies) to be disseminated to the other 
stakeholders to avert punitive and delegitimising sanctions that might be detrimental to 
their operations. Where the influence of the structural rule processes was not possible, the 
strategy adopted was to construct counter-accounts underpinned by diverse ideologies to 
problematize the detrimental effect of the corporation and regulators’ operations on the 
other stakeholders. 
Georgakopoulos and Thomson (2008) study revealed an assemblage of social reports that 
seek to control and address (un)sustainable production practices within the Salmon 
farming arena, which could be applied in other controversial arenas where operational 
inefficiencies, human rights violations, poverty, environmental degradation, climate 
change, ineffective governance mechanisms, adoption of double standards and starvation 
have been observed in order to contextualise, conceptualise and problematize the enormity 
of (un)sustainable production practices (Thomson, 2014a). However, Thomson et al., 
(2015) argued that the adoption of a single conflict arena cannot resolve the problem of 
unsustainable practices within a controversial arena but arena participants seeking change 
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often “engage a variety of different conflict arenas simultaneously over periods of time, 
particularly when the cause of the problematic behaviour is related to the actions of 
powerful groups in society.” Thus, adopting the dynamic conflict arenas that transcend 
different arenas to problematize and resolve unsustainable practices as embedded in 
Thomson et al., (2015), Georgakopoulos and Thomson (2008) and Renn (1992) enabled 
the author to 
“represent the key actors involved, their patterns of interaction, communication 
and the processes that affect the collective outcome (if any). [because] It is 
assumed that the assemblage of engagement practices by actors will differ and be 
shaped by different tactical intentions, that are in turn contingent on the collective 
dynamics of the conflict resolution process” (Thomson et al., 2015, p.812). 
It is pertinent to emphasize as presented in figure 1 below (p.73) that using the arena 
framework to analyse the nature of engagement does not necessarily reflect genuine 
dialogic engagements because it could imply an oppressive engagement to drive unequal 
power and accountability relations as evidenced in chapter 6, 7 and 8. The conflict arena 
framework was used in this study to differentiate the stakeholders and their interaction to 
drive a dialogic accountability and engagement process to facilitate effective governance 
regimes, sustainable corporate and environmental practices (Bebbington et al., 2007; 
Brown, 2009; Thomson et al., 2015). 
The conflict arena enabled the author to explore empirical evidence from different arena 
participants as to their ideologies, values and beliefs, engagement and accountability 
practices, patterns of interaction and communication channels, and the assumed 
knowledge of the power dynamics associated with the conflict. In the conflict arenas, 
power dynamics are considered to be affected by a number of factors, such as social 
resources, external legitimacy, the invisibility of governance processes and levels of 
collusion/corruption (Renn, 1992; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Tregidga, 2013, 
2017).  
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The arena approach enabled the author to take cognisance of the wide range of the 
dynamic counter accounts (systematic, partisan, contra-governing and dialogic), 
accountability and engagement interactions among the stakeholders. Furthermore, this 
approach enabled the author to critically explore the differences in ideologies, 
rationalities, and values of the arena participants in addressing the problematic issues on 
accountability, engagement, human rights and sustainable development in the Delta 
arena. In addition, adopting the arena approach enabled the author to make sense of the 
complex accountability and engagement interactions in the giving and receiving of the 
accounts of conduct to bridge the accountability and governance gaps and to drive the 
respect for human rights and sustainable development in the local arenas 
(Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Dey and Russell, 2014; Renn, 1992; Thomson et 
al., 2015; Tregidga, 2013, 2017). As shown in figure 1 above (p.73), there are different 
actors, engaging in the Delta arena to address the conflicts enunciated in chapter 6, 7 and 
8. This approach along with dialogic accountability and engagement theory help confirm 
or contradict the implication of counter accounting technologies within the Delta arena 
(see chapter 8). 
However, previous studies that adopted the arena concept placed the corporations at the 
centre of the arena while the community stakeholders are placed at the periphery (see 
figure 1 above, p.73) (see Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008, 2012; Dey and Russell, 
2014; Thomson et al., 2015). In this study, specifically from the perspective of dialogic 
theory of actions, the community stakeholders are placed at the epicentre because they 
could be argued to bear the potential human rights, accountability and governance 
unsustainable practices or risk from the exploratory and extractive activities in the Delta 
arena (see figure 2 below, p.75). Besides bearing the potential human rights risk, they 
often seek to influence policies, practices or formal structures by engaging the 
international and local advocacy NGOs, supranational organisations and international 
courts (Renn, 1992; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008).  
Furthermore, where the corporations are placed at the centre of the arena, despite the 
negative impacts of their activities on the other stakeholders, it implies that a case for 
stakeholders’ dialogic accountability and engagement (giving and receiving of accounts) 
could not be effectively established to influence outcomes. Instead, the business case lens 
which involves the engagement or disclosure of corporate information to the other 
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stakeholders (top-down) for their benefit or to legitimize their reputation or bottom-line 
could be made (Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Andrews, 2013; Idemudia, 2007; O’Dwyer, 
2003, Dillard, 2014; Owen et al., 2001). Furthermore, placing the corporations at the 
epicentre of the arena implies that heterogenous interactions/engagements for 
accountability, governance, human rights, power equality and sustainable development 
within an arena could be limited to enhancing the business case (Brennan and Merkl-
Davies, 2014; Killian, 2010; Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2009). Additionally, it 
could imply that the dynamic complexities of the interactions and engagements among 
the differentiated stakeholders would be sufficiently restricted and articulated on a 
business case argument, which revolves on reinforcing corporate strategies for financial 
performance and reputation rather than mitigating harm on the others. This implies that 
researchers could be restricted from understanding what prevents effective accountability 
and governance in an unsustainable arena from different arena participants (Baker, 2010; 
Spence, 2009; Gray, 2006; Adams, 2004). 
Centralizing the one causing the harm in the middle of the conflict arena and viewing the 
community stakeholders (the oppressed as evidenced in this case study) as not a 
stakeholder (see chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9) might not be tenable in this context because the 
fundamental rights of the oppressed could be viewed as not important if they are 
considered as a major stakeholders. However, where their environmental and human 
rights have been violated by the exploratory and extractive activities of the corporations 
and third parties; and the lack of an effective governance structure to ensure their human 
rights is protected, any engagements for accountability and effective governance, 
inclusive accountability and sustainable development mechanism should be geared 
towards the ability of the marginalised stakeholders to live sustainably (see figure 2 
above, p.75). The other stakeholders or the community stakeholders (oppressed 
stakeholders) could form coalitions with campaigning NGOs to legitimise their clamour 
for an effective dialogic accountability and governance system (Bebbington et al., 2007; 
Brown and Dillard, 2015; Dillard and Roslender, 2011). Understanding the dialogic 
engagement of the other stakeholders or the oppressed stakeholders within the arena could 
broaden and open up conversations on how to improve accountability and governance 
within controversial arenas. 
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The centralisation of the community stakeholders (oppressed) in the dynamic conflict 
arena could broaden and extend such conversations as empirically evidence in the Delta. 
This influenced the author’s argument for an inverted arena model to recognise the 
excluded marginalised groups perceived to bear the negative consequences of the actions 
of the corporations and the government (see figure 2 above, p.75) and their role in 
influencing the formal accountability and governance mechanisms. This inverted arena 
model is useful in analysing the arena participants’ counter accounts, ideologies, values, 
interest, rationalities/logics strategies and networks/coalitions of engagement to influence 
the outcomes of their arenas engagement on accountability, governance, sustainable 
development, the protection and the respect of human rights (Thomson et al., 2015; Renn, 
1992; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008, 2012; Joutsenvirta, 2011). This inverted 
arena model could be applied in other controversial arena discourse or it could be 
embedded in other analytical frameworks such as the lifecycle and pathways to conflict 
resolution (discussed in the next section). It could be applied in other controversial arenas 
for instance where the community stakeholders’ wellbeing is arguably envisaged as 
paramount to the debate for accountability, inclusive and dialogic engagement, and the 
effectiveness of governance of human rights and sustainable environment. 
 
4.4. LINKING DIALOGIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND DYNAMIC INVERTED CONFLICT 
ARENA WITH THE LIFECYCLE AND PATHWAYS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK 
4.4.1. EXPLORING THE LIFECYCLE AND PATHWAYS TO CONFLICT(S) RESOLUTION 
THROUGH DYNAMIC INVERTED ARENA, AND DIALOGIC ACCOUNTABILITY APPROACH 
The author argued that there is a potential benefit for a dialogic accountability framework 
to drive an emancipatory and transformative stakeholder’s dialogue for governance and 
accountability reforms in the Delta arena. The absence of this formal framework was 
argued to drive counter accounting technologies as a practice of freedom (see chapter 8) 
in problematizing and publicizing the human rights, accountability and governance gaps, 
sustainable development and inclusive ownership conflicts, and in educating the 
indigenous people to be the drivers of the change they desire through participatory 
accountability and governance mechanisms. 
On the other hand, the (inverted) arena framework (see section 4.3) provided a framework 
that explores the governance and accountability gaps from the different arena 
participants’ perception and how they attempt or interact to influence the engagement 
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outcomes within an arena. The application of the arena framework in exploring the 
perception of the arena participants (see chapter 7) provided a useful framework for 
explaining and exploring the contested notions of accountability, governance, power 
relations, justice, fair and sustainable environment and engagement relations within the 
arena and the discourses to prevent and resolve these conflicting perspectives within the 
arena. Hence, it is essential to explore how the contested issues are understood by 
different stakeholders’ group and how dialogic engagement reveal the underlining values, 
ideologies and assumptions to resolve the conflicting notions of social and environmental 
justice, accountability, inclusive engagement for human rights and sustainable 
development in order to support previous research by Dey and Gibbon, 2014; Brown et 
al., 2015; Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000; Tregidga et al., 2015b, 2012; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2016. 
However, the arena framework does not theoretically and chronologically express how 
the accountability and governance gaps ensuing from oil spills, gas flaring, human rights 
violations, inadequate wealth distribution, and marginalization of the less economically 
powerful stakeholders culminating in conflicts and violence could be resolved in the 
arena. Hence, it is essential to explore the dynamic and complex governance, 
accountability and engagement interactions and its limitations in the arena. It is also 
important to explore how counter accounting technologies by the advocacy NGOs build 
networks of accountability and engagement to problematize and resolve the conflicts due 
to the absence of regulatory compliance by the corporations and the inability of the 
regulatory agencies to enforce its regulations to resolve the conflicts at the local arenas of 
the Delta. Thus, the inverted arena is considered useful in exploring the perception of the 
arena participants on the oil spill, gas flaring, accountability and governance on the 
conflicts for human rights and sustainable development by understanding the dialogic 
accountability discourses that could help prevent and resolve the conflicts through the 
different arena participants in the Delta arena (Renn, 1992; Thomson et al., 2015; 
Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008, 2012). For instance, Renn (1992, p.196) argued 
that  
“…the theory [arena framework] may advance our knowledge…about present 
arenas and the actors within each arena. This knowledge can also help to 
restructure arenas or to assist the actors in the arena to overcome stalemates and 
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to reach a viable compromise…[because]… it is based on a pluralistic and 
democratic policy style…”  
A dialogic framework is required to resolve and prevent the conflicts as revealed through 
the arena framework (see chapter 7) in understanding the chronologies of the 
accountability and governance gaps from the perception of the different arena participants 
besides broadening and opening up discourses on human rights and sustainable 
development, and giving ‘voices’ and ‘identities’ to the marginalized stakeholders group 
in chapter 7 and 8 (Burchell and Cook, 2013a, b; Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007; Gray 
et al., 2014b; Kneip, 2013). Beyond the arena framework and the dynamic of counter 
accounting technologies in problematizing and publishing the conflicts emerging from 
unequal power relations, accountability and governance gaps, the conflicts could be 
prevented or resolved when the powerful stakeholders, the advocacy NGOs and the 
oppressed stakeholders envisaged that their desire for emancipatory and transformative 
changes could be better served or pursued through a dialogic policy framework (dialogic 
accountability) to resolve the conflicts and to address the unequal power relations (Freire, 
2002; Thomson and Bebbington, 2004, 2005; Dillard and Roslender, 2011; Belal et al., 
2015; Spence, 2009; Blackburn et al., 2014; Brown, 2009).  
By recognising the dynamic of the counter accountings and dialogic engagement of the 
advocacy NGOs’ voices and the identities of the oppressed stakeholders in articulating 
their desired inclusive form of accounting (new accounting) for the advancement of 
human rights and sustainable development within this arena, it is pertinent to propose the 
lifecycle and pathways to conflict(s) resolution into the dialogic accountability literatures 
and arena discourse by building on previous research such as Freire, 2002; Thomson and 
Bebbington, 2005; Brown, 2009; Thomson et al., 2015; Georgakopoulos and Thomson 
2008, 2012; Brown et al., 2015; Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000; Tregidga, 2017; Vinnari 
and Laine, 2017. This proposed framework encapsulates on the relative hegemony of the 
new accountings as contextually situated in educating or reshaping identities that would 
reform the dominant syntax or institutional structures through dialogue. Thus, the 
proposed framework could explain how conflicts in controversial arenas “could”11 be 
                                                          
11 “could” is used because previous research has shown that one conflict may evolve or escalate into bigger conflicts 
across different arenas (see den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Thomson et al., 2015; Kneip, 2013).  
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resolved through a dialogic accountability and engagement approach from the democratic 
and deliberative participation of the different arena participants. For instance, Brown and 
Dillard (2015b, p.964) argued that “democratic participatory governance [dialogic 
accounting] requires that affected stakeholders and public be able to scrutinise and debate 
the values and interests at stake from diverse perspectives.” Nevertheless, the inclusion 
of the lifecycle and pathways to conflict(s) resolution (not proposed as a normative 
structure) could enable arena participants and researchers to critically scrutinize whether 
institutional, economic and environmental conflicts for human rights and sustainable 
development have been prevented and resolved, and to evaluate if their values, ideologies 
and interests were considered, protected, respected and accounted for by the stakeholders 
within an arena. During the process of resolving the conflicts, the arena participants are 
expected to dialogue to redefine the scale of the conflicts through a constructive 
knowledge exchange process that allows feedback for the common good of all arena 
participants rather than narrowly privileging or focusing on what is done by the advocacy 
NGOs, corporations and the government to address human rights violations and 
unsustainable practices as will be discussed in chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9.    
This proposed framework through the dialogic accountability approach is envisaged to 
capture existing social arrangements to recognise the diversities of ideologies, values, 
interests, beliefs, expectations and knowledge in participatory accountability and 
governance platform that recognise the significant of the others in addressing conflicts, 
unequal power relations, unsustainable, human rights and environmental practices as 
encapsulated in the dialogic and arena accounting literatures (Thomson and Bebbington, 
2004, 2005; Tregidga, 2013; Dey et al., 2011; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008, 
2012). For instance, Dillard (2016, p.102) argued that this “discursive engagements are 
seen as interactions that potentially construct, deconstruct and/or reconstruct social and 
political identities, facilitating the possibilities for questioning, modifying and changing 
dominant narratives.”  
The lifecycle and pathways to conflict(s) resolution framework could be used to 
reflectively question problematic accountability and governance practices that do not 
advance human rights and sustainable development within contested arenas (Kneip, 2013; 
Joutsenvirta, 2011; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000; Cooper 
et al., 2005). The pathway to conflict(s) resolution through dialogic accountability could 
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enable the arena participants to recreate their worldview by disrupting the existing social 
order to drive accountability processes and practices, and inclusive stakeholders’ 
engagement for transformative changes within the arena (Brown et al., 2015). This is 
because it recognises that individuals could recreate their worldview and identity through 
dialogic engagements with others or through diverse dialogic pathways to freedom, 
especially with the stakeholders that could conscientize them to criticise and recreate their 
worldviews to drive sustainable and transformative (intra)intergenerational changes 
(Freire, 2002; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Tregidga, 2017; Contrafatto et al., 
2015).12 
These diverse dialogic pathways to freedom and accountability framework (see figure 3 
below, p.82) could open up diverse conversation, contestation and negotiation for social 
and environmental justice, human rights, equality of power, inclusive ownership, and 
enable arena participants to assume responsibilities for the re-arrangement of the social 
order they are experiencing (Brown et al., 2015; Thomson, 2014b). For instance, Gray et 
al., (2014b, p.271) argued that “…social life must always be negotiatory if it is not to 
degenerate into more violence, and negotiation can only operate in an environment in 
which there is also a commitment to hold to account and give accounts” of conducts. 
Hence, drawing essentially from the dialogic literatures (for instance, Brown et al., 2015, 
Contrafatto et al., 2015; Brown, 2009; Gallhofer et al., 2015), the lifecycle and pathways 
to conflict(s) resolution recognise the need for negotiation through dialogic accountability 
and engagement of the arena participants such as the communities, the corporations, the 
shareholders’ activist group, the developmental NGOs, the advocacy NGOs, the 
regulatory agencies or rule enforcers, political institutions and the media in changing the 
social order within this arena.   
The framework as empirically explored in chapter 8 revealed that there could be a radical 
approach to counter accounts and advocacy to conflict(s) resolution. The radical approach 
emerges where negotiation for accountability and engagement for human rights and 
sustainable development have to be compelled through extensive boycotts, mass 
movement confrontational protest, lobbying and external pressure such as through the  
                                                          
12 This is elucidated in chapter 7 and 8, specifically through the dynamic engagement of the advocacy NGOs in 
educating the indigenous people to be the drivers of the changes in resolving the conflicts.  
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international advocacy NGOs, shareholders’ activist groups and political institutions. The 
radical approach assume that sustainable change would emerge through networks of 
empowering and engaging the oppressed, who are directly affected by the negative 
consequences of unsustainable practices by being the agent of change through 
confrontational and symbolic actions (see section 8.4) (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; 
Fitzgerald and Rodger, 2000). Whilst the author recognised that there was a radical 
approach to conflict(s) resolution in this study, conflict(s) resolution for the respect of 
human rights and sustainable development could also be engineered through respectful 
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This lifecycle and pathways to conflict(s) resolution could be adopted to understand how 
multiple conflicts in contested arenas emerge from broken promises, denial, unequal 
power relations, dialogic gaps, governance and accountability gaps, human rights 
violations, marginalization of the subalterns and environmental pollution. The framework 
could also help understand the intervention of external parties such as the advocacy 
NGOs’ counter accounts and networks of engagements (see section 8.2) to facilitate a 
dialogic process to ameliorate or resolve these conflicts for a sustainable environment and 
human rights. The lifecycle and pathways to conflict(s) resolution could explore the 
emergence of conflicts, and the stakeholders’ interaction within an arena to prevent or 
resolve the conflicts amicably through a dialogic accountability policy framework 
regardless of their ideologies, interest, tactics of engagement, intentions, values or 
knowledge (see section 9.1, 7.2 and 8.4) (Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Thomson 
et al., 2015; Bebbington et al., 2007; Spence, 2009). For instance, Brown and Dillard, 
(2015, p.964) argued that “…dialogic accounting aims to support progressive change 
through the democratization of accounting” but the lifecycle and pathways to conflicts 
could be envisioned as a framework to understand the processes for sustainable change 
within an arena. This would enable accounting technologies to be conceptualised and 
evaluated across conflict arenas which promote dialogic accountability that exposes 
stakeholders to their rights and responsibilities as explicated by Thomson and 
Bebbington, 2005; Contraffato et al., 2015; Dillard and Yuthas, 2013; Bebbington et al., 
2007; Laine and Vinnari, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 2017; Tregidga, 2017; Gallhofer et 
al., 2015; Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016; Belal et al., 2015.  
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It is expedient to highlight that there could be intra-and-inter arenas conflict(s) resolutions 
occurring across different arenas such as the local, national, regional and international 
arenas as fleshed out in chapter 8. The resolutions could occur through the typologies of 
counter accounts to explore the state of false consciousness, educating the oppressed and 
through collaborative actions for transformative and emancipatory change in 
controversial arenas (Thomson et al., 2015; Apostol, 2015; Freire, 2002; Gallhofer and 
Haslam, 2003; Joutsenvirta, 2011; Kneip, 2013). Therefore, the lifecycle and pathways 
to conflict(s) resolution could be used in recognising and understanding the evolution of 
conflicts and how counter-accounting and dialogic accountability are used to prevent, 
manage or resolve the social, economic and environmental needs ensuing from such 
conflicts for sustainable development and human rights.  
This lifecycle and pathways to conflict(s) resolution could be used to understand the 
nature and pathways to dialogic engagements used in preventing or resolving 
accountability and governance practices (contested social and environmental issues) 
before they escalate and after their escalation. This author did not envisaged that conflict 
is static rather it is dynamic and changes over the conflicts’ lifecycle or phases 
(Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005; Kriesberg, 2010). For instance, Swanstrom and 
Weissmann (2005, p.9) argued that “an understanding of the conflict cycle is essential for 
an understanding of how, where and when to apply different strategies and measures of 
conflict prevention and management.” The dynamic of the lifecycle and pathways to 
conflict(s) resolution implies that the conflict for sustainable development and respect of 
human rights practices may form a recurrent cycle (see figure 3 above, p.82) after it had 
been deemed to have been prevented, resolved, or de-escalated.  
 
4.4.2. PHASES OF THE LIFECYCLE AND PATHWAYS TO CONFLICT(S) RESOLUTION 
THROUGH AN ARENA AND DIALOGIC ACCOUNTABILITY APPROACH 
As depicted in figure 3 (see p.82) and building on Thomson et al., (2015, p.817-820), the 
lifecycle and pathways to conflict(s) resolution are classified into three (3) phases – early, 
open and the later phase. 
 
4.4.2.1. THE EARLY PHASE OF CONFLICT  
This phase is characterised by latent conflict and conflict emergence. These could be 
viewed as the conflict prevention phase (Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005). At the latent 
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conflict stage, potential conflicts could emerge when unsustainable practices such as 
governance and accountability gaps, unequal power relations, non-inclusive engagement, 
unsustainable social, economic and environmental practices are allowed to occur and are 
unsolved. In this case study, conflicts could be viewed to have emerged due to spill and 
gas flaring, and human rights violations practices, which were unresolved by the 
corporations and the regulators through dialogues and effective remediation exercises. At 
this stage, conflicts could exist whenever there are unequal power relations among 
individuals, groups, communities, corporations, regulatory agencies that affect the ability 
of individuals, groups and communities to live sustainably but might not be a sufficient 
ground for the emergence and escalation of conflicts (see figure 3 above, p.82). The 
conflict could emerge when there is (are) triggering event(s) stimulating the emergence 
and the escalation of the conflict for sustainable social, economic and environmental 
practices and may be followed by stalemate or resolution, and it could become a re-
occurring conflict. At the latent stage, empirical evidence explores the historical 
perception of the conflict of interests through interviews and documentary analysis to 
understand the underlying time scale,13 physical or conceptual conditions that resulted in 
conflict within an arena (see chapter 6).  
The conflict emergence stage is analogous to the “conflict initiation” stage as elucidated 
by Thomson et al., 2015. This stage emerges when the constructive engagement and 
dialogue to prevent the social tensions and contradictions inherent in the latent conflict 
stage does not resolve the tensions from growing into conflict. This stage is characterised 
by a critical awareness of the dominant hegemonic structure or discourse and the need for 
an emancipatory and transformative social, economic and environmental change by the 
oppressed within the arena (Cooper et al., 2005; Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2009; 
Solomon and Thomson, 2009; Kneip, 2013). Conflicts could emerge when the oppressed 
through the support of experts critically evaluate the social and economic systems that 
have marginalised their ability to live sustainably (Freire, 2002). The emergence of 
conflict could occur because of conscientization and reflection, especially when there is 
a sudden awareness of the dehumanizing and alienating practices, and the divide and rule 
or manipulative strategies (anti-dialogic tactics) adopted by the powerful stakeholders 
against the other stakeholders (see chapter 7, Bebbington et al., 2007; Contrafatto et al., 
                                                          
13 To understand the origin of the conflict and the trend overtime. 
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2015 and Freire, 2002). The conscientization of the oppressed by the experts could enable 
them to re-evaluate their worldview of these practices to come to a common cultural voice 
for engagement and transformative changes by taking on the struggle or “dialogic 
activism” (practice of freedom) to change the dominant hegemony (Brennan and Merkl-
Davies, 2014; Thomson and Bebbington, 2005; Tregidga, 2017; Dey et al., 2011; Gray et 
al., 2014b). The conscientization (enlightenment) of the other stakeholders to critically 
recognise unsustainable practices through transformative actions are often driven or 
created through the intervention of external or internal activists, which in this case are the 
grassroots advocates,14 advocacy NGOs (laNGOs and iaNGOs) and the supranational 
NGOs. The conscious awareness of these unsustainable practices by the other 
stakeholders often results in conflicts to transform the established dominant language of 
unsustainable practices or human rights violations.  
At the conflict emergence stage, empirical evidence explores perception on when the 
conflict emerged (by asking the what, why and who questions to understand the factors, 
physical or conceptual reasons for the past conflictual actions) and what was 
constructively done by the arena participants using the inverted arena framework (see 
chapter 7) to prevent it or to expose contradictions in beliefs, ideologies, values and 
expectations for accountability and sustainable development. Furthermore, the 
exploratory historical analysis was conducted to understand the dynamic nature of the 
conflict for accountability, governance, human rights, sustainable development, and 
practice (see chapter 6). 
 
4.4.2.2. THE OPEN PHASE OF CONFLICT 
This phase is characterised by the escalation of conflicts, confrontation and 
problematization through counter accounting technologies and stalemate/deadlock from 
the non-dialogic engagement phase. These could be viewed as the conflict management 
phase (Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005). The escalation of conflicts, confrontation and 
problematization is characterized by the intensity and scope of the conflicts. The intensity 
and scope of the conflict could increase through violence or non-violence protest and 
resistance to address human rights violations and unsustainable practices, which could 
                                                          
14 The grassroots advocate having discovered the need to be free from repression and to engage, strived to instigate that 
desire for freedom in the indigenous people of the communities.  
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result in destructive attacks, the coalition of persuasive efforts, deaths, and the 
militarization of the arena by the powerful stakeholders (Kriesberg, 2010). Furthermore, 
the escalation stage could be characterized by the globalization of activism through 
protest, publicity stunts, musical campaigns and advertising, extensive communities’ 
engagement, the use of diverse counter accounting technologies such as lobbying, the 
media and other innovative strategies such as Facebook, Twitter, Blogs, YouTube, 
Instagram to initiate, perpetuate, escalate and confront the powerful stakeholders (see 
chapter 8). Counter accounts could be in the form of evidence-based systematic, partisan, 
contra-governing and dialogic accounts (see chapter 8, Thomson et al., 2015). However, 
does counter accounts expose and challenge the unsustainable practices of the powerful 
stakeholders and de-legitimize the compliance discourse of the corporations and the 
governance regimes to recreate dialogues, facilitate transformative changes and to engage 
the community stakeholders, the national and international audience in the Delta arena? 
At this stage, semi-structured interviews were conducted to explore the conflict arenas 
and its networks of accountability and engagement, the actors, the nature of the conflicts 
within the different arenas, the types of counter accounts produced, and the strategies 
adopted by the arena participants to drive accountability and governance reforms or 
emancipatory changes for human rights and sustainable development.  
The stalemate/deadlock from the non-dialogic stage could evolve from the latent, conflict 
emergence, escalation and conflict(s) resolution stage (see pathways’ lines and 3.4.2.3 
below). The intensity and scope of the conflicts characterized the stalemate stage, 
especially when the awareness and concerns for sustainable environmental practices and 
the protection and respect of human rights become a reality which cannot be offset by the 
other stakeholders (marginalised group and advocacy NGOs) for unsustainable practices 
or ineffective accountability and governance mechanism. Often, stalemate could result in 
extensive social injustice, violence or non-violence protest, resistance and mass 
movement and media campaigns, destructive attacks, non-dialogical engagement with the 
powerful stakeholders. The non-dialogic struggle could force institutional change, 
negotiation or compel the powerful stakeholders to re-evaluate their strategies or policies 
that impinged on the ability of the other stakeholders to live sustainably or to participate 
in decision-making. Furthermore, power inequalities might cause the powerful 
stakeholders to militarise or use force on the other stakeholders causing them (other 
stakeholders) to change their initial engagement tactics, thereby escalating the conflicts 
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leading to deadlock, and concurrently hindering progressive accountability, engagement 
and sustainable development discourse and changes. It is pertinent to emphasize that the 
absence of dialogic accounts and actions or an inept handling of the conflict at the 
emergence and escalation stage (see the pathways’ lines) could result in a 
stalemate/deadlock conflict and then it could culminate into cyclical conflicts (see the 
pathways’ lines). On the other hand, appropriate and timely conflict management 
measures and effective dialogue and actions could lead to the conflict(s) resolution phase 
(see figure 3 above [p.82] and 4.4.2.3 below). At the stalemate stage, empirical evidence 
explores the perception of the stakeholders and what was (non)constructively done by the 
arena participants using the inverted arena framework to compel dialogic accountability 
and transformative changes (see chapter 7).  
 
4.4.2.3. THE LATER PHASE OF CONFLICT 
This phase is characterised by the dialogic accountability and engagement stage, the 
conflict(s) resolution stage and the collaborative actions stage. These could be viewed as 
the conflict de-escalation phase (Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005; Thomson et al., 
2015). The dialogic accountability stage emerges when the arena participants decide to 
resolve the conflicts through a dialogic engagement approach (see chapter 4, 7, 8) with 
the aim of establishing effective dialogic relations to prevent the emergence of new 
conflict within the arena. This stage is characterised by the critical awareness of the need 
for negotiation, peacebuilding, stakeholders’ engagement and accountability leading to 
de-escalation or conflict resolution or the escalation or the re-emergence of new conflicts 
(see the pathways’ lines) when dialogic engagement fails to address the conflicts for an 
emancipatory and transformative social, economic and environmental change within the 
arena (Contrafatto et al., 2015; Cooper et al., 2005; Joutsenvirta, 2011; Gray et al., 
2014b). Furthermore, this stage is characterised by an accountability and engagement 
platform that enables the arena participants to speak their truth to power to address 
unsustainable practices (Thomson et al., 2015; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; 
Spence, 2009; Gallhofer et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017). This form of engagement through 
actions implies that the arena participants are expected to be accountable for their actions 
and to be responsible for their implicit and explicit actions that impact on the ability of 
the others to live sustainably (Parker, 2014; Brown and Dillard, 2015a; Dillard, 2014; 
Messner, 2009; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007; Robert, 2009). At this stage, independent 
stakeholders such as the advocacy NGOs or developmental NGOs could be envisaged as 
89 
 
 
experts that help educate the people, thereby creating the platform to dialogically address 
the absence of inclusive accountability, ineffective governance and unsustainable human 
rights and environmental practices. However, in this case study, are there dialogic 
accountability platforms for all stakeholders to engage with the oil industry and the 
established governance mechanisms (NOSDRA, DPR), besides the dialogic platforms 
initiated by the NGOs? Therefore, at the dialogic accountability stage, empirical evidence 
explores the perception of the stakeholders and the interactions among them on what was 
(non)constructively done (strategies) by the arena participants using the inverted arena 
framework (see chapter 7) and the Levels of activism, accountability and engagement in 
a conflict arenas: the nature of conflicts, types of counter accounts and the approach (see 
chapter 8) to compel dialogic accountability, transformative changes and the hindrances. 
This would enable potential researchers to explore whether dialogic accountability has 
foster transformative changes within a controversial arena or has failed in facilitating the 
protection and respect of human rights and transformative changes.  
The conflict(s) resolution stage emerges when the arena participants decide to resolve the 
conflicts through contractual agreement, and dialogic accountability approach (see 
chapter 7, 8 and 9) with the aim of de-escalating the conflict and reconciling the power 
inequalities, accountability and governance gaps to prevent the emergence of new 
conflicts or its escalation within the arena (see the pathways’ lines) (Kriesberg, 2010; 
Thomson et al., 2015). Conflict resolution could occur at all levels of activism within the 
dynamic arenas because it enables the arena participants to critically evaluate the 
underlying causes of the conflicts and to seek accountable and dialogic mechanisms to 
resolve them to prevent the (re)emergence of future conflicts. Furthermore, effective 
conflict resolution strategies could ensure that there are equal power relations for 
accountability and engagement when the different ideologies, values and beliefs that 
characterised the conflicts are critically evaluated by the arena participants (Wayne et al., 
2016). It is essential to emphasize as stated by Thomson et al., (2015, p.818) that the 
arena participants could arrive at a conflict resolution phase without going through the 
conflict escalation, stalemate or dialogic accountability phases and it could be difficult to 
resolve the conflict(s) where the arena participants are characterised by polarised 
ideologies, interests and views. Therefore, it is essential to explore how conflicts are 
resolved through the intervention of the advocacy NGOs, shareholders’ activist groups or 
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developmental NGOs in this case study to broaden out conversations on dialogic 
engagements (Bebbington et al., 2007; Laine and Vinnari, 2017). 
Finally, the collaborative actions stage could emerge when the arena participants decide 
to resolve the conflicts through a dialogic accountability and engagement approach (see 
chapter 7, 8 and 9) with the aim of de-escalating the conflict to prevent the emergence of 
new conflicts or its escalation or a latent conflict within the arena (see the pathways’ lines) 
(Kriesberg, 2010). Furthermore, this stage is characterised by the respect and protection 
of human rights, peace-building policies towards sustainable environment and 
development, and collaboration to hold stakeholders accountable. This stage could lead 
to a new round of conflicts (latent) or could escalate the previous conflict(s) when not 
properly resolved (see the pathways’ lines in figure 3 above, p.82). This implies that 
without this phase, human rights violations and conflict over resource management could 
result in the escalation of the conflict, if not collectively resolved (Uhl and Wiesener, 
2010). Thus, at this stage, empirical evidence explores whether there is an extensive 
collaboration among the arena participants – community stakeholders, advocacy NGOs, 
regulators, developmental NGOs, the media and the corporations in resolving the 
conflicts by ensuring the respect and protection of human rights, accountability, resource 
distribution and sustainable development.  
 
4.5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this chapter, an attempt was made at theorising dialogic accountability by connecting 
it to external/counter accounting, the arena framework, and the lifecycle and pathways to 
conflicts resolution framework. The author argued that there is potential for dialogic 
accountability in transforming controversial arena engagements and practices by enabling 
the oppressed stakeholders to engage the powerful stakeholders to redefine the 
accountability and governance relations, and the nature of accounts to be disclosed when 
they have been conscientized by the experts. The conscientization of the oppressed could 
enable the oppressed stakeholders to reflect and critique their unsustainable everyday 
realities or unequal power relations to facilitate a knowledge-driven dialogues and actions 
with the powerful stakeholders (Friere, 2002; Bebbington et al. 2007, p.364; Killian, 
2010; Brown et al., 2015; Contrafatto et al., 2015). However, the author argued that 
attracting the interest of all stakeholders including the oppressed to engage in dialogues 
to promote their cause or to speak their truth to power could be difficult, particularly 
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where there is no defined platform for dialogic engagements or actions among all the 
arena participants to address conflicts emerging from unsustainable practices and human 
rights violations. This implies that the ability of all the stakeholders to collectively engage 
and speak their truth or realities could become deciding criteria in advancing human rights 
and sustainable environment, accountability and governance practices within 
controversial arenas (Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Alawattage and 
Wickramasinghe, 2009; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014). 
The absence of a defined dialogic, effective governance and accountability systems 
designed to respect and protect human rights and sustainable development is argued to 
drive the proliferation of external accounts (Laine and Vinnari, 2017; Brown, 2009). 
Nevertheless, counter accounts could also emerge before dialogic processes to create 
visibilities for unsustainable practices, ineffective governance and accountability systems 
that affect the ability of the oppressed to live sustainably. When the desire for inclusive 
dialogic accountability drives the creation of external accounting, it could enable the 
oppressed stakeholders, who are vulnerable to human rights violation by the powerful 
stakeholders to dialogue and demand accounts geared towards significant institutional 
changes. In addition, the desire for a transformative regulatory and accountability changes 
through external accounting could initiate practices of freedom in the creation of networks 
of accountability and governance to trigger interventions from external stakeholders or 
experts to resolve conflicts on human rights violations and unsustainable practices at the 
local arenas (Dey et al., 2011; Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017). However, the 
extent to which this form of accountability and engagement had been able to hold the 
powerful stakeholders to account for the violation of human rights is still vague especially 
from all stakeholders’ perspectives and from developing countries, where human rights 
and unsustainable practices are prevalent (Belal et al., 2015; Sikka, 2011; Alawattage and 
Wickramasinghe, 2009; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Lauwo et al., 2016; Tregidga et al., 
2015; Apostol, 2015; Gallhofer et al., 2011, 2006; Spence, 2009). 
In addition, the arena framework, a metaphor representing the symbolic location that 
captures the engagements of arena participants with different ideologies, values, 
rationalities and intentions was further theorised. In this chapter, the dialogic 
accountability was extended to incorporate the arena framework, and then linked to the 
lifecycle and pathways to conflict resolution framework to theorise how conflicts of 
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unsustainable practices and human rights violations could emerge within an arena, 
prevented and resolved through dialogic engagements regardless of the stakeholders’ 
ideologies, interest, tactics of engagement, intentions, values or knowledge. The lifecycle 
and pathways to conflicts resolution framework provide a methodological approach to 
capture and understand how conflicts are prevented or resolved through exploring the 
historical dimensions and how different external accounting techniques, activist practices 
and dialogic actions are deployed to give voices to the oppressed, make visible 
unsustainable practices and to engage the power stakeholders.   
Consequently, this study would  contribute to knowledge by filling the gaps identified by 
O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2016; Tregidga et al., 2012, 2015; Sikka, 2006; 
Georgeakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Dey et al., 2011; Dey and Gibbon, 2014; 
O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009; Cooper et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2014b; Apostol, 2015; 
Owen, 2008; Spence, 2009; Paisey and Paisey, 2006; Tregidga, 2013, 2017; Burchell and 
Cook, 2013b; Adams, 2004; Kneip, 2013; Joutsenvirta, 2011; den Hond and de Bakker, 
2007; Rodrigue, 2014; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014 to explore the use of counter 
accounts to problematize and represent the oppressed stakeholders whose fundamental 
human rights have been violated. This study contributes to calls for research by Vinnari 
and Laine, 2017; Laine and Vinnari, 2017; Thomson et al., 2015; Gallhofer et al., 2015, 
2011; 2006; Brown, 2009; Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2015 on how counter 
accounts facilitate dialogic actions by exploring the perceptions of not only the advocacy 
NGOs but also the perspectives of the regulators, the corporations, the developmental 
NGOs and the oppressed stakeholders in the Delta. In addition, this study could be viewed 
as a response to calls for research into accountability, governance, corruption and 
environmental degradation that strips wealth and natural endowments from the 
indigenous communities in Africa and developing economies (Rahaman, 2010; Belal et 
al., 2015; Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2009; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Lauwo et 
al., 2016; Sikka, 2011; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). 
Using the dialogic accountability, the arena framework which is subsequently embedded 
in the lifecycle and pathways to conflicts resolution framework, the author is specifically 
interested in exploring the historical evolution of why counter accounts are produced and 
the activist practices to address and drive accountability, advancement of human rights 
and sustainable development within the Niger Delta. Furthermore, this study explores 
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why and how the arena participants perceive accountability and governance gaps, and 
how these impact on the proliferation of counter accounts, the conscientization of the 
oppressed stakeholders and the dialogic engagements of the powerful stakeholders. In 
addition, this study explores how counter accounts are used to bridge accountability and 
governance gaps for the advancement of human rights from the perspective of the 
advocacy NGOs against corporate and governance practices which affect the environment 
and the human rights of the oppressed stakeholders. Finally, this study explores the 
perceived effectiveness of counter accounts for the advancement of human rights through 
the lens of dialogic accountability.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHOD 
 
5.0. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter could be envisaged as a bridge between the literature reviewed, the research 
questions and the empirical chapters of this study. It is pertinent to highlight that the 
process of arriving at the decisions in this chapter, which influenced the preceding and 
subsequent chapters was never a straightforward process. The research questions and 
approach adopted in this study have been reviewed several times, particularly after the 
pilot study and during data analysis as could be viewed in figure 4 (see p.100). This 
chapter highlights the methodological philosophy underpinning this study which 
influenced the research questions, data collection method and the data analysis method 
adopted for this study.  
 
5.1. RESEARCH PARADIGM – ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Ontological assumption adopted in answering the research questions (see section 1.5) 
emphasize what constitute reality in the social world while epistemological assumption is 
the discourse of how reality is understood or known in the social world (Bryman and Bell, 
2011; Chua, 1986; Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Saunders et 
al., 2009; Willmott, 1983).15 The ontological assumption adopted for this study is 
subjective. It reveals that reality is continuously and socially constructed (not objective) 
as individual strive to make meaningful definition or knowledge of their social world 
while the epistemological assumption is interpretivist (not positivist) in nature by adopting 
“thick descriptions”16 of multiple views of phenomena which cannot be reduced to a 
mechanical act (Freire, 2002; Lukka and Modell, 2010; Morgan, 1983; Parker and 
Northcott, 2016). Morgan and Smircich (1980, p.493) argued that the subjectivist view 
reality as a projection of our individual imagination or social construction of our reality 
                                                          
15 For a detailed distinction between subjective and objective research or positivist and interpretivist research, refer to 
(Willmott, 1983; Lukka, 2014; Parker, 2012; Tomkins and Groves, 1983; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Patten, 2015; 
Richardson, 2015; Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Morgan, 1983; Chua, 1986; Gray and Milne, 2015).  
16 The concept of thick descriptions as elucidated by Lukka and Modell (2010); Parker and Northcott, (2016) and 
Charmaz (2006) reflects the quality of being deeply rooted in the social realities of the subjects. For instance, Charmaz 
(2006, p.14) argued that it involves obtaining rich data to seek meaningful contribution to knowledge through “writing 
extensive fieldnotes of observations, collecting respondents' written personal accounts, and/ or compiling detailed 
narratives such as from transcribed tapes of interviews.” 
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and the knowledge of such individual reality is known by interpreting the individual frame 
of reference from the perspective of their worldview. In addition, Chua (1986, p.614) 
argued that “the interpretive…seeks to make sense of human actions by fitting them into 
a purposeful set of individual aims and a social structure of meanings.” This paradigm is 
based on the premise that reality is subjectively or socially constructed by the research 
participants of this study in relation to their interactions with the everyday phenomena 
that influence their interactions and actions in the social world but the author’s role was 
to understand and interpret the meaning of these realities to contribute to knowledge and 
to influence practice (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Prasad, 2005; Hussey and Hussey, 1997; 
Saunders et al., 2009). For instance, Freire (2002, p.107) postulated that as an 
interpretivist  
“We must realize that the aspirations, the motives, and the objectives implicit in 
the meaningful thematics are human aspirations, motives, and objectives. They do 
not exist out there somewhere, as static entities; they are occurring. They are as 
historical as human beings themselves; consequently, they cannot be apprehended 
apart from them. To apprehend these themes [limiting situations] and to 
understand them is to understand both the people who embody them and the reality 
to which they refer…” {emphasis as in the original text} 
As an interpretivist, socially constructed knowledge, intentions, and actions are subject to 
change over time, particularly where new social structures and mechanisms emerge to 
disrupt institutional framework to drive transformative change(s) (Freire, 2002). This 
awareness implies that the stability of causal change in interpretivist research cannot be 
guaranteed because knowledge, intentions and actions of the subject over time play a 
pivotal role in understanding the meaning ascribed to the problems over time (Freire, 
2002; Lukka, 2014; Saunders et al., 2009). This awareness influenced how this study was 
conducted from the conceptual phase to the integration phase (see figure 4, p.100) 
(Morgan, 1983; Silverman, 2010; Tomkins and Groves, 1983). As revealed in chapter 6, 
7, 8 and 9, the author strived to understand the use of counter accounting by conducting 
an exploratory and historical analysis from the 90s along with exploratory in-depth 
interviews with multiple participants to understand and explain what could be envisaged 
as knowledge by adopting a dialogic accountability lens, and arena framework which was 
further extended into the lifecycle and pathways to conflicts resolution.  
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According to Lukka, (2014) and Saunders et al., (2009), the meaning ascribed to problems 
or the subjective motivating factors could be different in diverse context and by different 
participants. For instance, in this case study, the narratives, meaning and perceptions of 
the research problems are subjectively and socially constructed based on the participants’ 
historical and different frame of reference, which varies from one context to another, and 
from one participant to another (Gray and Milne, 2015; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; 
Tomkins and Groves, 1983; Willmott, 1983). This is because the corporations, the local 
and international advocacy NGOs, the developmental NGOs, the regulators (NOSDRA 
and DPR) and the community stakeholders interviewed in this study placed different 
subjective interpretations and meaning to the case study problems. The author’s role was 
to understand the meaning ascribed to the case study problems by stakeholders’ groups to 
arrive at a critical, grounded and constructive conclusion that could contribute to 
knowledge and influence practice (Freire, 2002; Chua and Mahama, 2012; Parker, 2012).  
Although qualitative research has been argued as lacking generalizable value, but 
researchers have often claimed that qualitative research that adopted the thick description 
approach has generalizable value by connecting theory and practice with findings, thereby 
allowing researchers to communicate their research findings across time and space (Chua 
and Mahama, 2012; Yin, 2003). For instance, Parker and Northcott (2016, p.1119) argued 
that “the ability of the researcher to make credible theoretical generalisations is enhanced 
by the use of thick description to explain observed actions and behaviours and by the 
invocation of theoretically grounded analysis and argumentation.” Thus, the qualitative 
principles or concepts and findings generated in this study could be explored in other 
controversial contexts, but the author did not argue that the findings in this study are 
generalizable because they are dynamic and context-specific. The empirical findings from 
this study are generalizable through the theoretical framing adopted in this study, but could 
also be relied on to explore or compare findings in other controversial arenas research 
(Gioia et al., 2012; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Charmaz, 2006; Gray and Milne, 2015).  
The interpretivist perspective assumes that knowledge is socially constructed, and the 
author of this study was consciously interested in understanding or gaining insight into 
the meaning ascribed to phenomena by the research participants (Freire, 2002; Chua, 
1986; Lukka, 2014; O’Gorman and MacIntosh, 2016; Richards and Morse, 2013). For 
instance, Lukka and Modell (2010, p.464) argued that the interpretivist research requires 
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an emic perspective in probing the life-worlds and social rule systems of the people whose 
communication is being investigated by producing enactive knowledge of how change 
occurs due to the interactive engagement of multiple entities (Freire, 2002; Chua and 
Mahama, 2012). Thus, this interpretivist paradigm influenced how this study was 
conducted particularly in the use of qualitative documentary analysis and interviews 
across multiple stakeholders’ groups to deconstruct their social realities on oil spills, gas 
flaring, accountability, governance, human rights and development which the advocacy 
NGOs’ counter accounts and counter actions are problematising to modify social orders.  
Adopting the interpretivist paradigm enabled researchers to draw from different 
theoretical insights (van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2012, p.253; Charmaz, 2006). 
The interpretivist paradigm adopted serves as a guide in situating the research, in 
developing the research questions and in analysing the empirical findings through the 
dialogic accountability lens, and the arena framework as embedded in the lifecycle and 
pathways to conflicts resolution (Gioia et al., 2012; Chua and Mahama, 2012). The 
dialogic accountability lens was used to inform the data analysis and to make the case 
study problems researchable by providing an interpretive mechanism to understand the 
data and to communicate the findings.  
The interpretive approach adopted in this study prevented the narrowing of the findings 
in the empirical chapters to a single analytical framework to explore the dynamics of 
counter accounts and to capture the emerging ideas that could inform other studies (Gray 
and Milne, 2015; Lukka and Modell, 2010; Guthrie and Parker, 2017). The interpretive 
approach enabled the author to modify the initial research questions to reflect the voices 
of the research participants during data analysis. The interpretivist approach created an 
opportunity for theorisation by connecting the research problem, the theoretical framing, 
the research context, and the empirical data (Gioia et al., 2012; Charmaz, 2006; Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967).  
This methodological awareness enabled the author to identify and correct the 
inconsistencies in the subjective realities as constructed by the research participants and 
the author’s initial pre-conceived assumption on the cause of the problem (Freire, 2002; 
Charmaz, 2006). It is pertinent to clarify that at the conceptual phase (see figure 4, p.100), 
the author being a Deltan (although was not raised in the Niger Delta) initially ascribed 
the problem of gas flaring, oil spills and human rights violations as stemming from 
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accountability gaps, particularly on studying the accounts projected by the media, or 
listening to her immediate family members’ accounts, after the initial study of the 
documentary reports and sustainability reports of the corporations. However, there is a 
shift in this perception after the interpretation of the evidence. This initial “social bias”17 
or inconsistencies in the subjective perspective of the author were resolved through the 
philosophical and qualitative approach adopted for this study. The credibility of the 
empirical evidence from one stakeholder group was triangulated with the documentary 
and empirical evidence from the other stakeholders’ groups to understand and explain the 
implications of engagements by advocacy NGOs to improve the lived lives of the Delta 
arena (Everett, 2004; Freire, 200218). This philosophical and methodological approach 
through the combination of methods (sources of data) provided a valid and reliable way 
to develop meaningful understanding of the complex social realities of the stakeholders’ 
empirical evidence and to resolve the author’s initial social bias (Ahrens and Chapman, 
2006; Charmaz, 2006; Everett, 2004; Yin, 2003). 
 
5.2. RESEARCH METHODS 
5.2.1. CASE STUDY APPROACH 
This study adopted a case study approach constituted within a single geographical study 
of the Niger Delta arena (Yin, 2003; Saunders et al., 2009) to explore the dynamics of 
counter accounting and accountability for the advancement of human rights and 
sustainable development. This case study approach incorporated a qualitative 
documentary (content) analysis and interviews (one-on-one and focus groups) evidence 
to provide an in-depth insight into the “why, how and could” questions posed in this study 
(see section 1.5). This case study approach used an interpretivist paradigm which 
influenced how the overall research process was conducted from the conceptual phase, 
data collection technique and to the integration of theoretical chapter with the empirical 
chapters to contribute to knowledge (see figure 4, p.100). It is essential to note that the 
                                                          
17 Everett (2004, p.1076) argued that the “social bias is a bias that affects the researcher’s choice of topic, methodology, 
and analysis of research data.” He claimed that “intellectual honesty” requires that the author address this bias by 
evaluating the motive(s) for conducting the research.  
18 Freire (2002, pp.110-111) argued that “while it is normal for investigators to come to the area with values which 
influence their perceptions, this does not mean that they may transform the thematic investigation into a means of 
imposing these (their subjective) values. The only dimension of these values which it is hoped the people whose 
thematics are being investigated will come to share is a critical perception of the world[view], which implies a correct 
method of approaching reality in order to unveil it.” 
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process of arriving at the final research questions was not a straightforward process. The 
research questions of this study were regularly revisited, including after the data 
collection to integrate the research questions with gaps identified in the literature and the 
theoretical framing for this study. 
The approach enabled the author to theoretically analyse and generate concepts through 
a deep analysis of the complex engagements as evidenced in the Delta arena that could 
be applied in other studies (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Yin, 2003). This case study approach 
facilitated an in-depth exploration and understanding of the use of counter accounting in 
driving dialogic accountability and human rights engagements among the arena 
participants in the Delta arena. Prior studies such as Apostol, 2015; Georgakopoulos and 
Thomson, 2008; Thomson et al., 2015; O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009; Tregidga, 2017; 
Vinnari and Laine, 2017; Contrafatto et al., 2015; Adams, 2004; Cooper et al., 2005; 
Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014 adopted a case study approach to provide an in-depth 
insight into the use of counter accounting in facilitating dialogic engagements and 
governance reforms to improve the lived lives of the marginalised stakeholder groups. To 
answer the research questions in section 1.5 of the background to this study, empirical 
data was collected from a range of secondary and primary sources to triangulate and 
provide an in-depth analysis to address the research questions. 
As discussed in chapter 2 (and in the subsequent chapters), the lack of inclusiveness, 
accountability and engagement in the Niger Delta generated considerable criticisms from 
grassroots, local, regional and international NGOs, international political institutions and 
other rule enforcing institutions (e.g. Akpan, 2008; Aroh et al., 2010; Christian Aid, 2004; 
Friends of the Earth, 2011; Frynas, 2003; Omeje, 2005; Pegg and Zabbey, 2013; UNDP, 
2006; UNEP, 2011; World Bank, 1995). There has been extensive use of counter 
accounting as part of campaign tactics by advocacy NGOs to address the extreme social 
and ecological harm that have faced the indigenous communities in the Delta. 
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This case study presents evidence on the use of counter accounts by the advocacy NGOs 
by exploring counter accounting practices in relation to their role in problematizing, 
intervening and driving dialogic engagements in addressing the limiting situations in the 
Delta arena. Counter accounts in this context and as explicated in section 4.2 are accounts 
produced by or on behalf of indigenous people or individuals, who are beyond or outside 
the control of the corporations. These counter accounts provide alternative views of the 
unsustainable human rights, poor accountability, governance and environmental 
pollutions that affect the ability of the current generation to live within a sustainable 
environment. The counter accounts identified and collected for this study are enormous 
and they included shadow accounts (see Mileudefensie/Friends of the Earth, 2011 
Erratum to the annual report Royal Dutch Shell Plc Annual Report for the year ended 
December 31, 2010 Special edition), accounts prepared by advocacy NGOs to 
delegitimised corporate and governance practices (see Amnesty International, 2009; 
2011, 2012, 2013; 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; Amunwa, 2011; CJP/ERA, 2005; 
Evironmental Right Action/Friends of the Earth, 2005; Friends of the Earth, 2015, 2011, 
2005; Christian Aid, 2004; ECCR, 2010; SACA, 2014; SDN, 2010, 2014a, b, c, d; Steiner, 
2010; Social Action, 2009a, b, 2014a, b; UNEP, 2011; UNDP, 2006; World Bank, 1995; 
Manby, 1999; NACGOND, 2014); videoclips (see Ellis, 2009a, b); accounts prepared by 
legal practitioners (see LeighDay, 2015); and the media (see Eboh, 2014; Deutsch, 2015; 
Arnott, 2009; Bassey, 2008; Dodondawa, 2015; Holligan, 2013; Howden, 2013; 
Onwuemenyi, 2015; Provost, 2014; Payne, 2015; Ross, 2013; Stein, 2014; Vidal, 2011, 
a, b, 2012, 2015, 2016)19. 
The counter accounts studied and considered in this study were either given to the author 
by the advocacy NGOs interviewed, some were extracted from the websites of the 
advocacy NGOs, the dailies, social media (facebook, twitter, Instagram and blogs) and 
others consisted of video clips extracted from youtube and the media. The counter 
accounts considered in this study dated back to the 90s (see chapter 6) and they were 
published to make visible, challenge and overcome the problematic corporate and 
governance practices. The counter accounts were collected over a period of intensive 
reading and research of over 5months. As evidenced in this case study, the counter 
accounts collected where used to frame the conflicts in the Delta arena (see chapter 6) 
                                                          
19 The author could not include all the counter accounts identified and collected in this thesis due to the restriction on 
words count 
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and to support the empirical evidence in chapter 7, 8 and 9. The counter accounts served 
as mediating instruments presented to the corporations and the government to speak truth 
to them. In addition, these counter accounts often serve as a bridge among stakeholders 
and they are used to create awareness in other arenas (e.g. national, international 
arenas– see chapter 8) where the distribution of power and disciplinary sanctions are 
effective to hold perpetrators of human rights and environmental pollution accountable 
for unacceptable practices in the Delta. Finally, the case study explores 
the conscientizing and dialogic potential of counter accounts in reforming the existing 
systems of governance and accountability in Nigeria to balance the legitimate quest for 
revenue generation by the government, wealth maximisation of MNOCs, and sustainable 
environment, respect and protection of the indigenous people's human rights. 
 
5.2.2. SOURCES OF DATA ANALYSED 
5.2.2.1. QUALITATIVE DOCUMENTARY (CONTENT) ANALYSIS  
A wide range of data sources was reviewed for this study to provide an in-depth historical 
context and to triangulate the empirical evidence in this study. These data sources include 
reports from the multinational oil corporations (MNOCs) such as sustainability/corporate 
social responsibility reports, annual reports, their web dialogues with stakeholders in 
2009, 2011 and 2013, press releases and other corporate communications, the interview 
evidence from the corporations and other relevant information such as legislation 
regulating the oil and gas industry were also reviewed. Furthermore, alternative accounts 
(such as video clips and TV documentaries), NGOs’ counter accounts, photographic 
evidence, press releases, resolutions, reports by supranational agencies, newspaper 
reports, and other public documents prepared by civil society organisations were 
analysed. These were analysed to provide the historical perspective (see chapter 6) into 
the evolution of counter accounting, accountability and human rights violation conflicts 
within this arena.  
Chapter 6 provides a historical context to understand the different uses of counter 
accounting by the advocacy NGOs when engaging with arena participants and in other 
arenas associated with the oil sector of the Niger Delta. This qualitative documentary 
approach has been adopted by previous research such as Adams, 2004; Apostol, 2015; 
Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Rodrigue, 2014; Thomson et al., 2015, Brennan 
and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Tregidga, 2017 and Vinnari and Laine, 2017. These documents 
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were used to construct a timeline of the Niger Delta conflict and to map out the different 
levels of conflict arenas as discussed in chapter 6 and 8. The eminent reason for the 
selection of these documents was because they contain and represent important facts 
about the accountability and human rights violations, conflicts, counter accounts and 
counter-counter accounts within the Niger Delta arena.  
 
5.2.2.2. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
In addition to the secondary data, informal conversations and 57 semi-structured (one-to-
one and focus groups) interviews were conducted with a range of stakeholders to provide 
deeper insights to the conflicts over human rights, environmental accountability, 
governance and sustainable development on the Delta arena. These interviewees, which 
included the corporation and non-corporate stakeholders were selected as they had 
considerable knowledge and experience on the conflict within the Delta. These 
interviewees were purposively selected after the documentary analysis, which enabled the 
author to identify key players within this arena, conditional on their willingness to 
participate. The interview process was flexible, interviewees were allowed to freely 
express their views without the author interrupting the process. A research guide (research 
information20 and question themes21) were sent to them and a brief introduction was given 
to clarify the aims of the study and to address their concerns before the interviews were 
conducted. These research questions included discussions on the ability of the 
stakeholders to hold corporations legally and socially accountable for human rights; how 
the civil society organisations have been able to bridge any accountability and 
transparency gaps; the role and impact of counter accounts; business responsibility for 
human rights advancement and stakeholders’ accountability; dialogic and transformative 
impact of stakeholders accountability, engagement and dialogue; effectiveness of the 
governance and regulatory frameworks; their vision for an ideal stakeholders’ dialogues, 
human right accounting and the future of the Niger Delta. This semi-structured interview 
approach enabled the author to ask follow-up questions relevant to the research topic and 
which could be explored in subsequent studies. There was no requirement for language 
translation because the interviews were conducted in English. 
                                                          
20 see Appendix 1 
21 The research question themes were similar for the stakeholders’ groups interviewed but they were modified 
accordingly to engage with the different stakeholders’ groups (see Appendix 2 for a sample of the interview question 
themes).  
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Previous research such as Tregidga, 2013, 2017; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; 
Belal et al., 2015; O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009; O’Dwyer, 2005 adopted semi-
structured interviews method either in conjunction with other methods to gain significant 
insights into their research questions. Tregidga et al., (2012, p.275) argued that 
interpretive and qualitative interview approaches could be used to gain insights into the 
issues of the quality of corporate reporting and communication, the meaning ascribed to 
problems and divergent perspectives on accountability. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with 57 participants. All interviews (except for two participants who refused 
to be taped - MNOCr2 and DPRr2) were recorded after consent to record and publish 
findings were agreed with the interviewees. All interviews were fully transcribed and 
coded for data analysis purposes but due to the sensitivity of the information, all 
interviewees were promised confidentiality and anonymity. These interviews were 
conducted between February and October of 2015.  During this period, the author visited 
the Niger Delta (Bayelsa State, Delta State and Rivers State) as well as Lagos State and 
Abuja (the capital of Nigeria) to conduct interviews, observe and document examples of 
social and environmental degradation. Fieldwork diaries were kept for the interviews and 
the site visited. During data collection, particularly during the author’s field visit to 
polluted riverbanks, farmland, fishponds and an abandoned ancestral community due to 
air pollution, the author experienced the everyday realities of the indigenous communities 
interviewed and what they endure on a daily basis from environmental pollution. These 
field visits enabled the author to triangulate the documentary analysis and evidence 
gathered in the interviews.  
As mentioned previously, focus group interviews were conducted  for this study. One 
focus group interview was conducted with the international advocacy NGOs (iaNGOrs), 
local advocacy NGOs (laNGOrs), developmental NGOs (DNGOrs), and the regulatory 
authority (NOSDRAr1) respectively while nine (9) was conducted with the indigenous 
people. The focus group interviews with the iaNGOrs, laNGOrs, DNGOrs and 
NOSDRAr1 were not initially planned by the author. However, the participants scheduled 
to be interviewed by the author decided to include other representatives/supervisors in 
their organisation after reading the research information and the themes to the research 
questions. The focus groups with these participants range from 2-7 participants. This 
provided the author with the opportunity to verify some of her empirical findings from 
other participants.  
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However, after the empirical evidence with the corporation, the advocacy NGOs, the 
regulators and the developmental NGOs, the author decided to conduct focus group 
interviews with the indigenous people in order to enable them to speak and be given a 
voice in this study. Although the author had semi-structured questions planned to initiate 
the conversation among the participants but the focus groups were open-ended to enable 
the indigenous people to speak within being confined to structured research questions. 
The author believed that the voices of the local communities/those oppressed by the 
actions of the others are relatively rare in the critical, social and environmental accounting 
research because they have been drowned out by the dominant voices of the corporations. 
By conducting these focus group interviews in which its participants range from 3-12 
participants, the author posited that exploring the implications of counter accounting in 
engaging all the stakeholders and in addressing the problem of human rights violations, 
accountability, governance, environmental pollution and other conflicts in this study has 
the potential to make a more impactful contribution to knowledge.  
The focus groups with the indigenous people were chosen due to their engagements with 
the corporations, government and the regulatory authorities. Majority of the participants 
of the focus groups are either local council members in their communities, women 
leaders, youth leaders or indigenous people that have been conscientized by the 
international and local advocacy NGOs to monitor environmental pollutions, human 
rights violations and trained to educate the indigenous people. In addition, the 
communities were chosen after they were mentioned by the corporate and the regulatory 
agencies’ representatives interviewed for this study and also due to their affiliation with 
local, national and international conflicts. The author specifically choose to conduct these 
focus groups in communities that have taken the corporations to national and international 
courts for human rights and environmental adjudications. This enabled the author to 
triangulate the interviews evidence with what had been published by local and 
international advocacy NGOs, and the media. Due to the dynamic conflict arena of the 
Niger Delta, access to the local council members (focus group participants) was 
negotiated through the local advocacy NGOs representatives.  
The participants of these focus groups were comfortable speaking to one another which 
were obvious during the interviews. In addition, the author observed that despite the 
prominent designations of the community stakeholders interviewed in these focus groups, 
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they were able to express their views on the research topic and the nature of 
accountability, governance, human rights, the implications of counter accounts and the 
engagements of the advocacy NGOs without anyone domineering and influencing the 
conversation. The author observed that when there were contradictory perspectives from 
a participant, these were instantly corrected by the other participants and confirmed by 
the participant that mentioned the contradictory evidence. The focus group interviews 
shield better light on the everyday realities of the indigenous people which help address 
the partial dialogic engagements with the powerful stakeholders in the Niger Delta. In 
addition, as a result of the focus group interviews with the community stakeholders, the 
author was granted permissions to visit an abandoned ancestral community, polluted 
farmlands, fish ponds and riverbanks, non-functioning infrastructural facilities 
constructed by the corporations (see Appendix 5).   
The process of conducting these semi-structured interviews was not without challenges. 
Negotiating access with participants was quite difficult. The author negotiated access with 
potential participants for over 9months. The first set of interviews were conducted 
between February and March 2015 while the second phase of the interviews was 
conducted between August and October 2015. The author was subjected to numerous 
bureaucratic processes before access to conduct interviews was granted by the regulatory 
agencies and the MNOC (see Appendix 4a and b).22 However, as highlighted in section 
5.2.2.2.1 below, the corporations were not willing to participate with the exception of one 
MNOC. The other MNOCs refused to acknowledge all the correspondence sent to them 
and the author also sent hard copies of the request through postal service but these letters 
were never acknowledged. It is pertinent to acknowledge the support received from the 
advocacy NGOs, one of the local advocacy NGOs gave me the direct contact details of 
the managing director of one of the MNOC. Despite my calls and his request for the 
research information guide and questions, access was still not granted to the author. 
Furthermore, conducting interviews with the NGOs was neither rosy. Interviews with a 
few advocacy NGOs and a developmental NGO representative (who later refused to be 
interviewed) were quite challenging due to the sloppy attitude of a few NGOs’ 
representatives. For instance, the author had an unacceptable experience with a prominent 
                                                          
22 The author could not include the approval received from the corporation due to the confidentiality agreement signed 
with them.  
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advocacy NGO’s representative not keeping to time despite numerous reminders sent to 
him. The interview was scheduled for 8am and he was not at his office despite the 
numerous reminders. The author called him to confirm when he would arrive but 
discovered that his phone was switched off. The author waited for him until 11am and 
left to attend another scheduled interview for that day. The hilarious aspect of this 
challenging experience was that the participant later sent a text message to the author at 
12.20pm to confirm if the author was still waiting for him because he was on his way to 
his office without offering any apologies. It is pertinent for potential researchers and users 
of this thesis to be aware that conducting qualitative research would never be without 
challenges because there would be “speed bombs on the road” and potential researchers 
should be prepared to manage these challenges with a happy demeanour.  
Consequently, the following sections provide background information on the 
stakeholders that participated in this study. 
 
5.2.2.2.1. INTERVIEWS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CORPORATIONS 
(MNOCR) 
Despite identifying the corporations to be interviewed through the qualitative content 
analysis, majority of the corporations contacted for access refused to participate 
regardless of the snowballing approach, incessant emails, letters and phone calls made to 
the representatives of these corporations, with the exception of one MNOC. Whilst 
negotiating access with the research liaison representatives of this corporation, initial 
negotiation was for at least 9 participants comprising a mix of senior managers and 
frontline employees saddled with the responsibility of liaising with the communities, local 
and international NGOs and other stakeholders, environmental clean-up and remediation 
team and the government. After signing the confidentiality agreement and prior to the 
interviews, the author was informed that access to only one participant would be granted 
after providing a detailed overview of the research themes.  
However, after the interview with MNOCr1, the author requested for an access to a 
manager in charge of the advocacy NGOs engagement (MNOCr2). The interview with 
MNOCr1 was tape recorded and consent to publish findings was agreed but MNOCr2 
refused to be taped and refused to sign the consent form (see Appendix 3 for a sample of 
the consent form). The full interview transcripts were sent to them for vetting due to the 
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confidentiality clause stated in the research information guide but MNOCr2 did not 
confirm if the transcript was satisfactory. The interviewees’ identities were anonymized 
as shown in the table below. However, due to the inability of the author to gain sufficient 
access to the corporations, secondary data sources were relied on to provide additional 
insights to the empirical evidence gathered from the corporate representatives 
interviewed. 
 
TABLE 3  
Overview of the MNOCrs details and data sources 
Interviewees Position Location Duration Type of Interview 
MNOCr1 Managing Director Port Harcourt 1hr.42mins Face-to-face 
MNOCr2 Managing Director Port Harcourt 15-20mins Face-to-face 
Note: ‘MNOCr’ signifies multinational oil corporations’ representative. The interviewees’ 
comments are based on their engagements and observations with the stakeholders in the 
Niger Delta arena. Their perspectives should not be deduced or labeled as the overall views 
of the corporation. 
 
5.2.2.2.2. INTERVIEWS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND 
LOCAL ADVOCACY NGOS 
Interviews were conducted with international and local advocacy NGOs’ representatives. 
The interviewees were selected as they utilized a range of activist practices that included 
counter accounting as part of their campaigns to build a transformative network of 
engagements to resist corporate and governance practices within the Delta. These 
interviewees had considerable knowledge and experience in relation to the conflicts over 
human rights, environmental accountability, governance and sustainable development 
within the Delta and other conflict arenas. The interviews were designed to gather a range 
of views on topics such as human rights violations, accountability and governance gaps, 
CSR, unsustainable practices, grassroots environmental advocacies’ strategies, their 
experiences, observations, and engagement with the other arena participants. Nine 
interviews were conducted with representatives of the international advocacy NGOs 
(iaNGOr). Seven of the nine interviews were conducted by telephone and skype due to 
scheduling problems and geographical distance while the remaining two interviews were 
face-to-face. All interviews were recorded after consent to record and publish findings 
had been agreed with the interviewees prior to the interviews. The complete interview 
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transcripts were not forwarded to iaNGOr1-7 for vetting because such vetting clause was 
not included in their information guide when negotiating access and the participants did 
not request for their transcripts to be vetted. These seven interviewees were those 
interviewed during the pilot study. Transcripts for iaNGOr8 and 9 were forwarded to them 
for vetting. These interviews were conducted in Nigeria, where such clause was 
considered necessary before access was granted by the participants. The interviewees’ 
identities were anonymized as shown in table 4 below. 
 
TABLE 4  
Overview of the iaNGOrs details and data sources 
Interviewees Position Location Duration  Type of 
Interview 
iaNGOr1 Director Ireland 31mins Telephone 
iaNGOr2 Campaign Director Netherlands 25mins Telephone 
iaNGOr3 Director UK 59mins Skype 
iaNGOr4 West Africa Rep. UK 48mins Skype 
iaNGOr5 Director US 41mins Skype 
iaNGOr6 Director UK 35mins Telephone 
iaNGOr7 Programme 
Director 
UK 1hr.7mins Telephone 
iaNGOr8 
iaNGOr9 
Country Rep. 
Country Director 
and Extractives 
Advisor 
Nigeria/UK 
Nigeria/Netherlands 
1hr 29mins 
1hr 17mins 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-
face/(Focus 
group) 
Note: ‘iaNGOr’ signifies International Advocacy NGOs’ representative. The 
interviewees’ comments are based on their engagements and observations with the 
stakeholders in the Niger Delta arena. Their perspectives should not be deduced or 
labeled as the overall views of the international advocacy NGOs organisation.  
 
16 interviews were conducted with the representatives of local advocacy NGOs 
(laNGOr), of which two were women (laNGOWr9 and 13). These interviews were face-
to-face and focus group interviews. Interviews were conducted in the offices of these 
representatives except for laNGOr1 and 11, which were conducted at their homes. Nine 
interviewees were purposively selected after an initial documentary analysis to 
understand the context and to identify the key players within this Delta arena, this led to 
a snowballing approach, conditional on their willingness to participate. All interviews 
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were recorded after consent to record and publish findings had been agreed with the 
interviewees prior to the interviews. The complete interview transcripts were sent to the 
laNGOrs for vetting. Changes were made to the transcripts by the participants before they 
were analysed.  The interviewees’ identities were anonymized as shown in table 5 below. 
 
TABLE 5  
Overview of the laNGOrs details and data sources 
Interviewees Position Location Duration  Type of 
Interview 
laNGOr1 Director Lagos/Bayelsa 1hr. 47mins Face-to-face 
laNGOr2 Director Lagos/Edo 23mins Face-to-face 
laNGOr3 Director Lagos/Edo 30mins Face-to-face 
laNGOr4 Project Manager Rivers 49mins Face-to-face 
laNGOr5 Director Rivers 1hr. 32mins Face-to-face 
laNGOr6 Director Rivers 1hr. 18mins Face-to-face 
laNGOr7 ex-Director/LGA chairperson Rivers 1hr. 22mins Face-to-face 
laNGOr8 Director/co-ordinator of a  
coalition of laNGO 
Rivers 1hr. 25mins Face-to-face 
laNGOWr9 Director (Women advocacy  
NGO) 
Rivers 1hr. 19mins Face-to-face 
 
iaNGOr10 Director/University lecturer Rivers 53mins Face-to-face 
laNGOr11 Director/co-ordinator of a  
coalition of laNGO  
Bayelsa 1hr. 16mins Face-to-face/ 
Focus group 
laNGOr12 Project Manager Bayelsa 1hr. 27mins Face-to-face 
laNGOWr13 Director/Programme Manager  
for Women 
Rivers 
 
45mins 
 
Face-to-face 
 
laNGOr14 Director Rivers 1hr. 27mins Face-to-face 
laNGOr15 Director Rivers 52mins Face-to-face 
laNGOr16 Project Manager Rivers 28mins Face-to-face 
Note: ‘laNGOr’ signifies Local Advocacy NGOs’ representative. The interviewees’ 
comments are based on their engagements and observations with the stakeholders in 
the Niger Delta arena. Their perspectives should not be deduced or labeled as the 
overall views of the Local advocacy NGOs organisation.  
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5.2.2.2.3. INTERVIEWS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL 
NGOS (DNGOR) 
This study draws on six (6) face-to-face interviews with DNGOrs, who were identified 
by MNOCr1. The DNGO were engaged by the corporation to facilitate the 
implementation of the GMOU programme by liaising with the community stakeholders 
on behalf of the corporations, thereby acting as an intermediary or channel of 
communication. These interviewees had considerable knowledge and experience in 
relation to the conflicts over human rights, environmental accountability, governance and 
sustainable development within the Delta and other conflict arenas. All interviews were 
recorded after consent to record and publish findings had been agreed with the 
interviewees prior to the interviews. The complete interview transcripts were sent to the 
DNGOrs for vetting. Changes were made to the transcripts by the participants before they 
were analysed. The interviewees’ identities were anonymized as shown in table 6 below. 
 
TABLE 6  
Overview of the DNGOrs details and data sources 
Interviewees Position Location Duration  Type of 
Interview 
DNGOr1 Director Lagos/Rivers 49mins Face-to-face 
DNGOr2 Director/Barrister Rivers 1hr 43mins Face-to-face 
DNGOr3 Director Rivers 52mins Face-to-face 
DNGOr4 Director Rivers 38mins Face-to-face 
DNGOr5 Director/Journalist Rivers 48mins Face-to-face 
DNGOr6 Director Rivers 1hr 20mins Face-to-
face/focus group 
with his staff 
Note: ‘DNGOr’ signifies developmental NGOs’ representative. The interviewees’ 
comments are based on their engagements and observations with the stakeholders in 
the Niger Delta arena. Their perspectives should not be deduced or labeled as the 
overall views of the developmental NGOs organisation.  
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5.2.2.2.4. INTERVIEWS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REGULATORS 
(NOSDRAR AND DPRR) 
This study draws from the interviews with the regulatory agencies – the Department of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR) and the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency 
(NOSDRA).  In Nigeria, DPR is the oil industry regulatory agency within the Ministry of 
Petroleum responsible for the maximisation of revenue and the conservation of the 
environment. NOSDRA was established by the NOSDRA Act 2006 and is an agency 
within the Federal Ministry of Environment charged with protecting the environment 
from damage related to oil spills. NOSDRA is responsible for implementing the National 
Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCP) in accordance with the International Convention on 
Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC 90). NOSDRA is a public-
sector organisation established with the statutory obligations to protect the environment 
for current and future generations of Nigerians. Since its establishment, NOSDRA has 
been responsible for ensuring compliance with environmental standards in the petroleum 
industry of Nigeria. However, the main regulatory framework for environmental pollution 
and remediation, the EGASPIN (The Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the 
Petroleum Industry in Nigeria) resides within the jurisdiction of DPR, which could be 
viewed as a conflict of interest (SDN, 2015a). 
Despite going through an onerous process of negotiating access with these regulatory 
bodies which resulted in the issuance of an approval letters (see Appendix 4), interview 
access with the representatives of these bodies were restricted to two participants. These 
interviewees had considerable knowledge and experience in relation to the conflicts over 
human rights, environmental accountability, governance and sustainable development 
within the Delta. The interviews with the regulators were taped and consent to publish 
findings was agreed but DPRr2 refused to be taped and refused to sign the consent form. 
The complete interview transcripts were sent to them for vetting due to the confidentiality 
clause stated in the research information guide. DPRr2 argued that the transcript does not 
reflect her perspective23. The interviews with NOSDRAr1 was conducted at the beginning 
of the fieldwork in the Niger Delta in August and a follow-up focus group interview was 
                                                          
23 It is pertinent to state that the interviewee was no longer comfortable with the views expressed in the transcript and 
hence, little or no reference was made to the interview evidence from DPRr2 in this thesis. This should neither be taken 
as the transcript was not accurate.  
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conducted in September 2015. The interviewees’ identities were anonymized as shown 
in table 7 below 
 
TABLE 7  
Overview of DPRrs and NOSDRArs details, and data sources 
Interviewees Position Location Duration  Type of 
Interview 
DPRr1 Managing director Rivers 1hr 23mins Face-to-face 
DPRr2 Director Rivers 20-25mins Face-to-face 
NOSDRAr1 Regulator/Supervisor Rivers 1hr 26mins 
& 58mins 
Face-to-
face/Focus group 
with one other 
supervisor 
NOSDRAr2 Regulator/Director Abuja 1hr 17mins Face-to-face 
Note: ‘DPRr’ signifies Department of Petroleum Resources while ‘NOSDRAr’ signifies 
National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency. The interviewees’ comments are 
based on their engagements and observations with the stakeholders in the Niger Delta 
arena. Their perspectives should not be deduced or labeled as the overall views of the 
regulatory agencies.  
 
5.2.2.2.5. INTERVIEWS WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS 
This study draws from the interviews (mix of one-to-one and focus group) with the 
community stakeholders in the Delta region through the support of the laNGOrs. The 
community stakeholders interviewed volunteered to participate in the research and were 
those with considerable knowledge and experience in relation to the conflicts over human 
rights, environmental accountability, governance and sustainable development emerging 
from oil spills and gas flaring. The interviews were conducted in English but some 
indigenous people responded with ‘Pidgin English’, which the author tried to capture and 
translate to English where necessary.  
Interviews were conducted in 13 communities across– Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta States 
in the Niger Delta region. These three states are the main oil-producing States in terms of 
the volume of oil extraction. A total of 20 interviews was conducted with the community 
groups. 5 were with the council of chiefs (community leaders) (CLs1-5), 2 with the 
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women leaders (CWL1-2), one with an ex-youth leader (CYL1) while the remaining 12 
were with indigenous people (IP1-12) from across the three States visited.  
Whilst collecting data, the author visited polluted farmland, lakes, and fishponds, and 
photographic evidence was taken (see Appendix 5). Access to the community 
stakeholders were negotiated through the support of the local advocacy NGOs due to the 
incessant conflicts within the Delta region. The interviews were taped and consent to 
publish findings was agreed with all the participants using the consent forms. However, 
the interviews’ transcripts were not forwarded to the community stakeholders because 
majority of them lack access to the internet except for IP7. In addition, vetting of the 
transcripts were not considered a substantial threat to this study because the participants’ 
responses were similar. The interviewees’ identities were anonymized as shown in table 
8 below. 
 
TABLE 8  
Overview of the community stakeholders’ details and data sources 
Interviewees Position Location Duration  Type of 
Interview 
CLs1 Community 
leaders/Activist  
Rivers 1hr 14mins Focus group 
CLs2 Community 
leaders/Activist  
Rivers 1hr 15mins Focus group 
CLs3 Community leaders  Bayelsa 37mins Face-to-face 
CLs4 Community leaders  Rivers 48mins Focus group 
CLs5 Community leaders  Bayelsa 26mins Focus group 
CWL1 Women leader/Activist  Rivers 51mins  Focus group 
CWL2 Women leader  Bayelsa 6mins  Face-to-face 
CYL1 Ex-Youth leader  Bayelsa 13mins  Face-to-face 
IP1 Indigenous people  Rivers 1hr 11mins  Focus group 
IP2 Indigenous 
people/Activist 
Rivers 1hr 28mins  Face-to-face 
IP3 Indigenous 
people/Activist 
Rivers 39mins  Focus group 
IP4 Indigenous people Rivers 26mins  Face-to-face 
IP5 Indigenous people Bayelsa 7mins  Face-to-face 
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IP6 Indigenous people Rivers 47mins  Face-to-face 
IP7 Indigenous 
people/Barrister/Activist 
Rivers 1hr 23mins  Face-to-face 
IP8 Indigenous people Bayelsa 30mins  Focus group 
IP9 Indigenous 
people/Activist 
Bayelsa 41mins  Focus group 
IP10 Indigenous 
people/Activist 
Delta 20mins  Face-to-face 
IP11 Indigenous 
people/Activist 
Delta 27mins  Face-to-face 
IP12 Indigenous 
people/Activist 
Delta 53mins  Face-to-face 
Note: ‘CLs’ signifies Community Leaders while ‘CWL’ signifies Community Women 
Leader, ‘CYL’ signifies Community Youth Leader and ‘IP’ signifies Indigenous People. 
The interviewees’ comments are based on their everyday realities, engagements, and 
observations with the stakeholders in the Niger Delta arena.  
 
5.3. DATA ANALYSIS 
This project generated an enormous data that was challenging to analyse. However, I was 
able to overcome this daunting challenge after studying Humphrey and Lee, ed. 2004 with 
emphasis on O’Dwyer, 2004 and Scapens, 2004; Bryman and Bell, 2011; Saunders et al., 
2009; Tracy, 2013; Hennink et al., 2011; Saldana, 2013; Richards, 1999; Yin, 2003. The 
data analysis process commenced immediately after each interview, through the reflective 
notes on the interviews by highlighting the emerging issues identified by the participants. 
These reflective notes were also used to highlight the emerging insights from the taped 
interviews. The taped interviews were listened to several times to identify emerging 
themes before full transcription was conducted. The author personally transcribed the 57 
interviews to avoid losing the emerging themes and this enabled the author to critically 
reflect on the data, the reflective interview notes, the secondary data and the photographic 
evidence. Whilst transcribing, additional reflective notes were taken to identify emerging 
themes from the transcripts that could address the research questions in this thesis and 
could support or contrast findings from previous literature.  
The recordings were listened to several times before and after the transcription to correct 
errors in the transcripts and to systematically prepare the data for coding by manually 
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highlighting relevant sections and by noting emerging themes on the transcripts along 
with the fieldwork notes to generate open codes. The review of these transcripts enabled 
the author to identify patterns emerging from the data without the author imposing a 
predefined data analytical model to reduce the data to manageable themes, thereby 
missing issues discussed by the participants. At the commencement of the data analysis 
process, the author coded the data using the themes identified in the interviews’ guide but 
later decided to collapse the growing numbers of themes under three core themes- 
Accountability, Governance and Power Struggle. NVivo 11 was used to categorize the 
data into manageable sub-themes under these three broad categorisations. A list of all the 
codes was compiled to identify the most significant themes and a secondary close coding 
exercise was undertaken to reduce the codes to manageable sub-themes. The author then 
went back to listen to the tapes to develop short summaries around the emerging close 
coded themes.  
The emerging codes from this iterative process facilitated the descriptive interpretive 
analysis reported in this thesis by collating and retrieving the relevant codes for data 
interpretation, particularly when categorising the data using NVivo. The data 
interpretation process in the empirical chapters initially focused on a storytelling analysis 
approach without extensive reference to the literature. After the initial analysis, secondary 
interpretation of data was conducted to help narrow the focus of the narratives to prior 
literature and the theorisation in chapter 4. This process resulted in the extraction of some 
of the codes initially thought of as relevant. This final procedure enabled the author to 
gain an in-depth understanding of the interviews and greater confidence in the robustness 
of the interpretation of data in relation to counter accounting and accountability in the 
Delta arena. 
 
5.4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This chapter provided an overview of the methodological assumption that subsequently 
influenced the research method and data analysis process adopted in this study. The 
paradigm adopted influenced how this study was conducted, particularly the rationale for 
using a case study to address the research questions through qualitative methods 
comprising a mix of qualitative content analysis and semi-structured interviews with 
117 
 
 
multiple stakeholders across the Delta arena. The methodological assumption influenced 
how the empirical chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 were drafted and interpreted. Chapter 6 highlights 
the historical dimension of counter accounts and activism for inclusive accountability and 
engagement for the respect and protection of human rights and environmental rights 
among the arena participants in the Delta.  
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CHAPTER 6: HISTORICAL EVALUATION OF COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN THE DELTA ARENA   
6.0. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the first research question by conducting a documentary content 
analysis of counter accounts and counter-counter accounts to provide answers to – “why 
are counter accounts produced to address and drive accountability, advancement of 
human rights and sustainable development within the Niger Delta conflict arena?” The 
emphasis is not on the quantity of counter accounts produced but rather on why and what 
was accounted for. This facilitated an understanding of the historical dimension of counter 
accounts within this arena. A timeline was conducted to provide historical insight into the 
inception and the evolution of the conflicts that engendered numerous counter accounts, 
campaigns and transformative processes.  
 
6.1. TIMELINE: WHY COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY? 
The origin of counter accounts within this arena could be traced to the campaign by the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) led by Dr. Garrick Barille 
Leton and Ken Saro-Wiwa acting as the spokesperson in the 1990s against Shell 
Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) in Ogoniland of Rivers State, Nigeria (Ako, 
2015; Isumonah, 2015).24 Oil was first discovered at Oloibiri in Bayelsa State in 1956 
while in 1958 commercial deposit was found in Ogoni (Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 2015; 
Fentiman and Zabbey, 2015). Pegg and Zabbey (2013) argued that according to Shell 
Oil’s own figures, 634million barrels of oil worth US$5.2billion were taken from 
Ogoniland from 1958–1993. MOSOP’s activism was that SPDC polluted the 
environment the Ogoni communities depend on for their livelihoods without any 
economic and infrastructural development. SPDC was accused of environmental 
degradation and ‘waging ecological war’ against the Ogonis while the federal 
government was accused of practising genocide (Okonta and Douglas, 2003; Saro-Wiwa, 
1992). 
                                                          
24 Demirel-Pegg and Pegg (2015, p.657) and Senewo (2015, p.665) argued that the Ogoni people live on approximately 
400 square miles or 1000 square kilometers of land located east of Port Harcourt in Rivers State, Nigeria. 
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Ken Saro-Wiwa wrote the ‘Ogoni Bill of Rights’ (OBR)25 that called for the political or 
governance autonomy and environmental self-determination of the Ogoni people (Okonta 
and Douglas, 2003; Social Action, 2014a, 2009b). The OBR was adopted on the 26th 
August 1990 by the Ogonis (Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 2015; Senewo, 2015). Senewo 
(2015, p.665) contended that “although Bills of Rights like the United States are always 
directed at government, the OBR was the first of its kind to be directed at both government 
of Nigeria and transnational oil-prospecting companies such as Shell. Saro-Wiwa’s 
linkage of the Nigerian nation-state to Shell made them prime precursors of the Ogoni 
situation.” This OBR could be seen as an important Bill in the environmental and human 
right struggles against ‘neo-colonial policies of natural resources’ by the government and 
its oil operator –SPDC on Ogoniland and the Niger Delta (Isumonah, 2015; Okonta and 
Douglas, 2003).26 The OBR was written to fight the repression and ecocide by the federal 
government and Shell, and to demand control and community ownership of the natural 
resources found in their land (Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 2015). Nigeria operates a 
centralized resource control system where ownership of natural resources is conferred on 
the federal government (Ako, 2015; Saro-Wiwa, 1995). The assumption that the 
deregulation of the colonial policies of the mineral resources was the only medium 
through which the resource control and ecological rights of the Ogonis could be secured 
(Saro-Wiwa, 1995). 
Senewo (2015) argued that MOSOP presented the OBR to the federal government and to 
Shell in 1990 but neither the government nor the corporation responded. Their 
unresponsiveness prompted the addition of an addendum to the bill in August 1991 to 
appeal for assistance from the international communities when MOSOP realised that the 
federal government was not responding to their request. Ken Saro-Wiwa addressed the 
United Nations Working Committee on Indigenous People in Geneva in July 1992 to 
appeal for their assistance in curbing the environmental menace against the Ogonis (Saro-
Wiwa, 1995) and to drive an institutional change in environmental legislation. His 
campaign received support from iaNGOs such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, 
Human Rights Watch (Ako, 2015; Bob, 2005; Saro-Wiwa, 1995). Bob (2005, p.82) 
                                                          
25 See Saro-Wiwa (1995, p.66-77) and Social Action (2009b, p. vii) Appendix 1 ‘Ogoni Bill of Rights’ presented to the 
government and people of Nigeria, November 1990.  
26 Demirel-Pegg and Pegg (2015, p.658) claimed that the OBR served as a template that was adopted in modified forms 
by various groups in the Niger Delta such as the Ikwerre Rescue Charter, the Kaiama Declaration of the Ijaw People 
and the Oron Bill of Rights. 
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argued that “on November 24, 1992, a handful of activists demonstrated at Shell’s London 
office, threatening an international campaign unless Shell agreed to compensate local 
communities for the impacts of its operations on the Delta.” 
Their activism did not only seek to address the problem of environmental degradation and 
the systematic deprivation of the Ogonis but also to elicit the recognition of communities’ 
engagement and accountability of the oil wealth for the development of the Ogonis and 
the Niger Delta (Ako, 2015; Isumonah, 2015). MOSOP advocated for non-violence, 
intellectual and evidence-based counter-accountability campaign from its local and its 
international supporters (Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 2015; Rowell et al, 2005).27 For 
instance, rather than ousting Shell out of Ogoniland through violence, Bob (2005, p.82-
83) and Social Actions (2014, p.3) reported that a letter was sent to Shell, Chevron and 
NNPC on the 3rd December 1992, requesting for the sum of US$10billion (consisting of 
US$6billion in royalty for past oil production and US$4billion as damages for the 
environmental degradation). Alongside their demand, a 30-day ultimatum expiring on the 
3rd January 1993 was issued to Shell, Chevron and NNPC to either meet their demands 
or to cease operation in Ogoniland (Bob, 2005; Osaghae, 1995; Social Action, 2014b). 
On the 4th January 199328 between 100,000-500,000, indigenous people participated in 
the Ogoni Day carrying twigs as a symbol of environmental pollution and English 
Language banners (despite being conscientized in their local languages and dialects) 
challenging Shell and the government, protesting against their political and economic 
marginalisation, environmental degradation, ethnic extinction and proclaiming the group 
as indigenous people (Osaghae, 1995; Senewo, 2015; Freire, 2002). Shell was ousted out 
of Ogoniland due to this campaign (Senewo, 2015; Bob, 2005)29. To amplify their 
campaign through the media, MOSOP hired a video team and invited Greenpeace to 
record pollution and environmental damage (Bob, 2005).30 The coalition with Greenpeace 
                                                          
27 Bob (2005, p.106) as cited by Demirel-Pegg and Pegg (2015, p.658) argued that “although some Ogoni used violence, 
these unusual events contravened MOSOP policy and were quickly condemned by the leadership.” 
28 This day is now referred to as the Ogoni Day (Senewo, 2015). 
29 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qkFEhnnwfWI  
30 Bob (2005, p.83-84) claimed that “although Ogoni Day garnered no contemporaneous media coverage outside 
Nigeria, Saro-Wiwa screened the videotapes at the UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization) General 
Assembly in The Hague at the end of January… His speeches attacking Shell won him notice in the Netherlands, Shell’s 
home country.” 
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allowed the Ogoni’s campaign for social and environmental justice to become part of an 
international anti-oil campaign and the publication of a Greenpeace counter account titled 
‘Shell-Shocked: The Environmental and Social Costs of Living with Shell in Nigeria’ in 
1994 (Bob, 2005).31 
This campaign dramatically escalated from a regional conflict in 1995 with the arrest and 
subsequent execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP activists (the Ogoni 9) 
by the federal government. The hanging of the Ogoni 9 activists marked a substantive 
transformation in the international visibility of the social, economic, and ecological 
damage of oil production in the Delta, which was amplified using a range of counter-
accounts produced by iaNGOs (Amnesty International 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015a; 
Amunwa, 2011; Christian Aid, 2004; Friends of the Earth, 2011; UNEP, 2011). The 
reaction to the Ogoni 9 execution escalated what was a partisan regional campaign into a 
series of high-profile international campaigns for human rights accountability, 
environmental protection, social justice, corporate responsibility, effective governance 
and sustainable development (Ako and Ekhator, 2016; Baumuller et al., 2011; Conway, 
2010; Gray and Gray, 2011; Ruggie, 2013).32 Rowell et al., (2005, p.6) claimed “Saro-
Wiwa’s death sent shock waves around the world. A UN Security Council debate on 
Liberia was interrupted; protests broke out in many European and American cities where 
Shell had a presence. Nigerian embassies were also targeted.” Isumonah, (2015) and 
Rowell et al., (2005) argued that there was evidence that their death was premeditated by 
the government and Shell.33 Demirel-Pegg and Pegg (2015, p.658) argued that “it is thus 
not surprising that oil companies (are) used to dealing with one Nigerian federal 
government or that government which depends upon oil for about 80% of its total 
revenues and 95% of its foreign exchange earnings would find such a demand 
revolutionary and unacceptable.” Before the conviction of the Ogoni 9, over 2000 Ogonis 
had been massacred, raped, beaten, imprisoned, maimed and some were on exile. Villages 
                                                          
31 The author could not find any copy of this report online, on Greenpeace webpage or in the library. 
32 Their death sentence on the 31 October 1995 resulted in international outrage. See: In remembrance- Ken Saro-Wiwa 
Part IV https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=50AGOBgoi3U 
33 The civic disturbances tribunal was made up of two judges and a military officer. The defence lawyers withdrew 
from representing the plaintiff in the hearings after alleging that the tribunal’s panel were bias. See ‘In remembrance – 
Ken Saro-Wiwa Part III’ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsH4Y_hMTPI. Frynas (2001, p.50) and Isumonah 
(2015, p.651) claimed that there was evidence that their death was prearranged. 
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were burnt by the military personnel during the dictatorship rule of General Sani Abacha34 
(Okonta and Douglas, 2003; Rowell et al., 2005). 
Their execution resulted in a stepwise change in local, regional (Niger Delta), national 
and international campaigns particularly against Shell and other MNOCs in Nigeria and 
in other controversial and environmentally polluted regions across the globe for greater 
and inclusive accountability, environmental accountability, effective governance, respect 
and protection of human rights and sustainable development (Conway, 2010; Rowell et 
al., 2005; Ruggie, 2013; Ako and Ekhator, 2016; Baumuller et al., 2011).35 For instance, 
over 1000 people from across the Niger Delta in August 1997 participated in a rally at 
Aleibiri, a village in Bayelsa State that gave birth to a ‘Chicoco movement’ (Bob, 2005; 
Rowell et al., 2005; Watt, 2015). Watt (2015) claimed the ‘Chicoco movement’ linked 
civic organisations and youth movements from all ethnic groups in the Niger Delta which 
include Andonis, Ogonis, Ijaws, Ikwerres, Itsekiri, Urhobos, and Ilajes. In congruence to 
MOSOP’s environmental campaign, the ‘Chicoco movement’ demanded an end to 
ecological damage, compensation for environmental pollution to the people, and 
demilitarization of the Delta communities (Rowell et al., 2005; Watt, 2015). Likewise, in 
May 1998, Bola Oyinbo led a non-violence campaign against Chevron for the 
environmental pollution experienced by the people due to Chevron’s operation in Ondo 
State (Rowell et al., 2005). Furthermore, on the 11 December 1998, Ijaw youths from 
Bayelsa State comprising over 500 communities met in Kaiama (a village in Bayelsa 
State) to ‘deliberate on the best way to ensure the continuous survival of the indigenous 
peoples of the Ijaw ethnic nationality of the Niger Delta within the Nigerian State’ 
(Rowell, 2005; Tuodolo and Kaiser-Wilhelm, 1998). They formed the Ijaw Youth 
Council and their campaign led to the adoption of a ‘Kaiama Declaration’ (Bob, 2005; 
Manby, 1999; Watt, 2015). Their demand was argued to be synonymous to the demands 
made in the Ogoni Bill of Rights (Bob, 2005; Rowell et al., 2005; Senewo, 2015; Tuodolo 
and Kaiser-Wilhelm, 1998). 
                                                          
34 The chronological analysis of events before and during the Ogoni 9 death were distinctly documented in Okonta and 
Douglas (2003) ‘Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights and Oil’; Rowell, Marriott and Stockman (2005) ‘The 
Next Gulf: London, Washington and Oil Conflict in Nigeria’ and Saro-Wiwa (1995) A month and a day.’ 
35 Their death sentence on the 31 October 1995 resulted in international outrage. See: In remembrance- Ken Saro-Wiwa 
Part IV https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=50AGOBgoi3U  
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The Kaiama declaration attributed the conflict in the Delta to the struggle for political 
autonomy and the control of oil resources. The Kaiama declaration asserted that 
environmental pollution in Ijawland by MNOCs and the Nigerian State arise mainly 
because Ijaw people have been robbed of their natural rights to own and control the 
resources through the use of the Land Use Decree of 1978, the Petroleum Decrees of 1969 
and 1991 and the Lands (Title Vesting) Decree No.52 of 1993 (Osborne Land Decree). 
The Kaiama declaration argued that all land and natural resources within the Ijaw territory 
belonged to the Ijaw communities and that was the basis of their survival. Furthermore, 
the Kaiama Declaration concluded that the Youth Council ceased to recognize all decrees 
enacted without their participation and consent. Following their statement, the Youth 
Council called for the military and repressive forces of the Nigerian government to 
withdraw from the region and warned that any oil corporations that has employed the 
services of armed forces to protect its operations would be regarded as an enemy of the 
Ijaw people (Human Rights Watch, 1999, 2005; Rowell et al., 2005; Tuodolo and Kaiser-
Wilhelm, 1998). 
Whilst the author undertook reviews of the histories of counter accounting engagements 
within this arena, the focus of this section was to develop a timeline to understand why 
counter accounts were produced as part of the non-violence and evidence-based anti-oil 
accountability campaign in Ogoniland. The reviews above revealed that the actions for 
inclusive accountability and engagement adopted the strategy of demobilising political 
systems and galvanising actions from the local, regional, national and international arenas 
to advocate for change within an unsustainable arena (Ako, 2015; Watt, 2015; Friere, 
2002; Contrafatto et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2015; Apostol, 2015). The timeline below 
identified the key stakeholders in this arena, some of the key emancipatory anti-oil 
accountability and human right campaigns by individuals, community groups, local and 
international NGOs, as well as the engagement of the MNOCs and the responses from 
the government. 
Individuals, communities, and NGOs have helped problematize and represent the voices 
of the oppressed indigenous people for over 25 years. This activism were embedded 
within the struggle for power, zero tolerance to environmental pollution, zero tolerance 
to corruption, transparency and accountability for environmental pollution and the wealth 
generated from the exploration and the campaign against the application of double 
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standards within the arena. These campaigns were conducted through diverse publicity 
stunts, articles, press releases, protest, shareholders’ group resolutions and campaigns, 
advertising, conducting a scientific investigation (such as UNEP 2011) to conscientize 
communities’ people to demand accountability and the respect of their human rights. 
Their advocacies led to numerous coalitions with other local and international activist 
groups to drive campaigns for legislative reforms. This resulted in the reform of the 
NOSDRA Act, 2006 and the introduction of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) in 2012. 
The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) (2012) would have established a framework for the 
actualization of accountability, transparency and the respect of human rights by 
stakeholders within this arena but this bill has not been passed by the legislature (Amnesty 
International, 2012). Amnesty International (2012, p.4) asserted that  
“The drafting of the PIB reflects the most comprehensive review of the legal 
framework for the oil and gas sector in Nigeria since the industry began 
commercial operations in the 1960s and could provide an important opportunity 
to ensure that the social and human rights impact of the oil industry are adequately 
addressed.”   
Instead of approving the PIB, an abridged version of the PIB called the Petroleum 
Industry Governance (PIG) Bill, 2016 was proposed. This abridged version excluded the 
Petroleum Host Community Fund (PHCF) earmarked for communities’ protection and 
development in the initial PIB (PIG Bill, 2016; Addeh, 2016; Payne, 2015; Perchstone 
and Graeys, 2016). For an overview of the key events on the historical evaluation of why 
counter accounts were produced in the Niger Delta, see Table 9 below titled “Overview 
of the Conflicts, Counter accounts and Engagements in the Delta from 1990-2017.” 
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1990-1995                                                                           
1990-1991 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
established to campaign for the ethnic minority rights after 35 
years of oil pollution. 
Ken Saro-Wiwa accused the Nigerian government of practising 
genocide and the oil corporations of waging ecological war. 
Ogoni Bill of Right presented to Federal government and the oil 
corporation, such as Shell.   
 
1992-1993 
On the 4th January 1993 tagged Ogoni Day, about 300,000 
people took part in a political non-violence rally to request for 
their right. 
Shell was forced to stop production in Ogoniland because of the 
protest. 
Environmental Rights Action (ERA) founded. A local advocacy 
NGO affiliated to the Friends of the Earth International.  
 
1994-1995 
Ken Saro-Wiwa & others arrested, and imprisoned for 9 months, 
triggering national and international campaigns for their release. 
Greenpeace published ‘Shell-Shocked: The Environmental and 
Social Costs of Living with Shell in Nigeria.’  
1996 - 2000 
1996-1997 
Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) suspended 
Nigeria from being a commonwealth country between 11th 
November 1995 to 29 May 1999 condemning the undemocratic 
human right violation of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni people.  
Escalated into an extensive rise of local and international civil 
society organisations to address the pollution and violation of human 
rights. 
Wiwa vs Shell case was filed in the United States of America (USA) 
to seek redress for Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other 8 Ogoni people. 
In 1997, ECCR shareholders’ resolution was presented at Shell’s 
Annual General Meeting. 
Over 1000 people participated in a rally creating the ‘Chicoco 
movement.’ 
 
1998-1999 
Between 1998-1999, military crackdown in the Niger Delta region 
against protesters. 
Non-violent protest by youths from 42 communities against 
Chevron. 
Ijaw Youth Council was formed and adopted the ‘Kaiama 
Declaration’ 
2001-2006                                                                               
2001-2002 
The emergence of armed insurgency groups including the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), 
fighting for social improvements and control of oil production. 
Formation of MEND and the rise of political insurgency groups 
stimulated an extensive 9 months’ conflict, which resulted in the 
destruction of oil installations. Because of this threat, the prices 
of oil skyrocketed to $50 per barrel from $43 per barrel. 
Extensive destruction of oil installations, kidnapping of oil 
workers and government officials. 
Esther Kiobel (whose husband was hanged along with Ken Saro-
Wiwa) sued Shell in US Federal Court. The case was eventually 
dismissed in 2013. The case was dismissed on the 17 April 2013 
on the basis that the abuse was not committed in the US and the 
plaintiff is not a US citizen. This ruling hindered other lawsuits 
on human rights violation against MNC outside the US from 
being adjudicated in the US. Activists claimed the decision was 
a setback for international human rights, thereby hindering the 
causes for human rights redress in the US. This opened a global 
horizon for countries where human rights perpetrated in other 
countries could be adjudicated. 
600 Delta women shut down Chevron/Texaco oil facility for 10 
days by occupying their sites.  
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While they were imprisoned, World Bank published a report 
titled ‘defining an environmental development strategy for the 
Niger Delta’ on the 25 May 1995. 
The case was withdrawn from the Nigerian judicial system under 
the directives of General Sani Abacha and was placed under a 
court called civic disturbances tribunal consisting of 2 judges 
and a military officer.  
On 30 and 31 October, nine of the accused were convicted and 
sentenced to death while six others were acquitted.  
On the 10th November 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa and the 8 Ogoni 
people were hanged (Ogoni 9). 
With the announcement of their death, the case became an 
international campaign for human right, environmental 
degradation, and accountability. 
National and international campaign claiming Shell was 
responsible for the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the 8 Ogoni 
people. 
Shell in 1995 published a counter video clip to debunk the 
allegations peddled against them over the death of Ken Saro-
Wiwa and the 8 Ogoni people. 
Human Rights Watch published ‘The Price of Oil: Corporate 
Responsibility and human rights violations in Nigeria’s oil-
producing communities’. 
Oputa panel also known as Human Rights Violations Investigation 
Commission (HRVIC) was formed to examine military human rights 
violations from 1966-1999. The commission received over 1000 
petitions and examined 340 cases. These cases include the human 
rights violations of the 9 Ogonis, environmental degradation of 
Ogoniland and other cases of environmental degradation and 
military brutality in the Delta. 
 
In May 2002, Oputa panel published its report, identifying a 
range of problems in Delta. 
 
2003-2004 
Human Rights Watch wrote to Shell and other oil corporations 
in the Delta to take preventive measures to avoid violence in the 
region.  
Period of violence by military resulting in deaths, houses 
destroyed, displacement of people  
40% of oil production closed due to the rise of insurgent groups. 
Parliament ordered Shell to pay $1bilion to affected 
communities.  
Series of counter accounts were published e.g. Christian Aid,  
Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative was 
established to enshrine transparency, accountability and 
effective governance in the management of the oil industry and 
its revenue but its activities were legislatively backed-up by an 
Act in 2007.  
 
2005-2006 
President set up a reconciliation process between Shell and the 
Ogoni. The proposal for an extensive scientific environmental 
assessment of Ogoniland emerged from this dialogue.   
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In 2005/2006, ECCR shareholders’ resolution was presented at 
Shell’s Annual General Meeting. This resolution called for an 
improvement in Shell’s performance within the region, 
stakeholder’s consultation, risk analysis; and social and 
environmental impact analysis. However, Shell called for a 
rejection of the resolution.  
Chevron adopted a Global Memorandum of Understanding 
(GMOU) as a framework for engaging the communities in the 
Delta. 
Sculpture of Ogoni 9, funded by Platform, unveiled in London.  
IUCN-World conservation report presented to UN, Nigerian 
government & Shell. 
Shell pursued reconciliation with the people of Ogoniland and 
consequently established an Ogoni re-entry unit to facilitate a 
dialogue. 
In May 2005, Reverend Father Mathew Hussan Kukah was 
appointed by the government to facilitate a reconciliation 
process between Shell and the Ogoni people. The proposal for 
an extensive scientific environmental assessment emerged from 
the reconciliation and this led to the UNEP (2011) report on 
Ogoniland. 
Chevron and Shell adopted a Global Memorandum of 
Understanding (GMOU) as a framework of engaging the 
communities in the Delta in 2005 and 2006 respectively.   
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Series of counter accounts were published e.g United Nations 
report 2006 (and so on). 
Remains of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight Ogoni’s were 
recovered after they were hanged. 
Shell pursued reconciliation with the people of Ogoniland  
2007-2010 
2007-2008 
Growth in international media & photo accounts revealing 
environmental degradation, human right abuse and violence. 
These media reports include Al Jazeera, CNN, BCC, Channel 4, 
Guardian, ABC News, Ed Kasha photo report on the horror of 
Shell in the Niger Delta, George Oshodi photo reports.  
‘Shell is Guilty’ campaign by iaNGOs on behalf of Ken Saro-
Wiwa. 
Stakeholders’ dialogue to engage the Ogonis and to re-install 
Shell’s operations in Ogoniland,  
On the 13th November 2008, Dublin Street sign was changed in 
remembrance of Ken Saro-Wiwa. 
During this period, there was diverse stakeholders’ dialogue to 
re-install Shell’s exploration in Ogoniland. This resulted in 
2011-2012 
2011-2012 
FOE/Milieudefensie published a Shadow account titled ‘Erratum to 
Shell Annual Report 2010’ and was presented to shareholders and 
Shell’s 2011 AGM. 
Platform published ‘Counting the cost: corporations & human rights 
abuses in the Niger Delta.’  
Guardian published a documentary on the pollution of Delta. 
UNEP published its critical findings on the environmental 
assessment of Ogoniland ‘Environmental Assessment of 
Ogoniland.’ The report revealed that remediation and restoration of 
Ogoniland are possible but might take up to 30 years. They observed 
900% level of benzene in drinking water of Nisisioken Ogale 
community above WHO guideline. Furthermore, in 49 cases, they 
observed hydrocarbons in soil at depths of at least 5m. They 
evaluated more than 200 locations, 1122 kilometres of pipelines, 
4000 soil and water samples and more than 5000 medical records. 
The study claimed that the environmental remediation and 
restoration of Ogoniland is possible but it might take 25 to 30 years. 
2013-2017 
2013-2014 
‘Publish what you pump’ and ‘what you paid campaign’ 
launched by ERA/ FOE. This was aimed at filling the gap in ‘the 
publish what you pay’ initiatives by advocacy NGOs to facilitate 
the transparency initiative of NEITI. 
IUCN-NDP published its reports after Shell’s consultation 
‘Sustainable Remediation and Rehabilitation of Biodiversity 
and Habitats of Oil Spill Sites in the Niger Delta’.  
Shell web chat ‘improving lives & supporting Nigeria’s 
development.’  
A Dutch court found that Shell breached its duty of care to 
prevent third-party interference with its installations in a case 
supported by ERA & FOE International. 
A farmer was compensated in Ikot Ado when Shell was found 
guilty of pollution in the Netherlands. 
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counter actions by advocacy NGOs such as the Ogoni Solidarity 
Forum/Social Actions. 
In February 2007, UNEP announced its assessment of Ogoniland 
project with SPDC sponsorship based on the ‘polluter pays 
principle’.  
 
2009-2010 
Between August 2008 and February 2009, there were two 
massive oil spills in the Bodo communities, which destroyed the 
vegetation, land and the livelihood of about 69000 people. 
Counter accounts produced ‘Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and 
Poverty in the Niger Delta’ (AI), ‘The true cost of Chevron’ 
(coalition), ‘Shell in the Niger Delta’ (ECCR).  
Increased violence and worsened social conditions in the region 
was argued to have led to major shortfall in crude oil production 
from 2.6million in 2005 to 1.7million barrels per day in 2009. 
UNEP commenced a 14-month study of the environmental 
devastation in Delta.  
The legitimacy of UNEP’s study challenged due to Shells’ 
sponsorship. 
The increased violence led to a major shortfall in crude oil 
production. 
Federal Government committee set up to address UNEP findings. 
Findings revealed that the committee submitted its report to the 
Presidency in May 2012 without disclosing it to the public. 
Therefore, the content of the report is unknown.    
Shell web chat ‘Shell in Nigeria – working in a complex 
environment.’ This was done to engage and address the questions 
raised by its stakeholders within the region and outside the region. 
Minister of Petroleum Resources established Hydrocarbon Pollution 
Restoration Project (HYPREP) to implement the UNEP report.  
HYPREP members not paid for 18 months and there had not been 
any significant implementation of UNEP’s report.  
Civil societies and Ogoni call for the dissolution of HYPREP.  
The lawsuit filed against Shell in the UK by Bodo community for oil 
spilt in 2008 and 2009. 
IUCN-NDP consulted by Shell to provide independent, scientific 
advice on the remediation of bio-diversity and habitats of oil-spill 
sites in the Delta.  
Independent satellite assessments by Accufacts through the 
engagement of CEHRD and Amnesty International were used to 
challenge the accuracy of Shell’s official measurements of 1640 and 
4000 barrels of oil spills at Bodo in 2008 and 2009 respectively.  
International lawsuit filed against Shell in The Netherlands by four 
farmers supported by Friends of the Earth 
Stakeholder Alliance & Corporate Accountability conducted a 
stakeholders’ consultation in the Niger Delta. 
Protest by half-nude women against the non-implementation of 
Memorandum of Understanding by Shell 
Minister of Petroleum Resources established a multi-
stakeholder consultative committee to plan the restoration of 
Ogoniland. They were saddled with the responsibility of 
proposing a focused and implementable plan for the restoration 
of Ogoniland, as well as advice HYPREP on how to utilise its 
funds. 
 
2015-2016 
Shell was found guilty of polluting Bodo community and paid 
an out of court settlement of £55m. 
Platform plan to move Ogoni 9 memorial from London to Delta. 
Dutch court re-examines case dismissed in 2010, due to new 
evidence presented by ERA & FOE International. This case was 
initially dismissed by the court in 2010. 
AI published ‘The state of the world’s human rights’. 
Federal Government authorised the Attorney General, Minister 
of Justice & NOSDRA commence legal action against Shell of 
1.3 trillion compensation for Bonga oil spill that affected 350 
communities in the Delta. 
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On 8 June 2009, Shell compensated Ken Saro-Wiwa and the 8 
Ogoni people by paying $15.5 million. A sum agreed out of 
court.  
Nigerian government granted amnesty to MEND with the 
agreement that the Delta would be developed and the 
environment would be cleaned-up. This action halted attacks on 
oil facilities by the end of 2009. 
Shell commenced a web-dialogue ‘doing business in Nigeria: 
challenges & questions’ to engage with different stakeholders in 
the region and outside the region. 
 ‘I am Sorry’ campaign launched by the “Yes Men” activists.  
Shell’s micro-development programme for Niger Delta.,  
Women blocked Chevron pipelines in October 2010. 
Introduction of Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) by a coalition of 
NGOs to the National Assembly. This bill could set a clear 
premise for resource allocation, accountability, transparency, 
human rights and the effective governance of the industry. 
Nigerian Content Act passed to promote indigenous companies’ 
participation in the oil industry. 
Chevron denied activists’ access to their AGM in the US to 
present their request for the clean-up of the Delta. 
Advocacy NGOs lobby for the Petroleum Industry Bill to be enacted. 
  
President launched the clean-up of Ogoniland as per UNEP  
2011 report.  
 
2017 
Shell admitted that they engaged with money launderer when 
negotiating access to the oil field in the Delta. 
 
Table 9: Overview of the Conflicts, Counter accounts and Engagements in the Delta from 1990-2017 
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6.2. WHY COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY? 
6.2.1. OVERVIEW OF THE COUNTER ACCOUNTS: WHY COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY? 
Over twenty-five years of activism for accountability and the respect of human right lies 
at the heart of these counter accounts, counter actions and stakeholders’ dialogue for 
emancipatory and institutional changes within this arena. These dialogues commenced as 
a local campaign against environmental pollution and (inadequate) lack of social 
amenities (Amunwa, 2011; Okonta and Douglas, 2003). Despite the success of the oil and 
gas industry to the economy and development of Nigeria; abject poverty, stench of 
hydrocarbon, conflict and environmental pollution in the Niger Delta is obvious (Abah 
and Okwori, 2006; Amnesty International, 2015a; 2013; 2011; 2009; ECCR, 2010; 
Friends of the Earth, 2011; 2005). Poor practices by the oil producing corporations and 
regulators led to the Niger Delta being ranked as one of the five worst petroleum damaged 
ecosystems in the world (Kafada, 2012; Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010). According to 
World Bank (1995, p.2) report, they asserted that ‘despite its vast oil reserves, the region 
remains poor.’ The World Bank (1995, p. v) claimed 
“The Niger Delta has been blessed with an abundance of physical and human 
resources, including the majority of Nigeria’s oil and gas deposits, agricultural 
land, extensive forests, excellent fisheries, as well as with a well-developed 
industrial base, a strong banking system, a large labor force, and a vibrant private 
sector. However, the region’s tremendous potential and economic growth and 
sustainable development remains unfulfilled and its future is threatened by 
deteriorating economic conditions that are not being addressed by present policies 
and actions.” 
Christian Aid (2004) argued that oil spills are left for months un-remediated and any 
subsequent remediation is of poor quality resulting in the pollution of water and land, 
which exposed the indigenous people to unacceptably high risks of diseases (Amnesty 
International, 2009; UNEP, 2011). Steiner (2010, p.4) claimed that  
“While the official estimates are that 4.1million barrels spilled into the Gulf of 
Mexico […] recent estimates suggest that over the 50-year history of oil operations 
in the Niger Delta, some 9 to 11 million barrels of oil have been spilled” 
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After an extensive research in Bayelsa and Rivers States of the Niger Delta, Amnesty 
International (2009, p.16) asserted that 
“To put this into perspective, people living in the Niger Delta have experienced 
oil spills on par with the Exxon Valdez every year over the last 50 years. Despite 
this, the government and the companies have not taken effective measures over 
these 50 years to prevent oil spills from recurring, or to properly address the 
impacts of oil spills.” 
While the Gulf of Mexico oil spills in 2010 and Exxon Valdez at Alaska in 1989 have 
been subjected to major discourse to remediate the damage caused (Rushe, 2015), the 
Niger Delta remains a place of environmental degradation and extensive pollution 
(Amnesty International, 2013; UNEP, 2011). The oil spills were argued to have destroyed 
the livelihoods of the local communities, environmental hazards and have significantly 
diminished the bio-diversity to the Delta. Indigenous people were exposed to polluted air, 
damaged land and polluted rivers, which contributed to the incidence of diseases such as 
typhoid, skin conditions, gastroenteritis and respiratory disorders (Amnesty International, 
2009; UNEP, 2011). Despite official claims by the corporations and government of 
substantial social investments in the Delta, the local communities have limited access to 
electricity, clean water, hospital buildings where no patient had ever been treated; school 
buildings where no lesson had ever been taught, women’s centres where no meeting had 
ever been held and a garri (cassava root) processing plant, where no garri has been 
processed and it is an ecological wasteland (Christian Aid 2004; Kadafa, 2012a; Oviasuyi 
and Uwadiae, 2010). 
Despite the massive wealth generated from the exploration of the Delta region’s oil 
reserves, on average the citizens of Delta were living on less than $1 per day36 and without 
any basic amenities (UNDP, 2006). UNDP (2006, pp.36-37) asserted that 
                                                          
36 $1 per day was the latest available poverty line benchmark on the Niger Delta region. However, it is recognised that 
the World Bank poverty line for developing countries (which include Nigeria) was adjusted in October 2015 to $1.90 
using the 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) from $1.25 in 2005 (The World Bank, 2015).     
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“The critical issue in the Niger Delta is not only the increasing incidence of 
poverty, but also the intense feeling among the people of the region that they ought 
to do far better. This is based on the considerable level of resources in their midst, 
and the brazen display and celebration of ill-gotten wealth in Nigeria, most of 
which derives from crude oil […] even if poverty is measured as living on less 
than US $1 a day, the true levels of poverty in the region will still be 
underestimated with poverty a way of life due to economic stagnation; agricultural 
underdevelopment from soil infertility; unemployment; poor quality of life due to 
shortages of essential goods, facilities and money; isolation and poor 
communication; government insensitivity; and an unhealthy environment 
spreading disease and malnutrition.” 
Poverty in the Delta has been described as ‘poverty qua poverty’, a term coined by 
Ikejiaku (2009, p.16) to emphasize the notion of practical absolute poverty where people 
find it difficult to satisfy their basic needs for food, clothing, shelter and education. Yet 
there are examples of extreme wasteful practices that could make a substantive difference 
to the lived lives of the people. For example, Eboh (2014) estimated that in August 2014, 
17.3% of the total gas produced was lost due to flaring (which was declared illegal in 
1985) representing approximately US$170.2 million of lost income in a single month 
(Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth, 2005; Social Action, 2009a). The 
advocacy NGOs argued that the communities in the Delta bear the real cost of crude oil 
and gas extraction while the corporations and government pursue profit maximisation 
(Social Action, 2009a). These unsustainable practices led to coalitions of local, regional, 
national and international advocacy NGOs campaigning to transform the lives of the 
indigenous people. 
The author pondered why a region known for its abundant natural resources and palpable 
human development capacity could be subjected to high environmental degradation, 
youth restiveness, conflict-ridden, social, economic, and environmental marginalization, 
governance and accountability negligence, consistent human right violations and stark 
poverty. According to UNDP, (2006, p.iii) 
“Analyses of poverty and human development paint a dismal picture, particularly 
when the region is compared with other oil-producing regions in the world. In the 
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Niger Delta, the results of poor development have been disillusionment, 
frustration among the people about their increasing deprivation and deep-rooted 
mistrust.”  
Pollution and the destruction of the environment through oil spills and gas flaring are the 
bedrock of the endemic penury and conflict within this region (Amnesty International, 
2009; ECCR, 2010; Steiner, 2010).37 The region is rich in natural gas but majority of the 
associated gas38 is flared. Gas flaring contributes to climate change, respiratory (lung and 
heart), eye irritation and skin rashes and cancer; damage to agricultural products due to 
acidic rain, constant noise, heat and light (Social Action, 2009a; Environmental Rights 
Action/Friends of the Earth, 2005). Consistent gas flare is a reminder of the application 
of double standards by the corporations, which would not be allowed to operate in this 
way in the western world (Amnesty International, 2015a, 2011, 2009; Amunwa, 2011; 
Steiner, 2010). This endemic poverty not only resulted in social and environmental 
accountability problems but resulted in economic, cultural, and political conflicts. The 
table below revealed the demography, social, economic and resource indicators of the 
Niger Delta region. 
 
Table 10: Demography of the Niger Delta region at a glance 
This region is made up of 9 states 
and 185 local governments 
Rivers State (23), Delta State (26), Akwa-Ibom (31), Bayelsa (8), Edo State 
(18), Cross River (17), Abia (17), Imo (27) and Ondo (18). 
Land areas 112,110km2 of land representing about 12% of Nigeria’s total surface area. 
Population39 Projected population in 2015 was approximately 40million (23% of the 
total population of Nigeria). 
Ethnic groups/Languages 40 different ethnic groups speaking 250 languages and dialects.  
Population density/settlement 
pattern 
Settlement pattern in the Niger Delta region is determined by the 
availability of dry land and the nature of the terrain. These settlements are 
classified as rural communities in dispersed village settlements while 98 
settlements, which is less than 1%, could be classified as urban 
                                                          
37 The author would claim that they form the bedrock to other conflict such as the consistent conflict of interest, youth 
restiveness and upheavals, political marginalization, vested interest problem that shape the interplay of the dialogic 
accountability and engagement within this arena (see chapter 7, 8 and 9).  
38 There are three basic treatment of associated gas: when distillated from the oil, it could be used as liquidified natural 
gas (LNG). It could be re-injected into the soil and lastly could be flared.  
39 The author could not find the current population data.   
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communities. The vast majority of the settlements house closely spaced 
groups, who are predominantly farmers or fish farmers. 
Age structure  People below the age of 30 years accounted for approximately 62% of the 
age group. Adults between 30-69 years accounted for approximately 36% 
while the aged 70 years and above constitute 2%. 
Ecological zones Mangrove forest and coastal vegetation, freshwater swamp forest, lowland 
rainforest, savannah montane region. 
Migration 
 
79% of the Niger Delta are non-migrant while the remaining 21% are 
migrants. (NDDC, 2005). Majority of the inhabitants are indigenous 
people.  
Wealth/Poverty 88% of the rural dwellers are migrating into the urban centres in search of 
a better life.   
 
 
Table 11: Socio and economic indicators of the Niger Delta region at a glance 
Life expectancy In the 70s, life expectancy rose to 60 years.40 This deteriorated to 
approximately 45years, which is lower than the overall expectancy rate of 
Nigeria at approximately 50 years in 2008.41 
Infant mortality rate 178 out of every 1000 children die under the age of 5 years (NDDC, 
2005).42 
Maternal mortality rate Maternal mortality rate was similar to the Nigerian maternal rate of 704-
1000 deaths per 100,000 women. This implies that out of 2.4million births, 
approximately 17,000 women die due to complications during pregnancy 
or birth within this region (NDDC, 2005).  
Economics About 80% of all employed persons are engaged in the private sector, with 
the greater proportion working in the informal sector, while 10% are 
employed in the public sector. 
Revenue  90-95% of export revenue is generated from the oil and gas sector from this 
region. 
                                                          
40 The author could not find any specific life expectancy data on the Niger Delta region except as stated in The 
Economist (2008).  
41 See World Bank (2015). Data: life expectancy at birth male (years) 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx and as stated in the UNEP report (2011, p.204) is less 
than 50years. 
42 When compared to the World Bank data for Nigeria in 2005, the infant mortality rate is between the thresholds of 
148.3-169.7. see http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx When this data is used as a 
benchmark and compared to the infant mortality rate of the Niger Delta region as stated by NDDC, (2005); it implies 
that the infant mortality rate within this region is very high. 
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Revenue allocation 13%43 revenue derivation is allocated on a monthly basis from the 
Federation Account to be shared among the oil-producing states. 
Energy The primary energy source in this region is firewood 73%, kerosene 24.8% 
and gas 1.2%. Access to electricity supply in the Niger Delta is extremely 
poor. Majority of the rural dwellers rely on firewood, kerosene lanterns and 
candle for electric lighting. About 72% of the population is not connected 
to the national electricity grid (UNDP, 2006).  
Economics About 80% of all employed persons are engaged in the private sector, with 
the greater proportion working in the informal sector, while 10% are 
employed in the public sector. 
Employment The highest proportion of the people engage in Agriculture. 44.2% are in 
forestry and fishing, 17.4% are engaged in trading activities, 7.1% are 
engaged in the education sector, 9.8% are in the service sector, 5.4% are in 
administration, 2.2% in transportation activities, 2.8% in construction and 
11.1% engaged in more than one activities (NDDC, 2005).   
Unemployment44, 45  
 
Evidence from the National Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire 
(NCWIQ) 2006 revealed that youth unemployment is prevalence. Their 
study revealed that approximately 24% of youth age 15-24 in the South-
South zone of the Niger Delta region were unemployed as shown below: 
State Unemployment 
(Age 15-24) 
General 
unemployment   
(15 and above) 
Underemployment 
(Age 15 and above) 
Abia 
Akwa-Ibom 
Bayelsa 
Cross River 
Delta 
Edo 
27.8 
32.8 
18.7 
5.0 
21.2 
22.3 
7.6 
11.3 
6.8 
1.8 
9.3 
8.0 
12.8 
33.7 
19.4 
12 
29.2 
30.9 
                                                          
43 Derivation implies that a fixed proportion of the revenue generated from the region would be retained for the 
development of the region (Frynas, 2001). Demirel-Pegg and Pegg (2015, p.658) as paraphrased from Frynas (2001, 
p.32) argued that “at independence, the derivation principle was set at 50% of the tax revenues derived from that area. 
This was subsequently lowered to 45% and then to 20% before being entirely abolished and replaced with a special 
account for oil producing areas, which ultimately hit a low of 1.5% in 1992. Under Nigeria’s current constitution, the 
derivation principle has been increased to 13%.” While the 13% could be seen as improvement for developmental 
purpose, the control of the resources still reside with the government, who decide how it should be spend (Demirel-
Pegg and Pegg, 2015; Watt, 2015) and counter evidence in Chapter 7 and 8 proved that this revenue have not been used 
for the development of the Delta. 
44 Recent data and unemployment figures for this region are not available. 
45 The author observed some inconsistencies in the figures disclosed in the analysis section as being different from the 
figures disclosed in the tables. For the purpose of this research, the figures disclosed in the analysis is deemed 
appropriate for Abia, Bayelsa, Delta and Imo State. 
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Imo 
Ondo 
Rivers 
South-South 
Nigeria 
19.5 
17.3 
28.8 
23.8 
14 
6.6 
3.5 
11.4 
8.8 
5.3 
21.9 
15.3 
25.3 
26.2 
20.2 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2006). 
These figures revealed that more youth are remanded in poverty due to 
unemployment.  
Adult and youth illiteracy46  
 
 
State Adult (Age 15 and above) Youth (15 - 24) 
Abia 
Akwa-Ibom 
Bayelsa 
Cross River 
Delta 
Edo 
Imo 
Ondo 
Rivers 
South-South 
Nigeria 
79.9 
81.6 
75.5 
68.1 
74.4 
77.0 
76.6 
76.6 
82.6 
78.0 
65.7 
95.1 
92.7 
90.7 
82.1 
89.3 
91.6 
95.2 
97.4 
93.9 
91.3 
80.2 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2006).  
 
 
Table 12: Resource indicators of the Niger Delta region at a glance 
Natural Resources Petroleum, associated and non-associated natural gas47, tin-lead, zinc, coal, 
arable land, limestone, tar sand, marble, gypsum, phosphate rock, feldspar, 
granite gravel. 
Traditional Industry Canoe carving, pottery, cloth weaving, mat-making, thatch making (roof 
materials), palm oil processing, food processing (garri, fufu and starch) 
from cassava, local gin. 
Crude Oil Production Nigeria produces high value, low sulphur content and light crude oil often 
called Antan Blend, Bonny Light, Bonny Medium, Brass Blend, Escravos 
Light, Forcados Blend, IMA, Odudu Blend, Pennington Light, Qua-Iboe 
Light and Ukpokiti (NNPC, 2015). 
Oil and Gas Reserves Crude oil production per day is approximately 1,754 barrels, proven crude 
oil and natural gas reserves are 37,070 million and 5,111billion cu.m 
respectively (OPEC, 2014b).  
                                                          
46 Adult literacy is defined for persons ‘aged 15 years and above’ as who could read and write in any language. 
47 While the operators exploit the non-associated natural gas/pure gas, the associated or mixed natural gas is flared.   
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Water supply  Majority of the rural dwellers depend on wells, streams, and creeks for 
drinking, cooking and washing. 
Waste management Majority of the waste products within this region (industrial or municipal) 
are dumped into rivers or creeks. 
Poverty 70% of the population is on/or below the poverty line. 
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank, 2015a, b, 2005; Social Action, 2014a, b; 2009a; Eboh, 2014; OPEC, 
2014b; Francis et al., 2011; The Economist, 2008; UNDP, 2006; National Bureau of Statistics, 2006; 
NDDC, 2005; Environmental Right Action/Friends of the Earth, 2005. 
From the tables above, it could be observed that the poverty, economic and infrastructural 
neglect is clearly visible in this region. It could be described as a ‘poor nation within an 
affluent nation’. The Niger Delta region has been a ‘victim’ of unsystematic constructions 
of canals, poor road networks, dilapidated schools and health infrastructures, no 
electricity, neglected developmental projects, youth upheavals, conflicts and kidnapping. 
Consistent upheavals and conflicts of interest have become major occurrences to resist 
the economic and infrastructural deprivation and abuse of human rights (Oviasuyi and 
Uwadiae, 2010). The youth have been subjected to a ‘climate of hopelessness’ and with 
the belief that violence, illegal bunkering of oil installations, kidnapping, mistrust of 
government officials and their paraphernalia, intra and inter-community rivalry, siege 
mentality and illegal activities are the solutions to their deprivation, the urgent need for 
transparency, accountability, effective governance and respect and protection of their 
human rights.  
Powerful stakeholders through corruption (looting of public funds) and bribery were 
claimed to have unequally distributed trillions of the revenue generated from this region 
which has not translated into any significant growth and development within this region. 
Activism for the control of resources and the redistribution of wealth have resulted in 
decades of conflicts to redress policies, accountability, and reform governance of the oil 
industry, adequate resource control and communities’ involvement in the management of 
the industry within and outside this region (Okonta and Douglas, 2003; Kadafa, 2012b; 
Pegg and Zabbey, 2013). 
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6.2.2. RESOURCE CURSE, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND POLLUTION: WHY COUNTER 
ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY? 
The Niger Delta region has experienced enormous oil spills, which have resulted in 
environmental pollution partly because of poor production practices/equipment failure, 
human error, corrosion of oil pipelines, and poor maintenance of infrastructural facilities, 
oil theft and sabotage. The oil corporations have ascribed sabotage as the cause of 
majority of the oil spills. However, Amnesty International (2009) proposed that the oil 
companies’ claims are based on the premise that it relinquishes them from compensating 
the affected communities and any subsequent legal actions from oil spills when the causes 
were attributed to sabotage and oil theft. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of oil corporations’ 
claims have been debunked by environmental activists through counter accounts and 
court actions (see chapter 7 and 8) (Amnesty International, 2012, 2013). 
Amnesty International (2009, p.17) substantiated their claims by reviewing communities’ 
claims and court evidence. For instance, court evidence from Shell (Nigeria) vs Isaiah 
(1997) as cited by Amnesty International (2012) revealed that when oil spills occurred 
due to operational failure and corrosion of oil pipelines, the oil companies avoided paying 
compensation by ascribing the fault to sabotage or oil theft. In this case, the plaintiff 
(Isaiah) went to court to seek redress for the oil spilt into his farmlands and fishponds due 
to an operational error, after a tree fell on the pipeline. Shell attributed their claims to 
sabotage. Nevertheless, the Appeal Court as cited by Amnesty International (2012, p.17) 
claimed that:  
“The issue of sabotage raised by the defendant is neither here nor there… I 
am…convinced that the defence of sabotage was an afterthought. The three 
defence witnesses…agreed on one thing, …that an old tree fell on and dented the 
shell pipe…How could this have metamorphosed into an act of cutting the pipe 
by an unknown person? What is more, there is no evidence whatsoever in proof 
that the pipeline was cut by hacksaw.”  
The impact of oil spills in the Delta and its negative effects on the livelihood and standard 
of living have been attributed to a ‘resource curse’ and a ‘true tragedy of human right 
violation’ (Amnesty International, 2009; Amunwa, 2011). The resource curse and human 
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right violations conflicts have resulted in communities drinking, cooking, washing and 
bathing with contaminated water (Christian Aid, 2004). This assertion was corroborated 
by the UNEP (2011, p.11) in their assessment of the devastating impact of oil pollution 
in Ogoniland  
“Hydrocarbon contamination was found in water taken from 28 wells at 10 
communities adjacent to contaminated sites. At seven wells, the sample are at least 
1,000 times higher than the Nigerian drinking water standard of 3µg/l.48 Local 
communities are aware of the pollution and its dangers but state that they continue 
to use the water for drinking, bathing, washing and cooking as they have no 
alternative.” 
Their report further asserted that the ‘benzene’ concentrations in all air samples were 
beyond the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) recommended standard. The UNEP (2011, p.11) asserted 
that 
“Benzene was detected in all air samples at concentrations ranging from 0.155 to 
48.2µg/m3. Approximately 10 per cent of detected benzene concentrations in 
Ogoniland were higher than the concentrations WHO and the USEPA report as 
corresponding to a 1 in 10,000 cancer risk.” 
Amnesty International (2012) requested that oil spill data should be published, and access 
be granted to them to review the previous joint investigation visit records. Shell obliged 
by publishing oil spills data from January 2011. However, majority of the disputed oil 
spill data were attributable to pre-2011, which were not published.49 This implies that 
advocacy NGOs and individuals could not assess this data to determine the extent of oil 
pollution. Amnesty International (2012, p.2) claimed that  
                                                          
48 This implies 3 micrograms per litre. 
49 It is pertinent to highlight that Shell is the only oil corporation that have been publishing oil spills data in Nigeria 
since 2011 while the other oil corporations have refused to engage the advocacy NGOs neither have they disclosed 
their oil spills data.  
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“Amnesty International has asked Shell for access to pre-2011 investigation 
forms, but has been given access to fewer than 10 such forms. A thorough 
examination of the oil spill investigation process in the Niger Delta could be 
accomplished if the JIT forms and associated photos and videos, covering the last 
decade were made public. Amnesty International is seeking such disclosure.”  
For instance, on the 28 August 2008 and 7 December 2008 an operational fault in the 
Trans-Niger pipeline (TNP)50,51 resulted in a catastrophic oil pollution and un-
quantifiable disruption to the lives of about 69,000 people living within the Bodo 
community52 and its creeks53 in Ogoniland. Shell accepted the liability for the spills but 
argued that the first pollution occurred on the 5 October 2008 rather than the 28 August 
2008.54 The community disputed this claim and the actual date of the spill was not 
disclosed in the JIVs’ record. Nevertheless, the oil spill was not clamped until the 7 
November 2008 while the second oil leak was stopped on the 21 February 2009 (Amnesty 
International, 2011). Furthermore, Shell was reported to have claimed they were denied 
access by a neighbouring community (K’Dere) to go through their community to facilitate 
the speedy clamping of the spill in Bodo community. Nevertheless, Amnesty 
International (2011, p.30) counter this by arguing that:   
                                                          
50 According to Shell (n.d.), the TNP transports around 180,000 barrels per day of crude oil to the Bonny Export 
Terminal and is part of the gas liquids evacuation infrastructure, critical for continued domestic power generation and 
liquefied gas exports. see http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/major-projects-2/trans-niger-pipeline-loopline.html  
51 The TNP operation flow station was shut down on the 12 May 2015 without Shell stating the reasons for such shut 
down and when it will be reopened. This implies that for every day the pipeline is shut down, Nigeria is expected to be 
losing an estimated sum of $11.713million, about N2.343billion according to the Central Bank of Nigeria day per barrel 
estimate of $65.07 (Eboh, 2015). 
52 Bodo community represents an aggregate of 35 villages in the Ogoniland. Refer to the court case titled ‘Claim 
HQ12X04933’ that was filed by nineteen (19) complaints against the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation 
(SPDC) dated 6th July 2014. see https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/11/court-documents-expose-shell-s-
false-claims-nigeria-oil-spills/  
53 The Bodo creeks represents an area of approximately 9320 hectares of land, swamp and waterways. Refer to the 
court case titled ‘Claim HQ12X04933’ that was filed by nineteen (19) complaints against the Shell Petroleum 
Development Corporation (SPDC) dated 6th July 2014. see https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/11/court-
documents-expose-shell-s-false-claims-nigeria-oil-spills/  
54 see https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/11/court-documents-expose-shell-s-false-claims-nigeria-oil-
spills/ 
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“Amnesty International and CEHRD could not find any connection between 
Shell’s delayed response and permission to pass through K-Dere. The direct route 
to Bodo from the Saakpenwa-Bori road is the trans-Gokana road from Kpopie 
junction, not through K-Dere.” 
According to Amnesty International (2011, p.5) and the YouTube accounts55 on the 
impact of the spill; indigenous people claimed that the oil spill gushed into the 
surrounding farmlands, swamp and creeks for at least 4 weeks or 10 weeks.56 YouTube 
video footage from the polluted site57 revealed the depth of environmental pollution, 
death of mangrove trees, death of ecosystem and loss of income to the subsistence farmers 
and anglers who depend on the natural resources or their livelihood. For instance, Vidal 
(2011) claimed the assistant secretary to the Bodo council of chiefs and elders – Chief 
James asserted that  
“Every family had been affected by the disaster. Nowhere and no one has escaped. 
This has caused serious poverty to everyone. Nearly 80% of people here are 
fishermen or they depend on the water. They have lost their livelihoods. People 
are leaving the community in their hundreds to search for greener pastures. We 
used to live beautifully. People caught so much fish we could sell it to the cities. 
Now we have no hope.”  
The absence of an effective oil spill monitoring and its impact on the indigenous people 
led to high unemployment, poverty and youth vulnerability to illegal activities. 
Furthermore, Vidal (2011) claimed the president of the Bodo youth federation asserted 
that  
“youths from the area started to steal oil and refine it in illegal camps only after 
the two spills occurred. It was the negligence of Shell, which compelled people to 
                                                          
55 see Amnesty International Canada, (2011) The True Tragedy - delays and failures in tackling oil spills in the Niger 
Delta https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DW5VTbJ5NQc 
56 This analysis was based on the community account of an oil spill that occurred on the 7 December 2009 and was 
untamed for 4 weeks or 10 weeks based on SPDC claim and the community claims respectively during which the joint 
investigation visit was conducted. 
57 See Amnesty International, Canada, (2011) The True Tragedy - delays and failures in tackling oil spills in the Niger 
Delta https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DW5VTbJ5NQc  
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steal. When our livelihoods were destroyed, the youth went to places where they 
learned how to do bunkering. They were desperate. They learned from others to 
steal. It was to survive.” 
To understand the level of stakeholders’ engagement, accountability and dialogue to 
facilitate an emancipatory and institutional change following the two-oil spills in the 
Bodo community, Vidal (2011) argued that the legal adviser to the council of chiefs, 
Sylvester Vikpee argued that  
“Shell had not responded humanely to the disaster. They do not know the scale of 
the devastation. One of the richest companies in the world has done this to us. We 
have tried to talk to them and asked them what they plan. They have told us 
nothing.” 
Despite, the awareness of the enormity of the pollution, Shell claimed that only 1,640 
barrels of oil was spilled in total covering an area of 61,350m2 (Amnesty International, 
2011). However, an expert (Accufacts) consulted by Leigh Day & Co.58 through the 
engagement of CEHRD and Amnesty International estimated that as much as 4,000 
barrels of oil per day leaked from the pipeline and an estimated 100,000 barrels of oil 
leaked. Furthermore, the second oil spill on the 7 December 2008 was attributed to 
equipment failure from corrosion. Evidence revealed that the second oil spill was greater 
than the first,59 but SPDC estimated that only 2,503 barrels, covering an area of 10,000m2 
was spilt (Amnesty International, 2011).  
These counter accounts revealed the real cost of the pollution within the Bodo community 
and the Niger Delta. The enormity of the pollution did not only result in human rights 
violation but resulted in fire outbreaks around the polluted site and the surrounding 
communities (Amnesty International, 2011). Amnesty International (2011, pg.11) 
described the impact of the oil spills and how Bodo received little or no assistance from 
the powerful stakeholders as  
                                                          
58 Leigh Day & Co. is an international and human right law firm that represented members of the Bodo community in 
the court case against Royal Dutch Shell and its subsidiary company -SPDC in the United Kingdom.    
59 Refer to the court case titled ‘Claim HQ12X04933’ pg.6-7 via 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/11/court-documents-expose-shell-s-false-claims-nigeria-oil-spills/ 
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“Eight months later, Shell finally appeared to recognise that people’s food sources 
had been affected. On 2 May 2009, Shell staff brought food relief to the 
community. It included 50 bags of rice, 50 bags of beans, 50 bags of garri (a 
cassava product), 50 cartons of sugar, 50 cartons of milk, 50 cartons of tea, 50 
cartons of tomatoes and 50 tins of groundnut oil.” 
These counter accounts revealed how accountability was perceived and expressed by 
different stakeholders, who were not the powerful stakeholders. NGOs revealed that there 
was a conflict of interest on what was expected of the stakeholders and what was done to 
ameliorate the problems (see a similar study - Killian, 2010 on the meaning ascribed to 
different accounts and engagements). The inconsistency of reports and engagement with 
the affected communities by the corporation revealed that formal accounts by 
corporations were distinctively different from those of the advocacy NGOs, community 
stakeholders and the media.  
 
6.2.3. CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATIONS, OIL 
POLLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: WHY COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY? 
Over 50 years of commercial exploration of oil have brought with it impoverishment, 
conflict of interest, human rights violation to life, healthy standard of living, food, water, 
freedom of speech, education and to a healthy environment. Impunity for environmental 
degradation was evident despite the rules and regulation governing the oil and gas 
industry (Amunwa, 2011; Amnesty International, 2009). NOSDRA Act (2006, 6[2-3]) 
claimed that when oil spill is not disclosed within 24 hours, the operator would be 
sanctioned by paying the sum of 500,000naira–approximately 1,620pounds.60 When 
remediation exercise is not conducted in accordance with the stipulated standard, a 
sanction of 1,000,000naira – approximately 3,240pounds61 would be imposed. 
Nevertheless, the question of whether sanctions have been imposed on the corporations 
have not been answered and was neither answered when the author interviewed 
NOSDRAr1 and 2 (see chapter 7). Empirical evidence by Amnesty International (2011) 
                                                          
60 This is equivalent to approximately 35-35 barrels of crude oil at £41.73 per barrels.  
61 This is equivalent to approximately 75-85 barrels of crude oil at £41.73 per barrels. 
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revealed that legal standards were not adopted or enforced. This represents an 
unsustainable approach to business practices and the application of double standards by 
oil corporations. For instance, Steiner (2010, p.4) claimed that 
“oil companies operating in the Niger Delta are not employing internationally 
recognized standards to prevent and control pipeline oil spills.” 
Studies have shown that Shell (Nigeria) and other oil corporations have failed to adhere 
strictly to international and Nigerian remediation standards (Amnesty International, 2012; 
Steiner, 2010). Where environmental remediation is conducted, they are often inadequate. 
For example, Amnesty International (2012, p.2) asserted that 
“clean-up of oil spills in the Niger Delta is often slow and inadequate, leaving 
communities to cope with the ongoing impact of pollution on their livelihoods and 
health.” 
The implementation of laws was not adequately enforced because the oil and gas 
regulatory agencies (NOSDRA and DPR) were under-resourced and were often subjected 
to compromise due to conflicts of interest between the two agencies and among the 
stakeholders (see chapter 7 and 8, Steiner, 2010; Amunwa, 2011; UNEP, 2011). 
Regulators rely on the oil companies to conduct JIVs, thereby losing and compromising 
their presumed state of independence to ensure timely and effective remediation 
procedures for the affected location (see chapter 7 and 8).  
NOSDRA has been extensively criticised by advocacy groups and communities within 
the Delta for not taking adequate measures in ensuring that oil spill remediation is 
conducted following national and international standards as stated in the NOSDRA Act 
2006. Evidence by UNEP (2011), Amnesty International (2009, 2011, 2013) and Steiner 
(2010) claimed that the agency lacks the human capacity, resources, the ability to ensure 
compliance and the equipment to conduct JIVs (see chapter 7). For example, UNEP 
(2011, p.12) asserted that  
“The Nigerian government agencies concerned lack qualified technical experts 
and resources. In the five years since NOSDRA was established, so few resources 
have been allocated that the agency has no proactive capacity for oil-spill 
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detection. In planning their inspection visits to some oil spill sites, the regulatory 
authority is wholly reliant on the oil industry for logistical support.” 
Furthermore, counter accounts such as UNEP (2011), Amnesty International (2009, 2011, 
2013), Amunwa (2011) and Steiner (2010) have shown that the regulatory agencies such 
as the DPR does not have an independent oversight role over the oil industry because it 
is under the hospices of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, which also oversees the 
activities of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). DPR’s role is to 
ensure corporations comply with petroleum laws such as Environmental Guidelines and 
Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN), supervise the oil industry 
operations, and ensure that the health, safety and environmental regulations within the oil 
industry conform to national and international best practice. This department is 
responsible for the collection of oil revenue and to advise the government on oil-related 
issues. Despite its statutory obligations over the oil industry, its legitimate role over 
environmental and oil pollution management remains a question to be answered (see 
chapter 7 and 8). Furthermore, its role in ensuring healthy and safe environment has been 
questioned by advocacy NGOs, community stakeholders, the media and independent 
observers of the industry (UNEP, 2011; Steiner, 2010). These other stakeholders have 
consistently questioned and debated how accountable and transparent the DPR is. They 
have questioned its ‘cosy partnership relationship’ and ‘assumed level of independence’ 
with the oil corporations. This conflict of interest from its roles as a compliance and 
maintenance agency alongside its regulatory responsibility to maximise production and 
revenue is an issue that needs to be critically addressed. For instance, Amnesty 
International (2012, p.3) asserted that  
“…the agency exercises almost no meaningful regulatory controls in relation to 
the environment and pollution, despite its statutory responsibilities. For years, 
independent commentators have noted that the DPR has serious conflicts of 
interest, as it is also responsible for promoting the oil industry.” 
In addition, individuals, communities, grassroots, local, regional, national and 
international NGOs, supranational organisations such as the United Nations, the World 
Bank and civil society groups have raised and discussed their concerns over the case study 
problems. Advocacy NGOs and community stakeholders have protested in Nigeria and 
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in other countries to express their views about the inadequacies of the regulatory agencies, 
environmental degradation and pollution holocaust within the Delta over three decades 
(Bob, 2005; Isumonah, 2015; Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 2015). The inability of the 
regulatory agencies to operate and curb the environmental and human right violations in 
the Delta have left the communities with nowhere to come to seek help (see chapter 7 
and 8). 
 
6.2.4. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: WHY COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY? 
The existing and potential challenges facing the oil producing communities because of 
unsustainable practices by the corporations and the regulatory agencies have been one 
reason for the use of counter accounts and other related forms of activism. Over the years, 
counter accounts have revealed that corporations denied accountability for environmental 
pollution in their CSR reports (see Amnesty International, 2011, 2009; ECCR, 2010; 
Amunwa, 2011; Social Actions, 2014; Steiner, 2010; UNDP, 2006; UNEP, 2011). 
Furthermore, corporate responsibility and accountability towards their immediate 
communities have received critical attention because of the inconsistency of information, 
displacement and suffering of the community stakeholders. For instance, on the 25 April 
1970, the first seed of counter accounting and agitation for institutional change was 
evident in a letter produced by the Ogoni divisional committee (Osaghae, 1995; Saro-
Wiwa, 1992). The letter addressed to the Military Governor of Rivers State critically 
highlighted the deteriorating environmental degradation and the continuous poverty of 
the Ogoni communities due to oil spill and gas flaring.62  
“…the entire economy of our people has been completely disrupted through the 
connivance of a nation which seems to have allowed the ShellBP… …So long as 
the nation gets her royalties, nobody bothers what happens to the poor rural farmer 
whose land has been expropriated… …most inland waters, rivers and 
watercourses have today been polluted by crude oil, mud, and other fluids which 
have contaminated our water supply in contravention of Section 25 of the 
                                                          
62 Refer to Saro-Wiwa (1992, pp.44-50) ‘Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy’. 
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Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations, 1969. …We are calling on the 
conscience of our dear countrymen to recognize that a people who have lost their 
sources of livelihood in the process of enriching the nation, deserve greater 
consideration by the country and the commercial company which is tapping this 
wealth…” (Saro-Wiwa, 1992, pp.44-50) 
Rather than address the environmental pollution and structural displacement highlighted 
by the committee, Shell-BP63 in their response portrayed their operation as a revenue 
generator for Nigeria. They criticised the committee’s accounts by denying any 
responsibility for environmental pollution, thereby fuelling conflict in the local arenas. 
An extract of their response from Saro-Wiwa (1992, pp.50-51) reads as follows  
“This petition is one of a series which have originated in Ogoni…attempting to 
place developmental and other responsibilities on this company which can only 
properly be undertaken by government or by a government agency. …the main 
aim and purpose of an oil company must be to find and produce hydrocarbons as 
efficiently as possible. This is the area in which it makes a very significant 
contribution to the overall economic development of any country in which it 
operates. …our obligations and responsibilities are clearly delineated in the 
agreements made with the Federal Government and by the laws and regulations 
relating to the oil industry in Nigeria. These have always been meticulously 
observed by this company. We have, however been extremely careful to ensure 
that our operations cause minimal disturbance to the people in this area in which 
we operate...” 
Rather than accept responsibility for environmental pollution in the Delta, majority of the 
causes of oil spills have been ascribed as sabotage and illegal bunkering (third party 
interference). A critical evaluation of Shell’s sustainability report from 2001-2014 
revealed a similar strategy was adopted when majority causes of oil spills were due to 
sabotage, theft and oil bunkering. For instance  
                                                          
63 Shell Petroleum Development Company primarily known as Shell Nigeria since 1979 was originally known as Shell 
D'Arcy and later as Shell-BP. Shell-BP was jointly financed by the Royal Dutch Shell Group and the British Petroleum 
(BP) Group in 1956 (see The History of Shell in Nigeria http://www.shell.com.ng/about-us/shell-nigeria-history.html).   
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“theft, sabotage and illegal refining continue to be the main source of 
environmental damage in the Niger Delta today and result in many thousands of 
barrels of lost production.” [Shell Sustainability report 2014, p.35]. 
NGOs and community stakeholders have countered the accuracy of these oil spills data.64 
For instance, in November 2008 and May 2009, four Nigerian fishermen and farmers 
through the support of Friends of the Earth filed a civil litigation in a Dutch court against 
Shell. This was to counter Shell’s oil spill data claims by accusing them of negligence in 
preventing oil spills and in ensuring adequate remediation of oil spilt (Friends of the 
Earth, 2011). In 2014, court evidence revealed that SPDC could be held liable for 
sabotage and bunkering if adequate protective measures were not taken to protect the 
pipelines following international and national standards. This was supported by UNEP 
(2011, p.100) claims that SPDC did not take adequate due diligence procedures to protect 
their infrastructure from environmental pollution and sabotage 
“The control and maintenance of oilfield infrastructure in Ogoniland is clearly 
inadequate. Industry best practice and SPDC’s own documented procedures have 
not been applied and as a result, local communities are vulnerable to the dangers 
posed by unsafe oilfield installations. The oil facilities themselves are vulnerable 
to accidental or deliberate tampering. Such situation can lead to accidents, with 
potentially disastrous environmental consequences.” 
Advocacy NGOs and independent observers have challenged the ‘managerial and 
regulatory capture’ perspective of the oil corporations by arguing that they do what looks 
good on a quarterly basis in their sustainability reports, but the opposite is obvious within 
the Niger Delta communities where they operate (O’Dwyer, 2003; Chalmers et al., 2012; 
Grant, 2011; Baker, 2010). According to their counter accounts, any corporations that 
operate in a manner that negates nationally and internationally recognised standards that 
affect the ability of people to live sustainably are violating the fundamental rights of the 
people. Furthermore, any corporations that conduct its affairs with or without the 
intention of inflicting harm on individuals and communities, but causes harm to their 
                                                          
64 Refer to Amnesty International (2014) Court documents expose Shell’s false claims on Nigeria oil spills 
 https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/11/court-documents-expose-shell-s-false-claims-nigeria-oil-spills/ 
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universal human rights is violating their rights (Social Actions, 2014, 2009; Amunwa, 
2011; UNDP, 2006; UNEP, 2011; Steiner, 2010).  
Consequently, the debate on whether corporations should be held accountable for such 
violations have been distinctively addressed by the Ruggie’s (2013; 2007); United 
Nations, 2011 framework on ‘protect, respect and remedy’ (see chapter 3). In this 
framework, the state is required to protect the human rights of its citizens through enacting 
appropriate and implementable legislation against third parties and business enterprises. 
Moreover, corporations are required to respect the human rights of individuals and 
communities, where they operate and should ensure that their rights are not violated, and 
the citizens should have appropriate and efficient redress mechanisms through which they 
could seek (non)judicial remedies where their human rights had been violated. The 
responsibility of corporations is to respect and refrain from abusing the basic human rights 
or to diligently act to avoid human rights abuses along with ensuring 
transparency/accountability on their operational impacts. Where violations of human 
rights were observed to have occurred, they are expected to duly address them without 
delays (Karp, 2014; Ruggie, 2013). 
 
6.3. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTIFICATION OF ACCOUNTS: WHY COUNTER 
ACCOUNTS?  
Corporate accountability practices within this region could be argued to be tactically 
managed to portray themselves as socially and economically responsible and responsive 
to the needs of the other stakeholders (Frynas, 2001). After Shell was ousted out of 
Ogoniland in 1993, it undertook a series of strategies and engagements to re-invent its 
corporate image and reputation as a socially responsible and responsive organisation with 
a commitment to sustainable community development, as evidenced through its Global 
Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU) in the Delta arena (see chapter 7 and 8). 
During a web dialogue in 2011 between Shell and its stakeholders titled ‘Shell in Nigeria-
working in a complex environment’, the panel claimed   
“…we listen to all who have an interest in Nigeria, including campaigners. […] 
When we are contacted via campaign – e.g. receive letters – we try to respond to 
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all. Where we receive questions along a particular theme, we also try to address 
through our annual Sustainability Report…” (Shell, 2011) 
They have strived to re-invent their image to portray themselves as stakeholders-oriented 
open to accountability and engagement with the other stakeholders. They have revamped 
their corporate image as being a ‘listening organisation’ that engages in constructive 
dialogue with their stakeholders to avoid domestic and international criticisms/activism 
and environmental litigation. However, this could be claimed to be due to the upsurge in 
the accountability and dialogic engagement discourses by the advocacy NGOs through 
counter accounts and actions in the arena. Empirical evidence from Shell’s sustainability 
reports and webinars in 2009, 2011 and 2013 attempted to shape stakeholders’ perception 
by engaging community stakeholders and advocacy NGOs to give accounts of their 
activities in the Delta (see chapter 7 and 8). Nevertheless, such dialogic accounts and 
engagement could be argued as mostly tailored to reveal the ‘good news’ while 
obfuscating the ‘bad news’ on human rights, social and environmental practices within 
the Delta similar to other studies such as Cho et al., 2015; Tregidga and Milne, 2006; 
Deegan, 2002; Buhr, 1998.  
 
6.4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents a historical analysis of key events and the emergence of counter 
accounting in the Niger Delta to provide a baseline from which to explore why counter 
accounts are produced to drive and address accountability, the advancement of human 
rights and sustainable development within this conflict arena. Emphasis was placed on 
examining why counter accounts were produced to drive accountability from the different 
arena participants and how it affected the indigenous people and other arena participants.   
What was obvious from this empirical analysis was that counter accounts were produced 
to problematize unsustainable practices, the lack of accountability, ineffective regulatory 
governance, and the managerial and institutional/regulatory captured phenomenon of the 
corporations. The focus of these counter accounts were on the poor environmental 
practices, human rights violations for governance reforms, and the lack of sustainable 
development within this arena. The counter accounts were produced to reveal how 
stakeholders problematized the accountability and environmental engagements of the 
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powerful arena participants. It revealed the evolution of the conflicts on environmental 
pollution and the counter-counter accounts by the corporations to clarify its 
responsibilities towards remediating the polluted environment and towards the respect of 
the fundamental rights of the people.  
Counter accounts were used to highlight the inconsistencies in environmental and human 
rights violations accounts published by the corporations to publicise the missing or often 
undisclosed information inorder to make visible and to problematize the extent of human 
rights violations and environmental degradations. Besides problematizing unsustainable 
practices, counter accounts were produced to reveal the inadequacy of the regulatory 
frameworks to implement its regulations on the oil industry in the Delta. The documentary 
evidence revealed that counter accounts were used to problematize the cosy relationships 
existing between the regulatory agencies and the corporations, and the conflicts of interest 
between NOSDRA and DPR.  
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CHAPTER 7: OTHER ARENA PARTICIPANTS’ NARRATIVES 
 
7.0. INTRODUCTION 
Whilst in chapter 6, documentary content analysis was conducted on why counter 
accounts are produced in the Delta arena, this chapter explores the second research 
question- “Why, and how the arena participants perceive accountability and governance 
gaps, and how this impacts on their counter accounting production?” This chapter strives 
to adopt the dynamic inverted conflict arena model as embedded within the lifecycle and 
pathways to conflict(s) resolution (see chapter 4) to flesh out the accountability 
engagement among the arena stakeholders and the implications of counter accounting 
within this arena. This approach enabled the author to critically explore the differences in 
ideologies, rationalities and values of the arena participants in addressing the problematic 
issues on accountability, engagement, human rights and sustainable development in the 
Delta arena.  
 
7.1. SOURCES OF DATA 
The stakeholders’ perspective analysed in this chapter included empirical evidence from 
the semi-structured interviews (see section 5.2.2.2) and documentary evidence (see 
section 5.2.2.1). My role as an author is not to ascribe blame to the corporations, 
government or the community stakeholders but to discuss the research question. This 
chapter provides a platform to evaluate the dialogic accountability engagements and other 
practices that affects the lived lives of the indigenous people and other stakeholders using 
the dynamic inverted conflict arena (see chapter 4). 
The chapter is structured around the analysis emerging from chapter 6. This thematic 
analysis structure includes  
• Counter accounting: delegitimising accounts, dialogic accounts and 
engagements 
• Counter accounting: networks for human rights, accountability, governance and 
environmental justice in an arena. 
• Counter accounting: networks for environmental management, engagement and 
sustainable development 
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7.2. COUNTER ACCOUNTING: DELEGITIMISING ACCOUNTS, DIALOGIC ACCOUNTS 
AND ENGAGEMENTS 
7.2.1.  DELEGITIMISING ACCOUNTS, DIALOGIC ACCOUNTS AND ENGAGEMENTS 
It is evident from chapter 6 that there are often little or no infrastructures to justify that 
the enormous resources which sustain the Nigerian economy is derived from the Delta 
despite the exploratory and extractive activities of the oil industry. The indigenous people 
have often seen the resource (crude oil) as a curse and not as a blessing because of the 
negative impacts on their environment and the conflicts emerging from oil companies 
exploratory and extractive activities, which subsequently affect their wellbeing (Karl, 
2005). The community stakeholders, iaNGOs, laNGOs, DNGOr2 and 5 overwhelmingly 
supported this  
“…you can’t really say the coming of multinationals into the Niger Delta as a 
whole is a blessing. It is more of a curse to us. It is not a blessing at all. We have 
the oil, yes but we live in abject poverty.” (IP9, focus group participant 1) 
“…You allowed Total to come and destroy the place, pollute the air and every 
other thing. Like most of the things we take here, are very bad. Poison foods, you 
destroy the underground water, you pollute the air… When you disorganise the 
structure of mother earth, it affects our mentality. We are part and parcel of nature, 
as you destroy and terrorise the earth that is how it affects the human beings also 
even our own children…” (IP2)  
Indigenous people argued that the cleaning up of oil spills are often delayed for months 
and gas is flared due to the absence of political will to provide infrastructural facilities to 
harness gas, which subsequently affects their lived lives. This was supported by all the 
community stakeholders interviewed.  
“…They don’t actually do any clean-up. When there is any spill, they just manage 
to clamp their equipment and that is all. No proper clean-up is done to preserve 
the environment, to make it productive for the people. …from time to time, fewer 
people go to the farm and when fewer people go to the farm, the harvest is not still 
good.” (IP9, focus group participant 1) 
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Evidence from the community stakeholders, especially the women leaders (CWL1 and 2) 
revealed the impact of the human rights violations on women and children  
“The spill has affected the women because we are all farmers. We use farm to 
train our children…to feed them but the spill has gone in a way that fruits are no 
more growing in the farm because it has destroyed the soil. Our ponds are being 
destroyed because it is our source of fish. […] Some of the women use those fish 
to train their children, …and it affect so many children. So many children dropped 
from their schools because of the spill…” (CWL2) 
The author’s fieldwork photographic evidence from the Niger Delta in Rivers State and 
Bayelsa State supported previous claims that the environment has been extensively 
damaged (refer to Appendix 5). It would require the combined political will of the 
governance regimes, the indigenous people and the corporations to address this problem. 
Within the Delta, the human rights to life, work, water, safe and healthy environment, 
education, self-determination, hold opinion, freedom of information and its expression, 
adequate standard of living and health have been violated due to the inability of the 
powerful stakeholders to protect and respect the environmental right of the indigenous 
people (see chapter 3). Nevertheless, contradicting evidence from the corporations’ 
webinar dialogues, sustainability reports and the interview evidence from MNOCr1 
revealed that the respect of human rights is embedded in their corporate governance and 
this influenced their strategies and interactions in the Delta. Corporations portrayed 
themselves as a morally, socially and environmentally responsible (Pupovac and 
Moerman, 2017; Joutsenvirta, 2011). For instance, Joutsenvirta (2011) observed that 
morally responsible discursive accounts were used by StoraEnso in Finland to legitimise 
their claims of adopting friendly environmental forestry practices against Greenpeace’s 
delegitimising counter accounts. In the Delta arena, MNOCr1 revealed that  
“As part of our respect for human rights… We do not carry on business activities 
where we considered that there will be a violation of the rights of other people and 
we also ensure that if there are proven cases of violations, they are investigated, 
and appropriate sanctions are meted to the defaulting individuals.”  
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Community stakeholders claimed because of the awareness created by the advocacy 
NGOs to drive dialogic accountability, they were aware of the need for their fundamental 
rights to be protected, respected and accounted for when they are violated. The human 
rights violations observed in the Delta are prohibited by the Nigerian constitution. 
Nevertheless, this level of awareness created by the advocacy NGOs have not been 
sufficient to drive the demand of accountability for human rights from the corporations 
and rule enforcers across communities because the Nigerian constitution under Section 
34 states that if there is an inclination that human rights would be breached then justice 
should be sought to protect them. However, it appears that little or nothing have been 
done by the rule enforcers (NOSDRA, DPR) to conscientize the indigenous people to 
understand their rights in order to drive a judicial process for remedy. This awareness of 
corporate unsustainable practices by the oppressed stakeholders often results in conflicts 
to transform the established dominant hegemonies (Freire, 2002; Bebbington et al., 2007; 
Kneip, 2013).  
“…that is why you see today that without the struggle of Ken Saro-Wiwa and 
other NGOs, …people were not aware of anything. […] even if the oil is in your 
compound, Shell can come here and take your oil and go, and the owners of the 
compound wouldn’t talk to them but when the awareness started coming in and 
we are being educated that it is our right, that the oil belongs to us, we decided to 
rise and fight for it. From the MOSOP aspect to the community, what Ken told us 
to do is to ‘use dialogue, non-violence dialogue approaches’ …So, the community 
and the local people, we are helpless, we are just helpless.” (CLs1, focus group 
participant 1) 
Furthermore, the community stakeholders argued that accountability and engagements 
had always been between the corporations and the government; often they are not 
involved in the exploratory and extractive activities within their immediate environment. 
The community stakeholders, iaNGOs, laNGOs, DNGOr1, 2 and 5 overwhelmingly 
supported this narrative.  
“Oil business is a dirty business and their focus is just to make money or profit 
out of it. So, the Nigerian state, the international oil companies, do not even 
consider the human life for oil. They prefer oil to the human life for profit. They 
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are faceless. There is no accountability. What they are after is to make their profit 
and go, not minding what happened because anything can happen…” (CLs1, focus 
group participant 1) 
“…all the while we have been engaging the communities on issues of 
accountability in the Niger Delta. I don’t think there is a clear-cut accountability 
mechanism on ground.” (DNGOr1). 
The community stakeholders, iaNGOs and laNGOs argued that where the corporations 
interact with the indigenous people, often they were accused of not fulfilling what they 
had promised or deliberated, thereby creating ‘dialogic gaps’ (Bebbington et al., 2007; 
Thomson and Bebbington, 2005). These dialogic gaps, often transcend into conflicts at 
the local arenas, particularly when the indigenous people recognise or perceive the social 
and economic implications ensuing from the unequal power relations, broken promises, 
problem denial, accountability gaps, environmental pollution and human rights violations 
(Freire, 2002; Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017). Nevertheless, MNOCr1 insisted 
that the corporation, he represents listen to all the stakeholders and strive to investigate 
cases of human rights violations.  
“As part of our respect for human rights, we listen to all stakeholders… …my job 
is to listen to community people, to talk to them and to ensure that they hear us 
out. …We have our community relations people, who visit the communities on a 
routine basis and part of what they do is to listen to the complaints of local 
stakeholders. …We do hold periodic town-hall sessions as well… …Issues or no 
issues, we hold meetings with them, we discuss, they provide information, a 
feedback on how we are performing or complaints that they do have, and we take 
our time to deal with that.”  
As argued in chapter 4, there is a distinct difference between asserting to be ‘listening’ 
and ‘being seen to practice/address what had been listened to’ (dialogic gaps) 
(Bebbington et al., 2007; Thomson and Bebbington, 2005). Bebbington et al., (2007, 
p.368-369) argued that engagement (dialogic) processes are often slow processes through 
which critical reflection and change could emerge but the process for change should 
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evolve overtime when there is a willing listener ready to participate, implement the 
change, and to be changed. DNGOr5 (who is also a journalist) argued that    
“There is no oil industry [company] that the door is open. I am a reporter but I 
loot to go to their gate because it is a long process. You need to know 
somebody…who wants you to come in before you can come in. So, how are they 
operating a listening ear to communities? Where is that listening ear? …There is 
no such thing. There is a big distance between the communities and those who 
govern oil. Do they go to communities? …There is no guiding principle. …we 
feel that our government lack the political will to call them to order because much 
depends on the outcome of their operations.”  
The indigenous people argued that the corporations cannot be held accountable when they 
refuse to honour their CSR plan or to fulfill the outcomes of their engagements and there 
is no formal defined agency relationship between the corporations and the communities. 
The mechanisms to hold them accountable has not been defined and where there is a 
stakeholders’ dialogue, there is often a disparity between agreed actions and its 
implementation. The community stakeholders argued that dialogic accountability for the 
protection of the environment and human rights should result in verifiable actions but the 
absence of accountability for their actions often created conflicts (Parker, 2014; Robert, 
2009). The community stakeholders, iaNGOs, laNGOs and DNGOr1 and 5 
overwhelmingly supported this argument.  
“When we are talking about accountability; we are talking about sincerity, 
transparency and honesty because if we are dealing with you and we have a 
roundtable discussion, the next thing is to implement what we discuss. If there is 
no implementation, there is nothing like accountability. …that is the problem. 
…We have the desire to discuss with them but despite you discussing with them 
at the tail end, they will not do what you have agreed upon.” (IP4) [emphasis added 
by author] 
As Messner (2009), Shearer (2002) and Schweiker (1993) argued that accountability goes 
beyond self-justification and should recognise and embrace the others who might not have 
a formal or established agency relationship within formal structures. Accountability by 
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the powerful stakeholders should recognise and reflect on the implicit actions of formal 
structures on the others (Parker, 2014; Messner, 2009). This form of accountability is a 
morally constructed concept that defines who is expected to account for what, to whom 
and in what manner when there is the lack of a defined accountability structure or 
mechanism, it results in tensions between the accountor and the accountee (Messner, 
2009; Shearer, 2002; Schweiker, 1993). This further creates networks of frictions, 
conflicts, violence, and discontentment in the local arenas. The emergence of conflicts 
due to the absence of accountability and engagement was evident in CY1, CWL1-2 and 
IP9.  
“…if companies would live up to their social responsibility as it is obtainable in 
their parent company overseas, there would be no problem, but they don’t do that 
here. […] if the companies want to be fair to us, they should start treating us as 
humans. …what is obtainable in Netherlands or in New York…if they can 
replicate those principles here… I don’t think there would be any problem in the 
Niger Delta. […] While we have, agitation is because we don’t get what we feel 
that we ought to get. […] If with the oil and gas…, we are living in abject poverty, 
what when there is no oil…no more gas? What would happen to us?” (IP9, focus 
group participant 1) 
The corporations have a moral relational accountability obligation to be transparent with 
the locals where they operate and to the wider society (Parker, 2014; Shearer, 2002; Gray, 
2010). Accountability requires a moral relational obligation to give and to demand 
accounts of conducts or actions. The moral relational obligation of accountability 
(Shearer, 2002; Boven, 2007; Messner, 2009) revolves around engagement and the need 
to give and receive accounts of conduct regardless of whether there is a systemic agency 
obligation to provide accounts (Belal et al., 2015; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the moral obligation to give and demand accounts of conducts is not 
adequately evidenced in the Delta arena. For instance, from MNOCr1’s argument, which 
supports Pupovac and Moerman (2017), one could deduce that a moral relational 
accountability obligation to be transparent and accountable and to learn from agreed and 
planned actions have been established.   
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“…we are a learning organisation. …we always seek for ways of improving on 
our systems. …We are a listening organisation and we know that we can only 
succeed when we have the people on our side. When we work hand-in-hand with 
all stakeholders. We demonstrate respect for people. We demonstrate 
transparency and we build a culture of openness and that helps us at all times to 
continue to drive improvement.” (MNOCr1) 
There should be the moral power of agency by the corporations to provide accounts to 
the indigenous people because of their proximity to exploratory and extractive activities 
and the pollution. However, iaNGOrs, laNGOrs and DNGOrs revealed that because of 
the absence of a direct agency relationship which requires a formal accountability 
mechanism, the moral obligation to give and demand accounts of conducts to the other 
stakeholders without a direct agency relationship with the corporations (Shearer, 2002; 
Gray et al., 2014b) was absent in the Delta arena.  
“…when you talk about accountability, it is not just money. There are a lot of 
things that need to be straightened out. …the need for the oil corporations to 
respect the host communities by respecting their agreements, by respecting their 
rights - they have a right to clean water, …right to healthy soil. […] They need 
to…recognise that these people have a right. It is not an offence that oil is 
deposited in their soil.” (DNGOr5) 
“If an effective accountability mechanism is in place, all the oil companies’ 
operators would sit up because there would always be an implication if the 
communities hold you accountable for projects and the development of the region 
and you fail… Either they could go to court, or they could do something otherwise 
but then it will help the oil companies’ operators to sit up. It will help the Nigerian 
government agencies to also sit up very well. Accountability mechanism is a 
mechanism that can… …reduce corrupt65 malpractices and other malpractices in 
                                                          
65 A commonly held view by the arena participants but this evidence should not be taken as confirming that corruption 
takes place unless there are court evidence proofing the existence of corruption but the perception of corruption in the 
arena could be argued to be sufficient to create conflicts and tensions. The arena participants believed there was 
corruption and they view effective accountability and engagement as a mechanism to demonstrate that such corrupt 
practice does not exist. 
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the oil sector and then make the communities to experience sustainable 
development that will turn the Niger Delta into an El dorado that it is supposed to 
be.” (DNGOr1) 
The iaNGOrs, laNGOrs and the community stakeholders argued that often this is not the 
case in the Delta. Listening is a crucial aspect of engagement, but accountability should 
transcend beyond listening to understanding the sociocultural dynamics underpinning 
dialogic engagement towards implementing agreed actions (Andrews, 2013; Bebbington 
et al., 2007; Freire, 2002; Humphreys, 2000). For instance, Humphreys (2000, p.130) 
argued that “a company which doesn’t listen attentively will not pick up the nuances of 
community opinion and cannot expect to establish a secure basis for good quality 
relationships.” The inability of the corporation to fulfill their agreed or moral 
accountability obligations to the indigenous people created a space for the development 
of an alternative platform of engagement for the advocacy NGOs to prepare systematic 
or partisan or contra-governing counter accounts (Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017). 
Their platform enabled the engagement of shareholders activist groups and other arenas’ 
participants to compel the corporations to fulfill their obligation to the others, especially 
the communities in the Delta  
“…the advocacy NGOs are impacting seriously in the communities because it is 
themselves that created this awareness. …ERA, Social Action, AI are giving 
serious orientation to people, showing people how to defend themselves in terms 
of pollution. …that one is impacting positively on the community, but the issue is 
that approaching the MNCs to respond positively is difficult…” (CLs2, focus 
group participant 1) 
 “…SACA66 mostly have been trying their best to make sure they force them 
[corporations] to act. {…} I know since SACA came in, they [corporations] have 
tried and they have done some but it is not up to what we are expecting…” (CYL1) 
There is substantive evidence to indicate that because of the accountability gaps, the 
community stakeholders, the iaNGOrs and laNGOrs strive to bridge the need for moral 
                                                          
66 Stakeholders Alliance for Corporate Accountability 
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and inclusive accountability by problematizing unsustainable practices through their 
systematic, partisan, contra-governing and dialogic counter accounts. Their counter 
accounts were used to give voices to the indigenous people and to create awareness within 
the local arenas on how to demand moral accountability. The advocacy NGOs prepared 
and published counter accounts to problematize unsustainable practices within the local 
arenas (see chapter 6, 8 and 9). NGOs counter account(ability) is to facilitate the moral 
accountability of their exploratory and extractive activities to the communities, which 
affected their human rights and their ability to live sustainably.  
 
7.2.2.  CONFLICTS, COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND JOINT INVESTIGATION VISITS (JIVS) 
The corporations are expected to report an oil spill incidence to the DPR and NOSDRA 
within 24hours of its occurrence, and remediation exercise should commence within that 
period until there is no visible oil sheen on water (EGASPIN, 2002; NOSDRA Act, 2006). 
However, contra-governing counter accounts and interviews with community 
stakeholders claimed whilst this was theoretically right, it was not obtainable in the Delta 
arena.  
“…Nigerian legal system clearly stated what you said, is what should be 
obtainable but …it doesn’t fly. …the pollution in Bodo West how long did it last? 
…over 2 months. Did they clean it? …No. What happened to {name of 
corporation}, who is the operator? Nothing. Yes, if there is any pollution, whether 
sabotage or equipment failure they are supposed to quickly within 24hours get to 
the point; look for alternative means of containing the spill. Here it is not like 
that.” (CLs2, focus group participant 1) 
All the stakeholders interviewed agreed that the JIVs are conducted by a coalition of 
representatives, but the community stakeholders and advocacy NGOs argued that the 
result of the JIVs are often not objective. Empirical evidence revealed that the NGOs’ 
publish counter accounts to problematize the credibility of the JIVs’ exercise due to the 
ineffectiveness of the regulatory regimes in relation to cleaning up spills. NGOs posited 
that the JIVs were often delayed for days or weeks and they are financed by the 
corporations. They argued that the JIVs are enshrined with conflicts of interest, which 
influenced its objectivity. The corporations and NOSDRA claimed that the JIVs were 
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objectively conducted and the outcomes were binding on all arena participants. For 
instance, Shell (2009, p.61 webinar) argued that 
“When an oil spill occurs, we respond by sending in an emergency response team 
to try to stop the spill immediately, and what’s called a Joint Investigation Team 
(JIT). The job of this team…is to ascertain the cause of the spill, assess the extent 
of the damage and negotiate compensation… We are very clear and open about 
the volumes spilled through operational failures – we don’t try to hide it and we 
are working to improve it. […] The JIT…report is verified by the relevant 
government body. …a cause through explosion or cutting a pipeline, or removal 
of equipment, or simply opening a valve, or trying to steal the crude is obvious. 
We don’t seek to hide it when it’s our fault either.”  
On the other hand, from formal and informal conversations with all the stakeholders 
interviewed, they reported that the regulators depend on the logistics provided by the 
corporations before they could conduct JIVs because the regulators especially NOSDRA 
is grossly underfunded. For instance, Amnesty International’s (AI) (2013) counter 
account reported an interview in which the Director of NOSDRA claimed a text message 
was sent by the Nigerian Agip Oil Company (Agip) stating when JIVs would be 
conducted and that the director should notify his staff to join in the visit at a given time. 
According to this account, the director confirmed that was the usual practice, which 
implied that NOSDRA is not in control of the process (p.15). When the regulators lack 
the resources or power to function and be accountable for their actions before, during and 
the aftermath of a JIVs, the community stakeholders, iaNGOr and laNGOr argued this 
impinged on their independence. NOSDRAr1 supported the claim that they are grossly 
underfunded, and this influenced their activities   
“…the agency is poorly funded, and this no doubt hampers our operation and 
performance. …the resources we need to be able to function and stand on our own 
are actually not just adequate… …to be able to cope with the myriads of 
challenges […] If we had our resources, we would have been able to 
provide…helicopter services to be able to take our people immediately they finish 
the investigation in such a very terrible terrain…”  
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Empirical evidence revealed that in the past, JIVs were conducted by the corporations 
without any participation from the community stakeholders or with the civil society until 
the advocacy NGOs’ intervention (NACGOND,67 2014).68 According to NACGOND 
(2014) and the supporting evidence from the laNGOrs, participation in the JIVs was 
envisaged as a step in the right direction but there are still lots of concerns that impinge 
on the credibility of the JIVs (see chapter 8). Regardless of any invitation to participate, 
community stakeholders still view their engagement as that of a third party. Community 
stakeholders reported that the documented evidence have not been issued to the 
community and the findings were neither finalized at the spill sites. iaNGOrs, laNGOrs 
and the community stakeholders claimed that when the cause of the spills were not 
determined during the JIVs at the spill site, JIVs were signed by the regulators and the 
community representatives but not by the corporations or by the regulators and the 
corporations and not by the community representatives.  
“It was supposed to be concluded in their office. So, you end up seeing 
JIV’s…signed by the regulators and the community but {name of corporation} 
would refuse to sign it. They will tell you we didn’t sign it because it was 
inconclusive.” (CLs3, focus group participant 2- laNGOr12) 
JIVs are critical factors in deciding responsibility for the remediation of polluted sites. 
The outcome of the JIVs are often contentious especially when the community 
stakeholders believe that they should be compensated for damages arising from the spill 
but were excluded from the JIVs.  
“…Before when {name of corporation} comes into the community, nobody will 
talk to them. They will go to the spill point and do what they want to do and go 
back. …they come with police, soldiers to scare people away…nobody can 
question them because they are carrying gun and you are defenseless. […] through 
the awareness from the NGOs, the civil society, and MOSOP, …when they are 
coming for JIV… …they will ask the community to bring somebody…to go with 
                                                          
67 National Coalition on Gas Flaring and Oil Spills in the Niger Delta. 
68 It is pertinent to highlight that evidence from laNGOr8 and 10 revealed it is only Shell (SPDC) that has allowed 
external stakeholders like the advocacy NGOs, especially NACGOND to independently engage and observe their JIVs’ 
process while the other corporations are unwilling to allow independent observers to participate in their JIVs. 
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them if they are doing the right thing. …another thing is that they don’t prepare 
the JIV at the site [spill site], they prepare it in their office.” (CLs1, focus group 
participant 1) 
Furthermore, the community stakeholders interviewed revealed that when JIVs are 
conducted, the corporations often finance the regulators’ trip to the polluted locations and 
this subsequently influenced the outcome of the investigation. The community 
stakeholders argued that because of this cosy relationship, the volume of the spills were 
understated or they were wrongly ascribed as sabotage even when they are caused by 
equipment failure. This was because the Oil Pipelines Act 1990 states that compensation 
should not be paid for spills due from third-party interference, but the spills should be 
remediated by the operator of the equipment. This Act made the causes of oil spill a 
critical factor in determining whether compensation would be paid or not. The iaNGOr, 
laNGOr and community stakeholders argued that the powerful stakeholders ascribe most 
of the spills to third-party interference to avoid compensating affected individuals and 
communities for damages arising from such pollution.  
“Oil companies have succeeded in shifting the blame of oil spills from pipeline 
integrity to oil theft. So, it is now fashionable to blame all oil spill cases on oil 
theft and ignore calls for repair and proper management of their assets” 
(NACGOND, 2014, p.10) 
“Oil companies…, in particular {name of corporation} blame most of the oil spills 
on sabotage and illegal bunkering (theft) by local community members. It is in the 
company’s perceived financial interest to allege such, as they feel these releases 
them from legal responsibility to clean up spills or compensate the local 
communities” (Steiner, 2010, p.6) 
Nevertheless, the regulators, especially NOSDRAr1 revealed that often the communities’ 
representatives during the JIVs are reluctant to append their signatures on the JIVs’ 
reports when they realize that the cause of the spill was recorded as third-party 
interference  
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“…The essence of bringing in community there is to instill transparency in the 
whole process. […] Where you will see a community representative not willing 
to append his signature or not appearing in that JIV form, the cause of that spill 
obviously may be a glaring case of third-party interference. …If it was clear case 
of equipment failure or corrosion, they will be very bold to put their signature 
since they know that compensation will be the next thing they will be expecting.” 
(NOSDRAr1) 
On the other hand, the community stakeholders argued that the outcome of such 
investigations are often pre-determined by the corporations and the regulators because he 
who pays the piper dictates the tunes  
“the community is the third party. […] when {name of corporation} is coming in 
to conduct JIV, {name of corporation} come with NOSDRA, NNPC, the Ministry 
of Environment and all other networks of people. They pay their flight, they pay 
their transport, they bring food packs for them, they feed them, and they grease 
their pocket.69 {name of corporation} is responsible for everything because 
NOSDRA don’t even have a boat, they don’t even have a coverall which they will 
wear and enter the spill site. …anything that {name of corporation} ask them to 
do is what they will do. He who pays the piper dictates the tune.” (CLs1, focus 
group participant 1) 
Other stakeholders believe that accounting for the JIV process and its outcomes are 
marred by the cosy relationship between the corporations and DPR, who are legally in 
charge of licensing and maximising the revenue from extraction. The NGOs and the 
community stakeholders believe that due to this relationship, the objectivity and 
accountability of DPR in the JIVs was marred because of this conflict of interest. For 
instance, UNEP (2011, p.139) argued that  
                                                          
69 A commonly held view by the arena participants is that the corporations provide the logistics required for the JIVs 
but whether the corporations (in the quote above – Shell) truly grease the JIT pocket is a perception of corruption from 
the community stakeholders interviewed. This evidence should not be taken as confirming that corruption takes place 
unless there are court evidence proofing the existence of corruption but the perception of corruption in the arena could 
be argued to be sufficient to create conflicts and tensions. The community stakeholders believed there was corruption 
in the JIVs and they view effective accountability to demonstrate that the corporations don’t grease their pocket.  
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“there is clearly a conflict of interest in a ministry which, on one hand has to 
maximize revenue by increasing production and, on the other, ensure 
environmental compliance. Most countries around the world, including in the 
Middle East where oil is the mainstay of the regional economy, have placed 
environmental regulation within the Ministry of Environment or equivalent.”  
Consequently, other stakeholders [community stakeholders, iaNGOrs, laNGOrs, 
DNGOr1, 2 and 5] agreed that because of this relationship between DPR and the 
corporations, the human rights of the indigenous people were violated because the 
corporations have considerable influence over what liabilities70 and damages to disclose. 
In addition, the DNGOrs revealed that the Nigerian government has the power to address 
human rights and environmental pollution, especially by dictating how the JIVs should 
be conducted and funded. However, given the joint ventures between the government and 
the corporations, the power to protect human rights was argued to have been traded for 
wealth maximisation. DNGOr2 argued that 
“Nigeria government is the biggest shareholders… …decides what happens, what 
you the operators [corporations] spend, what you invest in and what you don’t do. 
If you come from that end, Nigerian government is responsible for what we see in 
the Niger Delta today. …they caused…and…are perpetuating it. …As a major 
investor, as even the one that gives out the license; it can determine the 
condition…it can set the criteria… This has happened all over the world but the 
Nigerian government simply sees this as a business and they operate it like a 
businessman. A businessman doesn’t want anything that stops his profit… …it 
does everything to maximise it… …the Nigerian government is not into the oil 
industry as a development organisation…and that is why we have the situation we 
are having.” 
As a result of the inability of the government to protect and drive effective accountability, 
the advocacy NGOs through the support of the community stakeholders use their contra-
                                                          
70 NACGOND (2014, p.11) claimed “the total volume of oil spilled has remained an issue of controversy between 
SPDC and host community stakeholders. In all the JIVs monitored, SPDC did not disclose the quantity of oil spilled at 
the site nor the method used in calculating volume”. 
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governing counter accounts to problematize the relationship between the government, its 
agencies and the corporations. Campaigning for a review through the PIB for effective 
governance and dialogic accountabilities to benefit all stakeholders, especially the 
communities (Thomson et al., 2015; Gray et al., 2014b, Parker, 2014). 
Despite the lack of credibility in the JIVs process, evidence revealed that the laNGOs and 
its coalition have trained grass root environmental monitors71 to observe the JIVs’ 
processes and to give an account of unsustainable practices.  
“…the last that took place in that place [referring to a community in Rivers State], 
I was one of the people that called NACGOND before {name of corporation} 
came to stop the spill… …I was trained by NACGOND about JIV but still in case 
of anything of this nature, NO way. It is total zero. They can only be there, telling 
you all sort of lies…” (CLs4, focus group participant 3)  
This implies that partisan counter accounts on JIVs are published based on evidence 
provided by the grass root environmental monitors to drive dialogic accountability and 
engagement within the local arenas. This could be viewed as a step in the right direction, 
however, where the regulators whose responsibilities are to protect human rights and to 
drive a healthy environment for sustainable development practices have been captured by 
the powerful stakeholders72, the outcome of any JIV would still be questioned by the other 
arena participants.  
 
7.2.3.  CONFLICTS, COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND DOUBLE STANDARD 
Empirical evidence revealed that the corporations often adopt double standard when 
implementing regulatory instruments governing their activities in the Delta. The 
iaNGOrs, laNGOrs and community stakeholders revealed that the corporations’ practice 
‘environmental racism’ in the Delta arena because they are deemed to be more powerful 
than the government due to their overreliance on oil revenue and through the joint 
ventures. This was evident in the interviews conducted with the arena participants except 
                                                          
71 The grassroot environmental monitors are indigenous people trained by the local advocacy NGOs to monitor spills 
in their environment. They are expected to immediately capture and transit any information on pollutions to the 
advocacy NGOs. 
72 The local advocacy NGOs called this form of capture the “institutional captured phenomenon” – See chapter 8.  
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for MNOCr1 and 2, who do not perceive the corporations as the dominant stakeholders 
in the industry. For instance 
“…know that oil is tension, oil is conflict, oil is control and the control comes 
from the refusal of the oil corporations to really obey the rules and regulations of 
the countries they operate from because like in Nigeria, they are more powerful 
than the government. Our government is solely depended on oil, therefore if the 
corporations’ sneeze, we will catch cold.” (DNGOr5) 
“…They are practicing environmental racism, double standards. …they neglect 
the laws in Nigeria, they don’t adhere to the laws…and so we are saying that they 
should stop operating double standards, they should stop environmental racism 
and allow one set of laws that is operating in Europe to also be operating in 
Nigeria.” (laNGOr3) 
Counter accounts prepared by advocacy NGOs bridged the gaps and problematized the 
need for the powerful stakeholders to avoid practicing double standards. For instance, the 
NGOs and independent observers problematized the need to implement best practice on 
environmental standards or pipeline integrity standards as it is practiced in the 
Netherlands, USA or UK in the Delta arena. They viewed the non-implementation of 
these regulatory standards as the application of the double standards, which impact on 
human rights and sustainable development (Amnesty International, 2015, 2009; 
Amunwa, 2011; Steiner, 2010). For instance,  
“All was in a bid to ensure that {name of corporation} was compelled to do the 
needful because of their stiff-neckedness, their double standard, their 
environmental terrorism or racism that they practice in the Niger Delta, which they 
can never-never do in their home country. We saw what happened during the Gulf 
of Mexico’s spill. …Here…the communities are left to battle with this leviathan 
or monsters called the oil companies. …Not even the State House of Assembly 
can talk on oil issues. […] that is why there is negligence… …of all…we have 
been doing [advocacy NGOs], such a thing can still continue… It is a very sad 
and unfortunate situation.” (CLs5, focus group participant 2- laNGOr12). 
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Furthermore, evidence revealed that systematic counter accounts (Thomson et al., 2015) 
prepared by the laNGOs and iaNGOs were intended to ensure that the regulators enforce 
rules preventing corporations from applying double standards. For instance, evidence 
from the community stakeholders revealed that environmental remediation was 
inadequately conducted because the remediation exercises are often hired out to indigenes 
with little or no training on how remediation exercises should be conducted. This was 
because of the Nigerian Local Content Act 2010, which required environmental contracts 
be given to Nigerians to drive economic development. The laNGOrs, iaNGOrs and 
community stakeholders reported that when spills occur on land, the oil is either set ablaze 
while the burnt surface soil will be excavated and buried, or the oil is scooped while the 
land is covered with clay or the soil is tilled to expose the polluted part to nature. They 
assumed that as the crude ages, the lighter end would be lost through remediation by 
enhanced natural attenuation (RENA), which might prevent the crude from polluting the 
groundwater (UNEP, 2011; Steiner, 2010). For instance, NOSDRAr1 argued that RENA 
is a technique of removing contaminants particularly hydrocarbon and other associated 
waste from the environment by exposing the contaminated soil to aeration and then 
allowing natural forces of nature to act on them, thereby exposing the contaminated soil 
to micro-organisms to hasten the process of remediation. However, advocacy NGOs and 
the community stakeholders interviewed argued that the environment was inadequately 
remediated regardless of the approach adopted. IP1, IP7, CLs2 and CLs4 supported this 
claim 
“…After the spill, they tried to contain the spill. …then they clamped the pipeline 
and they gave it to one local contractor. What they did there was that they just 
scooped the oil from the surface of the earth and then set fire on it. […] The palm 
trees have been burnt. The grass is beginning to degenerate. After that, what they 
did is [that] they scraped the topsoil and then dug a pit and put it there and covered 
it. That is it! That is the remediation.” (IP1, focus group participant 1) 
“When spills happen, if they like, they could clean it up, they do the job poorly 
anyway. In some other cases, they don’t even care [to clean]… So, the community 
really is not powerful enough to confront these companies. In most cases, we don’t 
even have people in government to fight our cause.” (IP7) 
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Nevertheless, evidence from the regulators (NOSDRAr1 and DPRr1) revealed that these 
indigenous contractors are accredited by DPR and NOSDRA before they were appointed 
by the corporations to conduct any remediation exercise. However, evidence revealed that 
the contractors lacked the required expertise to remediate the polluted environment. This 
subsequently implied that the effectiveness and credibility of the regulators’ accreditation 
exercise are questionable. For instance, NOSDRAr1 argued that 
“…we have quite a number of remediation contractors and you cannot just say 
whether they operate at international standard or not… …the agency (NOSDRA) 
has its own checklist that it actually uses to ensure that these people are actually 
not briefcase carrying contractors. […] It is the oil operators that have the 
authority to a kind of pre-qualification criteria and they use their service. 
…NOSDRA will only give them that accreditation. The one that NOSDRA has 
accredited is the one that the oil company is expected to use for the exercise. They 
receive similar accreditation from DPR…”  
However, when immediate and adequate clean-up was not conducted, and it rained, the 
spilled crude spread to the creeks, swamps, fishponds, farms, which subsequently 
impacted on the lived lives of the indigenous people, their human rights, their ability to 
live in a healthy environment and earn a living. For instance, this was supported by UNEP 
(2011, p.167), CLs3 and 2  
“…Any crops in the area directly impacted will also be damaged, and root crops, 
such as cassava, will become unusable. However…even when no remedial action 
is initiated, thick layers of oil will eventually wash off from the soil, making it 
possible for more tolerant plant species to re-establish, giving the area an 
appearance of having returned to healthy stage. When farming recommences, 
plants generally show signs of stress and yields are reportedly lower than in non-
impacted areas. This naturally has an impact on the livelihood of the community… 
Also, farming in soil which is contaminated also exposes the community to dermal 
contact with hydrocarbons.” (UNEP, 2011, p.167) 
On the other hand, the corporations have denied this allegation by arguing that they clean 
up effectively and on time regardless of the cause of the spill. For instance, Shell in its 
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2011 webinar dialogue when questioned on what they were doing to clean-up the Niger 
Delta and contended that  
“SPDC is committed to cleaning up all spills from its facilities no matter the cause, 
and in the last five years 75% of oil spill incidents have been caused by third-party 
interference… First, we recover as much oil as possible – then residual oil is 
cleaned up. …SPDC uses recognised methods which are suitable for the tropical 
climate in which it operates.”  
However, community stakeholders, iaNGOrs and laNGOrs narratives revealed that the 
remediation exercises were unnecessarily delayed despite the regulatory requirement. 
Community stakeholders argued that the spills were allowed to contaminate other areas 
before they were investigated and remediated by the corporations and the regulators. In 
addition, they posited that when clean up were eventually conducted, they were conducted 
by non-experts, thereby exposing the indigenous people to environmental, health and 
(intra)intergenerational risks (Weiss, 1992; Grubnic et al., 2015; Gray, 2010).  
“like what they have done if there is spill, they will come back and then do the 
clean-up maybe to their own taste and not to the community’s taste. That is why 
in our creeks and our swamp, fishes are no longer there as it is before. That is the 
impact.” (CLs3, focus group participant 1) 
Furthermore, the community stakeholders and DPRr273 argued that pipelines were left 
unchanged because they were deemed as economically viable despite EGASPIN’s 
requirement that oil pipelines with a technical lifespan of 25years should be changed.  
“…the pipeline transporting crude oil for {name of corporation} to the export 
terminal is over 52 years old… The pipeline was there before I was born… …the 
{name of corporation} pipeline is like a hippopotamus face, patch-patch-patch-
patch… Every day, you will be hearing clamping-clamping-clamping, none of the 
sections of these pipelines have been replaced. …If they have changed in other 
towns, I don’t know but for this Gokana where I live, I service, I work as a chief; 
                                                          
73 See chapter 5, section 5.2.2.2.4, paragraph 2. 
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none of the pipeline facilities…have been changed…” (CLs2, focus group 
participant 1) 
For instance, Shell in its 2013 webinar dialogue when questioned by the other 
stakeholders on their role in implementing UNEP’s recommendations, particularly on 
their environmental programme in relation to the maintenance of their pipelines. They 
claimed  
“The maintenance of the integrity of our pipelines is based on risk analysis rather 
than age of pipelines. […] Shell is doing all that is technically feasible to ensure 
adequate maintenance of her pipelines in spite of disruption by vandals. Shell has 
been addressing the recommendations in the UNEPs report.”  
However, evidence from NOSDRAr1 revealed that often the integrity or standard of their 
pipelines were questionable because they were often not maintained in accordance with 
regulatory requirements. 
“…the oil companies can always launder [polish] their image…particularly 
whenever issues that have to do with the integrity of pipeline is concerned. …they 
can tell you that their pipelines are of international standard. …you know Niger-
Delta area is predominantly swampy…and the nature of soil that we have are so 
acidic. …if the pipe is not coated maybe with cement, the lifespan that is supposed 
to take probably like 25 years may not get up to that... …I am not disputing the 
fact that the pipes they laid are of international standard but at the same time they 
cannot also claim ignorance of the fact that some of these pipes are actually very 
old…” (NOSDRAr1) 
Informal conversation with iaNGOrs, laNGOrs and the community stakeholders argued 
that the problem of non-compliance or double standard was not peculiar to Shell but was 
the norm with other oil corporations such as Agip, ExxonMobil, Total, Chevron and so 
on. The non-compliance with regulatory requirement for the maintenance of pipelines and 
infrastructures and oil spill remediation have led to impoverishment, conflicts and human 
rights abuse to the local arenas. iaNGOrs, laNGOs and the community stakeholders 
argued that the regulatory agencies should be strengthened to account for compliance and 
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to force compliance among the corporations to protect the rights of the local people and 
to drive sustainable development within the local arenas. 
“…the government should implement its policies. […] They should not be making 
policies and sweep it under the carpet. …if a ministry or parastatal or an agency 
was formed for the purpose of checkmating the environment…the government 
should equip that agency so that they can do their work…instead of establishing 
agency for the purpose of exploiting the government [community]…” (CLs2, 
focus group participant 1) 
The community stakeholders, especially the grass root advocates and the counter accounts 
(Thomson et al., 2015; Kneip, 2013; Solomon and Thomson, 2009) published by the 
advocacy NGOs (see chapter 8) constructed a discourse for an effective dialogic 
accountability by the corporations and regulatory systems devoid of double standards. 
They were also used to engage stakeholders to bridge the compliance gaps in the 
ineffective governance systems. 
 
7.2.4. CONFLICTS, COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND GAS FLARING  
Gas flaring involves the burning or flaring of associated natural gas, which is a mixture 
of crude oil and gas from oil extraction. Besides abundant crude oil, the Delta has been 
described as a gas haven because of its enormous gas reserves but over 50% of its gas is 
flared (Bassey, 2008; Eboh, 2014; Social Action, 2009b). Gas flaring is visible in the 
Delta 24/7 due to its proximity to residential homes, its ‘open flare’ system and its impact 
on the health of the people (Baumuller et al., 2011; SDN, 2010; UNDP, 2006). Gas flaring 
is viewed as a violation of human rights, health, environmental and economic rights of 
the people. The flaring of associated gas is not allowed because it contributes to 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and climate change but in Nigeria, gas flaring seems to 
be embraced regardless of its negative impact (Baumuller et al., 2011; Hassan and Kouhy, 
2013; World Bank, 2015c; Vidal, 2012).  
"Gas flares are nothing short of crimes against humanity. They roast the skies, kill 
crops and poison the air. These gas stacks pump up greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere, impacting the climate, placing everyone at risk. Gas flares go on 
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because it is cheap to kill, as long as profits keep on the rise," (Nnimmo Bassey 
cited by Vidal, 2012). 
In the Delta, the bulk of associated gas produced from crude oil exploration is flared rather 
than converted to energy to address poverty and unemployment. This would have 
improved the lives of the indigenous people without electricity as well as the industrial 
capacity of Nigerians (Social Actions, 2009b). This was evident in the interview extracts 
from the community stakeholders, iaNGOr and laNGOrs.  
“…we don’t have light… …these are things that if they are there, members of the 
community would say, okay, even if we can’t go to the farm, there would be other 
means of livelihood…” (IP9, focus group participant 1) 
“…but what we discovered is beautiful light from the bush, flare light in the 
village as a result of the exploitation and exploration of the oil. …we don’t have 
light in the community but there is light in the bush close-by… …it is like the 
continuation of daylight, there is no night again...” (IP11) 
Gas flaring has been argued to produce continuous noise, acidic rain, increased 
temperature for communities located close to the flare, respiratory diseases, cancer, heart 
diseases, eye problems, rheumatic disorders, skin diseases, acidic rain which can 
contaminate water bodies and soil, corrode roofs, retard crops and illuminate communities 
with polluted light (Baumuller et al., 2011; CJP/ERA, 2005). Typical response from the 
community stakeholders supported this narrative  
 “…I can’t say 100% that their coming here is bad to us but health-wise, we are 
not benefiting anything. …if you pack your car overnight; in the morning, you 
will see particles of smoke or black carbon… …sicknesses like cholera, 
diabetes…smallpox, chicken pox…are what we don’t normally experience in the 
community here but all those are now part of what we are getting from the flare 
and the environmental pollution…” (IP10) 
“the level of heat in that community is higher than elsewhere… …We have acid 
rain; some plants are extinct from our community… …I believe our environment 
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is our inheritance. …many diseases such as respiratory diseases…the life 
expectancy is very short, stillbirth for women…” (IP11) 
“…we have crack walls…caused by the vibration of the equipment that they are 
using…and the noise of the flare shaking the ground. …it also makes children to 
convulse… …when they are to shut down some valves, the flare will go up. 
…Another thing we detected we call it ‘gas rain’… When they are shutting down 
their equipment, the gas would be released into the atmosphere. So, people would 
be thinking that rain is falling, ‘na lie’ [that is a lie], it is gas. …test your water, 
everywhere gas! …so many people have eye problems… Another one is cropped, 
they don’t grow well. …sometimes they will grow but will they produce good 
fruits? No way…” (IP12) 
These adverse effects have led advocacy NGOs, grass root advocates, supranational 
organisations and independent environmental observers to problematize the need for 
stricter environmental regulations of the oil industry to manage, account and prevent 
environmental pollution emanating from oil and gas exploration and extraction in the 
Delta (Amnesty International, 2013; CJP/ERA, 2005; World Bank, n.d.). The NGOs have 
problematized the need for gas flaring to be stopped or re-injected, refined to be traded in 
the developed liquefied natural gas market as it is practiced in Azerbaijan, Mexico and 
Kuwait in the Delta (Steiner, 2010; Social Action, 2009b). They argued that in other 
countries of the world, gas is harnessed and converted to energy but in Nigeria, it is 
continuously flared to the detriment of the people living in the Delta (World Bank, 2015c; 
Vidal, 2012). It was estimated that around $2.5bn worth of gas was flared annually in 
Nigeria, making it the second highest gas flaring country after Russia (Hassan and Kouhy, 
2013; SDN, 2010). The NGOs and the community stakeholders argued that communities 
have suffered extensively from gas flaring for over 50years because there is little or no 
commitment from the corporations and the government to stop gas flaring 
“…Although the Government also wants to end flaring, it has instructed SPDC 
and the other companies to maintain the status quo on oil production until further 
notice” (Shell, 2009, webinar, p.36) 
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Due to the absence of the commitment by the corporations and government to address the 
problem arising from gas flaring, eight communities across the Delta74 filed a lawsuit 
against the oil corporations in 2005 at the Federal High Court of Nigeria, Benin. Whilst 
the court dismissed seven communities’ lawsuit as lacking tangible evidence, the court 
ruled on behalf of Iwherekan Community, Delta State on the 4th November 2005 that gas 
flaring is illegal. The court ruled that Shell should stop gas flaring in this community by 
April 2007 because it violated their fundamental rights to live sustainably and their 
dignity. Despite this court ruling, gas flaring still continued in this community and 
elsewhere in the Delta because the corporation and the regulators ignored the court 
judgement (Steiner, 2010; Social Actions, 2009b).  
“…We took the action to stop gas flaring in the entire Niger Delta. …the Benin 
judgement is a sound one. […] if you destroy my environment, you are also 
endangering my life. If I can’t grow crops on my land, it will affect my livelihood. 
I can’t get suitable shelter because of the acid rain. […] the acid rain corrodes our 
roofs…fish in the rivers are affected, farmlands and crops too…” (IP7)  
Besides this court ruling, gas flaring was declared illegal in Nigeria in 1984 pursuant to 
section 3 of the Associated Gas Reinjection Act 1979. Gas flaring continues because the 
government has allowed gas to be burnt or flared with small fines and because the 
legislature allowed the Minister of Petroleum Resources (MPR) to grant exemptions for 
gas flaring (Social Actions, 2009b; CJP/ERA, 2005; Bassey 2008). Documentary 
evidence by the iaNGOs and laNGOs such as SDN, 2014c; Social Actions, 2009b; 
CJP/ERA, 2005 revealed that the corporations opted to pay fines or secure waiver for gas 
to be flared.75 Details of such records and their usage are not readily available for public 
                                                          
74 These communities include Eket in Akwa Ibom State, Imiringi and Gbarain in Bayelsa State, Iwherekan in Delta 
State, Akala-Olu, Erema and Idama in Rivers State. 
75 The Associated Gas Re-injection [1985 (2)] claimed “Where the Minister is satisfied after 1 January, 1984 that 
utilisation or re-injection of the produced gas is not appropriate or feasible in a particular field or fields, he may issue 
a certificate in that respect to a company engaged in the production of oil or gas- (a) specifying such terms and 
conditions, as he may at his discretion choose to impose, for the continued flaring of gas in the particular field or fields; 
or (b) permitting the company to continue to flare gas in the particular field or fields if the company pays such sum as 
the Minister may from time to time prescribe for every 28.317 Standard cubic metre (SCM) of gas flared: Provided 
that, any payment due under this paragraph shall be made in the same manner and be subject to the same procedure as 
for the payment of royalties to the Federal Government by companies engaged in the production of oil.”  
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scrutiny. Regardless of whether the fines were paid or (not)were disclosed, would such 
fines compensate for the lives that were lost from gas flaring in the Delta or compensate 
for environmental and human rights violations in the Delta or would it reduce the effect 
of climate change? For instance, evidence revealed that rather than conduct an EIA to 
understand the negative impact of any exploratory and extractive activities on the 
communities, EIA’s exercises were often waived thereby exposing the community 
stakeholders to harm or human rights violation. IP11 and IP10 reported that the 
corporation was issued a waiver for a gas project despite its negative impacts in the 
community.  
“The reason they are waiving the EIA is that the government is corrupt, companies 
are corrupt. There is another section in the constitution that said, that the federal 
government has right to give waiver to any company on EIA.  …100% of income 
of the companies, 60% goes to the federal government and 40% to the companies. 
…So, they listen more to the companies than the host communities. …They don’t 
care how many people would die. …How the land and the water would be 
polluted? …all they need is the resources…” (IP10) 
Besides the waiver of EIA, the corporations and the government often engineered 
numerous excuses for gas to be flared.  
“In 2014, flaring volume…totalled 4.5million metric tons. …an increase of 0.8 
million metric tons compared with our 2013 performance. The increase…in 2014 
was primarily due to…[the] operatorship of the existing Usan production field in 
Nigeria…” (ExxonMobil, 2014, p.37) 
“…in 2014, an increase in levels of oil production has resulted in the volumes of 
flared gas increasing by 12%… A challenging operating environment and 
shortfalls in funding from the government-owned NNPC have resulted in delays 
to the completion of a number of gas-gathering projects.” (Shell, 2014, p.37)  
The government has set numerous deadlines to stop gas flaring in Nigeria (2003; 2004; 
2008; 2010 and then 2012) but all were to no avail because ending gas flaring without 
infrastructures for it to be sold or re-injected or converted to energy might result in the 
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disruption of crude oil exploration and extraction for the government and corporations 
(Baumuller et al., 2011; CJP/ERA, 2005). This would create the loss of revenue for joint 
venture partners but their inability to refine gas for the benefit of Nigerians was claimed 
to cost Nigerians more (Social Action, 2009b). For instance, Eboh (2014) argued that 
“Nigeria has lost up to $868.8million, about ₦173.76billion to gas flaring in 2014, 
according to data obtained from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.” Under 
these circumstances, there was little or no incentive for corporations and the government 
to invest in infrastructures for the commercialisation of gas because gas flaring was the 
cheapest option resulting in a tragic waste of valuable resource. The social, economic and 
environmental costs of not curbing gas flaring despite the landmark court judgement led 
to numerous grassroots activism championed by laNGOs in collaboration with iaNGOs 
to facilitate a dialogic accountability and transformative engagement for changes in the 
Delta. 
“…they have been extending deadline from 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 from there to 
2010. […] So, we collected signatures on a petition on gas flaring from the Niger 
Delta and we sent it to the government that gas flaring should stop…After such, 
they set up a project called Dugas project. […] At least that was an achievement, 
which they have done.” (IP11) 
“The federal government is a fraud…has been…singing of stopping gas flaring. 
…federal government is benefiting from gas flaring, they cannot stop it because 
they [corporations] pay them and what they pay them is not even transferred to 
the direct sufferers of the gas flaring.” (IP3, focus group participant 2) 
However, the corporations viewed these dates as an unrealistic target. For instance, in 
2005, Shell announced it would eliminate gas flaring in all its facilities in 2008 but later 
announced that its 2008 target was not realistic and moved the date to 2009. In 2007, 
Shell announced a shift from 2009 to 2011 but gas flaring continues till date because they 
often engineer excuses to flare gas, often at the expense of the people living in the Delta 
(Social Actions, 2009b). Although, evidence from the corporations revealed that they 
have reduced the amount of gas flared, but they still produced excuses for routine gas 
flaring. These excuses include the non-availability of infrastructures to reduce flaring to 
acceptable standards due to the lack of funding from their joint venture partner (i.e. the 
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government) or due to the exploration of new oil wells and security challenges. For 
instance, Shell (2014, p.37) and Total (2009, p.13) argued that  
“…SPDC remains committed to…reducing the volume and intensity of gas flaring 
with a number of associated gas-gathering projects… Further progress to reduce 
flaring needs sustained commitment and funding by all joint-venture partners, 
together with safe access to install the equipment.” (Shell, 2014, p.37).  
“…we are determined to honor our commitment to halve flaring at operated sites 
from 2005 levels. However, these capital-intensive projects require the agreement 
of all of our partners, meaning this target cannot be met before 2014.” (Total, 
2009, p.13) 
Despite the consistent flaring since 1958 and its negative consequences, the actual 
quantity flared was unknown (CJP/ERA, 2005). This problem led to the development of 
the Nigerian Gas Flare Tracker (GFT) on the 27 November 2014 by Stakeholder 
Democracy Network (SDN) funded by the UK government, through its Department for 
International Development (DFID) to enable regulators, corporations, civil society and 
individuals monitor the amount of gas flared in the Delta (Esiedesa, 2014; Musari, 2014; 
SDN, 2014b). This was aimed at reducing associated gas flare, to improve accountability 
on gas flare and the enforcement of fines. The GTF aims to reveal the amount of 
associated gas that should have been converted to electrical power in a country where 
there is pernicious electricity shortage (Faucon, 2009; Howden, 2010). This online 
accountability platform was embraced by NOSDRA and community stakeholders. For 
instance, media evidence revealed that the former minister of environment (Laraba-
Mallam) and the director general of NOSDRA argued that the GFT an online 
accountability would promote transparency in the oil industry 
“Anytime we attend foreign conferences…we hear other countries tell the amount 
of gas released into the atmosphere, but we guess. But from today, we will not 
guess, we will give the correct amount, because of this tracker.” (Laraba-Mallam 
cited by Stein, 2014) 
181 
 
 
 
“We believe that the companies are not…paying us accurate taxes from the 
volumes of gas they’re supposed to have flared… …You can see they gave you a 
table showing those amounts. But right now, we’ll be able to know the total 
number, the total amount of gas flared, in relation to the tax they’re paying, and 
then the deficit they’ll be made to pay.” (Idabor cited by Stein, 2014) 
Few days after the launch of the GFT, fines for gas flaring were removed by the DPR. 
They argued that the non-imposition of fines would encourage indigenous oil companies 
to harness gas to energy (SDN, 2014c). The removal of fines on gas flaring could be 
viewed as an incentive encouraging gas flaring in Nigeria (Faucon, 2009; SDN, 2014c). 
Furthermore, advocacy NGOs and observers argued that the GFT exposed the 
ineffectiveness of DPR in enforcing its regulations on gas flaring, and the launch of GFT 
would enable NGOs and observers to demand accountability for gas flaring from DPR 
(SDN, 2014b). For instance, SDN (2014c) argued that the removal of fines did not matter 
as fines were never imposed  
“Fines were never really imposed anyway, …this is just a way of taking the heat 
off those culpable parties… At least no-one can be fooled now – fines are no 
longer even claimed to be collected for gas flaring in Nigeria. How this can be 
justified when Nigeria so desperately wants and needs to incentivise gas to power 
is anyone’s guess, and is a question rightly being asked by sensible policy and 
decision-makers both in Nigeria and on the international stage.”  
The GFT would have enabled advocacy NGOs, observers and individuals to delegitimise 
any false compliance claims, measure fines paid, check the amount of gas flared as 
disclosed by the corporations and regulators in the NNPC Annual Statistical Bulletins.76 
However, the GFT77 which was last updated in 2014 [unlike the Oil Spill Monitor78] has 
not been successful, which arguably could be attributed to the removal of fines by DPR. 
                                                          
76 
http://www.nnpcgroup.com/PublicRelations/OilandGasStatistics/AnnualStatisticsBulletin/MonthlyPerformance.aspx  
77 (http://gasflaretracker.ng/about.html) 
78 (https://oilspillmonitor.ng/) 
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The lack of political will by the government to enforce its law on gas flaring implied that 
the rights of the indigenous people of the Delta have been compromised. However, the 
campaigns of the grassroots advocate, iaNGOs and laNGOs have been clamouring for 
accountability, the respect of their rights, inclusive engagement and sustainable 
development beyond oil and gas.     
“…I have a concept of ‘going beyond this oil, beyond gas flaring’ …We should 
go renewable. …we can stop gas flaring and use solar systems to generate light… 
That will be sustainable, that is free, it will not be harmful, …and less expensive. 
The more you have a light that is constant; you know development can come in…” 
(IP11) 
 
7.2.5. EVALUATING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE REGULATORS AND THE LAWS 
7.2.5.1. CONFLICTS, COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND DEFICIENCY OF THE REGULATORY LAWS 
Natural resources are often instruments of political, social, economic and environmental 
discrimination. The community stakeholders described themselves as tenants without an 
ownership right to the oil minerals beneath their feet. This could be viewed as 
exacerbating other issues highlighted in this study. The Land Use Act 1978,79 ascribes 
ownership of any mineral resources below 6ft to the Federal government, therefore 
according to the Nigerian constitution, land and any resources belong to the federal 
government. However, iaNGOrs, laNGOrs, DNGOrs and independent observers (see 
chapter 8) have argued that the ownership of natural resources should be bestowed on the 
indigenous people while the government oversees the exploratory and extractive 
activities. iaNGOrs, laNGOrs, DNGOrs and independent observers argued that taking the 
resources away from people is a violation of their fundamental rights to life, healthy 
environment, right to earn a living and ability to live sustainably. This was supported by 
the DNGOr5, IP2 and IP10. 
“The source of wealth whether you like it or not is the soil. When you come here 
and take away the land from the people and you come back and start telling us 
                                                          
79 http://www.nigeria-law.org/Land%20Use%20Act.htm  
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you want to fight poverty. How can you fight poverty when you have removed the 
source of wealth from the indigenes?” (IP2) 
“…we are not landlords to them. They only pay you for the crops that are on that 
plots of land that they want to acquire. So, you are not their landlord. They only 
treat you as a neighbouring community… If you base it on the Land Use Decree, 
you are not a landlord but you are a tenant.” (IP10) 
This also implied that the State and Local Government have no defined role in the 
coordination and exploration of mineral resources in Nigeria. This implied that the 
indigenous people have no direct ownership rights to their property and anything below 
6ft despite the direct impact of the oil exploratory and extractive activities on their lives. 
Community stakeholders argued that they were not consulted even when the licence to 
explore were issued. 
“The law in Nigeria denies oil bearing communities any meaningful involvement 
in the companies’ operations. The Land Use Act has taken away the land from the 
community. …the operators go to the federal government, get a license or 
whatever, without the involvement of the communities. …and come to the 
community and carry on their operations but when they come like that there is 
bound to be agitation…” (IP7) 
Evidence from the iaNGOrs, laNGOrs and community stakeholders revealed that before 
the Land Use Act, the oil companies were expected and indeed forced to negotiate royalty 
payment with the communities before they could access their land or at least make some 
payment for the use of their land. These negotiations proved cumbersome and some 
communities allowed companies to access their land before negotiation. However, the 
iaNGOrs, laNGOrs and community stakeholders argued that in the 70s where there was 
a dictatorship, the military government could not understand why communities should 
hinder or delay a company from exploring and extracting crude which contributes to the 
Nigerian economy. Therefore, they came up with the Land Use Decree, which arrogated 
all land below 6ft to the Federal government. 
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“…It should not have gone that way and that is why there is a need for us to have 
a voice. It is a very big cheat because below 6ft is for the federal government and 
above 6ft is for the landlord [indigenous people]. Even though anything above 6ft 
belongs to the landlords, everything is carted away to the Federal government. 
Look at Abuja being built, it is our oil (wealth)… we need to have a voice and that 
is why I think Ken [Saro-Wiwa] came and rose up but they killed him. We need 
to have a voice…” (IP6) 
The iaNGOrs, laNGOrs and community stakeholders argued that this stole from the Niger 
Delta people what was theirs. Although, it was not targeted only at the Niger Delta 
because the Land Use Act was implemented nationwide. They argued that the real reason 
why the decree was promulgated was to allow oil corporations easy access to the land. 
They argued that  
“The communities do not have ownership of the land and if you do not have 
ownership of the land, you cannot make decisions on what happens there. One of 
the key elements of ownership is the decision-making power. You have the 
decision-making power over what you own. If you do not own it, you cannot make 
decisions about it and if you cannot make decisions about it then you are as good 
as landless because you cannot decide who comes in or who goes out, what can 
be done or what cannot be done…” (laNGOr8) 
This law has led to mistrust, suspicion, and conflicts in the Delta. The community 
stakeholders believe that if they don’t have a voice to control the resources or ownership 
rights (which the iaNGOs and laNGOs are striving to reconstruct), they should not be 
unduly exposed to the negative impacts of environmental pollution or the lack of 
accountability for environmental pollution by the regulators and the corporations 
(Bebbington et al., 2007; Freire, 2002; Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007). The Land Use 
Act affected the accountability and engagement relationships among the community 
stakeholders, the government and the corporations. iaNGOs, laNGOs and independent 
observers have argued for the repeal of this law because it is an infringement of human 
rights and sustainable development. In their effort to reconstruct the ownership 
framework in the oil industry, they proposed the PIB to repeal the Land Use Act and other 
decrees. 
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“…the Land Use Act must be repealed. It is elitist, it is obnoxious, it takes away 
the right of the local people and gives it to the elite. People who need the land are 
not able to gain access to the land for farming or for agricultural purposes…” 
(laNGOr3) 
“…the federal government is claiming all accruable wealth from that land …the 
Land Use Decree is one of the predicament we are having as we are speaking.” 
(CLs4, focus group, participant 1) 
The community stakeholders argued that the only way they can create accountability for 
human rights and sustainable development is when they build networks of campaigns and 
engagement at the grass roots to give voice to their plight in order to address the unequal 
power relations and accountability. This was supported by the indigenous people 
interviewed 
“There is a joint venture here… …what we call the oil conglomerate conspiracy.  
…all of them are merging… Unless there is networking within the rank and file 
of the people, we can’t free ourselves. …If we are not free. We will always be 
stagnant.” (IP2) 
“We are asking for resource control. It is only when these resources, the mainstay 
of Nigeria is being controlled by the owners. It is only then that we can talk of 
accountability. …nobody is accountable to anybody.” (IP3, focus group 
participant 2) 
The iaNGOrs and laNGOrs argued that without equality of power and ownership structure 
as well as the repeal of the Land Use Act, it would be very difficult to address the 
environmental degradation from oil spill and gas flaring.  
 
7.2.5.2. CONFLICTS, COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND CREDIBILITY OF THE REGULATORS 
The stakeholders (i.e. the regulators, the communities’ groups, the iaNGOrs, laNGOrs 
and DNGOrs) argued that there is a need for a repeal of regulations such as the Oil 
Pipelines Act, 1959; Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, 1979; Land Use Act, 1978; The 
Petroleum Act 1969; Oil Terminal Dues Act, 1965; Land (Title Vesting) Act, 1993 
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(Amnesty International, 2009; Amunwa, 2011; Steiner, 2010). The author argued that the 
government and corporations are violating the fundamental rights of the people, abusing 
the environment and the need for sustainable development in the Delta because the 
primary drive for wealth maximisation renders every other need for an effective 
enforcement of regulations worthless in the Delta. The government responsible for 
enforcing the laws is deeply involved in joint venture partnerships for oil exploration and 
extraction, and this provided corporations the leeway to avoid implementing 
environmental and human rights standard in the Delta. 
Independent observers, iaNGOs and laNGOs have argued that the regulatory mechanisms 
in the oil industry have been captured (see chapter 8) by the powerful stakeholders to 
avoid tougher regulations which could prevent unsustainable practices. Lauwo and 
Otusanya, 2014; Belal et al., 2015; Gallhofer et al., 2011; Ruggie, 2013; Sikka, 2011; 
Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016 have argued that weak governance systems to hold corporations 
accountable resulted in human rights violations, especially in developing countries. The 
ineffectiveness of the captured regulatory system in Nigeria was evident in the 
community stakeholders, iaNGOrs and laNGOrs interviews. For example  
“See all these things are borrowed institutions. The people will shout, talk and do 
all that, it is they themselves [regulators] that are eating a lot of money. …It is not 
easy to resist bribe… …How do you think they will allow you to come and eat 
with them then you will go out and begin to castigate them…” (IP2) 
This simply implied that the absence of enforcement or implementation of the laws in the 
Delta does not have anything to do with the quality of legislations but could be linked to 
the government relationships with corporations, which restricts their ability to enforce the 
laws. The regulatory mechanisms (DPR and NOSDRA) established to conserve the 
environment and to protect the rights of the people are not independent of undue influence 
from the corporations. This was evident in the activities of DPR. However, independent 
observers such as UNEP, World Bank, iaNGOs, laNGOs, DNGOs and community 
stakeholders have often asked how DPR could maximise oil revenue and protect the 
environment? They argued that DPR’s abilities to maximise revenue compromised their 
independence or power to implement health, safety and environmental best regulatory 
practice. 
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“…in fact, when FME80 approved the use of some technologies for remediation, 
it took the DPR, who had been in charge of operations and environmental 
issues…up to 2003 before they had the courage to approve some of those 
processes and procedures for remediation that FME had approved as at 2001. …it 
is understandable; the mandate of environment is to ensure the conservation and 
protection of the Nigerian Environment. For DPR, it has to produce oil to the 
maximum possible to make sure that we get our revenue. So, our mandates are 
different…” (NOSDRAr2) 
However, DPRr1 argued that independent structures have been established within the 
organisation to ensure objectivity in the conservation of the environment and in the 
maximisation of revenue. DPRr1 argued that these decentralized independent structures 
ensure that their conduct aligns with best practices as required by the regulations.  
“…DPR does not exist in a vacuum. Whatever we do is encapsulated in its entire 
process. …we don’t go to another organisation to see what the exploration group 
does, what the field development group is doing, what the drilling people are doing 
because we also have those teams within DPR. …that is where you see the same 
group in DPR working side by side with those teams [other regulators] to ensure 
that whatever is done is done in line with best applicable technology and practice.”  
Regardless of the independent structures established to legitimize their credibility, 
evidence revealed that stricter enforcement of regulations by DPR might result in loss of 
revenue and this could create disincentive on the ability of the regulators to implement its 
regulations. The regulators become powerless in enforcing their standards when 
corporations flout the rules.  
On the other hand, NOSDRA81 was responsible for ensuring compliance with 
environmental standards but NOSDRAr1 and 2, MNOCr1 and 2, iaNGOrs, laNGOrs, 
DNGOrs and the community stakeholders unanimously argued that NOSDRA was 
underfunded  
                                                          
80 Federal Ministry of Environment 
81 See chapter 5, section 5.2.2.2.4. 
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“…How much funding had been provided for them and how have they harness 
those funds to deliver those services? How equipped is NOSDRA to handle some 
category of oil spill incidence? When they still to some extent depend on the 
industry [corporations] to ensure their logistics, it pegs their roles… …they are 
making some progress and I do hope that they will continue to drive that progress 
to the level that they would be effective monitors of what industry [the 
corporations] is doing because the stronger they are, the better for the Nigerian 
State and Nigerian people.” (MNOCr1) 
As evidenced in chapter 6 and 8 and in the quote above, NOSDRA lacked the expertise 
and financial capability to monitor the hundreds of oil spills and to adequately fund its 
activities. The overreliance on the corporations implied that its independence had been 
compromised or could be compromised, which subsequently affected its credibility as an 
independent regulator to enforce best practices and mitigate unsustainable environmental 
practices. This analysis was evident in the interviews conducted with all the stakeholders. 
Typical responses were 
“No, they are weak! Those agencies were not even meant to function… They are 
grossly under-funded… […] when there is oil spill offshore, what happens? 
{name of corporation} provides the helicopter; they provide every other logistics. 
So, what do you expect? …If it is somewhere they go by land…{name of 
corporation} will bring vehicles… You see, the agencies are there – they are there 
in names. If you read…the bill or the Acts that established them. …the legislation 
looks nice but…No implementation.” (IP1, focus group participant 1) 
“…Nigerian government thinks that to deal with an issue, you appoint a 
committee or create an agency…but little emphasis is being paid to technology, 
to systems…the equipment, these bodies need to function are often not there. That 
was the problem DPR had then and that is the problem NOSDRA is having now.” 
(DNGOr2) 
NOSDRAr1 and 2 revealed that although they were grossly underfunded, they required 
the approval and logistics of the corporations to access their facilities as well as to conduct 
their JIVs. They argued that the provision of logistics by corporations did not affect their 
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legitimacy or credibility as an independent regulator. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the 
regulators as being independent of undue influence from the corporations could be 
compromised by their dependence on the logistics provided by the corporations to 
undertake their regulatory activities or investigate environmental pollutions at their 
facilities. For instance, NOSDRAr2 argued that  
“…you cannot just walk into any oil facilities without going with the owners of 
the asset. …When it comes to going offshore for instance or in the swamp areas, 
we do not have helicopters but these people [corporations] do not even own 
helicopters too, they charter it… We cannot go in separate helicopters for the sake 
of saying that ‘no we don’t want to stay together’… Why does Nigeria have joint 
asset with oil companies?” (NOSDRAr2) 
Despite the inability of NOSDRA to regulate effectively, it appeared that there was a 
conflict of interests and duplication in the environmental responsibilities of DPR and 
NOSDRA. The regulator (NOSDRAr1 and 2, and DPRr1 and 2) revealed that there was 
duplication of responsibilities, which hindered their ability to effectively regulate. For 
instance, NOSDRAr2 
“…we hear oil companies say, ‘we are over-regulated, we are over-regulated’, 
my answer to them has been ‘nothing like that…. Comply with the environmental 
laws, simple’. …They will tell you ‘if we do this, DPR will ask us to come and do 
this and so and so forth’. Of course…what is environment is environment, what 
is oil production is oil production. We are not worried about how many barrels 
they produce but we are worried by the number of barrels that goes to the 
environment… …you [referring to DPR] cannot be a player and also regulate 
yourself. That is the major area of conflict.” (NOSDRAr2) 
However, the regulators revealed that both agencies attend the JIVs and independently 
conduct their own assessment but NOSDRAr1 revealed that where NOSDRA tries to act 
by implementing regulations as a first respondent after the spill, this often results in 
disputes with DPR. NOSDRAr1 argued that DPR often viewed them as acting beyond 
their regulatory jurisdiction, which subsequently resulted in conflict. In addition, the joint 
attendance of DPR and NOSDRA in JIVs could be viewed as an ineffective use of staff 
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capacity regardless of who financed the JIVs, which should be based on the polluter pays 
principle (see Chapter 8). NOSDRAr1 and 2 argued that the polluter pays principle 
signifies the oil companies’ commitment to take responsibility for oil spills, which 
included the provision of logistics for regulators to attend JIVs and remediate the polluted 
environment.  
Where regulatory institutions are weak in their ability to hold perpetrators of 
environmental and human rights violations to account for their actions, it allows 
corporations and third-parties to capitalize on the inability of the regulators or the 
governance gaps to further violate the environmental and human rights of the people 
living in the Delta. As argued by the arena participants, enforcement was not the case in 
the Delta because the corporations were envisaged to be more powerful than the Nigerian 
State. For instance, DNGOr1 and NOSDRAr1 expressed their frustrations on the 
ineffectiveness of the regulatory agencies 
“…What is written on paper is not what is practically operational. NOSDRA Act, 
EGASPIN are paper regulatory framework and not pragmatic, hence they are not 
effective.” (DNGOr1) 
“…In advanced countries, there is no way an oil giant as much as I know like 
{name of corporation} can be bigger than the law of the land. …it is only in 
Nigeria…we can have that kind of situation. …the issue there is that the law 
setting up NOSDRA does not make provision for other alternatives when our 
regulations are flouted… …for instance, we have made several requests to oil 
operators for the conduct of damage assessment…where massive oil spills have 
occurred. This is with a view to determining the extent and intensity of such 
incidents…but they turned deaf ears to that call. In such situation…are we going 
to use police to compel them to do that?” (NOSDRAr1)  
Furthermore, because of the duplication of responsibilities, the vested interest in wealth 
maximisation and problematic relationships, the inability of the regulators to regulate, the 
advocacy NGOs and independent observers proposed the PIB in 2012 and the amendment 
of the NOSDRA Act to enable them to enforce the laws. The PIB was proposed to 
delineate the responsibilities for environmental protection on an independent agency 
191 
 
 
 
devoid of undue influences from the corporations and the government, as well as to ensure 
the inclusion of the community through its proposed 10% host community fund for the 
Delta (see section 6.2) (SDN, 2014d). However, the PIB and NOSDRA bills are currently 
pending in the legislature. 
 
7.2.6. CONFLICTS, COUNTER ACCOUNTS, CONTROLLABLE AND UNCONTROLLABLE SPILLS 
The causes and volume of oil spills in the Delta is a contentious issue because there is no 
standard method of verifying them. Evidence from NOSDRArs and DPRrs revealed that 
there are controllable, uncontrollable and mystery spills (spill that could not be linked to 
any corporations). Controllable spills are spills emerging from operational failure (human 
error), equipment failure and corrosion. While uncontrollable spills are spills from third 
party interference such as sabotage, theft of equipment or leaks caused by thieves opening 
the wellheads or induced corrosion of pipelines or drilling into the pipelines to steal crude 
oil.82  
Community stakeholders, iaNGOrs and laNGOrs reported that the corporations often 
deny responsibility for spill emerging from the operational, natural corrosion or 
equipment failure ascribing them as sabotage (uncontrollable spill), thereby abrogating 
their responsibility to compensate affected community stakeholders (see Pupovac and 
Moerman, 2017). Where controllable spills are ascribed as operational failure, the volume 
of oil spilt and the extent of the damage caused are often denied by the corporations to 
underpay compensation to the affected indigenous people. However, evidence revealed 
that if the JIV had been effective, the volume spilt and the extent of the damage could 
have been uncovered but these were often not the case. For instance, Amnesty 
International (2013) reported that the corporations’ data on JIV could not be relied on as 
a basis of making claims on oil spills, the volume of oil spilt and the extent of damage in 
the Delta. Furthermore, JIVs’ forms meant to reveal the cause of the spill, the volume 
spilt and the extent of damage might not be a reliable source of accountable information 
(refer to section 7.2.2. and 8.2.1.2) as evidenced in the Bodo court case in the UK 
                                                          
82 A detailed analysis of uncontrollable spill is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, reference could be made to 
Social Action, 2014b – Crude Business: oil theft, communities and poverty in Nigeria.  
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(Amnesty International, 2014, 2013; NACGOND, 2014). For instance, CLs2 (focus 
group, participant 1) revealed that the JIVs’ process was grossly abused  
“…some of the areas in Bodo where I visited with the NGOs. …you will see the 
proof that it is an axe head cut and you get the community representative to see it 
with you. …that they will know that actually it is sabotage but in {name of 
corporation}’s case, {name of corporation} doesn’t do it that way. {name of 
corporation} will quickly rush in, pay some people and the youths will be carried 
to that scene.83 They were busy serving them with take away packs, they will load 
them with big-big chicken and because of poverty and hunger, once they see food, 
they will be there fighting to eat while {name of corporation} will take one or two 
persons and say “don’t you see it this is sabotage”. The next thing, they will 
conclude that it is sabotage when it is an equipment failure…”  
Furthermore, the denial was evident in the Bodo court case filed by 15,000 indigenous 
people whose livelihoods were destroyed by the TNP spill in 2008 and 2009. The 
indigenous people filed a court action against Shell in the United Kingdom through 
Amnesty International (AI) and the Center for Environment, Human Rights and 
Development (CEHRD) (AI, 2014). In this case, Shell initially argued that the quantity 
spilled and the impact of the spill from the TNP in 2008 and 2009 at Bodo were 1640 and 
4000 barrels (see chapter 6 and 8) respectively but was later found guilty by the Court of 
negligence and understating the magnitude of the quantity spilled and its impacts. 
“AI firmly believes Shell knew the Bodo data were wrong. If it did not, it was 
scandalously negligent – we repeatedly gave them evidence showing they had 
dramatically underestimated the spills… Shell has refused to engage with us and 
only now that they find themselves in a UK court have they been forced to come 
clean.” (Audrey Gaughran cited by AI, 2014). 
                                                          
83 A commonly held view by the community stakeholders in the arena but this evidence should not be taken as 
confirming that {name of corporation} do that unless there are court evidence proofing the existence of such 
unsustainable practice but the perception of corruption in the arena could be argued to be sufficient to create conflicts 
and tensions. The arena participants believed there was corruption and they view effective accountability and 
engagement as a mechanism to demonstrate that such corrupt practice does not exist. 
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Prior to the court injunction, AI argued that Shell made false claims about the quantity 
and the impact of the spill to underpay its compensation to the affected indigenous people. 
Evidence presented in court revealed that Shell admitted its assessment was wrong. 
Evidence revealed that Shell knew for years that its pipelines were in a very poor working 
condition and were susceptible to leak (AI, 2015c) (see chapter 6). This court evidence 
suggested that Shell’s assessment on previous spills could be questioned, in addition to 
imposing the need for greater accountability and transparency on Shell and the other 
corporations operating within this arena. This is because if the corporations fail to be 
accountable and do not ensure that their activities do not violate human rights, the judicial 
remedy for victims of such corporate abuse could be sought in local and in international 
arenas. 
“For years, Shell has dictated the assessment of volume spilled and damage caused 
in spill investigation reports, now these reports aren’t worth the paper they’re 
written on… These spill investigation reports have cheated whole communities 
out of proper compensation.” (Audrey Gaughran cited by AI, 2014). 
However, MNOCr1 stated that the respect of human rights and its effective 
implementation in the Delta in accordance with the regulatory requirement(s) was their 
watchword because they took preventive measures to avert violations of human rights by 
learning and listening to all stakeholders.  
“…Our pipelines meet the requirement of the Nigerian oil industry. We get 
certification on those pipelines on a periodic basis and you can’t get such 
certification if you do nothing about it. […] They come, look at our management 
systems in place and if it is okay, they will give you certificate and if it is not okay, 
they will tell you sorry, here you need to improve and those audits are not just 
Nigerian Audits, international audits as well.” (MNOCr1) 
Despite these justifications as to the integrity of their pipelines, advocacy NGOs, 
community stakeholders and supranational organizations such as UNEP, World Bank 
revealed that oil spills were often not remediated and when they are remediated, they are 
not conducted to international standards as required by the laws and other international 
standards governing the activities of oil corporations (Steiner, 2010; AI, 2009; UNEP, 
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2011). This implies that the spill could spread to unaffected areas and the underground 
water.  
“…most of the time, when we have spillage, we call on them to come and do 
remediation and clean up, even without compensating us because the allegations 
that {name of corporation}’s multinational company has been saying is that it is 
sabotage. So, what they do is that when they come, they clamp the place, they 
come to do the shallow remediation and then go. We haven’t been able to farm in 
the place again…” (IP6)  
However, community stakeholders revealed that other factors influenced oil spillage. For 
example, youth unemployment (see chapter 6). Majority of community stakeholders 
interviewed argued that the unemployed youths were often incited to vandalise oil 
pipelines to earn some income to satisfy their basic needs. They revealed that this act was 
orchestrated by contractors operating on behalf of the corporations to pave way for 
remediation contracts. This was evident in the following quote 
“…he said that sometimes {name of corporation} report that they cut the 
pipelines… That it is the contractors that are behind the cutting of the pipelines. 
That if they don’t have any pipeline where there is a cut that the contractor would 
not receive any contract from them. It is when they finish this cutting of this thing 
[pipeline] that they would now go to {name of corporation} and report that 
something is happening here, give us the contract and they would now have 
contract… That is the secret.” (CWL1, focus group participant 1 interpreted 
evidence from participant 3)  
Nevertheless, these acts were inimical to sustainable development and hence the 
corporations should ensure that adequate mechanisms are in place to protect their 
facilities. Also, the government, whose responsibilities it is to protect human rights and 
to provide the basic infrastructures that will drive sustainable development should get 
their governance system right to prevent unsustainable practices such as oil spillage in 
the Delta. This argument was unanimously supported by the arena participants 
interviewed. For instance, NOSDRAr1  
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“…it is very expedient on the part of the government to ensure that citizens don’t 
go into this kind of anti-developmental practices. …if they are discouraged 
through increased advocacy outreach, orientation and public enlightenment, it will 
no doubt change their attitude to indulge in any act of sabotage.… …oil 
exploration and exploitation are quite enormous activities that result inevitably in 
oil spill…”  
To address the lack of reliable information on controllable and uncontrollable spills, the 
Oil Spill Monitor (OSM) was launched in January 2014 by a coalition of advocacy NGOs 
in partnership with NOSDRA (SDN, 2014).  
“…they [NGOs] work hand-in-hand with us and when did that start? It is a matter 
of just 2years ago that we started… we have a platform called ‘Oil Spill Monitor’. 
If you go into it, you will see the report of all of those things, you will see the 
causes and just take a check yourself.” (NOSDRAr2) 
The OSM online-accountability platform is a visual accounting-sustainability instrument 
managed and used by NOSDRA. The NOSDRA’s OSM is in response to the persistent 
counter accounts and actions by advocacy NGOs, supranational organisations, and other 
independent observers and even community stakeholders on oil spillage and its 
remediation within the Delta arena. The OSM platform was established to provide a 
detailed account of the cause, the timing, location or area impacted, the quantity of oil 
spilt and the remediation exercise on the spills. It provides public access to information 
on oil spills, which encouraged engagement from the political institutions, the rule 
enforcers, the oil corporations, civil society groups and community stakeholders 
regardless of who discovers the spill and it allows all the arena participants to report oil 
spills as they occur in the Delta to prevent the problem of delay in reporting (see Denedo 
et al., forthcoming). This online accountability platform allows arena participants to 
monitor the performance of NOSDRA and the corporations in relation to how they protect 
and respect human rights of the other stakeholders from social, economic and 
environmental cost of oil pollution and how the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan 
performed against its zero tolerance to oil spills.    
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Besides the significance of the OSM platform in ensuring relational accountability and 
transparency on oil spill activities and data, it is expedient to highlight that improved 
accountability might not necessarily lead to improved performance, especially where 
NOSDRA is not empowered to enforce the laws when flouted. NOSDRA need to be 
adequately funded and empowered to independently enforce the laws to prevent further 
environmental pollution as well as to protect the rights of (intra)intergenerations to live 
sustainably (Grubnic et al., 2015). As argued by the laNGOrs, iaNGOs and NOSDRAr1, 
the modified NOSDRA Act currently pending in the legislature would enable NOSDRA 
to independently enforce the laws, protect human rights, the environment and 
(intra)intragenerational sustainable development in the Delta arena.   
 
7.2.7.  CONFLICTS, COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
Corporates’ sustainability reports by Chevron, Total, Eni-Agip, ExxonMobil and Shell 
revealed that the corporations considered themselves as good corporate citizens and 
influence communities’ engagements where they operate through their developmental 
projects. This was evident in ExxonMobil (2006, p.44)  
“…Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited sponsored an aquaculture project in 
Nigeria to raise local freshwater fish and shrimp for sale at local and regional 
markets. This generates income for local small-scale farmers and boosts protein 
supply in the diet of local communities. The project directly employs over 100 
young people and has stimulated additional farming activities such as maize 
cultivation, the operation of a feed mill, and raising goats and snails.”  
Furthermore, MNOCr1 and 2 revealed that oil and gas processing companies operating 
onshore and offshore are statutorily required by NDDC Act 2000 to remit 3% of their 
total budget to the Niger-Delta Development Commission (NDDC)84 for community 
development. Interviews conducted with MNOCr1 and 285 argued that this agency should 
                                                          
84 NDDC Act 2000, Section 14 (a-f) required that 15% of the total monthly statutory allocations due to oil producing 
States from the Federation Account, 3% of the total budget of oil and gas processing companies and 50% of statutory 
allocation from the Ecological fund to oil producing States be remitted to NDDC (see: 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/nig42654.pdf)  
85 MNOCr2 had worked with NDDC before transiting to an MNC (see section 5.2.2.2.1).  
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be made to account as to how they utilised the 3% of their income for community 
developmental projects but NDDC has no significant substance in the Delta arena. This 
claim was supported by the iaNGOrs, laNGOrs and the community stakeholder. For 
instance, Total (2007, p.48) argued that 
“…our oil and gas operations create value for Nigeria and Nigerians by acting at 
three levels. Nationally, we support the Nigerian Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (NEITI) to enhance transparency and oil revenue 
management; in 2007, we paid $2.57 billion in income tax, royalties and education 
tax. Regionally, since 2001 we have allocated 3% of our total annual budget to 
NDDC. Locally, our strong commitment to communities is expressed through 
action plans and roadmaps developed in close cooperation with residents…”  
MNOCr1, iaNGOrs, laNGOrs and the community stakeholders revealed that NDDC was 
not working effectively rather it was a channel for corruption and embezzlement of 
funds86 at the expense of the developmental needs of the Delta. This was overwhelmingly 
supported by MNOCr1, IP2 and IP9.  
“Industry contributes 3% of their annual budget to NDDC, how has that improved 
the quality of life of the Niger Delta people? These are salient questions that 
should first and foremost be asked…” (MNOCr1) 
“…if NDDC is being used for the people, see it will affect the people or liberate 
the people from poverty. You know even if you watch the government…they will 
spend money and share it within the contractors. That is why you see NDDC is 
not working fine…” (IP2) 
MNOCrs, DNGOrs, laNGOrs and community stakeholders revealed that there was a 
Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) between Shell, Eni-Agip and Mobil, and the 
individual oil producing communities from the 1980s (Draper, 2010). The MOUs was an 
                                                          
86 A commonly held view by the arena participants but this evidence should not be taken as confirming that corruption 
takes place unless there are court evidence proofing the existence of corruption but the perception of corruption in the 
arena could be argued to be sufficient to create conflicts and tensions. The arena participants believed there was 
corruption and they view effective accountability and engagement as a mechanism to demonstrate that such corrupt 
practice does not exist. 
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agreement between the corporations and a single community, which enabled the 
corporations to use their discretion to decide what ‘one-off projects’ or large 
infrastructural developmental projects should be implemented for the oil-producing 
communities. This was the case before the introduction of the Global Memorandum of 
Understandings (GMOUs) in 2005 and 2006 by Chevron and Shell respectively. The 
GMOUs were geared towards an inclusive community development project (Aaron, 
2012; Draper, 2010; Ite, 2005). This was evident in Shell’s webinar dialogue and the 
evidence from MNOCrs, DNGOrs and community stakeholders. This revealed that 
communities’ development should be a dominant discourse in corporate governance, 
particularly in the Delta arena.  
“…the previous approach…SPDC agreed to hundreds of separate development 
projects with individual communities and managed them directly and separately” 
(Shell, 2013) 
“The GMOU is a far better approach of developing communities than when the 
companies on their own developed the communities without adequate 
consultation. Now the development of the communities is in the hands of the 
communities…” (DNGOr4) 
Aaron (2012) and Draper (2010) argued that these ‘one-off projects’ were controlled by 
the corporations, often they resulted in the construction of facilities that did not align with 
specific needs of the communities. Some of these projects were argued to have been 
abandoned, not completed and when some are completed, they are hardly functional. 
Where there were agreed MOU projects, evidence revealed that they were often not 
implemented.  
“…the idea of the MOU process is quite ok but the implementation is very very 
defective because it does not give ownership to the communities, which was the 
main idea why they ask communities to nominate contractors.” (IP1, focus group 
participant 1)  
“…we have an agreed MOU with {name of corporation}… This MOU is to give 
the three communities standard light… That MOU…is lying down there for over 
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15 years now. …there is no light at all. {name of corporation} is not giving us 
light, the State government is not giving us light. The federal government too is 
not giving us light… …Some of the community that is not producing oil are doing 
more than us.” (IP8, focus group, participant 2) 
These basic amenities should be provided by the government with or without oil 
exploration but where the corporations have agreed to provide such amenities, then it 
should address the needs of the communities. Establishing communities’ development 
initiatives that identify and address specific communities’ need would have significant 
impacts and outcomes compared to a predetermined community development agenda in 
this context (Andrews, 2013; Idemudia, 2007, 2009). On the other hand, the GMOU 
represent a paradigm shift from their MOU programme (Aaron, 2012; Draper 2010; Ite, 
2005). This was argued to have emerged because of the counter accounts and 
counteractions from the iaNGOs and laNGOs clamours for the corporations to 
compensate and engage (see chapter 8) the communities in their development as against 
the one-off community assistant programme. This was overwhelmingly supported by the 
iaNGOs, laNGOs (see chapter 8), community stakeholders and the DNGOrs. For 
instance, the DNGOs were responsible for mentoring the community stakeholders to 
develop sustainably following the operating policy and procedure guideline (OPPG) of 
the GMOU. They argued that  
“…the GMOU is a recent development…but before now, there has always been 
this document of engagement between oil companies and host communities… It 
has always been a point of disagreement… …Sometimes, the community blocked 
the facilities [of the corporation] in protest but over the years, following outcries 
by civil society organisations, complaints by communities and also some media 
attention, there were some reviews… Which is more beneficial.” (DNGOr5) 
The GMOU is an agreement between the corporations and clusters of communities in the 
Delta arena. The GMOU cluster is an aggregation of communities that are contiguous in 
nature either within the same local government council or within the same tribal group 
presumed to be a manageable size for developmental purposes by the corporations. 
Evidence from the corporations revealed that the GMOUs were jointly funded by the 
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federal government and the corporations based on the proportion of their joint venture 
investment.  
“GMoUs help improve management through increased accountability and 
transparency and by grouping communities into clusters… They also give 
communities the lead in managing their own long-term development by 
encouraging them to identify projects and determine who implements them.” 
(Shell, 2006, p.24). 
The agreement specifies the corporations’ activities and the benefits ensuing from such 
agreement to the communities in terms of development and engagement relationship 
between the corporations and the communities in the cluster. The GMOU required the 
communities to be the drivers of their own sustainable development by initiating the 
projects that they desire to be implemented through the Community Trusts (CTs) to the 
Community Development Board (CDBs)/Regional Development Committee (RDCs) for 
Shell and Chevron respectively. According to the GMOU brochure by Shell, the GMOU 
was part of the sustainable development effort of the corporations to interact with the 
communities to achieve a safe, healthy and self-reliant Delta. 
The iaNGOs, laNGOs and the community stakeholders argued that the GMOUs 
implementation was used as a silencing strategy (see Chapter 8). They argued that the 
GMOUs were employed by the corporations to capture, silence and marginalize the 
community stakeholders from demanding accountability, engagement and from 
‘speaking truth to power’ for the advancement of their human rights. Nevertheless, the 
DNGOrs argued that the GMOU was not a silencing strategy but a developmental strategy 
adopted by the corporations to engage and give the communities a voice in their own 
development (Gray et al., 2014b; Spence, 2009; Tregidga, 2017; Brennan and Merkl-
Davies, 2014). For instance, DNGOr2 argued that  
“…the people may think that what is happening is not enough or that there is an 
ulterior motive in the gesture, but I do not believe that the idea is to silence them 
from speaking out… the GMOU wasn’t to clean up the communities. It was 
simply to help the communities grow in the areas of human capital, economic and 
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social development, basic infrastructures, that are hitherto not in the community 
especially where government had failed. So, it wasn’t to silence them.”  
However, the community stakeholders revealed that they were not aware of the content 
of the GMOU and the structures for its implementation did not align with their traditional 
governance structure. They were not aware of how the GMOU programme was 
implemented and they were not aware of the activities of the CTs or the CDBs.  
“…I will not say it is really really effective because the people are not even sure 
of what is in the GMOU. If we know what is in the GMOU, we will be able to 
monitor the activities of the company, …you will be able to monitor the progress 
of the GMOU and how effective it is but we don’t even have a copy of it. So, if 
there is any crisis and you go to them, they will say, it is not in the GMOU.” (IP9, 
focus group participant 1) 
MNOCr1 stated that the GMOU was a transparent process for inclusive engagements but 
there could be lacunas in its implementation at the local arenas.  
“The GMOU instrument is a transparent process and opportunity for an enhanced 
relationship. There could be gaps in communication at the local level between the 
leadership and the larger community, but it is not intended to be that way and we 
have systems in place to ensure that there is openness in the value chain.” 
(MNOCr1) 
This developmental instrument simultaneously required the engagement of the DNGOs 
to support/facilitate the process of mentoring the communities to identify, plan, 
implement and develop sustainably by deciding their infrastructure needs, which would 
be communicated to the corporations, whose responsibility it was to fund such 
infrastructures. The GMOU required the community to identify the project to be 
implemented and not the corporations. 
The iaNGOrs, laNGOrs, DNGOrs and community stakeholders argued that the GMOU 
process was not transparent because the basis of fund allocation was unknown to the 
community stakeholders. For instance, the MNOCrs and DNGOrs argued that the 
GMOU’s funding was negotiated and distributed based on what was extracted or the 
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number of pipelines within the communities. Furthermore, the GMOU brochure for Shell 
required that communities would be mobilized for negotiations to agree and sign the 
GMOUs’ agreement. However, the data on quantity or what was generated from oil 
extracted in the communities or in the Delta arena was unavailable because accountable 
information on exploratory and extractive activities were shrouded in secrecy by the 
powerful stakeholders. It also appeared that this information was not available to the 
DNGOs employed by the corporations to mediate and facilitate the negotiations between 
the communities and the corporations. For example, DNGOr5, 4 and 3 argued that the 
basis for this negotiation was generally unknown to them despite being an intermediary 
between the corporations and the communities. 
“if you talk about derived {referring to what was extracted}, who even gives you 
a record of what [volume of] oil is being produced from your community? There 
is no such thing. The government has not told us that in 2014, this is the quantity 
of oil that was drilled from the land of the Niger Delta, No. Oil is a business that 
is shrouded in secrecy in Nigeria…” (DNGOr5) 
“They are not. We have raised that too. …if you are going to talk about 
transparency and accountability, it should come from both ways. The people in 
the community are asking, “we don’t know the basis on which this amount of 
money was agreed on and allocated or allotted to them.” Can’t we be more 
transparent on this? And you get sealed lips.” (DNGOr3) 
This generally led to the ‘publish what you pump’ and ‘publish what you pay campaigns’ 
organised by the laNGOs and the grassroots environmental monitors to enhance 
accountability and transparency in the oil industry. They presumed that when 
corporations published what they pumped and what they pay to the government, they 
could calculate what was earned from crude oil and subsequently engage more effectively 
for transparency and accountability on the GMOU’s implementation. This additional 
information would drive an effective evaluation of the data published by corporations.  
“If they publish such a thing, they should give us the copy… If you are here for 
operations, our safety matters a lot. …what {name of corporation} could have 
done is after okaying [certifying] the operations here, they could give us the 
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analysis of the workings here and we should know that this is what is obtained…” 
(IP4) 
“[…] I am an activist and I believe in transparency and accountability, that is what 
we are fighting for. If there is going to be transparency and accountability in what 
{name of corporation} is doing with this GMOU…” (CLs1, focus group 
participant 1) 
The GMOU was required to be managed by the CTs at the community level and the 
CDBs/RDCs at the regional level. The CTs comprises 10 community representatives 
across all stakeholders’ group (men, women and youth) within the community while the 
CDBs and RDCs comprise 2-3 representatives of each CTs within the cluster (SACA, 
2014). Evidence revealed that there are other factors that obstruct the effectiveness of the 
GMOUs’ implementation. These factors included the CTs and CDBs were not known to 
the indigenous people because they were not elected by them nor were the community 
stakeholders given any account of conducts. The laNGOrs revealed that CTs and CDBs 
were appointed by the corporations without a mandate to represent the people (see chapter 
8). Nevertheless, even where there was a mandate to represent, they were often deemed 
to be unaccountable. However, MNOCr1 and DNGOr4 noted that the GMOU’s operating 
guidelines required that CTs should periodically give accounts of conduct to the people 
they represented.   
“…There are in-built mechanisms to ensure that communities’ representatives 
brief their community, but you know in everything, despite the systems put in 
place, some persons often abuse the process. Some CTs will not often report back 
to the community as to making progress report but in the GMOU’s process, there 
is in-built mechanism for people to report back to their communities through town 
hall and peoples’ parliament sessions….” (DNGOr4) 
Furthermore, Shell’s GMOU programme required that 15% of its allocation be utilised 
for the development of women but evidence from the women leaders revealed that little 
or nothing has been dispersed for their development. CWL2 argued that there was nothing 
like women development in the implementation of the GMOU. Hence, they argued that 
they were not involved in any decision-making processes despite claims that they had 
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representatives in the CTs and CDBs. The DNGOrs argued that cultural factors delimit 
the capacity of women to actively participate in decision making because of gender 
discrimination. For instance 
“There is no empowerment programme for the women. There is nothing like 
that… Even the GMOU…nothing has been done…” (CWL2) 
“…women constitute about 50% of the population and you know it may get to 
them but it may get to the colonies of the chairman, not even the people that will 
need it but it will get to the women. Have you not seen a situation in which the 
wife of the chairman is the daughter of the chairman {corruption}87?  …and it will 
be reported.” (DNGOr6, focus group, participant 1)  
Furthermore, the community stakeholders revealed that the disbursement of funds for the 
implementation of identified projects through the GMOUs were often delayed. For 
instance, they argued that the GMOU programme was a 5 years’ programme with funds 
to be disbursed annually. Community stakeholders claimed the annual funds were often 
not disbursed until the 4th or the 5th year. At the end of the 5th year, it was presumed that 
the GMOU programme have elapsed without any significant projects.  
“…I have seen…signs of development in terms of providing infrastructure, skill 
acquisitions from the GMOU’s fund but because of their bureaucracy which 
involves a lot of processes that are very difficult and complex, the flow of 
information is not as fast as it is supposed to be and they don’t release the money 
on time. …this is 2015, we are still expecting 2014 batch. The funding is not 
coming as expected…” (IP11) 
However, the MNOCr1 and 2, and DNGOrs revealed that the delay in the disbursement 
of the fund was often because of the reluctance of the federal government to disburse their 
proportion of the fund, which meant that the implementation of any projects would be 
delayed or abandoned. This was evident in DNGOr2, 4 and 6 interviews  
                                                          
87 A commonly held view by the arena participants but this evidence should not be taken as confirming that corruption 
takes place unless there are court evidence proofing the existence of corruption but the perception of corruption in the 
arena could be argued to be sufficient to create conflicts and tensions. 
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“[…] Nigerian government is holding either 55% or 60%. So, whatever SPDC is 
doing, the Nigerian government is supposed to match but when I go into SPDC, 
they are telling me that for the last 4 years or for the last 8 years, they are having 
cashflow problem from the government. Their own (SPDC) fund is available but 
government fund is not available but the government is ready to come quickly and 
take its own share but it is not ready to put back…” (DNGOr2) [emphasis added 
by author] 
It is pertinent to identify that evidence from the community stakeholders revealed that 
there was a shift in the perception (see chapter 8) of the local people from the government 
to the corporations on the provision of their basic infrastructures, thereby relieving the 
government of its fiduciary responsibility in addressing the infrastructural problems in 
the Delta.   
“…It is one of the things that I mentioned. That {name of corporation} should 
provide a good drinking water for the people in this community… …I will suggest 
that they should bring us employment opportunity that can reach everybody.” 
(CWL1, focus group participant 1 and 2) 
“…you see nobody is accountable, especially the operators. …the social amenities 
provided is not commensurate with what we are getting. …because we don’t have 
government. …Total is our godfather. They have tried but comparatively, they are 
not doing anything.” (IP3, focus group participant 2) 
Regardless of the activities of the MNOCs in the Delta through their developmental 
programmes, the community stakeholders believed that the MNOCs had not been 
accountable and had not done enough commensurate to the billions generated from the 
Delta. They presumed that accountability should be commensurate to what was generated 
from the Delta. They believed the GMOU and the MoUs have not been impactful but 
rather they have resulted in conflicts which have split the communities into different 
factions.  
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7.2.8.  CONFLICTS, COUNTER ACCOUNTS, AND DIVIDE AND RULE TACTICS 
There was an obvious evidence of communal and inter-communal conflicts ensuing from 
the negative influence of the corporations and regulatory activities in the Delta arena from 
the stakeholders interviewed. This negative influence was often called ‘the divide and 
rule tactics’. This tactic was described by Freire (2002, p.141) as the theory of oppressive 
action. Freire (2002, p.141) argued that the theory of oppressive action or divide and rule 
was often in the “interest of the oppressor to weaken the oppressed…to isolate them…to 
create and deepen rifts among them.” He argued that this could be done through various 
medium- from the repressive medium of government bureaucracy to cultural action with 
which they manipulated the people by giving them the impression that they were helping 
them through the provision of infrastructures (p.141). This was because as long as they 
remain divided, Freire (2002, p.145) argued that they will be “easy prey for manipulation 
and domination” by the powerful stakeholders but the unity of purpose can enable them 
(the oppressed) to drive transformative change by turning their weaknesses into strength 
to re-create their dehumanized world.  
The divide and rule tactics were often used to prevent substantial transformative dialogue. 
Freire (2002, p.145) argued that it was a fundamental objective of non-relational dialogic 
action because it prevents the oppressed from organising themselves to drive the 
transformative changes they desire for the protection of their human rights and sustainable 
development. This was because the powerful stakeholders would strive to preserve their 
interest, power, wealth maximisation objectives, methods of operations at the expense of 
the human rights of the oppressed (Belal et al., 2015; Gray et al., 2014b; Cooper and 
Owen, 2007; Rahaman et al., 2004; Owen et al., 2000; Ramasastry, 2015). For instance, 
the stakeholders interviewed argued that the corporations often adopted this strategy to 
violate and engineer chaos, violence and conflicts within the communities, especially 
where they were required to be accountable and transparent on their exploratory and 
extractive activities. The community stakeholders, the iaNGOrs, laNGOrs and 
NOSDRAr1 revealed that often corporations often engineered divisions and violence in 
the communities by indirectly/directly creating different fractions for/against the 
exploration of new oil wells by either secretly providing monetary incentives to 
influential communities’ leaders or vocal communities’ members/actors rather than 
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dialogue with the stakeholders, thereby making the communities ungovernable (see 
chapter 8). NOSDRAr1 argued that   
“…whenever there is some form of cash incentives from the companies to the 
communities. This monetary incentive usually turns violent… …So knowing fully 
well that the community is not safe, you may not just go in immediately to carry 
out your investigation because we really do not know if that area has been lined 
with IEDs [explosives]…”  
Furthermore, the community stakeholders and advocacy NGOs argued that pipeline 
surveillance contracts were awarded to contractors in a manner that threatened the 
peaceful co-existence in the communities because families have been turned against one 
another, which had resulted in court cases. For instance, this was evident in Ikarama 
community, Bayelsa State. They claimed the corporations often fuel conflicts within the 
communities by engaging with these different fractions to intensify chaos, violence and 
conflicts to explore oil. Evidence from the community stakeholders overwhelmingly 
supported this argument. For instance 
“…since the operation of {name of corporation} in this place… They do their 
things in corner-corner ways [crafty ways]. If they see that three of us are putting 
heads together for the common benefit of the community, they would not mind 
cornering one of us… They operate on a divide and rule system. They can go to 
this other man and say they have given this man something, what are you still 
coming to do, thereby causing problems –crisis within the community…” (CLs4, 
focus group, participant 1) [emphasis added by author] 
It is expedient to state that these communal and intercommunal conflicts from the divide 
and rule tactics have resulted in the maiming and killing of indigenous people, destruction 
of properties, displacement of people and the exile of some communities’ leaders. For 
instance, this was evident in the interview conducted with community stakeholders, 
iaNGOrs and laNGOrs, particularly on Rumuekpe crisis in Rivers State, where oil 
corporations were seen to pitch communities against one another (Social Action, 2009b). 
For instance, IP7 argued that he was in exile from his community (Rumuekpe) from 2007 
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till 2012 because his brother, who was a vocal member of the community was killed 
during a conflict, which commenced in 2005.  
The divide and rule tactic resulted in the marginalization of people. A majority of the 
community stakeholders interviewed claimed that they cannot air their views on issues 
relating to oil exploration and extraction that could affect their well-being in the 
communities, thereby leading to mistrust in the communities (Freire, 2002).  
“…anywhere {name of corporation} or multinationals operate, there is conflict. 
…They just split the communities into four, five, different fractions.88 …the 
community…cannot come together to say, this is what we want …cannot speak 
one voice …because if they do, definitely {name of corporation} or the 
multinationals will just get one fraction that will just shout down at the others…” 
(IP9, focus group, participant 1) 
In addition to the divide and rule tactics, evidence revealed that the community 
stakeholders were marginalised or suppressed by the heavy presence of armed personnel 
either representing the corporations or the federal government to intimidate the 
indigenous people. For instance, in Umuechem and Odi communities, evidence from the 
laNGOs and community stakeholders revealed that properties were burnt, and people 
killed due to the presence of military personnel in the Delta, especially when communities 
were agitating for inclusive ownership, stakeholders’ engagement, transparency, and 
accountability for oil.89 
“{name of corporation} uses divide and rule because of accountability and 
transparency. […] If they come to a community, they will talk to A and talk to B, 
and make the community clash so that when there is trouble, they can now bring 
in the soldiers and the army to do what they want to do. …if that valve is closed, 
it will affect the federal government finances, it will affect {name of 
corporation}’s finances. {…} So, the people {corporations} use divide and rule 
                                                          
88 A commonly held view by the community stakeholders in the arena but this evidence should not be taken as 
confirming that Shell do that unless there are court evidence proofing the existence of such unsustainable practice but 
the perception of divide and rule strategy in the arena could be argued to be sufficient to create conflicts and tensions. 
89 Further reference could be made to Okonta and Douglas, 2003. 
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to achieve what they want.” (CLs1, focus group, participant 1) [emphasis added 
by author] 
However, the community stakeholders unanimously argued that the advocacy and 
engagement activities of the NGOs to resolve the incessant conflicts were not effective 
because of the divide and rule tactics by the corporations.  
“…there are some NGOs that are trying to enlighten the people, telling them the 
benefit of coming together. I believe the conflict we use to have within our 
community is now reduced because of those enlightenment campaigns that are 
going on. …there is a lot of division and the NGOs’ activism has not been 
effective. Yes, it has not been effective because of the division that they have 
within the community.” (IP9, focus group, participant 1)  
There is an urgent need for action to be taken by the government, the communities, and 
the corporations to prevent this tactic in the Delta. Evidence revealed that the advocacy 
NGOs have been sensitizing the communities people on the implication of this strategy, 
but the author argued that the community stakeholders would have to unanimously resist 
this strategy that is violating the environmental and human rights of the people. 
Furthermore, the enlightenment campaigns by the advocacy NGOs would not be 
sufficient in addressing the conflicts unless the government, the community stakeholders 
and the corporations willingly adopt dialogic accountability measures to prevent this 
tactic ravaging communal and inter-communal co-existence and development (see 
chapter 8).   
“One of the things that are hindering development in the Niger Delta is this 
confusion of war. […] I have not experienced where development is smooth under 
crisis […] if all of us can have our heads together and have a representative 
and…have a table discussion …when it comes to your own community; you put 
heads together and have a dialogue. You bring the case that is from your 
community and this person also brings and we dialogue on what to do, I think that 
we can move forward.” (CWL1, focus group participant 1)  
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7.3. COUNTER ACCOUNTING: NETWORKS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ACCOUNTABILITY, 
GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN AN ARENA. 
Besides the use of counter accounts and the conscientization of the community 
stakeholders, the iaNGOs and laNGOs often served as bridge between the corporations, 
government, the local, regional, national and international arenas (see chapter 8) in 
addressing human rights violations, environmental justice, the need for an effective 
accountability and governance system. Evidence revealed that the indigenous people 
lacked channels of accountability and engagement with the powerful stakeholders’ groups 
within the local arenas without the help of the advocacy NGOs and the DNGOs to give 
the community stakeholders a voice. Although, the role of the DNGOs was often not that 
of advocacy but because they liaised on behalf of the corporations, the community 
stakeholders often engaged them as a medium through which their concerns could be 
aired.  
“There is a lot of work to be done…because the government prefer these people 
to remain illiterate. …so that is the void the NGOs would have to fill. Educating 
as per formal education and maybe in their language, making them aware of their 
environment, what they should do or what the oil companies should do and what 
they shouldn’t do. …ERA has been doing that anyway…” (IP7) [emphasis added 
by author] 
In seeking desired change for an emancipatory process in the local arenas, the iaNGOs 
and laNGOs presumed that change would emerge when the community stakeholders were 
co-owners of the industry because of their proximity to the resources and the impact on 
their lives. They envisaged the communities as stakeholders whose human rights should 
be respected and protected by NGOs serving as the bridge between the communities and 
the governance regimes to ensure that governance get its government right. This required 
co-operating with the communities as well as giving voice to their desire to be co-owners, 
the respect and protection of their rights and sustainable development in the local arenas 
(see chapter 8) (Bebbington et al., 2007; Everett, 2004; Freire, 2002). This was supported 
by CLs3 and IP10.  
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“…the NGOs like ERA; the job they are doing is trying to assist the community. 
…the NGOs are trying to see that at least government should give back to us from 
what they have collected from us…” (IP10) 
“…these community people have now learnt to go to the NGOs to report spillages 
or maltreatment. These NGOs now come to the community, interview people and 
most times, they confront the oil companies. …the oil companies would do what 
ordinarily they wouldn’t have done because of these NGOs. They know that…if 
these local people cannot fight, these NGOs can take up their fights and publicize 
them.” (IP7) 
The community stakeholders and the advocacy NGOs revealed that because of their 
engagement, a dialogic accountability system emerged between the communities and the 
regulators, especially NOSDRA to improve effective accountability, governance and 
engagement mechanisms. Furthermore, due to the collaboration/engagement between the 
laNGOs and NOSDRA, enlightenment workshops and campaigns have been undertaken 
to bridge the gaps on the role of the agency to the communities, and to the corporations, 
as well as the negative impacts of environmental degradation, sabotage and artisan 
refineries in the Delta. This collaboration suggested that the indigenous people were being 
enlightened and empowered to be drivers of change.  
“The whole essence of the NGOs coming in is to actually contribute from their 
own angle in a bid to improve on the dissemination of information… …we 
constantly engage them in quite a number of workshops; they also invite us to 
come and be part of the workshop organised as part of advocacy outreach with the 
communities…to bridge the gap as far as possible between the knowledge that is 
usually released regarding the operations of the oil companies, and what the 
regulators are also doing. …that collaboration has been quite helpful… …it’s a 
very healthy collaboration in the sense that…public enlightenment outreach[es] 
are usually organised to adequately inform the people… …This is because 
through this approach, they imbibe the good attribute of trying to believe in 
themselves, and embrace other alternatives to livelihood…” (NOSDRAr1) 
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However, it appeared that this level of NGOs awareness creation and accountability 
relationships or networks of engagements within the local arenas were still evolving. 
Evidence revealed that majority of the community stakeholders interviewed were not 
aware of the role of NOSDRA or DPR in the oil industry nor were they aware of any 
enlightenment by the laNGOs through an inclusive stakeholders’ engagements in the 
Delta arena.  
“Well for us here, we are not aware of such development. I don’t know whether 
they do it with a section of the community…but it has not been thrown up to the 
generality of the people in the community. So, we are not aware.” (CLs4, focus 
group participant 1) 
Evidence revealed that there had been changes in accountability and engagements from 
the regulators, especially NOSDRA and the community stakeholders because of the 
activities of the NGOs despite the slow progress in the creation of awareness in the local 
arenas. NOSDRAr1 argued that statistical evidence revealed that there was a gradual 
decree in third-party inference with pipelines in the Delta.  
“There is a very positive gain as a result of this collaboration with the NGOs. 
…we have also noticed that the attitude of people towards this pipeline vandalism 
is actually coming down based on statistics.  …there are times in a particular 
month, you record several numbers of spills…but the number is actually coming 
down to single digit. I’m sure probably what informed this drastic change may 
have stemmed from the fact that the…partnership with these NGOs…is actually 
yielding positive results. I’m sure in days to come, with much collaboration with 
NGOs…the level will be brought down to the barest minimum. …All we are 
trying to do is…to have a zero tolerance for spills.” (NOSDRAr1) 
It appeared that because of the counter accounts, actions and audits by the advocacy 
NGOs, grass roots monitors/activists were trained to create awareness to drive 
fundamental accountability changes in local arenas. Evidence revealed that community 
stakeholders were aware of the need for their rights to be respected and protected because 
of this engagement strategy. In addition, they were aware of their moral rights of 
accountability and environmental justice through the engagement of the iaNGOs and 
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laNGOs to engage the powerful stakeholders (Messner, 2009; Roberts, 2009; Parker, 
2014).  
“…The first-time ERA came to my community in 2005, they interviewed my 
father… I have always known that gas flaring is harmful, but I didn’t really know 
that this is the extent. So, when ERA educated me, I volunteered instantly, and I 
went to court even with all the risks involved. …I felt that is one thing I could do 
for my community…” (IP7) 
Community stakeholders argued that their desire for environmental justice or a healthy 
environment to live sustainably and to fend for their future generations have provided 
them with valuable insights into the use of counter accounts and how to engage powerful 
stakeholders. Despite the enormous scale of environmental pollution or the destruction of 
the biodiversity facing the communities in the local arenas, they argued that the grassroots 
environmental monitors, the iaNGOs and laNGOs have been the drivers of enhanced 
accountability and sustainable development within the Delta arena.  
It appeared that the community stakeholders believed in inclusive ownership structure 
and majority of the community stakeholders interviewed proposed that they should have 
been informed from the initial negotiation stage on what form of oil licencing should be 
issued before the crude was explored or extracted. This implied that the federal 
government should recognise the community stakeholders as co-owners of the mineral 
resources.  
“…when they talk about accountability… it is about being fair to the people. 
Recognising the basic rights of the people. Treating them as human beings first 
and knowing that anybody who is host to any business should enjoy something 
from that business. […] Is it not the right of government to protect the interest of 
the people? Government has to wake up to its own responsibilities of protecting 
the people. Their land is feeding government…” (DNGOr5)  
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7.4. COUNTER ACCOUNTING: NETWORKS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
To address the breakdown in accountability and engagement relationships between the 
powerful stakeholders, the regulators and the community stakeholders, the iaNGOs and 
laNGOs often built internal and external networks of engagement to drive the respect and 
protection of human rights and sustainable development (see chapter 8). The advocacy 
NGOs built these networks as evident in section 7.3 (also see chapter 8) to give the 
marginalised indigenous people a voice to articulate and construct their everyday realities 
through inclusive engagements with the corporations and the government. For instance, 
IP1 argued that the communities’ voice was weak because they do not have a direct stake 
in the ownership structure of the oil industry, which has resulted in cantankerous 
relationships among the corporations, the government and them. This was because a 
direct ownership relationship bestows the power to democratically participate in 
accountability and decision making, thereby driving the respect and protection of their 
rights and their need for a sustainable Delta.     
“The voice is very weak! We also have to give credit to some of the NGOs… At 
least through them, the voice of the community is being heard in some areas…” 
(IP1, focus group participant 1) 
On the other hand, these networks of engagement often resulted in systematic, partisan 
and contra-governing counter accounts, counter audits, and counteractions (court actions) 
(see chapter 8) (Thomson et al., 2015; Kneip, 2013; Tregidga, 2017). The regulators 
viewed these as inimical to their activities, which they argued is being projected as not 
sufficient to address the myriad of unsustainable practices in the Delta. For instance, 
NOSDRAr2 argued that    
“…crosscheck – what has been the role of ERA, Friends of the Earth, AI in making 
sure that they carry out…sensitization…within the oil-producing areas… What 
you just see is that they have not paid compensation, government is doing nothing, 
everybody is doing nothing… Who is doing something? I can tell you that…oil 
spills by virtue of the establishment Act is deemed to be reported… …there have 
been oil companies that have been sanctioned… …we have done what we called 
host community’s interactive sections… …but you see AI will write and offcourse 
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when you look at the names, it is like somebody from the Niger Delta who hides 
under Amnesty International, …depicting to the world as if in Nigeria… nothing 
is done…”  
Furthermore, DPRr1 argued that their activities have been effective in driving sustainable 
development, which had always been their ‘watchword’.  
“Sustainable development has always been our watchword. It has always been 
part and parcel of our process. Any projects that we do not consider as sustainable, 
we find it difficult to get DPR approval to even proceed…because sustainability 
is people, …secondly, it is the environment, and then last but not the least the 
equipment. it is in that order of priorities that we do have our concern. It is the 
people, the environment and then the equipment not profit. We are not a profit-
making organisation. […] DPR do not have any economic interest…”  
Evidence revealed that what was projected by the regulators as a ‘watchword’ could be 
different from what was practiced and their inability to implement regulatory standards 
implied that the negative impacts would affect (intra)intergenerational equity, human 
rights and sustainable development, especially in local arenas (Gouldson and Bebbington, 
2007; Weiss, 1992). The community stakeholders argued that not only did the iaNGOs 
and laNGOs help build networks for human rights, accountability, engagement and 
sustainable development to bridge the accountability and governance gaps (McPhail and 
Ferguson, 2015; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014) in local arenas but they argued that 
the only way sustainable development and respect for their human rights could be 
achieved and implemented was when they network/collaborate with the NGOs to drive 
the (intra)intergenerational emancipatory changes.  
“Well, the only thing is that we have to [do is] network and react. …When the 
people are pushed to the wall an answer must come, they must know how to be 
themselves…” (IP2) 
The community stakeholders believed that if justice for unsustainable practices could not 
be served in Nigeria, they argued that by building a network of engagements with the 
laNGOs, environmental justice could be served in Nigeria and outside its territory. These 
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networks of engagements for environmental justice resulted in court cases filed in 
international courts or the judicial systems where the MNCs are registered (see chapter 
8). These court cases were due to the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian judicial system, the 
unwillingness of the corporations to disclose environmental information and be 
accountable for environmental pollution.  
Additionally, majority of stakeholders interviewed agreed that accountability and 
engagements for human right and sustainable development is achievable in Nigeria when 
all the stakeholders, whilst protecting their interests, ensure the protection and respect of 
the environment and human rights for the benefit of (intra)intergenerational equity (Gray, 
2010; Grubnic et al., 2015; Hazelton, 2013). Furthermore, the community stakeholders 
argued that their human rights to live sustainably would be respected and protected where 
there was an effective accountability and engagement system. This was supported by 
NOSDRAr1 
“We can actually improve on it if we believe that we have environment where 
everybody benefits whether you are on one organisation or the other by trying to 
protect the interest of that organisation. Whatever interest you represent, the 
overriding objective should be that the environment should be conserved. You 
should also ensure its protection and then ensure that you work within the ambits 
of the law to do all you are expected to do within the environment in order not to 
undermine it. All relevant stakeholders are expected to work in synergy… 
…Every member representing any organisation should ensure that accountability 
should actually be seen as the watchword whenever anything is to be embarked 
upon…”  
In building networks of human rights, effective environmental management, engagement 
and sustainable development, the stakeholders argued that the regulatory agencies should 
get their governance right to prevent accountability and governance gaps that impact on 
the lives of people and their ability to live sustainably. Consequently, the community 
stakeholders are expected to have a voice in the governance, accountability, and 
operations of the oil industry.  
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“As a Niger Deltan, I believe that communities’ groups at all times…should have 
a say in how things happen, should have a say in how they are led because it 
impacts on their various livelihood. Yes, they must have a say. The Federal 
Government exist for the people, not the people for the federal government either, 
so their voice must be heard… but people also need to understand and put their 
voices in context in terms of understanding what the extant laws are and working 
within the boundaries of those extant laws…” (MNOCr1) 
 
7.5. CONCLUSION  
This chapter explored the second research question of this thesis. In this chapter, the 
(inverted) arena framework (see Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008, 2012; Renn, 1992; 
Dey and Russell, 2014; Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2013) was used to flesh out the 
conflicts, accountability, counter accounting, engagement within the Delta arena (Brown, 
2009; Bebbington et al., 2007; Blackburn et al., 2014; Brown et al., 2015; Brown and 
Dillard, 2015a, b; Dillard, 2014; Dillard and Roslender, 2011; Dillard and Yuthas, 2013). 
The stakeholders’ perspectives analysed in this chapter included the community 
stakeholders, the local and international advocacy NGOs (iaNGOrs, laNGOrs), the 
developmental NGOs (DNGOrs), the corporations (MNOCrs) and the regulators 
(NOSDRArs and DPRrs), and some documentary evidence from political institutions 
such as the United Nations and media (issue amplifiers). This approach enabled the author 
to critically explore the differences in ideologies, rationalities and values of the arena 
participants.  
The author observed complex engagements in the Delta arena. There was substantive 
evidence that the communities at the centre of the arena do not see themselves as having 
a voice to drive engagement, accountability and to address the unequal power relations in 
the arena (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2015; Freire, 2002). They argued that 
due to the Land Use Decree and partnerships between the corporations and the 
government, they were consistently exposed to human rights and environmental 
violations and this limited their ability to live sustainably. They argued that the inequality 
of power and ownership structure emerging from the adoption of the Land Use Decree 
and the partnership limited their accountability and engagement role as landowners in the 
Delta arena. Evidence revealed that the community stakeholders were interested in being 
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included in the ownership and management of the mineral resources. Additionally, they 
argued that being co-owners would facilitate effective accountability and engagement for 
human rights and sustainable development in local arenas. Furthermore, they argued that 
the only way their voice could be heard by the powerful arena participants was through a 
dialogic accountability system and a network of engagement with the advocacy NGOs 
(Bebbington et al., 2007; Freire, 2002). They viewed the advocacy NGOs as the most 
important arena participant in projecting their voice to the other arena participants at the 
international, national, regional arenas and even in the local arenas especially through the 
trained grassroots environmental monitors and advocates (see chapter 8). The community 
stakeholder argued that the absence of an inclusive accountability system in the Delta 
arena necessitated their engagement with the advocacy NGOs and this resulted in the 
proposed PIB still pending at the legislature. They argued that their engagement and the 
awareness created by the advocacy NGOs to drive dialogic accountability has enhanced 
the quest for their rights to be protected and respected, besides the drive for environmental 
justice.  
The advocacy NGOs argued that the corporations practised ‘environmental racism’ in the 
Delta arena and they were deemed to be more powerful than the government. They argued 
that the application of double standard was predominant despite the corporations 
vehemently arguing that ‘they listen to all stakeholders including the community 
stakeholders’. The advocacy NGOs’ engagement with the community stakeholders was 
to problematize the accountability and governance gaps in the Delta, thereby advocating 
and giving the marginalized community stakeholders a voice to engage the powerful 
stakeholders in the arena (see chapter 8).  
The corporations were viewed as the dominant stakeholder in the Delta. Evidence from 
the corporations revealed that the respect of human rights was embedded in their activities 
and it influenced their interactions, policies and practices in the Delta arena. Nevertheless, 
the advocacy NGOs and the community stakeholders revealed that this level of 
engagement do not have substance in the local arenas. The corporations were accused of 
not engaging with the community stakeholders and when they engaged they were accused 
of not implementing what had been agreed, thereby resulting in dialogic gaps and 
tensions between the corporations and the other stakeholders (Bebbington et al., 2007; 
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Thomson and Bebbington, 2005, Brown, 2009; Shearer, 2002; Parker, 2014). These 
tensions were often because of the implicit belief by the stakeholders, including the 
DNGOrs, that the corporations had a moral relational obligation (informal rule of 
engagement) to be accountable and transparent with the communities’ regardless of 
whether there was a formal requirement for such accountability engagement. The DNGOs 
argued that the absence of a moral relational/dialogic accountability system resulted in 
unsustainable practices because a relational/dialogic accountability system would not 
only reduce corruption, human rights violations, environmental violations in local arenas. 
The presence of dialogic gaps and tensions between the corporations and the community 
stakeholders created a platform of engagement for the iaNGOs and laNGOs through 
counter accounts and the engagement of the other arena participants (see chapter 8).  
Evidence revealed that the corporations adopted double standard or did not abide by 
regulations because the rule enforcers were deemed to have been captured and this 
influenced the oversight role of the regulators. The community stakeholders, NOSDRArs, 
DNGOrs, iaNGOrs and the laNGOrs argued that there was nothing like the 
implementation of environmental and pipelines best practice in the Delta against what 
was practised in their home countries. They argued that the adoption of double standard 
impacted on the human rights, environmental rights, accountability and sustainable 
development need to the indigenous people and was accentuated by divide and rule tactics 
by the corporations. Evidence revealed that the corporations often incentivised vocal 
communities’ leaders or directly/indirectly caused conflicts which resulted in communal 
and intercommunal violence while they conducted their exploratory and extractive 
activities in the Delta arena. The community stakeholders argued that this restricted their 
ability to engage and air their views in local arenas. Furthermore, oil spills were expected 
to be reported within 24hours of their occurrence and remediation activities conducted to 
international standard within 72hours but empirical evidence and even independent 
scientific investigations by UNEP (2011), Steiner (2010) revealed that disclosures were 
often delayed, and remediation not conducted, and when the polluted environment were 
eventually remediated, they were deemed as inadequate.  
Furthermore, the volume of gas flared and the fines charged by DPR on gas flare was 
under-disclosed despite its negative impact on the human rights to health, environmental 
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rights and economic rights of the people. Evidence revealed that the corporations often 
give reasons to violate the rights of the community stakeholders through gas flaring 
regardless of the court injunction in 2005 on Shell to stop gas flaring in the Delta arena. 
Their excuses for gas flaring revealed that there was no political will from the government 
to end flaring which restricted their ability to invest in infrastructures to reduce and 
harness gas for the benefit of the Delta and Nigerians suffering from electricity shortage. 
However, the advocacy NGOs, independent observers and community stakeholders 
argued that the corporations and the government lacked the commitment to end gas flaring 
and it had nothing to do with the excuses propelled by the corporations. Nevertheless, a 
coalition of NGOs launched the Nigerian Gas Flare Tracker in 2014 to monitor the 
volume of gas flared by the corporations and to engage all the stakeholders in addressing 
this unsustainable and harmful practice in the Delta. This online accountability platform 
was argued not to have been successful because of the regulatory mandate by DPR in 
December 2014 to legalize gas flaring through the removal of fines. 
In addition, all the stakeholders agreed that sabotage, pipeline vandalization, induced 
corrosion of pipelines and oil theft was an unsustainable and environmental practice in 
the Delta, but evidence revealed that they were often orchestrated by the oil corporations’ 
contractors through the unemployed youths. Despite the negative impacts of third-party 
interference on pipelines, evidence revealed that the causes and volume of oil spills, and 
the extent of damages were contentious issues. The community stakeholders and the 
advocacy NGOs argued that the corporations often denied the causes of oil spills and 
abrogated the causes of oil spills to sabotage, thereby escalating the conflicts. These 
denials resulted in national and international court cases due to the absence of a credible 
JIVs. The JIVs were deemed to be conducted by all stakeholders to establish the causes, 
volume of spills and the extent of the damages but all the stakeholders unanimously 
agreed that the corporations provided the logistics required for the JIVs. The 
independence of the rule enforcers [NOSDRA] to be credible and accountable for their 
oversight role was questioned due to the logistics provided by the corporations. Evidence 
revealed that the causes and volume of oil spills were under-disclosed. The Oil Spill 
Monitor (OSM) online accountability platform for oil spills was launched to address these 
problems. The OSM was to facilitate transparency on oil spills and to engage the 
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community stakeholders, the corporations, the regulators, the political institutions, 
Nigerian government, the media and the independent observers. 
The other stakeholders argued that the role of NOSDRA and DPR have been captured by 
the corporations to avoid tougher regulations. NOSDRA was deemed as lacking the 
capacity to enforce its regulations because it was argued to be grossly underfunded, 
lacked the mandate and capability to ensure the corporations complied with its 
regulations. DPR was described as having a cosy relationship with the corporations, 
which restricted their ability to be an independent regulator. However, evidence revealed 
that regardless of the mechanisms adopted by DPR to ensure their independence, their 
role in the wealth maximisation of oil revenues hindered their ability to credibly give and 
demand accounts, engage on behalf of the community stakeholder and the protection of 
the rights of the people. Evidence revealed that the differences in mandates resulted in 
conflicts of interests between NOSDRA and DPR. The conflicts of interests between the 
regulators on the implementation of regulations implied that the corporations and third-
parties could capitalise on the governance gaps to create accountability gaps. 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence revealed that the advocacy NGOs and independent 
observers proposed the PIB and the amendment of NOSDRA Act to delineate the 
regulatory role to NOSDRA or an independent agency. 
Furthermore, evidence revealed that GMOUs emerged because of the counter accounts 
and counter actions by the advocacy NGOs clamouring for an inclusive ownership and 
the engagement of the community stakeholders in their development by the corporations 
and the government. The DNGOs served as a medium of communication between the 
corporations and the community stakeholders due to the absence of a formal mechanism 
of accountability and engagement. However, the basis on which the GMOU’s funds were 
negotiated and allocated to the clusters were unknown to the community stakeholders and 
even the negotiators (DNGOs). Besides, the implementation of the GMOUs were argued 
to be a silencing strategy adopted by the corporations to capture, silence and marginalise 
the community stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, the advocacy NGOs, community stakeholders, NOSDRA, the political 
institutions such as UNEP, World Bank [after studying their reports]; viewed effective 
and engaging accountability systems as dialogic (Brown, 2009, Bebbington et al., 2007, 
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Thomson and Bebbington, 2005; Dillard and Roslender, 2011; Contrafatto et al., 2015, 
Gallhofer et al., 2015, Gray et al., 2014b; Shearer, 2002; Parker, 2014, Schweiker, 1993). 
Dialogic accountability systems involve building the giving and the receiving of accounts 
of conduct from local arenas by paying attention to power relations and ensuring effective 
participation of the others in the construction of their everyday realities in the Delta arena 
(co-producers of accounts). This supported Dillard (2014) and Brown (2009) claims that 
an accountability information that would result in emancipatory changes should be 
established on moral, ethical and dialogic platforms. The stakeholders assumed that the 
role of the advocacy NGOs were to facilitate dialogic accountability relationships by 
collaborating with NOSDRA and the community stakeholders in addressing 
unsustainable practices. 
Besides the claim by DPRr1 that ‘sustainable development has always been our 
watchword’, evidence revealed that they were yet to fully recognise their role and in being 
accountable to the community stakeholders. DPR was envisaged to have a formal 
hierarchical structure of accountability to the government and the corporations and not 
the community stakeholders. Despite the role of the iaNGOs and the laNGOs in 
promoting a dialogic accountability in the Delta, one could empirically conclude that 
DPR was yet to grasp the need to be accountable to the other stakeholders, who did not 
have an agency relationship with them. Nevertheless, evidence revealed that NOSDRA 
was transcending from being a regulator by seeing themselves as being accountable to 
the community stakeholders. 
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CHAPTER 8: COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: HOW AND WHY 
ARE THEY USED? 
“On our own part as civil society, we will continue to 
engage and we will continue to create awareness, continue 
to bring up issues, engage with government, engage with oil 
companies, engage with communities, enlighten them on the 
little knowledge and exposure that we have in this area.” 
(laNGOr11) 
8.0. INTRODUCTION 
Whilst chapter 7 explored the second research question with cognisance to the inverted 
arena framework in understanding the conflicts and dialogic accountability engagements 
of all the arena participants. This chapter explores the third research question – “How are 
counter accounts used to bridge accountability and governance gaps for the advancement 
of human rights and sustainable development from the perspective of the advocacy NGOs 
against corporate and governance practices within this arena?” The author aims to 
understand how counter accounting technologies were used to build networks for human 
rights, dialogic accountability, governance, engagement and sustainable development to 
give voices to the marginalised groups and the need for sustainable development in the 
Delta.  
 
8.1. SOURCES OF DATA 
This chapter drew from various sources, which included 9 and 16 interviews from 
international (iaNGOs) and local advocacy NGOs (laNGOs) respectively. In addition, 
other relevant documents such as sustainability reports, press releases, regulations, 
YouTube and TV documentaries, media reports, online dialogues reported in blogs and 
webinars, counter accounts and reports by supranational organisations (e.g. UN, World 
Bank) were analysed. This chapter captured how counter accounts were constructed and 
used by the iaNGOs and laNGOs to address the problematic unsustainable accountability 
and governance practices in the Delta arena.  
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8.2. COUNTER ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY RELATIONSHIPS: LEVEL OF 
ACTIVISM AND CONFLICT ARENAS 
It is pertinent to identify the different levels of conflict and engagements operating in the 
Delta arena to enable potential users of this study understand the nature of the conflicts 
and the engagement strategies adopted to address unsustainable practices. There were 
radical and reforming stakeholders operating at different accountability and dialogic 
arenas (see chapter 4 and figure 5, p.225) to facilitate transformative and emancipatory 
changes by targeting and engaging different stakeholders with significant power over the 
corporations and the government. This distinction would help understand the use of 
counter accounting technologies in connecting the conflicts in the different arenas. It is 
essential to highlight that the conflicts elucidated in chapter 6, 7 and further fleshed out 
in this section was not a single conflict and the advocacy NGOs, shareholders’ activist 
groups, the courts, supranational organisations operated at different levels to address these 
conflicts.  
Empirical evidence revealed that the conflicts were different at each levels of activism 
(see the figure 5 below, p.225) but they were connected because they were geared towards 
addressing poor accountability practices, unequal power relationships, unsustainable 
practices, poor governance system, human rights violations and environmental pollution 
at the local arenas. At the regional arena, there were laNGOs that produced systematic, 
partisan and contra-governing counter accounts to bridge and engage the corporations and 
the regulatory regimes in the Delta arena and in other arenas (see chapter 4). The laNGOs 
operated and transmitted evidence-based counter accounts from the local arenas to the 
regional, national and the international arenas to facilitate transformative changes at the 
local arenas. However, when their counter accounts, boycotts, lobbying or engagements 
did not produce significant results, they transmitted the conversation or engagement and 
the accounts into different arenas, often to international arenas, which were later 
translated into other counter accounting technologies – publicity stunts, musical 
campaigns, petition, protest, press releases on Facebook, Twitter, video evidence on 
YouTube, blogs, newspaper articles (Thomson et al., 2015; Kneip, 2013; Joutsenvirta, 
2011). For example, the advocacy NGOs bridged and built networks of transformative 
engagement. Systematic and scientific partisan accounts through pictures of polluted 
farmlands, fishponds and waterways, evidence of  
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human rights violations, documentaries of polluted resources and how it impacted on the 
indigenous people or bottle of spilt crude oil were presented to international arenas, which 
through confrontational and dialogic approach engaged the corporations at their home 
countries. This was consistent with the empirical evidence of Thomson et al., (2015) and 
Kneip (2013).  For instance, Thomson et al., (2015, p.828) observed that ASH built a 
network of transformative engagement at the local, national and international arenas to 
pressure political institutions to achieve their desired outcomes to cause a legitimate 
regulatory reform on tobacco. They argued that counter accounts were used to deny, 
perpetuate, escalate the conflict, to confront, counter-act and co-operate to achieve 
transformative reforms. Their analysis of ASH counter accounts against BAT 
demonstrated that ASH adopted diverse external accounting practices across different 
arenas associated with multiple tactical intentions and desired outcomes (p.830). This was 
distinctively evidence in the Delta.  
For instance, two bottles of spilt crude oil (accounts) were taken by laNGOr1 from Oya 
Lake (a fishing lake at Ikarama community, which was polluted in December 2008) and 
were presented to shareholders’ activist in London (international arena), who then 
presented them as verifiable evidence to Shell in London to address the problem of 
delayed remediation at the local arenas (Ikarama community). laNGOr1 argued that Shell 
remediated the polluted environment (desired outcome) because of the engagement of the 
shareholders’ activist group in August 2013. 
Empirical evidence revealed that counter accounts within these different arenas made 
visible the conflicts, helped conscientize the indigenous people and other arena 
participants, and developed verifiable systematic, partisan and contra-governing counter 
accounts that connected the arenas’ participants toward addressing the conflicts 
(Thomson et al., 2015; Freire, 2002; Contrafatto et al., 2015; O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 
2009; Rodrigue, 2014). It is important to note that the counter accounts were not 
absolutely linking the conflicts together as single conflict but were able to provide 
verifiable evidence emerging from the local arenas to different arenas, which were 
valuable dialogic accountability tools to address the conflicts and contradict what the 
powerful arena participants (e.g. corporations or regulators) have reported. 
Empirical evidence revealed that there were listening audience within the different arenas 
to dialogically facilitate transformative changes at the local arenas. The laNGOs escalated 
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the counter accounts into other arena through symbolic actions such as through the web, 
the conventional and contemporary media, YouTube documentaries, publicity stunts, 
musical campaigns, court actions to facilitate a significant conflict resolution that would 
benefit the local arenas, where environmental and human rights violation occurs (Brennan 
and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Tregidga, 2017; Bellucci and Manetti, 2017). As elucidated in 
chapter 6 and 7, the local communities and indigenous people could be seen as voiceless 
and powerless. For their voices to be heard, advocacy and lobbying were done either by 
the radicalist or participationist or the hybrid radical-participationist laNGOs (see Section 
8.4), the international NGOs (iaNGOs see section 8.3) and shareholders’ activist groups 
through confrontation, symbolic counter-actions or dialogic accounts. For instance, the 
iaNGOs were interested in taking the systematic, partisan or contra-governing accounts 
from the local arenas through the cooperation of the community stakeholders and through 
the coalition of advocacy NGOs such as NACGOND90 or the International Network for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR-Net)91 (Thomson et al., 2015; den Hond 
and de Bakker, 2007; Kneip, 2013) to the national and international arena participants. 
These accounts were taken to the court through legal symbolic counteractions against the 
corporations or by presenting signed petitions by the general public to the corporations or 
presented evidence of non-compliance of regulations to the regulators and the 
corporations or published verifiable evidence for the public or political institutions in 
other arenas or used the social media to make visible unsustainable practices (see section 
8.3 and 8.4 below). These networks of engagement implied that groups operating at the 
local, regional, national and international arenas with sufficiently overlapping ideologies, 
values, rationalities/logic, concerns and interest could cooperate to collectively transform 
institutional and regulatory regimes. These networks of engagement were to overcome 
the problem of unequal power relations, accountability and governance gaps leading into 
                                                          
90 NACGOND is a coalition of environmental and human rights advocacy NGOs in the Niger Delta. However, 
laNGOr2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 12 with international affiliates argued that they are not a member of the coalition. 
91 The International Network for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR-Net) is a global network that connects 
over 280 NGOs, social movement groups and individual advocates over 75 countries to collectively build global 
alliance towards securing social, environmental and economic justice around common challenges for the protection 
and promotion of the fulfilment of human rights, economic, social and cultural rights (see https://www.escr-net.org/). 
This network has eight thematic working groups. For instance, the Corporate Accountability Working Group (CAWG) 
supported the resolution for a binding business and human rights treaty lead by Ecuador and South Africa at the UN 
Human Rights Council in 2014 (see 
http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/finaldraft20201620cawg20statementto0igwg20282220sept2020162920clean.p
df). 
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unsustainable environmental and human rights violations that impacted on the ability of 
the indigenous people in the local arenas to live sustainably (Thomson et al., 2015; den 
Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Renn, 1992; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008, 2012; 
Tregidga, 2013).     
 
8.3. COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE 
IANGOS 
In this section, the findings from the semi-structured interviews with the iaNGOs are 
presented using the following three themes: 
• Counter accounting, problematizing environmental degradation and human right 
violations in the Delta arena,  
• Counter accounting, problematizing human rights, sustainable development, 
accountability and governance gaps  
• Motivation and aspirations associated with iaNGO’s use of counter accounting. 
 
8.3.1. COUNTER ACCOUNTING, PROBLEMATIZING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND 
HUMAN RIGHT VIOLATIONS IN THE DELTA ARENA 
As revealed in the previous chapters, it had been extensively reported that the indigenous 
communities within this arena have been marginalised, neglected and their human rights 
violated at the same time as oil and gas production developed in their region (see chapter 
6). The empirical analysis in chapter 6 and 7 revealed that the indigenous communities 
had no significant voice to resist problematic governance and corporate actions relating 
to oil and gas production within this arena. This analysis problematized the activities of 
the oil corporations and criticised the ineffectiveness of the regulatory framework that 
resulted in extensive poverty, human rights violations on a range of issues including right 
to an adequate standard of living, clean water and food, freedom of speech, health, 
education and healthy environment. The persistent oil spills and gas flares had taken their 
toll on the indigenous communities within this arena. The interviewees overwhelmingly 
supported this interpretation 
“The reality of the average Niger Deltans’ community is frustration, is the 
destruction of their livelihoods –fishing, farming. In the rivers, the lakes and the 
creeks have been destroyed. These people cannot even go back to the fishing that 
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used to give them little means to pay for the school fees of their children and feed 
themselves. …their environment is so polluted and so, so, so destroyed that there 
are all sorts of health impacts.” (iaNGOr8) 
“The problem is much complex, every year; there are about 200 spills from oil 
pipelines. Which is a very high percentage compared to Russia or US.” (iaNGOr2) 
“[…] what struck me were a number of things. I went to Bodo and they just had a 
big court case in Britain, where Shell has settled. The damage there was quite 
unbelievable.” (iaNGOr3) 
As the indigenous people sought non-violent (and in some cases violent) ways to redress 
their plight due to the absence of an effective formal accountability platform, this resulted 
in the escalation of conflicts from the local arenas to the international arenas to facilitate 
dialogic accountability through counter accounting (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Dey 
et al., 2011; Thomson et al., 2015). The iaNGOrs interviewed argued that the inequality 
of power and ownership structure limited the dialogic accountability engagement of the 
community stakeholders and therefore, they had no significant voice to hold the 
corporations and the government accountable, thereby resulting in tensions. These 
tensions were because of the implicit belief that the corporations have a moral obligation 
(informal rule of engagement) to be accountable and transparent with the other 
stakeholders whether there was a formal requirement for such accountability and 
engagement (Parker, 2014; Shearer, 2002). Their inability to engage, the absence of the 
voice to speak truth to power and to hold the powerful stakeholders accountable resulted 
in diverse conflicts within the arena (Freire, 2002; Spence, 2009). These conflicts resulted 
in a significant shift in the political and the cultural dynamics of the indigenous people 
and communities against the oil corporations and State. For instance, iaNGOr8 claimed 
“What is happening here is scandalous. What is happening here should not happen 
in the…so-called ‘civilized society’. What is happening here, especially at the 
communities’ level, helpless poor communities’ folks, people being exploited in 
such a way that they don’t have anywhere to run to. They cannot run to the federal 
authorities because they do not care. They cannot go to their state government, but 
their state government needs the money that is the only thing they have to pay for 
governors and the commissioners, the projects that they flag off and the salaries 
of the workers. So the state government, even though sometimes, they know that 
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these activities are destroying the lives of their own people, they cannot even 
complain. They have become so dependent, like the federal authorities on the oil 
and gas resources. They definitely cannot go to their local government chairman 
because the local government chairmen are just waiting for the oil revenue to come 
at the end of every month. …It is a vicious cycle and in the middle of all these, is 
the people of the region and the well-being of the people of the region, which is 
definitely ignored and of course taken for granted.” 
Furthermore, the attempts to mitigate the harm caused in the Niger Delta were argued by 
the iaNGOs through their systematic and partisan counter accounts to have been captured 
by the corporations due to the inability of the regulatory regimes to effectively implement 
its regulations. However, the systematic counter accounts (e.g. Christian Aid, 2004; 
Friends of the Earth, 2011; Steiner, 2010) posited that corporations were trusted to fix the 
problems, but in many cases, their interventions resulted in inappropriate solutions which 
made the situation worse, leaving the local population as victims of unsystematic, poorly 
planned and executed canals, road networks, dilapidated schools and health 
infrastructures, no electricity, neglected developmental projects, fatalism in youth groups 
and social conflicts.  
“{name of corporation} has traditionally not done the right job in clean-up, they 
quit people out, they go through the motions, they make it look like they have been 
responsible at cleaning things up but on the contrary, in actually getting oil out of 
the environment, they have failed time and time again. And this is the way things 
have been going-on in the Niger Delta for decades […] They [oil companies] have 
made 100 of billions of dollars off the Niger Delta over the last 50years and have 
put very little back into it. They do little projects; they built a water treatment centre 
and left it without maintenance to fall apart. They built schools, no teachers and 
books. They do the things that look good on a quarterly report to their shareholders, 
but they do not have any substance in the Delta.” (iaNGOr5) 
Frustration over the perpetuation of these problems and apparent inability of regulators 
and government institutions to resolve these problems became major drivers of grassroots 
activism through the collaboration and counter accounts of local, regional, national and 
international advocacy NGOs to transform the everyday realities of the indigenous people 
experiences of human rights violations, economic and environmental deprivation 
(Contrafatto et al., 2015; Dey et al., 2011). The youth have been driven to a ‘state of 
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hopelessness’ developing a ‘siege mentality’ and the belief that violence, illegal 
bunkering of oil facilities, mistrust of government officials, intra and inter-community 
rivalry and illegal activities were the ways out of the practices which had destroyed their 
means of livelihoods (Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010; Social Actions, 2009a). At the same 
time, the powerful stakeholders were perceived to be corrupt, looting public funds, 
ignoring conflicts of interest and bribing others to continue with the unequal distribution 
of the revenue generated from this region. For instance 
“It was obvious that the political twist [dynamics] and corruption between the 
government, and the oil companies, the MNCs: that the local interest, their 
environmental interest and the human rights interest in the communities are left out; 
and they are marginalised and defoliated.” (iaNGOr5) 
The iaNGOrs argued that their counter accounts and counteractions were to reveal the 
sources of the accountability and governance gaps faced by the local communities and to 
challenge the powerful stakeholders to mitigate these problems. They believed that before 
any revolutionary and emancipatory changes would emerge in the Delta, they had to 
‘uncover what was covered’ by the unequal accountability and power relations in the 
‘crony capitalist’ system and by the perpetrators of environmental and human rights 
violations (Fitzgerald and Rodgers (2000, p.581); Bakre and Lauwo, 2016). The Delta 
was often compared with other arenas such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Kuwait and Venezuela where profitable oil and gas exploration occured to challenge 
corporate and governance regimes to collectively and dialogically resolve the conflicts 
for sustainable environment and the respect of human rights at the local arenas (Amnesty 
International, 2009; Brown, 2009; UNEP, 2011). Empirical evidence revealed that there 
had been decades of consistent pressure for the reform of government policies, removal 
of systemic conflicts of interest, changes to accountability and governance processes, 
more equal resource distribution and platforms for community engagement within and 
outside this region (see chapter 6 and 7). These pressures for change resulted in numerous 
lawsuits (some successful) in Nigeria, United States of America, United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands (Amnesty International, 2015b; Arnott, 2009). 
The iaNGOs activism was corroborated by the interventions of international institutions, 
such as the UN and World Bank, who also produced series of highly critical reports that 
problematized the activities of the MNOCs and the Nigerian state (Baumuller et al., 2011; 
UNEP, 2011; World Bank, 1995). These formal and informal counter accounts combined 
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over time with assemblages of engagements practices such as press releases, lobbying, 
publicity stunts, petition, protest, scientific video evidence on YouTube, social media, 
newspapers articles (Thomson et al., 2015; Bellucci and Manetti, 2017) led to sustained 
pressure for the implementation of social and environmental governance and 
accountability reforms in accordance with recognised national and international human 
rights conventions in the Delta arena. 
 
8.3.2. COUNTER ACCOUNTING: PROBLEMATIZING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE GAPS 
The iaNGOrs interviewed were campaigning to improve the governance and 
accountability systems in the Delta, in relation to human rights and environmental 
protection (Cooper et al., 2011; Gallhofer et al., 2011; Hazelton, 2013). They confirmed 
that counter accounting had played a significant part in these campaigns for dialogic 
accountability and transformative reforms in addressing the conflicts over human rights 
and the environment in the Delta arena. There have been a series of counter accounts (see 
chapter 6) produced by iaNGOs that problematized and challenged the effectiveness of 
the accountability and governance systems in the Delta that allowed human rights 
violations and massive ecological devastation. The ability of ordinary citizens living in 
the Delta to enforce any regulations, report non-compliance or seek redress is extremely 
difficult in practice (Idemudia, 2007). The indigenous people relied on the regulatory 
authorities to carry out their responsibilities to protect individuals and their natural 
environment. Gaps in the practice of governing of these responsibilities are almost 
impossible for the indigenous people to overcome. For example:   
“[…] if you are living in the Delta, you have an oil spill and you want to sue the 
company for the damage it is very, very difficult because you have to go to the 
Federal court, but that is the problem. Even when you go to the court at the State 
level, you will face a big challenge partly because the court system is quite slow 
and partly because you will find that all of the good lawyers are working for the 
oil companies. If you are a poor farmer or a poor fisherperson, then where would 
you get a good lawyer to represent you in court because they will all be working 
for the company who can pay them much more than you can pay them? So, you 
have a double disadvantage in the Delta.” (iaNGOr1) 
Furthermore, the interviewees claimed campaigning were made more difficult because 
information on exploration and extraction plans, oil spills, gas flaring, how oil revenues 
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were distributed, or other problems were shrouded in secrecy (Hazelton, 2013; Killian, 
2010). The lack of transparency and unaccountability on critical aspects of state 
governance, regulatory compliance, corporate actions, environmental accidents and 
human right abuses made it very difficult for iaNGOs or local citizens to engage 
effectively using formal channels of communication.  
“[…] access to information is extremely important because it helps people to be 
able to know what exactly is going on but the information has to be good 
information. It cannot be information that is made-up. Sometimes, we find the 
information that the oil companies are publishing is not correct. There needs to be 
oversight. The biggest problem that we have encountered is that there is no really 
an effective regulation of the oil industry. There is no regulator that is making 
them behave properly and that is the biggest accountability problem.” (iaNGOr1) 
iaNGOs appeared to regard good accountability mechanisms as part of effective 
governance and as a way for local citizens to hold governors/regulators to account. The 
iaNGOrs claimed access to information to facilitate dialogic accountability and 
governance reform was necessary to facilitate sustainable development and respect for 
human rights because it would enable “affected stakeholders and the publics to be able to 
scrutinise and debate the values and interest at stake” (Blackburn et al., 2014; Brown and 
Dillard, 2015, p.964; Killian, 2010). Their use of counter accounts sought to fill the 
information gaps in the arena by providing alternative accounts of the realities of life in 
the Delta and thus allowing different stakeholders to participate in reforms of the system 
of governing and accountability (Cooper et al., 2005; Spence, 2009). They posited that 
greater levels of accountability were required for vulnerable and marginalised 
communities to develop a stronger voice in the existing governance system.   
“The accuracy and the availability of the information are absolutely critical for 
the realisation of human rights. That is one of the points that we have been trying 
to communicate repeatedly in the Niger Delta.” (iaNGOr7) 
The interviewees recognised that the inadequate human rights and sustainable 
development governance/accountability systems were the results of a power imbalance 
among the arena participants. It was noted that corporations were more powerful than the 
state and that the state inadequately resourced the regulatory frameworks that should have 
ensured the protection of the local communities and environmental resources.  
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“There is power struggle but most of the powers are with the oil companies. They 
are the most powerful actors in the Niger Delta. The communities have almost no 
power and the government has its representative in the Delta by government 
agencies. The government agencies have almost no power. They frequently do not 
have the resources to do their job properly. Therefore, what you see is that the actors 
with the most influential power in the Niger Delta are the oil companies. If you go 
to the regulator, you find that they often do not have the capacities to go to the oil 
spills site. They have to wait for the companies to come and drive them to the oil 
spills site.” (iaNGOr1) 
The iaNGOs identified themselves as having the capability to initiate an increasing 
‘practice of freedom’ to address these gaps by empowering indigenous people and local 
organisations to gain access to their advocacy/campaigning expertise and resources to 
escalate the conflicts from the local arenas and to galvanise international audience, host 
government and investors groups to the unsustainable practices in the Delta (Bebbington 
et al., 2007; Contrafatto et al., 2015). One of the tactics adopted by iaNGOs to deal with 
this problematic governance system and absence of accountable and verifiable 
information was to produce their own accounts of their realities and make them available 
to stakeholders with power over the managers of the oil corporations operating in the 
Delta. These counter accounts sought to delocalise and or escalate the conflicts from the 
local arenas and to confront those with the power to enforce corporate and governance 
reforms (Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009). Counter 
accounts were seen to be useful in rebalancing power structures by making visible to the 
world the harm caused in the Niger Delta. They envisaged that without the rebalancing 
of powers, it would be very difficult to address environmental pollution resulting from oil 
spills and consistent gas flares. Typical responses were 
“…we only intended to shine light on the exact situation, the truth and that is what 
science does; is that it identifies the truth in any situations to the parties in the group 
both the oil companies, the Nigerian government, the state government in the Delta. 
The international communities have to take that in and do something with it. The 
extent to which our reports have changed corporate behaviours, I am unclear of but 
my hope and my belief is that these reports have changed international perspective 
of what corporation has not done in the Niger Delta. It has raised the standard of 
the attention that the world pays to the Niger Delta environmental and human right 
crisis. It is a crisis!’ (iaNGOr5) 
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“a lot of the social reporting that we do is highlighting the problem and putting 
pressure on the oil companies and the government to take actions. …we found out 
that the media coverage that the report get compels the companies to make 
improvement. …we send our reports to the investors in the oil companies and they 
then talk to the oil companies and push them to make improvements.” (iaNGOr1) 
The iaNGOs viewed their counter accounts as an accountability mechanism that 
facilitated an escalation of the conflicts or upward flow of information to investors, senior 
corporate managers, lenders, national and international political institutions particularly 
in relation to problems that were not visible in their formal channels of reporting or in the 
public domain (Apostol, 2015; Dey et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2014b). Their counter 
accounts constructed new linkages between what was reported in the formal structure of 
reporting and what was not disclosed but visible in the local arenas of practice, thereby 
serving as a mediating instrument for engagement and change (Kurunmäki et al., 2011). 
They viewed their counter accounts as a mechanism to provide the indigenous 
communities with a more powerful voice to address unsustainable human rights and 
environmental violations. Consequently, iaNGOs made use of various international 
standards to create a normative evaluation of the global un-acceptability of these local 
practices. For example, the UDHR (1948) and UN’s GPBHRs (2011) were powerful 
framing devices that were used to determine the legitimacy of corporate and state 
(in)action. UDHR was used to problematize the unequal power relations in the Delta by 
arguing that human rights must be recognised as inalienable (Amnesty International, 
2009; Muchlinski, 2012). For example, the right to have a voice was asserted to have been 
captured and used to problematize the governance system 
“The communities need to have a say and the local people in the…certainly need 
to have a voice in what happens within their communities and within their 
environment. They have a right to crunch the existing systems for their sanctuary. 
There is the criminality element in the Delta that needs to be dealt with.” (iaNGOr5) 
These counter accounts appeared to be designed to problematize activities in the Delta on 
two levels. First, to report the non-compliance with existing laws and regulations by the 
corporations, to use the current regulatory system to discipline and punish corporations, 
what Thomson et al., (2015) refer to as systematic accounts. Counter accounts were used 
to enforce existing governance and accountability systems and support indigenous people 
to use their existing rights in local, national and international sustainable development 
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arenas to clamour for human rights and environmental accountability or justice. The 
iaNGOs campaigns included local actions that resulted in greater engagement of the 
communities in the governance of local problems and enforcement of existing laws. This 
approach was characterised by specific accounts/actions against specific breaches of 
laws, such as the absence of EIA or reporting oil spills and gas flaring to regulators or to 
the laNGOs. 
The second intention was similar to Thomson et al., (2015) notion of partisan external 
accounting, as the iaNGOs sought to reform particular aspects of the governance system. 
One impact of the counter accounts was to initially paralyse the governance process and 
then reform the political dynamics and power struggles surrounding the governance of oil 
exploration activities 
“[…] the report92 has paralysed the actions within the Nigerian government and 
within {name of corporation}. Sometimes it takes several years 5, 6 or 8 years to 
start seeing the impact of these reports but I truly believe that they do have positive 
impact in shifting the political dynamics” (iaNGOr5) 
The interviewees were able to provide valuable insights into how they prepared their 
counter-accounts and used these counter-accounts to engage the powerful arena 
participants. Despite the scale and urgency of the problems facing communities and the 
polarised position of many participants, the iaNGOrs reported how they attempted to 
mediate between the different arenas, coalitions and where possible to establish dialogic 
engagement processes (Brown et al., 2015; Cooper and Owen, 2007). However, these 
dialogic processes appeared to be in two stages. First, working with the communities 
suffering the social, economic and environmental harm to co-produce accounts of their 
situation. Second, presenting these accounts to those with the responsibility and power to 
resolve the issues raised in the counter accounts. Using these approaches, the iaNGOs 
attempted to establish and maintain legitimacy with as many arena participants as possible 
(Contrafatto et al., 2015; Thomson et al., 2015) by incorporating existing emancipatory 
ways of thinking and possible solutions into their accounts of unsustainable practices. 
They asserted that they have been able to establish communication mechanisms with the 
corporations, laNGOs, politicians, regulators and affected indigenous people.  
                                                          
92 Note it is not possible to provide examples of these reports, as it would compromise the anonymity of the 
interviewees. 
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 “We have partners who are supporting the communities to hold companies and 
NOSDRA accountable to oil spills and remediation. What they do in creating the 
ground for the community is to go to the community, create the awareness as to 
what they can do in this regard; and working with the community to appoint 
people who can help in documenting and reporting on oil spill cases and also 
training such people and providing them with the equipment that can facilitate 
that.” (iaNGOr9) 
It appeared to be normal practice that before the counter accounts were published, they 
were discussed with the corporations and the regulators to give them the opportunity to 
address these problems. 
“When we do our research, we go and speak to the communities about the 
investigation we are doing, we will talk to them about our work and what could 
happen and what would they want {name of NGO} to be saying. Therefore, we 
ask them what do they want, they might say they want clean up and compensation. 
In addition, we talk about what we could do and what our partner organisations 
could do. Then we will go from there to ask for a meeting with the operators, we 
will go to their offices in Port Harcourt and discuss our findings, ask them what 
they have to say and if they are willing to meet with us. We will go to NOSDRA, 
we will talk to them about what is their work, what do they feel is the issue and 
what do they think an organisation like {name of NGO} should focus on. We do 
that every time we do research, we talk to all of the stakeholders and we try to talk 
obviously on the ground in Port Harcourt and in Abuja, when we are doing the 
meeting.” (iaNGOr1) 
The iaNGOs claimed counter accounting had been able to change accountability and 
governance practices and had facilitated more effective communication and engagements 
“From what we have observed over time is that the accounts have galvanised 
companies to become a lot more serious about responding to concerns as they are 
raised.” (iaNGOr4) 
The iaNGOrs argued that their engagement had been successful, particularly through the 
launch of the OSM in January 2014 (see section 7.2.6).  
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“I think the biggest success is probably the oil spill monitor, where you see 
collaboration between civil societies, the government, and the oil industry looking 
to create public transparent platform to document every single oil spill that is 
happening in Nigeria.” (iaNGOr6) [emphasis added by author] 
The iaNGOrs believed that the use of the OSM accountability platform improved the 
operations of the regulators and the corporations (Denedo et al., forthcoming; SDN, 
2014). However, if it is not accompanied by effective governance and accountability 
through action (Parker, 2014) to mitigate or prevent the oil spills, and to remediate the 
land and rivers affected, then it would not have as much positive impacts as would have 
been expected, particularly on the lived lives of those living near the spills and who 
depend on the natural resources for their livelihood. If the OSM is to be effective, then it 
should improve both the visibility of the problem and the solution to the problem of oil 
spills (Denedo et al., forthcoming). Knowing there had been inestimable barrels of oil 
spillage and that none of the leaks had been fixed or cleaned, the OSM could be regarded 
as a pyrrhic victory (Amnesty Report, 2015a, 2013; Baumuller et al., 2011). Accounting 
for a problem created a mechanism to question what had been done to address the 
underlying problems. However, accounting for a problem might not necessarily lead to 
the resolution of the problem unless a significant and deliberate effort and strategies are 
adopted to address the problem. 
Filling accountability and governance gaps by the corporations and regulators through 
the OSM without considering the impact of the unsustainable practices on the everyday 
realities of the communities living in the Niger Delta, may prove ineffective in the 
medium to long-term (UNEP, 2011; UNDP, 2006). For instance, the EGASPIN (2002, 
p.158, [2.6.3]) stated that oil spill clean-up should commence within 24hours of the 
occurrence of the spill until there was no more visible oil sheen on water.93 Counter 
accounts produced by Amnesty International (2015a, 2013, 2011) and UNEP (2011) 
identified a number of instances where this was not undertaken and reported corporations 
for non-compliance. NOSDRA Act (2006, 6[2-3]) stated that when oil spill was not 
disclosed within 24hours, the operator would be sanctioned by paying the sum of 
                                                          
93 EGASPIN is the regulation enacted by the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) to embrace and protect the 
environment from gas and oil impact. DPR is a regulatory agency but its role in relation to oil spill monitoring and 
remediation is unclear since the establishment of NOSDRA in 2006. DPR is responsible for oil licencing and 
prospecting and they have been criticised over potential conflicts of their roles as a licencing agency and as an oil spill 
monitoring and remediation agency. 
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500,000naira (approximately $2492 or 67 barrels of crude oil)94 and when remediation of 
the impacted area was not conducted in accordance with the stipulated standard, a 
sanction of 1,000,000naira (approximately $4983 or 133 barrels of crude oil)95 would be 
imposed on the defaulter. Oil spills and gas flares were major environmental problems, 
which when combined with human rights violations due to negligence, failure to clean 
and remediate the affected locations within a reasonable timeline are substantial obstacles 
to sustainable development (Amnesty International 2009, 2011, 2013; UNEP 2011). Even 
if the accountability of oil spills were improved and the regulations appropriately 
enforced, the sanctions appeared wholly inadequate given the scale of the possible 
ecological damage of an oil spill. However, it appeared that even these limited sanctions 
were not being applied, nor does it appear that there was any improvement in the rate of 
cleaning and remediation of the affected locations within a reasonable timeline (Amnesty 
International, 2015a, 2011; UNEP, 2011). 
 
8.3.3. MOTIVATION AND ASPIRATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH IANGOS’ USE OF COUNTER 
ACCOUNTING 
The iaNGOrs confirmed the importance of access to information as human rights 
(Hazelton, 2013; Killian, 2010) to enhance corporate and governance accountability (see 
chapter 6 and 7). The absence of verifiable accountable information served as a 
motivation for the proliferation of counter accounts to bridge the accountability gaps to 
facilitate dialogic and inclusive accountability for the advancement of human rights and 
sustainable environment in the Delta arena. Similar to the argument of de Schutter, 2016; 
McPhail and Ferguson, 2016; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016, the iaNGOrs also supported the 
argument that the respect and protection of human rights and sustainable development 
should be the focus of corporate and governance accountability. 
“Since UN developed the UN guidelines on BHRs, companies also now would agree 
that human rights have to be part of corporate accountability and would be considered 
within corporate governance. I think that is now becoming wide world accepted.” 
(iaNGOr1) 
This corroborates Dillard (2014, p.241) claim that “sustainability issues should become 
an integral part of corporate governance, especially as these issues relate to legislation 
                                                          
94 This was calculated using Nasdaq crude oil WTI price of $37.35 as at 16/12/2015. 
95 This was calculated using Nasdaq crude oil WTI price of $37.35 as at 16/12/2015. 
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and regulation; and the scope of disclosure should include any affected constituency, past, 
present and future.” Whilst this assertion is becoming accepted across the world, it 
appeared to be missing in the Niger Delta:   
“…there is absolutely no alignment of anything to do with human right or corporate 
good practice with what the oil companies have been briefing. It is hard to align, for 
example, if you look at the international website of {name of corporation} and all the 
nice things they have said on that website about their standards, and then you go to 
the Niger Delta to verify how these things have been applied, you can’t see anything 
been applied. We have taken {name of corporation} ethical principles and we have 
asked them to justify how all these things have been applied in the Delta given the 
investigation that {name of NGO}96 have done, they did not answer us. I don’t think 
they have an answer.” (iaNGOr1). 
This is because corporations are expected to play an important role in respect of human 
rights and sustainable development, but previous research suggests that this 
developmental role requires the government to have robust governance and enforcement 
regimes that are aligned with the principles of sustainability (Fasterling and Demuijnck, 
2013; Taylor et al., 2009). For example, the Brundtland Report (1987, p.51) stated that 
‘economic growth always brings risk of environmental damage’ but the onus was on the 
government to ensure economic growth was guided by the notion of sustainability. If 
human rights and sustainable development objectives are not incorporated into the 
accounting and accountability systems of corporations and the government, then this 
provides a platform for diversified engagement processes, which include the proliferation 
of counter accounting in driving dialogic accountability (Belal et al., 2015; Taylor et al., 
2009). This could create spaces where advocacy NGOs would problematize any human 
right violation and/or environmental degradation, especially when the accountability and 
engagement practices of corporations and/or the government are incomplete in relation to 
human rights and environmental problems (Gray et al., 2014b; Thomson et al., 2015). 
The existence of alternative channels of engagement would allow other stakeholders to 
problematize corporations and governance unsustainable practices through the 
publication of counter accounts. For instance, iaNGOr9 claimed that 
                                                          
96 Note it is not possible to provide the name of the iaNGO, as it would compromise the anonymity of the interviewees. 
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“The emphasis has been to sort of help to address the challenges that arise in the 
context of the extractive industry… Issues like the relationship between the 
operators and the host communities and the regulators. The impacts of these 
operations on the environment and on the livelihoods of the community members. 
The need to facilitate dialogue between the communities and the operators.”  
Despite these concerns, the iaNGOrs supported the drive for corporations to become more 
accountable for their human rights performance and environmental impact, and 
considered counter accounts as having the potential to bring about dialogic transformative 
changes in corporate accountability and governance practices by filling perceived 
accountability gaps in accountable and verifiable information and evidence or knowledge 
required to govern inclusively and effectively (Blackburn et al., 2014; Thomson and 
Bebbington 2005). The iaNGOrs believed that counter accounts could enable all arena 
participants to have access to accountable information to drive dialogic governance and 
accountability reforms that would impact on the ability of the indigenous people to live 
sustainably (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown and Dillard, 2015).  However, it was stated 
that if there was to be any significant change in the Delta, the drivers for that change, 
particularly for corporate accountability, governance reforms, and duty to respect human 
rights have to include stakeholders who have the power to exercise significant leverage 
on the corporations, such as the investors group, supranational organisations and the home 
government of the corporations. This was evident in the interview extracted from 
iaNGOr3 
“the commitment that holds the work together is a commitment to challenging 
unequal power relations and settling them. We try to tackle the unequal power 
relations… …in a lot of very different ways, we write, we do analysis, we take court 
cases, we try and create platform for communities. …over the years, I have worked 
on a lot of communities affected by…oil pipelines and trying to create a platform 
for those communities and movement that are sort of questioning those 
infrastructural projects, [particularly] by those who are adversely affected by them 
to raise questions in the UK and in the world most generally.”  
The iaNGOrs were critical of the ability of corporations to hide behind commercial 
confidentiality laws to justify their non-disclosure of human rights policies, EIAs or 
payments made to their host government. There was the consensus that these corporate 
powers need to be re-evaluated, particularly in the context of developing countries (Lopez 
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and Shea, 2016; Ramasastry, 2015). This implied that where the judicial system of the 
host country where the MNOCs operate was not adequate for its citizens to seek judicial 
redress, the international space through the opening of the corporate veil (de Schutter, 
2016; McPhail and Ferguson, 2016) could permit indigenous people to seek judicial 
redress where the MNOCs are registered. This shift in the legal landscape could enable 
the advocacy NGOs to galvanise the indigenous people to seek judicial redress in 
international courts to seek redress for environmental and human rights violations. 
“And at the moment, the reporting requirement is very minimal in companies’ law, 
so we need to have far-reaching changes in companies’ law to require companies to 
report on their impact. Not just because these are material to shareholders but because 
this can directly affect the communities that are affected by companies’ activities.” 
(iaNGOr7) 
Another important objective of counter accounting reported by the interviewees was to 
hold the state, and its related institutions to account for its actions. This was a major 
accountability gap in relation to sustainable development that cannot be filled with greater 
corporate accountability. For substantive change to occur, the performance of governance 
systems needs to become the focus of formal accountability requirements or through 
counter-accountability mechanisms. This was summed up by iaNGOr4 as ‘getting 
government to get the governance of the government right’  
“The conversation is not just to increase corporate respect for human rights, but it is 
about getting government to get the governance of the government right. So that 
accountability can be facilitated at the state level and it is about getting companies not 
to take advantage of the governance gap but to hold themselves at a higher standard.”  
Whilst the iaNGOs did recognise the significant impact of their counter accounts, they 
did not see their counter accounts as a permanent part of governance in this arena. Their 
counter accounts were considered a temporary intervention into systems of governance 
when there were critical accountability gaps and missing information. Thomson et al., 
(2015) called this form of counter account as partisan external accounts that analyse and 
critic the fundamental power structure of the existing governance regime to problematize 
unsustainable practices and unequal power relations within the system. Counter accounts 
were intended to reform the formal systems, not to replace them, leading to effective, 
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formal accountability systems that fully disclosed the human rights performance and 
environmental impacts of all relevant arena participants. For example:  
“There are a lot of things missing. If they were there and functioning fully, when there 
is an oil spill, people could go to government agencies to report and get an 
independent assessment but at the moment if there is an oil spill, you have to wait for 
the oil corporations to come and tell you the cost and how much oil is spilled” 
(iaNGOr1) 
As discussed earlier, these oil spills violated the communities’ human rights and 
consequently their ability to develop sustainably. The power imbalance and problematic 
governance regimes in the Niger Delta meant that these communities were effectively 
powerless, voiceless, economically and politically marginalized. In situations like this, 
environmental and human rights activists campaign tactics and counter-accountability 
were complementary practices and when combined could create potentials for 
transformative changes (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Kneip, 2013). The iaNGOs were 
able to integrate human rights as a conceptual framework for their counter accounts, 
which allowed them to evaluate potential human rights violations and accountability 
mechanisms from the perspectives of the affected individuals, local communities, civil 
society groups and future generations. Underpinning their use of counter accounts were 
the assumptions that there should be the protection and respect of human rights, 
commitment to sustainable development, the need to address power imbalances and the 
importance of effective dialogic accountability and governance systems.   
 
8.4. COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE 
LOCAL ADVOCACY NGOS (LANGOS): 
8.4.1.         COUNTER ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY: ‘RADICALIST’, 
‘PARTICIPATIONIST’ AND ‘HYBRID’ APPROACHES TO ACTIVISM  
In addressing unsustainable practices in the oil industry, the author observed that there 
were three approaches to advocacy by the laNGOs (see section 8.2 and figure 5 above, 
p.225) – “the radicalist”, “the participationist” and the “hybrid radical-participationist.” 
The “Radicalist approach”- adopted complete boycott as a strategy of engaging the 
corporations, “the Participationist approach” -adopted a dialogic accountability 
engagement approach while the “Hybrid radical-participationist” adopted a mix of the 
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radicalist and participationist approaches to activism in the Delta arena (see figure 6, 
p.246).97 
 
8.4.1.1. ‘RADICALIST’ AND ‘PARTICIPATIONIST’ NGOS APPROACHES TO ACTIVISM  
The radicalist, the participationist and the hybrid unanimously agreed that there should 
be equality of power and the indigenous peoples’ rights for a healthy and sustainable 
environment to drive (intra)intergenerational equity and human rights to be respected and 
protected by the powerful stakeholders. However, evidence revealed that the radicalist 
did not presume that their activism should follow a structured approach because they did 
not emphasize membership as their criteria of engagement rather they were recognised 
for being confrontational and non-violence by operating from the local arenas to the 
international arena. On the other hand, the participationist encouraged membership 
because it involved the coalition of different advocacy NGOs with similar dialogic 
ideologies. This was evident in the following quote 
“Through SACA’s effort because they have this alignment [dialogic] type of 
relationship with the oil companies, which we don’t have [radicalist]… SACA and 
some other group like SDN, NACGOND; [participationist] they are aligning, and 
it is not bad, it is good…” (laNGOr12) 
This supported the classification of activist groups by den Hond and de Bakker (2007) 
and Fitzgerald and Rodgers (2000). They classified activist groups into the ‘radical 
factions’ [the radicalist] and the ‘moderate or reformative factions’ [participationist]. den 
Hond and de Bakker (2007, p.903) building on Fitzgerald and Rodgers (2000), argued 
that the radical factions believed the corporations are part of the problem and should not 
be directly engaged as part of the solution rather changes should emerge through drastic 
revolutionary and emancipatory measures. On the other hand, the reformative factions 
believed the corporations are part of the problem and should also be part of the solution, 
especially through a direct and moderate engagement mechanisms. This was evident in 
the following quote 
                                                          
97 It is pertinent to clarify that in this study with the exception of where the author specifically mentioned the radicalist, 
the participationist or the hybrid radical-participationist NGOs, when the author mentioned “the laNGOs” the author is 
referring to all the NGOs regardless of their categorisations. 
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“it depends on the NGOs involved, some of the NGOs have gone to court. 
Sometimes they were advised that the issues should be settled out of court 
[radicalist]. They had to go to address it out of court. There are some NGOs that 
also undertake to dialogue from the beginning instead of going to court 
[participationist]” (laNGOr5) 
“…we don’t work with the oil companies [radicalist]. We don’t want to sit on the 
same table with organizations that pollute the environment because it is like you are 
talking to the deaf, they don’t pay attention to the needs of the people otherwise 
they wouldn’t be doing what they are doing right now.” (laNGOr2) 
den Hond and de Bakker (2007) and Fitzgerald and Rodgers (2000) argued that the radical 
factions were ideologically anti-capitalist and their activism were organised non-
hierarchically and non-bureaucratically, but they consistently emphasized nonviolent, 
innovative tactics and direct counteractions to facilitate emancipatory changes. The 
radical factions focused extensively on protecting the interest of the groups that  would 
directly benefit from their activism through radical and mass action networks with 
organisations with similar ideologies, concerns and tactics of engagement. On the other 
hand, the reformative factions were hierarchically and bureaucratically organised and 
have large membership base either through aligning with other organisations with similar 
ideologies and dialogic engagement approach. laNGOr12 argued that  
“…It is deliberate. We don’t want to sit down with the oil companies in one place. 
We want to stay with them at arms-length. Where we meet is on TV, on the pages 
of newspapers and at the internet level because we don’t want to be contaminated, 
we don’t want to compromise. They should do their own until there is an 
appreciable level of change towards the positive where we can also now move 
towards them and say, ‘yes we can see some changes, we can now begin to discuss.’ 
[radicalist]… We are not against NACGOND and all those who are aligning 
[participationist] but let us also remain at our own point. So that if we {name of 
NGO}98 are hitting hard, those [NACGOND and others] people will be negotiating 
with them.” [emphasis added by author] 
                                                          
98 Note it is not possible to provide the name of the laNGO, as it would compromise the anonymity of the interviewees. 
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The quote above (p.245) distinctly reflects den Hond and de Bakker (2007, p.904) 
argument that the radicalist can make use of confrontational disruptive tactics (“hitting 
hard”) to pave way for the participationist claims and negotiations as evident in the above 
quote (“those people will be negotiating with them”) to facilitate accountability for human 
rights and sustainable environment.  
Furthermore, den Hond and de Bakker (2007, p.910) and Fitzgerald and Rodgers (2000, 
p.579) argued that the radical factions favoured decentralized activism that fostered 
grassroots activism because they believed that social change did not need the convergence 
of selected people as the main agent of change, but social change should emerge from the 
collective efforts of the ordinary people. In the Delta arena, the radicalist vehemently 
believed that change would emerge when the local people are adequately conscientized 
to be the drivers of the emancipatory and reformative changes they desire or by being 
proactive in problematizing unsustainable practices and demand for inclusive or local 
control at the local arenas. Fitzgerald and Rodgers (2000, p.584) citing Sellers (1973, 
p.117) argued that this tactic of engagement is called the “participatory democracy: local 
people working to develop the power to control the significant events that affected their 
lives.” The radicalist activism in the Delta arena were not only geared towards resolving 
the conflicts through extensive publicity but to give voices to the local people by setting 
up local or grassroots network of radical engagement. The radicalist assumed that 
extensive symbolic actions such as lobbying, protest, through conventional and social 
media, buying shares of contested corporations to speak at AGMs, visual evidence, 
publicity stunts, musical campaigns, documentaries of unsustainable practices and legal 
actions rather than dialogue through the collaboration of the local people (Joutsenvirta, 
2011; Davison, 2007; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Livesey, 2001). For instance, 
laNGOr4 argued  
“we are a community-driven organisation [radicalist]. […] Anything that has to be 
effective has to be communities driven. Anything that is communities’ driven 
would need to trickle down to communities, where they would have a fair share in 
every atom of extraction that goes on in the communities. So, anything that is 
outside the communities benefiting from resource extraction is totally not 
acceptable and we don’t look at that as effective way of accountability in terms of 
resource, governance and distribution.” 
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The radicalist argued that change would only emerge where there was an external pressure 
such as investor pressure group, communities, mass movement campaigns at the different 
arenas, international courts and supranational organisations to compel the corporations 
and the regulators (sometimes, they engage with the regulators) to implement the law, 
respect and protect human rights and to develop the region sustainably (see Thomson et 
al., 2015; Kneip, 2013). This was evident in the following quotes 
“We don’t sit with polluters [corporations] on the same table to discuss but we have 
engaged the regulatory agencies, we have engaged the communities, we have 
engaged other civil society groups on a roundtable to discuss… Are we going to 
negotiate the re-birth of Ken Saro-Wiwa? How people lost their farmlands? …No, 
we don’t negotiate with [corporations]. They have to do what is right. …It is not 
conditional! …We are very radical in our own approach to environmental justice… 
We cannot stand on the side of the corporations or government against the people. 
Whatever affects the people affects us. Whatever is going to be good for the people 
is what we are going to stand with.” (laNGOr4) 
On the other hand, the participationist believed in dialogic accountability and 
engagements with the corporations, the regulators, governance regimes and the 
communities. For example   
“…by gaining access to the oil companies, persuading them to become transparent. 
I can talk specifically about {name of corporation}99 because they are the biggest 
player in this region and they are the ones we have engaged with most of the 
time…” (laNGOr8) 
As evidenced in the above quotes, the radicalist ideologically viewed the corporations as 
the problem and should not be directly engaged in a dialogue to resolve the conflicts at 
the local arenas. They believed transformative changes would only emerge when they 
exerted significant leverage on the external groups such as the iaNGOs, international 
courts, shareholders’ activist groups, journalist, host government where they were 
registered to compel the corporations to change their modus operandi in the local arenas. 
They believed that before any revolutionary and emancipatory changes would emerge in 
the Delta, they had to problematize by “uncovering what is covered” through the unequal 
                                                          
99 It is not possible to provide the name of the corporations mentioned by laNGOr8 because it would compromise the 
anonymity and confidentiality agreement of this interviewee. 
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accountability and power relations in the “crony capitalist” system and by the 
perpetrators of environmental and human rights violations (Fitzgerald and Rodgers (2000, 
p.581); Bakre and Lauwo, 2016). Fitzgerald and Rodgers (2000) and den Hond and de 
Bakker (2007) argued that the radical factions [radicalist] were discredited or lacked 
validations from the corporations being challenged because they believed they had to be 
independent to criticise the powerful stakeholders. This supports the evidence from 
MNOCr1 and MNOCr2100 emphasizing that the radicalist had the choice of deciding what 
they reported and they [corporation] were mindful of those reports. They argued that their 
approaches to activism often morally delegitimised the corporations’ reputation as 
socially and environmentally irresponsible. For instance 
“…Some of those reports may not be fully reflective of the real situation but we are 
mindful of those reports and we work to ensure that we continuously improve our 
performance and our standards. […] These NGOs have the choice of determining 
what report they want to feed the public with but the public also have the 
opportunity to understand our perspective. We don’t go out publicly to beat our 
drums, but we provide opportunity for people to mine for the information that is 
necessary for them to access if they want to have that information.” (MNOCr1)  
The radicalist believed that transformative engagement would emerge through the 
publication of unsustainable practices (as shown in the quote above), empowering the 
communities to be their own agent of change and by creating a platform for litigations 
through their networks of engagement without undergoing a formal dialogic engagement 
with the corporations (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007). For example 
 “Civil society…are not unanimous in their approach of engagement with the oil 
companies. Groups such as {name of NGO}101 have given complete blanket boycott 
to oil companies and we will not simply engage for the fact that they need to show 
signs of change and signs of recognition of communities’ participation… The oil 
companies have been saying they are changing… I say they should tell me one thing 
they have done that has changed. Once they are not able to justify that, we are not 
able to engage.” (laNGOr3) 
                                                          
100 See section 5.2.2.2.1 
101 It is not possible to provide the name of the NGO because it would compromise the anonymity and confidentiality 
agreement of this interviewee. 
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On the other hand, the participationist believed that social and environmental change 
would emerge when they exercise significant leverage over the corporations by engaging 
them to be part of the solution to the conflicts of unsustainability within the local arenas 
(den Hond and de Bakker, 2007). Fitzgerald and Rodgers (2000) argued that the 
participationist gained credibility needed for emancipatory reforms through their dialogic 
approach. For instance, den Hond and de Bakker (2007, p.908) argued that the “the 
reformative [participationist] activist groups focused their energy on the issue of how 
firms in general may convincingly show that they have established high levels of 
corporate social change activities.” This supported the evident from MNOCr1 and 
MNOCr2 emphasizing that the participationist have gained credibility due to their 
dialogic approach because they pragmatically engaged the corporations to drive 
transparent and accountable social and environmental changes at the local arenas. For 
instance, MNOCr1 claimed 
“{name of NGOs}102 is an association of NGOs, who have come together to enforce 
standards of performance… We…have…a team set up whose responsibility is to 
work hand-in-hand with these NGOs to ensure that best practices are deployed. We 
hold periodic meetings with the NGOs…they challenge us on what they have 
observed independently, and we provide them update from our perspective. When 
we have workshops with local communities…they also come as independent 
participant… …it helps them to assess whether we are moving in the right direction 
or otherwise. That platform exists, and it raises participation… It also raises the 
stake on our part as well knowing that there are unbiased observers in what we do, 
it helps us to also position effectively.” (MNOCr1)      
Besides, engaging the corporations in a dialogic process to address unsustainable 
practices, the ‘participationist’ also believed in empowering the communities to drive the 
emancipatory and transformative changes they desired within this arena.103 This 
                                                          
102 Referring to a coalition of NGO. 
103 It is pertinent to note that during the fieldwork, some of the photographs and interviews’ findings were presented to 
some of the ‘participationist’ advocacy NGOs. The author’s intention was to make her findings known to them in order 
for them to be addressed at their stakeholders’ meetings with the corporations and the regulators. The author was 
informally informed by one of the laNGOr that her findings were presented to [name of corporation]’s director and 
they have agreed to address some of the problems identified during the fieldwork visits to polluted communities, 
especially on environmental pollution from oil spills. It is not possible to provide the details of the NGOs nor the 
specific photographs due to the confidentiality agreement. 
 
251 
 
participationist approach to transformative changes elucidated Bebbington et al., (2007, 
p.364) as explicated by Freire (1970) that 
“Dialogic change is initiated by an incremental process of working with groups with 
an initial shared experience, empowering them to embark on authentic engagement 
that exposes the contradictions in their lives and allow them to begin to organize, 
cooperate and unite with other groups to uncover common goals and shared truths. 
This process is essential if they are to transcend their situation. If change is to occur 
then similar process should be undertaken with the oppressors, working with them 
to recognise the dehumanizing and destructive nature of their actions. Once both 
groups uncover the common ground between them, then dialogic engagements can 
begin between these previously antagonist groups.” 
It is pertinent to emphasize that one of the participationist (laNGOr8) perceived he could 
reconstruct the ownership structure to reflect an inclusive ownership structure to make 
the corporations, the government and the indigenous people co-owners depending on how 
the oil industry affects them. 
“…I am interested in re-constructing those relationships. So that there can be good 
understanding between communities and the oil companies and also between 
communities and the government… if those relationships are not right and there is 
no transparency in those relationships, you get the kind of discontent that is often 
felt all around the region with the industry and the government.” (laNGOr8) 
He argued that as the corporations publish accounts to their shareholders and the 
government; likewise accounts of conducts should be envisaged as important to the local 
people where they operate because they directly or indirectly define their legitimate 
identities which were crucial for their survival and how they are perceived as 
(ir)responsible organisations (Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Tregidga and Milne, 
2006). The reconstruction of the ownership structure as argued by laNGOr8 could be 
through ensuring respectful dialogic accountability relationships and the respect and 
protection of the indigenous people’s rights (Brown, 2009; Dubnick, 2006; Gray, 2010). 
Thus, the ‘participationist’ laNGOs presumed that through effective stakeholders’ 
dialogue, the ownership structure and cantankerous relationship between the corporations 
and the indigenous people, and between the government and the indigenous people, on 
the other hand, could be reconstructed.  
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8.4.1.2. ‘HYBRID’, NGOS APPROACHES TO ACTIVISM  
The author also observed that some laNGOs within the Delta could be categorised as 
‘hybrid radical-participationist.’ The laNGOs within this spectrum believed in dialogic 
accountability relationships but also engaged in symbolic activism such as court actions, 
shareholders’ activism, mass movement, confrontational actions and campaigns when 
there was a deadlock or escalation of conflicts emerging from the dialogic engagement 
with the powerful stakeholders. The author observed that the laNGOs within this 
spectrum were also members of the coalition that believed in dialogue. For example, 
laNGOr1, 10, 14, 16 and laNGOWr9104 falls within this category. The author observed 
that one of the landmarks international court actions were undertaken by these laNGOs 
through their networks of engagement at the international arena.105 For example 
“No single approach is all-encompassing in terms of yielding the desired results 
but the mode of approach or the mechanisms will actually evolve over time. …it 
will graduate from very aggressive campaign, not that it will be violent in nature 
but stating it bluntly without any form of diplomacy and pointing fingers at the 
perpetrators…to a stage where the violators and the campaigners (the advocates) 
will have to sit together and discuss the issues in a very mutually respectable manner 
and there will be a time lapse to watch and see whether there will be an 
improvement in the way and manner the TNOCs do business here in respect to 
human rights. Back and forth dialogue while also ensuring that prerequisite data on 
human rights are generated in the region. So, there are different approaches to it. 
                                                          
104 There could be more laNGOs that fall within this spectrum but due to time and financial constraints, the author 
could not interview all the environmental and human rights advocacy NGOs operating within the Delta arena. Future 
research could explore this strategy to understand their ideologies. 
105 It is essential to highlight that majority of the iaNGOs interviewed falls within this hybridity classification. The 
author’s analysis revealed that they either move from radical activism to participatory activism to ensure that their 
demand for social and environmental changes were addressed by the corporations or the governance regimes at the 
local arenas through the collaboration of the laNGOs or their annex within the local arenas. For instance, 
Mileudefensie/Friends of the Earth in 2011 published a report similar to Shell’s annual report titled “Erratum to the 
annual report Royal Dutch Shell Plc Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 2010 Special edition.” This was 
presented to the Shareholders during their AGM to facilitate an emancipatory dialogue on behalf of the local arenas. 
This reporting style is referred to as Shadow Accounting, which is a typology of counter accounting or external 
accounting (Dey and Gibbon, 2014; Collision et al., 2010; Tregidga, 2017). 
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All the mechanisms definitely have their merit and demerits…” (laNGOr10) 
[emphasis added by author] 
Whichever the strategies to activism, underlining the ideologies of the laNGOs within 
this arena was that the corporation was an ‘organ of the society’ (see chapter 3). It is a 
corporate citizen that should respect the rights of others including its neighbours on 
environmental, accountability, governance and developmental issues regardless of its 
wealth maximisation objective (Sikka, 2011; Lauwo et al., 2016). The dis-alignment in 
the perception of corporate citizenship to respect human rights and do no harm, and the 
government duty to protect human rights and to do no harm meant that the communities’ 
people were definitely powerless, voiceless and marginalized in the Delta arena. These 
dilemmas were what facilitated the NGOs counter accounting to drive dialogue, challenge 
the imbalance in power and accountability relationships and to create a platform for an 
inclusive democratic engagement and transformative change emerging from the 
ineffectiveness of the governance regimes to enforce its rules and regulations.  
“…whichever approach, the governance structure need to be strengthened because 
the reason why we found ourselves in this situation…is because of the weak 
governance system. The government must provide direction, the government must 
drive the process, the government must ensure that the laws of the land are fully 
respected without that we will have a limited ground to work on.” (laNGOr10) 
 
8.4.2. COUNTER ACCOUNTING: NETWORKS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ACCOUNTABILITY, 
GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN AN ARENA  
8.4.2.1. COUNTER ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY, PROBLEMATIZING THE 
NEED TO GIVE AND DISCHARGE ACCOUNTS  
Accountability was presumed to be the underlying global discourse for human rights, 
engagement, CSR and sustainable development (Gray, 2010; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). 
Where accountability relationships are enshrined in corporate governance and the 
implementation of national and international laws, it would provide stakeholders with 
accountable information to facilitate an emancipatory dialogue for the advancement of 
human rights and sustainable development (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009). 
Where accountability, transparency and good governance were not enshrined in corporate 
governance and in the implementation of national and international laws, it would result 
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in human rights violations and unsustainable practices that could facilitate 
(non)confrontational radicalist or participationist activism or counter actions or counter 
accounts to drive social, economic and environmental changes within a conflict arena 
(Gallhofer et al., 2011, 2006; Joutsenvirta, 2011). In the Delta arena, the absence of 
accountability, transparency and good governance mechanisms appeared to be normal 
practice that facilitated the construction of confrontational systematic, partisan, contra-
governing and dialogic counter accounts, counter audits and even counter actions by the 
laNGOs through a knowledge-based evidence and collaborations with national and 
international (non)human rights organisations and audience (Thomson et al., 2015). For 
instance   
“…we’ve documented some human rights violations within the ambit of BHRs, 
violations of the rights of communities by the TNOCs. …with Amnesty 
International, we have been able to research and publish {title of the report}106, 
which is a great violation of the rights of the people when the TNOCs allow oil spill 
to linger for months. It is a blatant disregard for national remediation laws of the 
land. We’ve also co-authored a report that we refer to as {title}. {title} is a report 
showcasing the level of disregard for corporate accountability in the region when it 
comes to environmental issues. The TNCs have neglected their responsibilities in 
terms of protecting the environment, restoring the degraded environment in the 
Niger Delta and that has impacted on other rights like land right, water, food and 
health, virtually all the human rights.” (laNGOr10) 
The need to ‘give an account’ and be seen to ‘discharge accurate accounts’ facilitated 
advocacies and the publication of counter accounts in the Delta arena besides ensuring 
the respect for human rights, inclusive communities’ participation in resource control and 
sustainable development. Shearer (2002, p.543-544) argued that “to give an account is to 
present one’s identity in relation to others and to the circumstances within which one acts, 
and in so doing to transform one’s efforts and exertions into a power that is subject to 
ethical evaluation.” To give an account of oneself goes beyond the economic obligations 
of accountability to a moral and ethical obligation to give accounts that considered the 
intersubjective obligation of an ethical reflection of what was accounted to the others 
without an agency relationship with the accountor (Gray et al., 2014b; Messner, 2009). 
                                                          
106 It is not possible to provide the title of these reports because it would compromise the anonymity and confidentiality 
agreement of this interviewee. 
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In addition, Shearer (2002, p.545) as stated in Schweiker (1993, p.234) defined “giving 
an account” as “providing reasons for character and conduct, ones held to be 
understandable to others and thereby rendering a life intelligible and meaningful.” For 
instance, laNGOr4, 7, 11 and 2 buttress these needs to ‘give accounts’ and to ‘discharge 
accurate accounts’ in their response to addressing how they held the corporations and the 
government to account for the development of the arena. Their contra-governing counter 
accounts (Thomson et al., 2015) posited that the government does not have accurate 
accounts of the volume and quantity of crude oil being extracted and they argued that it 
was a deliberate action by the government and the corporations not to be morally and 
ethically accountable and transparent to the other stakeholders, who were not direct co-
owners of the oil industry. This was evident in the following quotes 
“Oil extracted in this nation is not properly metered. Nigeria does not really know 
how much oil is being extracted on a daily basis. …we don’t know how much oil 
is produced, we don’t know how much oil is dumped into the environment. You 
cannot be accountable if you don’t know what you are accounting for.” (laNGOr2) 
[emphasis added by author] 
“…we have instigated a campaign to say that they should publish what they pump. 
What they only tell us is that ‘hey we were able to sell or oil production is about 
2.4millions barrels per day’. That is what they have told us but let us know from 
available statistics by having metering systems at every point of the oil production 
circuit and exportation circuit. We need to know how much is taken off the coast of 
Nigeria. We need to know how much is taken off the ground. …we are asking them 
[corporations] and also the federal government of Nigeria to please publish what 
they pump, we don’t want to know what they pay. From what they pump, we can 
be able to determine what they pay.” (laNGOr4) [emphasis added by author] 
Accountability increases transparency vis-verse (Gray, 1992; Roberts, 2009; Cho et al., 
2015) because it makes visible (for criticism) sustainable and unsustainable practices. 
This was considered by the laNGOs as one of the requirement for an effective 
implementation of the regulatory framework, the respect for human rights, engagement 
and sustainable development. For example, laNGOr4, 7 and 16 claimed 
“Over the years…I have never seen any act of transparency; even pretending to be 
transparent… I have not seen it and things have refused to change because the 
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operators…and their collaborators within the Nigerian State know what they are 
doing.” (laNGOr7) 
laNGOrs argued that accountability and transparency was the bedrock of their advocacies 
and it drove their activism in order that power to demand accountability should also 
reside with the people through an inclusive and dialogic accountability platform (Brown 
et al., 2015; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008). This supports (Thomson and 
Bebbington, 2005) argument that if the power to demand and disseminate account reside 
with the corporations, there would be limited stakeholders’ engagement.  
“…most of the reports [counter accounts] that have been released possibly have 
resulted in a few changes over the years. I will not say that we are still where we 
were many years ago. […] the…advocacy for transparency and accountability and 
also participation…has yielded results in the areas that the companies begin to take 
actions that they were not taken before. …they try to behave as if they are more 
transparent and accountable than before. […] it [counter account] has somehow 
made the companies to be responsive to an extent but we still need more sincerity 
on their part and more commitment to get those things implemented the way it is 
supposed to be.” (laNGOWr9) 
Counter accounting(s) enabled the advocacy NGOs to confront the oil corporations and 
the government on the need to be transparent not just to themselves but be seen as 
transparent to the communities. This according to Dillard (2014, p.238) is the ‘ethic of 
accountability’ which should govern the stakeholders’ engagement. According to Dillard 
(2014), the ethic of accountability requires a moral act to give an account and be seen to 
discharge account of sustainable and unsustainable practices to an ongoing community of 
stakeholders whose responsibility it was to consciously interpret the historical and 
physical context with which such an account was discharged. To drive the need to give 
an account, there is a need to establish dialogic processes for an acceptable standard of 
behaviour through effective monitoring mechanisms that would promote the ‘account 
giving’ and ‘account receiving’ rhetoric within a dynamic context (Blackburn et al., 2014; 
Gray et al., 2014b; Parker, 2014). To achieve the dialogic processes for an effective 
accountability mechanism, there has to be a moral and ethical dimension to provide an 
account of conducts to other stakeholders for which the corporations and the government 
are held responsible (Robert, 2009; Messner, 2009). For instance, Shearer (2002, p.543) 
argued that it is the moral responsibility to the other stakeholders that shapes an entity’s 
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accountability relationships and the accounting practices to discharge accountability. 
Furthermore, Schweiker (1993, p.233) postulated that the moral or ethical dimension of 
accountability to the others is to “act on the principle of equal respect for others, to treat 
them as ends in themselves” but the advocacy NGOs argued that the moral dimensions 
of account giving was missing in the local arenas and this facilitated the publication of 
counter accounts to fill the gaps. This was supported by laNGOr12, 6 and 8. For instance 
laNGOr8  
“The companies should be more accountable within and also without. Within 
should be to their shareholders and without to the world because they are citizens. 
What gives them the licence to operate is because they have presented themselves 
as worthy citizens, worthy of sharing the space with the local communities, worthy 
of sharing the resources with the country and the communities… …without that 
they should not have any licence to operate there. If they have a licence to operate 
by their reason of being a social entity, there being a corporate entity with a social 
responsibility, then they have to be accountable to the other stakeholders, who are 
not their shareholders.”  
Holistic and ethical corporate accountability and engagements for human rights and 
sustainable development to all stakeholders (including the non-shareholders) could drive 
the respect for human rights and sustainable development because the corporations were 
seen as an organ of the society (McPhail and Ferguson, 2016; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). 
However, laNGOrs postulated that the problem in the Delta arena was not the lack of 
resources rather it revolved around the ‘ethic of accountability’, which involved account 
giving and being seen to discharge accurate accountabilities towards protecting and 
respecting the rights of the local powerless indigenous people (Dillard, 2014; Gray et al., 
1995, 2014b). The laNGOrs argued that the corporations did not have a formal role to 
give accounts to the indigenous people in the Delta arena that transcend their formal 
policy statement or corporate governacne requirements (Gallhofer et al., 2011). For 
instance, Shell in its (2011a) webinar dialogue with numerous stakeholders argued that  
“Shell contributes to the Nigerian economy by generating revenues for government 
as well as pay taxes and royalties. …Shell companies in Nigeria pay a statutory 
contribution to a regional development agency- the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) to develop the Niger Delta.”  
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According to the laNGOrs, for whatever reasons the resources/incomes remitted to the 
region by the corporations either through their statutory contribution to NDDC and other 
parastatals107 or either the 13% derivative income108 established for the development of 
the region failed to translate into sustainable development for the indigenous people.  
“…the Niger Delta environment…is dead. We cannot say that the environment can 
yield anything productive but it is blessed with manpower…and more resources. 
Yet…the Niger Delta has lost its opportunities…by virtue of having a Ministry of 
Niger Delta, …the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), …13% 
derivation, …DESOPADEC, EDSOGPADEC.109 Have these trickled down to 
development for the region? …Have there been an opportunity to develop? No! …It 
is not about creating all those agencies and expecting that at the end of the day, the 
agencies will automatically develop the region, No! I was reading in the news 
yesterday; they were asking NDDC to refund ₦183b for contracts unexecuted.” 
(laNGOr4) 
Where developmental programmes did not translate to better the lived lives of the local 
people, that “economic choices cross over into human rights’ violations very quickly 
where there is an expansive notion of human rights” (Gallhofer et al., 2011; Watt, 2015). 
Counter accounting and their activism were not just to ensure that the powerful arena 
participants give accounts by monitoring and reporting their unsustainable practices, but 
they embarked on transparency and accountability campaigns through sensitizing, 
empowering and engaging the indigenous people to hold public officials accountable 
through budget monitoring. This was because there was a shift in the perception of the 
local people that the government that had received taxes, royalties, 60-50% of its stake in 
the joint ventures should be held accountable for development and poverty reduction in 
the Delta (Ite, 2005). This shift in perception affected the sovereignty of the government 
                                                          
107 For instance, the Ministry of the Niger Delta Affairs. 
108 The 13% derivative income is the extra revenue allocated to the oil producing States in the Niger Delta from the 
Federation Account. This extra income is allocated on the basis that it is equitable to allocate 13% of the total revenue 
generated from oil revenue considering the resources and revenue generated from the oil producing States (Odje, 2016; 
Ogheneochuko, 2013). 
109 DESOPADEC is an acronym that implies Delta State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission while 
EDSOGPADEC implies Edo State Oil and Gas Producing Areas Development Commission. These commissions act 
as an interventionist agency for sustainable economic development, especially on the provision of infrastructures such 
as healthcare, roads and waterways facilities, and manpower development through education in the oil-producing 
communities of Delta State and Edo State respectively. 
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to get its governance right by providing the social, economic and environmental needs of 
the people (Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007).  
“…we concluded that it is not the absence of resources but because the citizens 
have failed to hold the public officials accountable for mismanagement, corruption, 
nepotism and so on. All these combine to deny citizens of what should be the 
benefits accruable to this very blessed region. So, we decided that one of the ways 
of ensuring development was to embark on the transparency and accountability 
campaign to hold public officers accountable to the people. So, we formed a 
network called the Niger Delta Citizens and Budget Platform.” (laNGOr6) 
 
8.4.2.2. COUNTER ACCOUNTING, BRIDGING ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE 
GAPS  
To address the problem of being seen as accountable in giving account and being seen to 
discharge accountabilities, the laNGOs’ often strived to close or bridge the gaps in the 
implementation of recognised regulatory instruments of which the Nigerian State and the 
oil corporations are signatories. For instance, Ruggie (2007) argued that the government 
play a significant role, but they need to be joined by other social actors to achieve the 
regulatory institutions’ objective of addressing human rights violations and unsustainable 
practices. Evidence revealed that the laNGOs could reduce the ‘accountability and 
governance gaps’ by initiating independent counter audits and dialogues on 
accountability and the human rights discourse among the arena participants and 
supranational organisations such as the United Nation. The independent counter audits 
entailed the observations of non-implementation of the BHR principles or other human 
rights frameworks in the Delta. This was evident in the following quotes 
“They are…laws adopted from these {global principles} but the companies will not 
{implement them because} they don’t have any interest {in their implementation}s 
and the people make a mistake when they create these very extremely loose 
frameworks and expect oil companies to abide by it. […] The Nigerian government 
make that mistake. […] You cannot have such un-enforced principles that don’t 
have government backing. They don't have backings that stem out of the Nigeria 
constitutions to enforce and ensure that they are applicable…” (laNGOr6) 
The laNGOrs unanimously agreed that the frameworks for the implementation of these 
principles have not been established through the legislative or constitutional backings. 
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The laNGOrs argued that the corporations and even the Nigerian government pay lip-
service to their implementation despite ratifying them for diplomacy and legitimacy 
purposes. This supports Gouldson and Bebbington (2007, p.9) argument that corporations 
and government make “a rhetorical commitment” to engage in this discourse without the 
capabilities of the State to regulate or govern corporate activities. The laNGOrs argued 
that where the enforcement regimes to protect human rights and ensure effective 
implementation by the powerful stakeholders are not established and funded by the 
Nigerian government, then the moral obligation of corporations to do no harm would not 
be achieved. This supports Cragg (2012), Ramasastry (2015) and Wettstein (2012b) 
argument that there should be collective and moral obligations to protect, respect and 
prevent harm to human rights by the State and the corporations. This ‘shift in regulatory 
and accountability requirement’ implied that all stakeholders including the State and the 
corporations should take necessary procedures to manage and prevent human rights risk 
by not causing harm where they operate to avoid creating ‘accountability gaps’ and 
‘governance gaps’ that would hinder the realization of human rights (McPhail and 
Ferguson, 2016; Taylor et al., 2009).  
“…the companies are more powerful than the Nigerian government because 
Nigerian government have signed on to these voluntary principles…but they have 
not been able to adopt it… Even the companies themselves have also signed on to 
it. I know that Shell, Mobil and others have signed on to it but is it being respected? 
…if you go to {name of corporations}’s website, they tell you so many beautiful 
things but is this the reality on the ground?” (laNGOr4)  
“…if those guiding principles…are being adhered to, there would have been a good 
relationship…in terms of the environment…human rights…business 
ethics,…everything. It is about a mutual thing {relationship} for both parties. If 
they are adhered to and respected, then we will have a better situation than now…” 
(laNGOr11) 
The lack of engagement by the corporations and States led to the debate for a global treaty 
on human rights (de Schutter, 2016; Lopez and Shea, 2016). However, the laNGOs 
translated the lack of engagement with national and international regulatory 
[(non)voluntary] frameworks into contra-governing counter accounts through their 
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Universal Periodic Review coalition110 to identify gaps in the implementation of the 
regulatory framework to engage political institutions at the international arenas. For 
instance, they evaluated the implementation of the regulatory framework by the 
corporations in terms of accountability, gender and child rights, internally displaced 
people (IDP), refugees and the implementation of these instruments in other sectors of 
Nigeria from 2009 to 2013. The focus of these reviews was to reveal the absence of 
political will by the State on the implementation of regulatory frameworks. Their contra-
governing counter accounts (Thomson et al., 2015) were to delegitimize the institutional 
works of the State and the corporations as willing parties on the implementation of the 
BHR frameworks in the arena. Their counter accounts also highlighted the need for 
government to relinquish its ‘captured control’ of the oil industry to drive compliance 
despite being co-owners through the joint ventures (Amnesty International, 2011, 2009).  
“It is not uncommon for a government to be a partner in a business that it regulates. 
However, unless robust, independent regulatory and oversight mechanisms are in 
place, conflicts of interest can result in violations of human rights.” (Amnesty 
International 2009, p.42) 
However, this shareholding relationship was described as a ‘conspiracy’ because it 
limited the ability of regulatory regimes to independently regulate the oil industry (see 
chapter 6 and 7). For instance, World Bank (1995b, p.45) argued that ‘this situation has 
resulted in the government inadequately regulating oil pollution while at the same time, 
being party too much of the oil-related environmental problems of the Delta.’ Arguably 
they were self-regulating their activities and that limited their power to regulate and 
subsequently encourage the corporations to act without supervision (Pegg and Zabbey, 
2013; Obi, 2009). For instance  
“I am yet to understand why no company had been punished the way human beings 
are punished for genocide… environmental crime is worse than that one […] It is a 
very high-level conspiracy against the citizens that are poor, that are helpless. The 
                                                          
110 The Niger Delta UPR Coalition was established by MOSOP and two other advocacy NGOs to document and publish 
reports on the governance, business and human rights violations of corporations and other business in Nigeria. The 
laNGOs claimed that these reports were used by the UN Working Group for their Universal Periodic Review 
programme. As at when the interviews were conducted in 2015, the laNGOs argued that they have published 4 seminal 
reports from 2009 to 2013 and were used for the periodic review of Nigeria. 
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government collaborating with the multinationals to take over what belongs to 
them. It is sad.” (laNGOr7) [emphasis added by author] 
Subsequently, this affected how the corporations respected and accounted for 
environmental pollution and human rights violations where they operated (Obi, 2009; 
Pegg and Zabbey, 2013). The laNGOrs argued that where environmental pollution was 
not adequately addressed, this bequeathed on the indigenous people no other option than 
to seek habitable communities or live in the polluted environment resulting in high 
mortality rate through their exposure to the polluted environment, contaminated water 
and food. This was the case in Goi (see Appendix 5),111 a predominantly fishing and 
farming community in Ogoniland, where as a result of the oil spill incidents in 2003 and 
2004 from SPDC’s facilities, the indigenous people were requested to seek shelter in 
neighbouring communities and they argued that they have received little or no support 
from the government or the corporation (Onukwugha, 2015).  
Furthermore, it appeared that the ownership structure did not only affect the human rights 
of the indigenous people, but it restricted how corporations gave accounts of their 
exploratory and extractive activities to ‘the other stakeholders’, who did not have a direct 
agency relationship with them.  
“Companies just declare what they want to do, make financial reports to the 
government and to their shareholders and that is all. We don’t see the benefit of 
what they are doing. That is not supposed to be like that. It is supposed to be 
something that anybody can verify publicly and then you can get the information 
you are looking for.” (laNGOr16) 
Additionally, the relationship could curb or limit the potential liabilities of the 
corporations, especially where gross environmental misconduct was observed because 
the government would remit 55-60% of any potential liability to the affected communities 
or person (UNEP, 2011). This assertion was supported by laNGOr14 and 2 that even 
though the government was a shareholder in the oil industry, that should not exonerate 
                                                          
111 The author visited this uninhabited community while collecting data for this study in August 2015. On entering the 
deserted community through a tiny track road (the only road that led to the community), the stench of hydrocarbon was 
undeniable. She photographed, went to the riverbank to observe the oil spill and the state of the disserted community. 
Finally, a focus group interview was conducted with prominent members of this community.  
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them from their fiduciary responsibility to protect and regulate the activities of the 
industry. 
“…Even if we have the contrivance of the Nigerian government also holding 
equities in the companies… …they are also stakeholders in the companies and that 
explains why, if they are reluctant to act but that does not excuse the primary role 
of government as regulators of the activities of this industry.” (laNGOr14) 
Furthermore, the laNGOs claimed government absolved itself of its primary 
responsibility to protect the rights of its citizens and to implement its laws by establishing 
parastatals, which were poorly funded. The laNGOs problematized the need for 
government to get its governance right by empowering those regulatory parastatals to 
function independently and effectively. According to laNGOrs, the corporations were 
more powerful than the government because they had an overbearing influence on the 
regulators who were not properly funded to regulate (see chapter 6 and 7).  
“NOSDRA most times don’t have the facilities and they depend on the oil 
companies’ facilities to do their work. In that circumstance, how can NOSDRA 
hold the companies accountable? When you [NOSDRA] are depending on my 
scientific equipment, …on my flight…” (laNGOr15) 
The advocacy NGOs (iaNGOs and laNGOs) argued that the regulatory parastatals should 
be independent, exclusively empowered and funded to address environmental and human 
rights violations. However, the advocacy NGOs claimed there were provisions in 
NOSDRA Act [2006 (11)], which required the Federal, State and Local government to 
provide the required funds and resources for them to operate effectively, but the funds 
and resources were often not provided by the government. They argued that the regulators 
often relied on the corporations for the logistics required, thereby compromising their 
independent, regulatory and accountability roles to drive sustainable development (see 
chapter 7). The laNGOrs expressed their frustration over the inability of the regulators to 
conduct their regulatory activities in the following quotes: 
“that is the tragedy about the regulators…about the federal and state governments 
that they have not financed these regulatory agencies to do the work they are 
supposed to do. If you come to Yenegoa the capital city of Bayelsa, the comptroller 
of the federal ministry of environmental agency, he stays in a little office, he has no 
computer system… …he cries that he has been abandoned and if he wants to send 
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a mail, he has to leave his office…[to]…find a cybercafé to send a mail to Abuja. 
[…] He has no car or way of transporting himself. It is only if {names of 
corporations} or any other oil companies come to him and say there is a spill, we 
want to take you to see what is happening…” (laNGOr1). 
“there is another part, where it says that the percentage of the national budget goes 
to NOSDRA for their equipment to act. Do they have that? They don’t have that…. 
They have to wait for the oil companies to take them to wherever there is an oil 
spill…” (laNGOr4) 
A review of the NOSDRA Act [2006 (12)]112 did not stipulate that the corporations should 
provide the logistics required for the regulator’s activities. The NGOs’ partisan counter 
accounts were to express their frustration at ensuring that government get its regulatory 
regimes right by equipping the regulators to be effective at regulating the activities of the 
oil industry to protect human rights and ensure a healthy environment for sustainable 
development (Thomson et al., 2015). 
The shareholding relationships and the absence of effective regulatory regimes were 
described by the laNGOrs as a conspiracy against the people. The laNGOrs revealed that 
the governance gaps created a platform that enabled the laNGOs to conscientize the 
indigenous people on the need for their human rights to be protected and respected by the 
powerful stakeholders (Freire, 2002; Bebbington et al., 2007). They argued that the duty 
of the State was to protect its citizens but in the Delta arena, that ability ‘to protect’ was 
argued to have been hindered by the ownership structure of the oil industry that inhibited 
the implementation of these regulatory frameworks. laNGOr5 argued  
“We came to look at some issues that need to be addressed… …We were concerned 
that some of these instruments are just documentary positions as far as reality is 
concerned in this part of the world. …our understanding is based on closing those 
                                                          
112 NOSDRA Act [2006 (12)] claimed “the Agency may, from time to time, apply the proceeds of the funds established 
in pursuance of Section 11 of this Act: 
(a) To the cost of administration of the Agency;  
(b) … 
(c) To the payment of the salaries, fees or other remuneration or allowances, gratuities and pensions, and other 
benefits payable to the officers and other employees of the Agency… 
(d) For the development and maintenance of any property vested in or owned by the Agency; and 
(e) For and in connection with all or any of its functions under this Act.” 
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gaps, making sure that the citizens actually get the benefits of the intended goals of 
these existing instruments and that has to do with not just oil companies and 
citizens, and even State agencies and citizens. […] These, in a nutshell, is what we 
understand as a platform for engaging either providing awareness, enlightening or 
sensitization or actually getting involved in bringing some of the envisaged benefits 
and goals of those instruments to the grass root. So, that people can realize their 
rights.” [emphasis added by author] 
 
8.4.2.3. COUNTER ACCOUNTING: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE   
Empirical analysis revealed that the notion of power, accountability, and sustainable 
development in the Delta arena required a massive political will for reforms. The laNGOs 
argued that the political will to address unequal power relationships and unsustainable 
practices in the Delta were missing. Their independent activism, systematic, partisan and 
contra-governing counter accounts to speak truth to power serves as a technology to 
address the issues of oil spills, gas flaring, poor waste management, unequal power 
relationship, human rights violations, lack of good governance and poor institutional 
framework, engagement and development to facilitate the enactment of the reforms 
required for dialogue and sustainable environment (Solomon and Thomson, 2009; 
Tregidga et al., 2015; Laine and Vinnari, 2017). 
“We have a case of frequent oil spills in the Niger Delta and we have been 
campaigning for decades… …it is looking as if the civil society is not making any 
progress, but the take-home message is that for being consistent by speaking truth 
to power; the issue of gas flaring, the issue of oil spill…remains a public 
discourse. So, if civil society was not there, those issues would not even be spoken 
of.” (laNGOr3) [emphasis added by author] 
It is expedient to explicate that the notion of power did not ostensibly depend on 
accountability relationships existing among stakeholders to give and receive accounts of 
conduct, but it could also be present in accountability relationships (Gray et al., 2014b; 
Parker, 2014). The notion of power could define what accounts should be given to exert 
influence or authority over others and how it would be interpreted by the others, 
especially where significant inequalities and repressive relationship existed among the 
stakeholders (Dubnick, 2006; Koppell, 2005). Power could be an abstraction of positive 
or negative influence over others with or without defined accountability relationships. 
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Gray et al., (2014b, p.9) argued that complications arise within an accountability 
relationship when the obligation to render accounts and the responsibility to give accounts 
gave rise to the exercise of power. Where there is a significant difference in power, it is 
pertinent to recognise that there could be the residual power to demand accounts by and 
on behalf of others, who might not have a defined relationship with the accountor. This 
residual power could drive radical or participatory changes in the accountability 
relationship to address the inequalities and the repressive relationship ensuing from the 
stakeholders exerting significant negative influence over the others. This residual power 
to demand accounts from the powerful arena participants in order to address inequalities 
on behalf of those whose accountability relationship depends on it is what Gray et al., 
(2014b, p.10) called ‘speaking truth to power’ or ‘interstitial accounts’ (pp.12-13). 
However, Thomson et al., (2015, p.814) viewed this as ‘contra-governing external 
accounts’ with an underlying motive of addressing unequal and repressive power 
relationships by critiquing the ideology of those in power with the intention of 
problematizing and proffering knowledge-based solution. 
The laNGOs contra-governing accounts and their advocacies represented an account 
giving mechanism that speaks truth to power. This signified a paradigm shift from the 
traditional accounting that promote agency relationships convenient to improve 
shareholders’ (and even the government) wealth to a form of accounts that confront the 
powerful arena participants with the “truths” of its multiple and negative actions on the 
lives of those (with)without a direct agency relationship, with a view to engage and 
address unsustainable practices (Shearer, 2002; Tregidga, 2017; Laine and Vinnari, 
2017). Within this arena, counter accounts of the unsustainable practices could be viewed 
as a technology “of control and surveillance […] of the powerful on behalf of the 
oppressed and dispossessed” (see Gray et al., 2014b) for an effective accountability 
mechanism and governance to drive sustainable development and human rights needs of 
the vulnerable, oppressed and the dispossessed (Apostol, 2015; Gallhofer et al., 2011).  
Sinclair (1995) argued that to increase accountability, we need to understand how it was 
constructed by, and extracted from, those that are held accountable. Accounting for the 
others and on behalf of the others required a deliberate effort to be seen as accountable 
and transparent when engaging. The laNGOrs argued that they have demanded accounts 
from the corporations and government to understand how their accounts were 
constructed. For instance 
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“…we have also argued that there must be transparency around the volume of oil 
spilt. We need to know how it is determined. The usual practice that the team get 
to the field and the owner of the facility will be the one to tell us the volume that 
was spilled through visual assessment without any form of scientific calculation is 
totally unacceptable. …There must be a traceable way of doing it…” (laNGOr10) 
Furthermore, the laNGOs contended that to get the governance right and to get the 
corporations to respect human rights, they problematized the need to ensure corporations 
do not apply double standard in the Delta arena by reinforcing the need for NOSDRA and 
DPR to regulate independently and effectively. The laNGOs’ problematized the need for 
NOSDRA to regulate independently by given specific examples of where they were 
ignored by citing the Bonga oil spill of 2011, a spill that occurred offshore but affected 
350 communities. Shell claimed 40,000 barrels of crude oil was spilt while its workers 
were offloading crude into a tanker (Vidal, 2011b). This oil spill was declared the worst 
of oil spill within this region because it drastically affected the livelihood of the coastal 
communities that depend on the natural resources for survival. Dodondawa (2015) and 
Onwuemenyi (2015) argued that Shell was sanctioned by NOSDRA, but Shell declined 
payment and neither provided relief packages to the indigenous people that could not 
afford to meet their needs due to the spill.113  
“NOSDRA in 2014 issued a notification of sanction to the oil company with regard 
to the Bonga spill incident but it has yet neither paid compensation to the affected 
shoreline communities nor provided relief materials to them…” (Onwuemenyi, 
2015) 
“…even if you have released 40000 barrels into the ocean before you knew… we 
can only describe that as dastardly irresponsible. Offending company should have 
been held to account for that… […]NOSDRA penalized them by asking them to 
pay 5billion; they just laughed it off… Even when the President lent his voice, 
nothing happened. …the capacity to monitor effectively is still a long way from 
being sufficient.” (laNGOr2) 
                                                          
113 The incumbent President of Nigeria authorized the Attorney General of Nigeria, the Minister for Justice and 
NOSDRA to commence legal action against Shell to seek redress for the indigenous people and the 350 communities 
that were affected by the Bonga oil spill (This Day, 2016). See http://allafrica.com/stories/201605040647.html  
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“We feel that it is not that they lack capacity but they need the power to act, they 
need the power to be able to take decisions whenever it occurs and we also expect 
that government compel the oil companies to respect NOSDRA if they are fined.” 
(laNGOr4) [emphasis added by author] 
Furthermore, laNGOs problematized the need for NOSDRA to regulate unhindered by 
citing a specific example of where they were ignored. For instance, they argued that the 
verdict issued by the Federal High Court of Benin in 2005 (see chapter 7) on gas flaring 
was ignored despite its negative impact on the Nigerian economy (Eboh, 2014; Social 
Actions, 2009a).  
“…Since 1984, gas flaring has been illegal in Nigeria, but gas flaring goes on 
because the law allowed for corporations to pay a fine and the fine is a very tiny 
fraction of the economic value of gas and the gas does not belong to them, it belongs 
to the nation. …they just keep…wasting over $2billion worth of gas every year. 
Not just economic waste but wasting lives in the process…” (laNGOr2) 
“We keep saying that the laws in Nigeria are sufficient but…NOSDRA need to 
have power. We cannot have a situation where a law court would ask a company to 
stop gas flaring… For 10years, the oil companies have not listened to that 
judgement. We need to have a government that can act when the court speaks…” 
(laNGOr4) [emphasis added by author] 
It was obvious that the associated gas flare could be harnessed and converted to gas 
turbines for electricity but Aaron (2012) argued that it makes good business sense to flare 
gas because it was cheaper to flare than to harness associated gas. The social, economic 
and environmental costs of not harnessing gas could be argued as a violation of human 
rights to life, healthy environment and means of livelihood (Gallhofer et al., 2011; Lauwo 
et al., 2016). This assertion was supported by laNGOr1, 2, 3, 6, 8 and 14  
“…If we can utilise the gas we are burning every day into small units of power to 
various communities, then the entire region would be lite up and we know what 
Nigerians can do when there is electricity. If we can get electricity to the various 
parts of this region, that would be a big stimulator of the economy that it would be 
almost impossible for anybody to deny the fact.” (laNGOr8)  
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“…they [corporations] are operating as a government or as super-government 
because how can in a lawful society presided over by a government; the Court 
would take a decision and it is the responsibility of the government and its agencies 
to enforce but the company just ignore and nothing happens… The only deviation 
from that is the breakthrough that Zabbey114 and his group did and that was in the 
UK’s jurisdiction” (laNGOr14) 
The deviation was in respect of the out of court settlement of Bodo vs Shell case in the 
UK on the 7th January 2015, which was due to two massive oil spills in 2008 and 2009 
(see chapter 6 and 7). This case was instigated by the Centre for the Environment, Human 
Rights and Development (CEHRD) and supported by Amnesty International on behalf of 
15,600 indigenous people of the Bodo community in Ogoniland. Shell settled with the 
sum of £55m (Aba, 2015; LeighDay, 2015; Vidal, 2015). This was a victory for the 
victims of corporates’ human rights abuse especially for those who could not seek judicial 
accountability and redress within their jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the laNGOrs argued 
that the settlement did not reflect the damage to the natural resources and the environment 
which the people rely on for their sustenance. laNGOr7 claimed 
“…they have given them money…but it is not commensurate with the level of 
devastation that Bodo community experienced… Will that be compared to the 
money that the people would have gotten from their land? You can’t compare that… 
So, they can’t say that the people have been settled… We just want them to restore 
the environment to its former state so that people can go back to their fishing and 
farming business that will put food on their table and put money in their pocket so 
that they can send their children to school.” 
Despite this counter-argument, this settlement was to re-enforce the need for corporations 
to ensure effective accountability, environmental management and community relations 
and CSR strategies that would respect the rights of indigenous people and communities 
where they operate (Chakravarti, 2015). The success from this case is a symbolic re-
enforcement that the corporations are not independent of laws in their home country 
regardless of the ineffectiveness of the laws where they operate, especially in developing 
countries. Additionally, where the Nigerian government fails to hold them accountable 
for negligence or human rights violations then redress could be sought outside the 
                                                          
114 Zabbey is the director of the Centre for the Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD). CEHRD is 
one of the local advocacy NGOs.  
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Nigerian jurisdiction on behalf of the indigenous people and communities whose human 
rights have been violated by the lack of accountability and the ineffectiveness of the 
governance regimes. Finally, this putative victory was to emphasize the ineffectiveness 
of the judiciary process and for governance to get its accountability and governance right 
to protect the rights of its citizens as specified in its laws (national or international), to 
drive good corporate behaviour and sustainable development. For instance,  
“Accountability means there has to be the existence of security and rule of law. That 
is where the narratives in social sciences is changing… Security means that both 
government, security institutions and their law enforcement institutions are 
accountable. […] So, if there is no security, if the security is weak and the rule of 
law is not functional or not effective; you cannot hold anybody to order.” 
(laNGOr16)       
 
8.4.3. COUNTER ACCOUNTING: DELEGITIMISING ACCOUNTS, DIALOGIC ACCOUNTS AND 
ENGAGEMENT 
8.4.3.1. COUNTER ACCOUNTING: NETWORKS FOR DIALOGIC ACCOUNTS AND ENGAGEMENT 
Counter accounts problematize the limitations in dialogic accounts and engagement in an 
arena where there are unsustainable practices, poor accountability relationships, unequal 
power relations, and human rights violations to speak truth to power (Dey et al., 2011; 
Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014). The radicalist, participationist and the hybrid radical-
participationist laNGOs collectively problematized the lack of a recognised dialogic 
accountability mechanism between the corporations and the communities. This is because 
dialogic accountability could help redefine the extent through which underlying tensions 
and conflict of interests for sustainable practices and accountability engagements could 
be accommodated to reduce incongruent social relations arising because of power 
differences, accountability gaps or stakeholders lack of identities (Everett, 2004; Brown, 
2009). The laNGOs forged dialogic networks and coalitions of engagement between the 
corporations and communities. The dialogic counter accounts network appeared to be in 
two stages; the first involves enlightening and empowering communities experiencing the 
social, economic and environmental rights violations to engage with the powerful arena 
participants. Second, the laNGOs built dialogic counter accounting networks with 
iaNGOs to be able to engage within this controversial arena because the iaNGOs could 
exercise significant leverage on the international audience and institutional investors to 
hold the powerful stakeholders to account and engage with the local communities 
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(Spence, 2009; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007). Nevertheless, Bebbington et al., (2007, 
p.360) argued that the dialogic approach is “often seen as more legitimate because the 
involvement of various publics creates the possibility of the inclusion of previously 
marginalized groups.” Using this strategy, the laNGOs were able to establish dialogic 
networks of engagement to legitimise their counter accounts, counter audit and 
counteractions within this arena and outside the Delta to give voice to the marginalised 
indigenous people. For instance 
“Our mission is to forge a common link with the rural communities in the Niger 
Delta to equip, research, do advocacy campaign. Equipping them [referring to 
communities] with the basic knowledge of their problems, helping them to solve 
the problems themselves in a non-violence manner. So, we have been involved in 
research, …have been collaborating with both national and international 
organisations that share the same vision with us and share the same core values with 
us.” (laNGOr10) 
“…these are narratives that are used to provoke the conscience of the public, to get 
the media, to get the government, to get the international communities, to get 
everybody to understand that this is not something you do to people and expect 
them to live.” (laNGOr16) 
laNGOrs argued that communication, accountability and engagement had always been 
between the corporations and the government while the communities were excluded. 
They believed that abject poverty, environmental pollution, human rights violations, and 
the lack of engagement and feedback mechanism between the communities, the 
corporations, and the government created networks of frictions, conflicts, violence and 
discontentment. These networks of frictions, conflicts, violence and discontentment 
escalated the problem. They argued that accountability was not just about the resources 
and how the resources were utilised, but it was about the people and the ethic of 
engagement that could prevent unsustainable practices and human rights violations (Gray 
et al., 2014b; Schweiker, 1993). This was evident in the following quotes 
“Accountability is not just about the resources, it is also about persons, it is also 
about the ethics of your business as you have conducted it. It is also about how you 
allowed things to happen that could have been prevented by the sheer [act of 
engaging others].” (laNGOr8) 
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 “…they have not done well at all in terms of social and environmental 
performance. …what have heightened the agitations and had also forced the 
companies to make the shift in terms of their CSR’s policies from the days they 
were doing communities’ assistance…” (laNGOr14) 
The laNGOrs argued that accountability should involve establishing networks of dialogic 
counter accounting engagements, enlightenment and empowerment with ‘ongoing 
communities’ to address unsustainable practices, double standards, deficiency in cultural 
awareness, human rights violations, accountability and governance problem (Brown et 
al., 2015; Dillard, 2014). laNGOs noted the importance of dialogic counter accounts and 
engagements to minimise conflict initiation and escalation in the Delta (Brown and 
Dillard, 2015; Contrafatto et al., 2015). The laNGOs posited that accountability should 
be dialogic and the lack of dialogic accounts gave rise to counter accounts to drive 
emancipatory and engagement processes in the Delta. 
“We actually want a system where the indigenous people have access to the oil 
companies, and more or less participate in decisions concerning the extractive 
activities in their communities and the way they want to benefit from those activities 
because the way it is, somebody else takes the decision. The companies discuss 
with the government at that level without input from communities’ members. […] 
This has given rise to conflict, violence, discontentment in the oil-producing states 
over the years. […] there is really no feedback mechanism between the 
communities and the companies, and that is why we have all the problems that we 
have. That also has made the companies not to be sensitive to the negative impact 
of their activities on the communities because communities’ members have become 
impoverished. …nobody – not the government, not the corporations – is paying 
attention to those issues.” (laNGOWr9) 
Problematizing the need for dialogic accountability and engagement was to make known 
the need for the corporations and the government to listen to the communities and to 
ensure that accountability and engagement are inclusive (Brown, 2009) since the 
corporations were seeing themselves as a listening organisation. For instance, Shell 
(2011a) webinar dialogue argued   
“…Shell is also a listening company and we do often take on board suggestions 
from third parties including campaigners. We give equal weight to suggestions, 
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whether through constructive dialogue or a campaign. …constructive dialogue is 
often more effective as suggestions need to [be] discussed and [be] moulded to be 
put into practice…” [emphasis added by author] 
Listening is a crucial aspect of dialogic accountability, but it should transcend beyond 
listening to understanding the sociocultural dynamics underpinning dialogic engagement 
towards implementing agreed actions (Andrews, 2013; Humphreys, 2000). For instance, 
Humphreys (2000, p.130) argued that “a company which doesn’t listen attentively will 
not pick up the nuances of community opinion and cannot expect to establish a secure 
basis for good quality relationships.” However, there is a distinct difference between 
asserting to be ‘listening’ and ‘being seen to practice/address what had been listened to’ 
(dialogic gap) (Bebbington et al., 2007; Thomson and Bebbington, 2005).  
“…Communities have been speaking but it is in two ways. Who is listening to the 
communities’ voice? To what extent are they taking into consideration the 
communities’ voice and taking actions with respect to the communities’ voice? 
Those are questions that we need to answer because when you have a voice and 
your voice is not listened to, then you don’t have a voice. […] …civil society, local 
NGOs that work here, we are all communities [indigenous people], we represent 
communities. …there is the communities’ voice and…there is no corresponding 
actions on the part of the stakeholders that should address these voices.” 
(laNGOr11) 
Bebbington et al. (2007, p.368-369) argued that engagement (dialogic) processes are 
often slow processes through which critical reflection and change could emerge but the 
process for change should evolve overtime when there is a willing listener ready to 
participate and to be changed. The laNGOrs argued that the regulatory regimes should 
provide regulatory intervention or direction to create a ‘dialogic entitlement’ that would 
minimise the dialogic gaps. laNGOs were critical of the corporations’ portraying 
themselves as willing listeners, ready to dialogue with the other stakeholders or change 
their practices. They were similarly critical of the potential of government and regulatory 
agencies to drive an inclusive engagement and sustainable environment. The presence of 
dialogic gap(s) led to the use of counter accounting, counter audits and symbolic activism 
to address unequal power relations, the absence of accountability relationships with the 
others, human rights violations and unsustainable practices within the Delta arena by the 
different actors operating within the different arenas to compel regulatory interventions.  
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“Where they [oil corporations] are lacking roundly is in the area of the environment 
because we are saying that their CSR should show first how they care for the 
environment they are operating in. How do you react when there is a spill? No 
matter the cause of the spill, how do you react?” (laNGOr12) 
Nevertheless, Thomson and Bebbington (2005, p.525) argued that the stakeholders 
(powerful) have the legitimate rights to choose what they heard and to decide whether to 
engage with them, thereby prioritizing the stakeholders’ voice they choose to listen to. 
However, the powerful stakeholders’ legitimate rights to ‘screen’ what to listen to 
becomes critical to the dialogic discourse and processes. The interplay in the use of 
counter accounting technologies (which was argued as being partial and selective) to 
compel them to listen and engage are also critical to the dialogic discourse because they 
project and legitimise the voices and rights of the powerless and marginalized 
stakeholders (Gallhofer et al. 2006, 2011; Spence, 2009; Li and McKernan, 2016). The 
laNGOrs presumed that through counter accounting, they provided the communities the 
platform to participate besides seeing themselves as the ‘community’ to address the 
dialogic gaps within the local arenas (Cooper et al. 2005).  
The laNGOrs recognised that there were dialogic gaps between ‘listening’ and ‘practising 
what had been listened to’ but through the engagement of the iaNGOs, the shareholders’ 
groups and the communities’ engagement, these dialogic gaps appeared to have been 
bridged. For example, because of the communities and laNGOs’ campaigns for 
communities’ development and participation, Chevron and Shell introduced the GMOUs 
(see chapter 7). For instance, Shell (2011a) in its webinar argued 
“The GMOU approach does not just allow communities to define their own 
development but it also empowers them to implement those requirements.” (Shell, 
2011a) 
The GMOU was acclaimed as a model for development and the corporations often 
employed mentoring/developmental/partnering NGOs to facilitate its process of 
implementation and engagement with the oil-producing communities (Aaron, 2012; 
Draper, 2010; Idemudia, 2009).  
“…theoretically it is a very good development because it provides for dialogue 
unlike before when communities were largely going violent over the gaps of CSR 
by the oil companies. …the GMOU have served as a mechanism for dialogue…but 
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whether the GMOU…is delivering the expected goals is another thing. …I doubt if 
we are getting all that the oil companies may want to claim except we go to specific 
communities and…find out the benefit…they are deriving and match those benefits 
against what ought to be there or what ought not to be there.” (laNGOr5) [emphasis 
added by author] 
Empirical analysis revealed that the GMOU requires the creation of institutional 
structures such as the CTB and the CDC (see chapter 7) which was distinct from the 
traditional governance structure within the communities, which the radicalist NGOs 
viewed as a huge interference with the existing governance structure resulting in a conflict 
of interests and poor communication. Furthermore, the radicalist laNGOs contended that 
this CSR approach was not a proactive and neither a reactive strategy that addresses those 
social, economic and environmental externalities that affected the communities’ 
wellbeing. They argued that the profit-maximisation objectives of the corporations 
hampered this programme because it lacked an effective monitoring mechanism to ensure 
its effectiveness. The radicalist laNGOs argued that it was another ‘means of 
colonialization’ because it had not resulted in transforming or developing the region. This 
supports Aaron (2012, p.264) assertion that “when we place the nature of the corporation 
side by side with the enormity of the development challenge in the Niger Delta region, it 
becomes immediately clear why CSR cannot engender sustainable community 
development and contribute to conflict resolution in the impoverished and troubled Niger 
Delta.” For instance 
“…I believe oil companies’ CSR is sheer nonsense. …the corporations have been 
claiming that they have been building clinics and schools but if you are injecting 
poison into somebody…, and you are injecting an antidote on the other hand, you 
are not really helping matters. …oil companies should stop oil spills, clean up their 
mess and then pay compensations for the harms they have done.” (laNGOr2)  
“We have not seen that [GMOU] transform into physical development of the area. 
All what they have done is to indirectly compel the people to protect the pipelines 
around their areas to make sure that nothing happens, indirectly tying the people. 
…the GMOU is a deceit. It is another means of colonialization of the people.” 
(laNGOr7) [emphasis added by author] 
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Whether the pursuit of profit through the adoption of CSR practice was meant to prove 
their altruism as willing listeners and partners in communities’ development or whether 
the indigenous people should envisage it as a right require further research. Furthermore, 
research could evaluate if the GMOU was a strategic mechanism for securing their social 
licence to operate within the oil-producing communities. According to Aaron (2012) and 
Draper (2010), the corporations’ aspiration to secure the communities’ social goodwill 
propelled the adoption of the GMOU programme, which was an attempt to project 
themselves as a listening organisation willing to drive sustainable and transformative 
development within this arena. Whether the corporations are actually listening is what 
further and in-depth analysis of the GMOU process could explore. Therefore, 
underpinning their counter accounts, are the need for the corporations to be committed to 
respect human rights, sustainable development and effective stakeholders’ dialogue.  
 
8.4.3.2. COUNTER ACCOUNTING, DELEGITIMISING ACCOUNTS 
Despite problematizing the need for corporations and government to listen and engage 
with the communities in the Delta, the laNGOs often counter the accounts of the powerful 
stakeholders to de-legitimatize or deinstitutionalise the ‘managerial captured strategy’ 
or the ‘institutional captured phenomenon’ as mentioned by laNGOr5 (den Hond and de 
Bakker, 2007; O’Dwyer, 2002, 2003; Baker, 2010; Chalmers et al., 2012; Cortese et al., 
2010). According to laNGOr3, 7 and 5, ‘institutional captured phenomenon’ emerged 
where the government establish regulatory institutions to monitor the activities of 
corporations and rather than abide by the agencies’ modi operandi, the corporations 
influenced the agencies’ activities because the agencies were benefiting either through 
cash or in kind and that compromises their capacity to implement the regulations. He 
claimed 
“…we see the situation of the…government agencies becoming deregulated and 
those whom they ought to be regulating like the oil companies have become the 
regulator through that process because they then decide the volume of the spill, 
when the spill occurred and what measure of remediation.” (laNGOr3) 
“Then you will find a situation where DPR…is also one of the captured institutions 
because they are also part of the oil industry… Can the oil industry regulate itself? 
[…] …most of these things are going on…” (laNGOr5) [emphasis added by author] 
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For instance, laNGOr1 gave a specific systematic and partisan account of how they 
monitored Shell’s activities on their Gbarain-Ubie Integrated Oil Gas Project (IOGP) for 
2 years. Shell began this project in 2005.115 This multi-billion-dollar project was 
embarked on to reduce gas flaring by harnessing gas to power for the Delta and to increase 
business potentials for 70,000 barrels of crude oil per day and one billion cubic feet of 
liquefied natural gas per day in the international market (Shell, 2011c). Shell issued a 
press statement (hybrid-account) in 2011 that contended   
“The Gbaran project is a world-class development that will boost Nigeria’s oil and 
gas resources significantly. […] It will help meet government targets to reduce 
flaring, provide more energy for Nigerians and increase exports of liquefied natural 
gas.” (Shell, 2011c) 
Dadiowei (2009), Ereba and Dumpe (2010) argued that this project was an essential 
component of SPDC’s development in its gas utilization programme within and outside 
Nigeria. The iaNGOrs and laNGOrs argued that the statutory requirements of the EIA 
Decree 1992 [9 (2-4)] by DPR and the corporation to publish the EIA highlighting the 
potential social, environmental and health risks were not adhered with. 
“DPR once in a while; …make it look as if they are doing EIA but in a situation 
where people are commissioned to do EIA, and it is {name of corporation} that is 
providing the logistics for them to go into communities to conduct the study, what 
report do you expect? How inclusive and participatory is that EIA? How many of 
those EIA report has been released to the public…?” (laNGOWr9) 
Section 7 of the Nigerian EIA Decree 1992 empowers government agencies, members of 
the public, experts in any discipline and interested groups to make an input in the EIA 
reports before they are approved for implementation. Allowing public engagements on 
EIAs would lead to a legitimate and transparent EIAs for proposed projects but Dadiowei 
(2009), Ereba and Dumpe (2010) posited that transparent EIAs were not conducted to 
consider the health, safety and environmental risks to the indigenous people.  
“[…] this is NACGOND’s strategy paper. […] as part of the issues we raised in this 
document was ‘improving the EIA processes especially the process of 
implementation. Actions that were identified is the creation of awareness and 
                                                          
115 For a detailed historical perspective on this project, refer to Dadiowei, (2009), Ereba and Dumpe (2010). 
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building of capacities for communities to conduct independent EIA. Encourage and 
advocate to communities to get external bodies to carry out EIA on their behalf. 
Advocate for government to review EIA policies.’ That gives you an idea of what is 
on ground. If everything is as perfect as DPR is portraying it, then NACGOND will 
not come up with this. […]They create that impression that they do these things, 
but it is not inclusive. Communities’ members are not part of it and adequate 
awareness is not being conducted for people to know that they are doing EIA. They 
do it the way they think it is okay but even they themselves…know that is not the 
proper thing.” (laNGOWr9) [emphasis added by author] 
The inability of the regulators to enforce its EIA’s regulation could be viewed as an 
institutional captured phenomenon which subsequently affected the lives of the 
indigenous people. On the other hand, the corporations presumed control of the EIAs 
without adhering to the EIA Decree, 1992 and without an adequate stakeholders’ dialogue 
to understand the risks on the impacted communities before implementing the IOGP, 
could be viewed as managerial capture (Baker, 2010; O’Dwyer, 2003; Owen, 2000). The 
need to address the conflicts emerging from the lack of EIAs and to delegitimise the 
socially responsible accounts of the corporation resulted in the construction of counter 
accounts, counter audits and counteractions to challenge the compliance discourse of the 
regulators and the corporations (Apostol, 2015; Thomson et al., 2015). 
“…Up to 2003, {name of corporation} was not able to use the proper method of 
doing EIA and it took the advocacy effort of civil society and citizen groups to 
compel them to review their method and the then executive director of {name of 
corporation} publicly acknowledged that the EIA process of the company was 
grossly deficient. It was in 2003, more than ten years that they now set up a 
committee to re-write a new procedure of doing the EIA.” (laNGOr5) 
laNGOr1 argued that they monitored the social, environmental, health and human rights 
risks of this project on four clusters of communities116 for 2 years in Bayelsa State and 
                                                          
116 These four clusters of communities included Gbaran-Ekpetiama cluster (11 communities with oil wells, flow station, 
pipelines and a central processing facility (CPF), Epie-Atissa cluster (has 14 communities with oil wells), Okordia-
Zarama cluster (has 9 communities with oil wells, pipelines and a manifold) and Kolo Creek cluster (has 4 communities 
with oil and gas wells, flow station and pipelines).  
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claimed this project had social, environmental and human right (health) impacts on almost 
91 communities.  
“{name of corporation} …did an EIA and…you will discover they will find it very 
difficult to give you…because what it seems they have done is that they made a 
general environmental impact stretching from Owerri right down to Warri. What 
happens there is that if {name of corporation} are doing new development as they 
are doing now in phase two of the IOGP, they don’t actually have an environmental 
impact to show…in other words, they did it in a very Nigerian way. They got an 
EIA, which covers everything and nothing…” (laNGOr1) 
laNGOr1 argued that Shell commenced the phase 2 project without conducting a separate 
EIA which negated the requirement of the EIA Decree of 1992 that required a distinct 
EIA to be conducted on projects with foreseeable significant risk to people and the 
environment. Dadiowei (2009), Ereba and Dumpe (2010) contended that the EIA for 
phase 1 lacked an in-depth analysis, this was applied to phase 2 despite the statutory 
requirement for a separate EIA. 
“…if you come now to phase 2 of the IOGP, you will notice that they are putting 
new oil wells, new gas wells, new facilities, flow stations, manifolds. It has huge 
impacts on environmental issues and secondly it has huge impact on the 
communities. […] When you do an overall project[EIA], you pay one overall 
payment and that covers apparently everything… It is a casual and irresponsible 
way of tricking communities and people that you are actually working with. You 
don’t do that anywhere else in the world, you do it in Nigeria…” (laNGOr1) 
According to laNGOr1, they had dialogues with shareholder’s activist group in London 
to study the EIA conducted on this project, but access was denied by Shell. Despite Shell 
providing accounts of how this project could develop sustainably, the laNGOs systematic 
and partisan counter accounts revealed that effluent from this IOGP facility was poured 
into the Nun-river and the company has not been transparent and accountable about that 
yet the indigenous people drink, wash and bath there.  
“…the local people are not aware of the levels of hydrocarbon in the water because 
no one takes measurement and no one explained to them. Like the facility does pour 
their effluent, which have constituents which they say…is 10part per million which 
is very small. Small or big; once you are getting any level of hydrocarbon into your 
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system if you drink the water, it will cause damage. …I have watched people bath 
in it… I filmed it while young boys were washing themselves in that river… I 
brought this spill into the attention of the {name of corporation}’s staff. I went there 
with them, they did the clamping, the clamping didn’t hold… I came back and I 
filmed it… I have never heard whether one penny was ever paid for compensation 
after {name of corporation} had denied that the spill poured into the river. …I was 
there, I filmed it, and I have the document to prove.”  (laNGOr1) 
The social and environmental impacts of such project and other spills into the Nun-river 
would affect the lives of the people and if not adequately addressed, would impact 
negatively on future generations (Weiss, 1992; Grubnic et al., 2015). The videoed 
accounts of human rights violation and unsustainable practices were not only constructed 
to problematize and to provide new knowledge of these unsustainable practices but also 
to de-legitimise the corporation’s account of their unsustainable practices to transform 
their conduct, especially on their EIAs and stakeholders’ engagement, and in de-
legitimizing the institutional captured and managerial captured phenomenon of the 
regulatory frameworks.   
 
8.4.3.3. COUNTER ACCOUNTING: BUILDING CAPACITY TO DIALOGICALLY CO-
PRODUCE COUNTER ACCOUNTS  
laNGOs tend to bridge the dialogic gaps by disseminating information, mobilize and build 
the capacities of the indigenous people, and sometimes regulators to address 
unsustainable practices (Contrafatto et al., 2015; Freire, 2002). This enlightenment 
activism was to enable the arena participants to engage the corporations and the 
government to implement the regulatory frameworks by providing the resources required 
to regulate, to protect and ensure the respect of human rights. Evidence revealed that the 
regulatory agencies relied on the logistical support of the corporations to provide their 
oversight role (see chapter 6 and 7). For instance 
“The regulatory agencies are not even properly funded. They now depend on the 
oil companies for logistics. Logistics to visit site, logistics to eat and 
accommodation; and ‘he who pays the piper, will dictate the tune’. Even the bible 
has told you the influence of gift ‘don’t accept gift and if you must accept, know 
the consequence’. You cannot accept gifts from me and then behave contrary to 
me.” (laNGOr12) [emphasis added by author] 
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The laNGOs published partisan counter accounts to engage the regulators and sensitize 
the local communities on the need to demand accountability and to ensure that their rights 
were protected and respected as specified in the ambit of regulatory instruments to seek 
inclusive engagements, address unequal power relations, human rights violations, identify 
gaps in the implementation of regulatory frameworks and the need for sustainable 
development (Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Thomson et al., 2015). For instance 
“There should be high level of orientation on the part of communities generally, all 
stakeholders’ inclusive because it is one thing to understand human rights 
violations, regulations [or] laws. It is another thing to ensure that such principles 
are adhered to. It is another thing for people to actually know that these things 
actually are human rights violations…and know where to seek redress in case ones’ 
right is being violated. What we have discovered is that there is a huge gap with 
respect to knowledge, with respect to information on the issues of human rights. 
…the engagement point should be at the level of the community” (laNGOr11) 
laNGOrs viewed their partisan counter accounts as an accountability, capacity building, 
engagement and emancipatory mechanism that facilitated a downward flow of 
accountable information to the community or indigenous people and upward flow of 
accountability to the powerful stakeholders in the arena (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006; 
Cooper et al., 2005). laNGOs assumed the role of experts in facilitating an upward and 
downward flow of accountable information, necessary for dialogic and accountability 
relationships/engagements besides problematizing the conflicts and unsustainable 
practices within the Delta arena (Bebbington et al., 2007; Dey et al., 2011). 
“…we do have a project…and that project is an NSRP (Nigeria Stability and 
Reconciliation Programme) big project. The basic thing is that we are training 
environmental monitors, who are communities’ member that would be monitoring 
the environment and in the case of an oil spill, they will go to the site, ascertain 
what it is and quickly send the report upward.” (laNGOr8) 
“…what we do is to work with communities to monitor environmental 
degradations, report on those degradations, build capacities on how to monitor to 
defend the environment and also at times support litigations.” (laNGOr2) 
In addition, they viewed their counter audit, counter accounts and counteractions 
through symbolic activism such as litigation as a mechanism to provide the indigenous 
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communities with a strong dialogic voice to demand accounts and engage the powerful 
stakeholders on the advancement of their fundamental rights and on their desire for 
sustainable development practices in the Delta. Denedo et al., (2017) referred to this as 
‘building counter accounts’, which in this context were not just used to reveal non-
compliance with regulatory instruments or to make visible the ineffectiveness of the 
regulatory regimes by the indigenous people but also to creat knowledge for engagement 
and emancipatory changes (Freire, 2002; Contrafatto et al., 2015). For example, laNGOs 
revealed that they attempted to give community stakeholders a voice to dialogically speak 
their truth to power to resolve the conflicts by equipping them with the knowledge to 
engage besides making visible the problematic corporate and governance unsustainable 
practices (Boyce, 2014; Dey and Gibbons, 2014; Spence, 2009).   
“It is absolutely important for communities to have a voice, not just a passive voice 
but indeed an active voice in all the negotiations and decisions that relate to the use 
of land either by industry or by ordinary people. Communities must have a voice to 
make a decision. It is that voicelessness that causes and reinforces the discontent 
that we have in the Niger Delta region because they feel powerless and when 
someone feels powerless, you cannot control the next thing that they may do. They 
may just fight to death or just destroy at will, or do anything they could do but if 
they have responsibility and if ownership gives them responsibility, then they will 
not do that, they will think twice before destroying what they own.” (laNGOr8) 
laNGOrs believed that to deconstruct the sense of powerlessness or voicelessness 
experienced by the indigenous people, it was essential to give them a dialogic voice by 
building their capacities to engage and to demand accountability for sustainable 
environmental practices at the local arenas. laNGOs have established an agency 
relationship with the communities to enable the co-production of counter accounts 
(Thomson and Bebbington, 2005; Lauwo et al., 2016). It was noted that the indigenous 
people are powerless because of the ownership structure in the oil industry (see chapter 
6 and 7), hence the co-production of counter accounts and its corresponding 
counteractions were to address the power imbalance in ownership and the governance 
regimes among the arena participants through their strategic activism at different levels 
of engagement (see section 8.4.1). 
“We have drawn the attention of perpetrators to the problems of human rights 
violation and we also build the capacities of the local communities on how best they 
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can respond to issues like that within the ambit of the law. Where necessary, we 
provide legal support. […] we research, we document and we also engage the 
perpetrators on how to see some positive changes in the region.” (laNGOr10) 
Besides problematizing unsustainable practices, the laNGOs acted as the intermediaries 
between the powerful stakeholders and the indigenous people through their counter 
accounts. Evidence revealed that the laNGOs often organised monthly and quarterly 
congresses with the community stakeholders to strategically address the problem of 
environmental degradations and to build the capacities of the indigenous people on their 
interactions with the powerful stakeholders, supranational organisations, shareholder 
activist groups and international advocacy NGOs. Subsequently, the trained indigenous 
people were expected to disseminate the information to their constituencies to enlighten 
and empower the indigenous people at the local arenas to curb unsustainable third-party 
practices and also to enable them to engage from a knowledgeable perspective. The 
laNGOs argued that the indigenous people have a dialogic voice to engage and articulate 
their concerns with the corporations and the regulatory regimes from a knowledgeable 
viewpoint on the regulatory requirements for best and sustainable environmental 
practices. For instance, laNGOWr9 argued that 
“NGOs have played a significant role in projecting the voices of community 
members. …NGOs…played a critical role in terms of mobilisation, organising, 
capacity building and information dissemination. Most of the information about the 
United Nations Human Rights frameworks…, even information about existing 
legislation in the country are information that is [are] being provided by NGOs […]  
through series of capacity building, community members are learning to articulate 
their issues very well. Even if you are complaining, you’ve got to be able to know 
how to express what you are saying. […] corporations are very powerful people, 
they have the resources, they have the information, they have the skills… …how 
do you fight empty-handed [without knowledge]? …NGOs…have influenced the 
community to have a strong participatory voice.” (laNGOWr9) 
The laNGOrs believed that the indigenous people should have access to corporate and 
regulatory information and should be conscientized on how such information could be 
used to liberate or drive the transformative and accountability changes they desired at the 
local arenas, thereby filling the gaps in the absence of information. For example, 
laNGOWr13 argued that  
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“…relating this properly to the locals, we do that by way of a kind of a congress. 
We have congress and what we do at such level is to brief people on the journey so 
far, the level so far, what we have done, what is still pending and still keeping 
people abreast with information so that they don’t lose focus. Sometimes, we have 
quarterly congresses. There are some meetings we have monthly. …At their various 
groups, they meet, and they come here for a steering committee meeting, which is 
held every month and from there they can get information and go disseminate at 
their various kingdoms.” (laNGOWr13) 
The laNGOs have built the practice of freedom through the conscientization of the 
indigenous people, through diverse counter accounting technologies and networks of 
dialogic accounts to address unsustainable practices. However, the laNGOrs argued that 
communities with similar histories of environmental and human rights violations have 
been conscientized to collectively drive the emancipatory changes with their international 
affiliates. For example, these enlightenment and emancipatory process was elucidated by 
the laNGOr7 as  
“We have also organised a capacity-building workshop where we educate people 
on their rights and what to do when things like this happen [violations of their 
rights] […] We bring communities with a common history together under one 
roof…to become one. So, they form a strong bond… they now have a common 
history that is to say that ‘injury to one is an injury to all’ ‘the people united can 
never be defeated’. We come together to form that strong bond. When there is an 
action [campaign], you are not only seeing the Ogoni people, you are seeing 
somebody from Umuechem who also feel the pain the Ogoni man is feeling…” 
[emphasis added by author] 
The laNGOrs recognised the need to ‘build bridges amongst the communities’ members 
to address the divide and rule strategy acclaimed to be practised by the powerful arena 
participants (see section 7.2.8). The laNGOrs argued that the divide and rule strategy 
adopted by the corporations and the nonchalant attitude of the few recognised 
communities’ representatives by the corporations were some of the conflict-inducing 
mechanisms, which impinged on human rights and good environmental management 
strategy.  
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The interviewees argued that emancipatory changes would only emerge when the 
indigenous people were co-owners of the industry and to be co-owners in decision 
making, they have to be educated to demand accountability and to dialogically co-produce 
counter accounts to engage the powerful arena participants from a viewpoint of 
knowledge (Contrafatto et al., 2015). They presumed that access to verifiable and 
accurate information at the local arenas was necessary to build the capacities of the 
indigenous people. However, it appeared that such capacities building dialogic counter 
accounts and engagement also involved the collaborative supports of their international 
affiliates. 
 
8.4.4. COUNTER ACCOUNTING: OTHER NETWORKS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GOVERNANCE, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 
8.4.4.1. OTHER NETWORKS OF ENGAGEMENT IN BRIDGING ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
GOVERNANCE REFORMS 
Similar to the findings of Cooper et al., (2005), den Hond and de Bakker, (2007) and 
Joutsenvirta, (2011), the laNGOrs recognised that to reform problematic accountability 
and governance practices at the local arenas, it was essential to escalate or delocalise the 
conflicts at the local arenas to relocate the conflicts of unsustainable practices to another 
arena participants with the power to de-legitimate, impose sanctions and drive 
accountability and governance reforms at the local arenas. The laNGOs appeared to 
publish contra-governing counter accounts to engage the iaNGOs to escalate the conflicts 
to other arenas. They argued that through the contra-governing counter accounts with the 
iaNGOs, significant pressures were placed on those with the power to engage the 
corporations and the regulatory regimes at their home countries and the Nigeria 
government to address unsustainable practices that affected the ability of the indigenous 
people to live sustainably (see section 8.3). For instance  
 “…what stand as the greater voice of pressure that…then compel the companies 
to greater responsibilities in the communities is this external pressure that you 
have from NGOs, what you called your ‘counter accounts’ from the NGO’s…like 
Amnesty International. The level of those pressures, how much it comes, that is 
what helps the communities… What gives voice into or for communities’ 
aspirations are those ‘counter accounts’, the pressures that come from the NGOs 
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and the coalition of forces that work within that space.” (laNGOr14) [emphasis 
added by author] 
Evidence revealed that besides collaborating with the iaNGOs, the laNGOs often engage 
with other networks such as the shareholders’ activist groups and the United Nations 
outside the Delta arena to influence the accountability and the governance engagements 
of the corporations and the regulatory regimes at the local arenas. Evidence revealed that 
the laNGOs often captured and documented environmental pollution with or without 
waiting for the corporations’ account of such pollution to address the ongoing breakdown 
in accountability relationships. For instance 
“In setting out to do those sorts of counter accountability reports… there are two 
things, one is to make the issue known to the audience beyond your own immediate 
environment and two, to also make this knowledge available for people that can 
occasion change in practice and change in policies.” (laNGOr15) 
These documented and often verifiable samples (physical systematic and partisan counter 
accounts) of oil spilt were disseminated to shareholders’ activist groups to bridge and 
enforce sustained significant pressure for the implementation of governance and 
accountability reforms in accordance with recognised corporate and regulatory 
conventions in the Delta arena. These documented counter accounts were used by the 
shareholders’ activist groups at the international arenas to co-produce counter accounts 
to advocate by dialoguing with the corporations at their home countries on behalf of the 
indigenous people at the local arenas. Within this international arena, it was observed that 
the shareholders’ activist group (such as The Ecumenical Council for Corporate 
Responsibility [ECCR] and The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility [ICCR]) 
played significant roles in this space to enforce accountability and transparency in the 
implementation of recognised corporate and regulatory instruments. By co-producing 
counter accounts based on the physical systematic counter accounts, evidence revealed 
that they legitimized themselves as ‘responsible investors’ seeking to promote 
transparency and sustainable development within controversial arenas such as the Delta. 
In addition, it appeared that rather than depend on the existing governance regimes to 
provide oversight of the corporations’ activities, the shareholders’ activist groups through 
the co-production of counter accounts performed oversight role either through their 
shareholder’s resolution (see Appendix 6) or through verifiable counter audit of the human 
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rights violations and unsustainable practice within the Delta arena (Thomson et al., 2015; 
Uche et al., 2016). For instance 
“…in one of the communities, they have a lake…a spill occurred in 2008 and it 
poured itself into Oya Lake. Oya Lake is a fishing lake and it was filled…with 
barrels of oil that was pouring for days and weeks. You can imagine! It was even 
filmed, the original spill pouring down from the spill point. Apparently, it was a 
sabotage and most likely, it was a sabotage. However, the clean-up that took place 
never got to the lake. They did around the spill point but they didn’t go to the lake 
and the lake was nearby. The lake was lying like that for 4years until I came and I 
witnessed it and I took bottles of crude oil out and I sent it to the shareholders. 
Within a week or so, the message got back to {name of corporation} in London, 
‘problem, you are failing your principles, clean up! Environmental standard says 
within such and such a period of time, you will respond. 4years had gone no 
response.” (laNGOr1) [emphasis added by author] 
“I am not aware of any [shareholders’ activist group in Nigeria] but some of these 
shareholders’ groups [outside Nigeria] work in alliance with some of the local 
NGOs. They [shareholders’ activist group] depend on them [local NGOs] for 
underground monitoring and reporting, which they [shareholders’ activist group] 
also latch on. That is, they use such reports in terms of their engagements with the 
companies.” (laNGOr14) 
laNGOr14 claimed these diverse networks of engagement, which included a regional and 
international coalition of NGOs and shareholders’ activist groups have had significant 
impacts on corporate practices and they have been able to change corporate governance 
accountability and regulatory practices at the local arenas. laNGOr14 revealed that the 
shareholders’ activist groups relied on the systematic and partisan counter accounts that 
captured the everyday realities of the subalterns to problematize the need for governance 
and accountability reforms at the local arenas.  
“Yes, the coalition of NGOs, the pressure of that coalition both local and 
international have also had very significant influence, especially from the 
dimension that I am very aware of, is the shareholders’ groups that are interested 
in…influencing…corporate practices. Those shareholders are very interested in 
some of the local reports that convene the realities on the ground, which they have 
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further used to the point where the influence of the local NGOs cannot get to. 
Sometimes, these shareholders’ groups have taken them further, even to the 
boardroom of the operators of some of the companies. At least I know, for example, 
the ECCR located in the UK and even the ICCR in the US…and those have been 
very effective in influencing change in terms of companies’ policies and even on 
their practices on the ground (local arenas).” (laNGOr14)  
Additionally, counter accounts did not only creat knowledge and visibilities of the 
invisible or communicated unsustainable human rights and environmental practices or the 
absence of accountability and effective governance or the lack of inclusive engagement 
with the community stakeholders (Dey et al., 2011; Rodrigue, 2014) but helped to 
legitimised and represented the communities’ voices by communicating knowledge to 
different institutional and ideological networks and coalitions (Cooper et al., 2005; 
Tregidga, 2017) to enlighten and empower the indigenous people to be the drivers of 
reformative and emancipatory social and ecological change.  
In ensuring that greater attention or emphasis were paid to their activism in achieving the 
desired objectives, the laNGOs have revamped their activism into an assemblage of 
coalitions within the Delta arena (such as NACGOND) and Niger Delta UPR (Universal 
Periodic Review) and outside the Delta arena (such as the International Network for 
Economics, Social and Cultural Rights). All the laNGOrs argued that transformative and 
emancipatory changes in the Delta arena should be a collective activism rather than a 
collation of singular activisms which might produce minimal or no result. These 
assemblages of coalition/activism recognised the ability of the coalitions to unilaterally 
engage with the powerful arena participants to facilitate the desired result (Lauwo et al., 
2016; Burchell and Cook, 2013a, b). The laNGOrs postulated that establishing a coalition 
of activism to capture, document and publish counter accounts, and to collectively engage 
the powerful stakeholders, provided the oppressed indigenous people a dialogic voice to 
articulate and reconstruct their everyday realities through collective engagement with the 
powerful stakeholders (Freire, 2002; Bebbington et al., 2007).   
“…we have been documenting and popularizing the issues until we now formed a 
coalition. …we felt that if all the organisations campaigning around environmental 
rights in the Niger Delta do it on their separate fronts, then we would not get the 
desired result. We came together, four organisations {names of NGO} and formed 
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NACGOND. As at today, NACGOND boast of over 25 NGOs…to actually join 
together and state what the problems are and also to engage.” (laNGOr10) 
The laNGOs, NACGOND’s counter accounts and other networks of engagement either 
through the shareholder’s activist group (Adegbite et al., 2012; Uche et al., 2016) or 
through the iaNGOs (see section 8.3) were significant engagement platforms that could 
facilitate accountability, socially responsible corporate practices, emancipatory dialogue 
and transformative change within the Delta arena (Brown et al., 2015; Lauwo et al., 
2016). 
“We do social reporting all the time and we send it to shareholders and it has an 
impact and I have always said it. Our social report {name of NGO}117 to 
shareholders, shareholders to Shell, Shell London back to here (Nigeria) is 
boom…” (laNGOr1) 
“…we can report with all sense of humility that some of the counter reports or the 
activities that we do in terms of advocacy have actually helped to shape 
policy…[and] shape practice both from the government sector to the corporate 
sector. […] those reports have actually lead to some changes…in the way people 
react to our activities.” (laNGOr15) 
 laNGOrs contended that the shareholders’ activist group could exercise their power or 
leverage on corporations by engaging in dialogue with the corporations, by submitting 
resolutions on social or environmental problems at AGMs, by conducting multi-
stakeholders’ forum to discuss social and environmental problems that affected the less 
powerful stakeholders. For instance, in 1997, 2006 and 2015 respectively, laNGOr1 and 
laNGOr14 (hybrid radical-participationist) revealed that ECCR submitted resolutions 
(hybrid account – see Appendix 6) to Shell’s AGM in the UK requesting for regulatory 
compliance, the monitoring of their environmental and corporate responsibility policies, 
improvements on how they conducted their activities in relations to the social and 
environmental impacts, human rights impacts, stakeholders and community relations 
impact of their activities at their international operations. In addition, first-hand evidence 
gathered by the author during an ECCR 2015 forum held at Oxford revealed that the 
shareholders’ activist group viewed the management of their investment as a catalyst for 
                                                          
117 It is not possible to provide the name of the NGO and the title of the report because it would compromise the 
anonymity and confidentiality agreement of this interviewee. 
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social, economic, governance and environmental changes especially in an arena where 
unsustainable environmental practices and human rights violation to life, water, health, 
education and shelter are prevalent. Future research could explore these shareholders’ 
activist group perspectives and their impacts in addressing unsustainable practices in the 
Delta. 
 “…what have been most effective here is when you are able to drag this people, 
perhaps to the jurisdictions of their own government. The effectiveness of ECCR 
for example in influencing changes that we have had the opportunities to work with 
them has also come from that dimension. What we say here and is not taking 
seriously when they take the reports and go to Shell in London or The Hague and 
make presentations, of course within that clan they are more responsive and to that 
extent, maybe pressurized their Nigerian subsidiary to behave better. So, the answer 
to the question is that we [will] continue to latch on that one [support of the 
shareholders’ group].” (laNGOr14) 
 
8.4.4.2. BRIDGING COUNTER ACCOUNTING TECHNOLOGIES: GREATER VISIBILITY 
FOR UNSUSTAINABLE ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE PRACTICES    
It was observed from formal and informal conversations with the radicalist NGOs, that 
whilst constructing counter accounts and engagements for the advancement of human 
rights and sustainable development, the media and other rhetoric and innovative forms of 
engagement such as lobbying, advertising, photographic evidence, protest, participation 
in communities forum, musical campaigns, Facebook, Twitter, Blogs, YouTube, 
Instagram were used to initiate, perpetuate, escalate, confront corporations and 
governance regimes, and to galvanize national and international audience to the ordeal of 
unsustainable practices and human rights violations within this arena. laNGOr5 argued 
that social media and other media platforms were often used to give visibility to 
unsustainable corporate and governance practices as well as support dialogic 
engagements at the local, regional, national and even at the international arenas. This 
supports research that has shown that NGOs and other organisations often adopt social 
media and other conventional media platforms to create and communicate unsustainable 
environmental and human rights practices to drive dialogic counter accounts to address 
such practices (see studies such as Unerman and Bennett, 2004; Bellucci and Manetti, 
2017; Brivot et al., 2017; Arnaboldi et al., 2017a, b; Agostino and Sidorova, 2017). For 
instance, laNGOr5 argued that  
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“measuring effectiveness depend on the indicators we set for ourselves, but we do 
know that if for instance, oil spill is going on in a community for 3months 
continuously and the community people claim that they have informed the company 
within 12hours of the start of that oil spill and the company has not responded and 
by law, the company is supposed to respond as quickly as possible. Now, if you take 
a rally to the company premises and the media reported it either through the 
television, radio, newspapers and even through social media, is also very effective. 
Once this kind of awareness have been raised over this kind of lapse, there is no 
way even the authority like NOSDRA, if they have been sleeping over the matter 
would not jump out of their office to ask questions or to at least demand for a 
response from {name of corporation} [and other oil companies] and the same thing 
with DPR…” (laNGOr5) [emphasis added by author] 
The ‘media’ whether through conventional medium -television, radio and newspapers or 
through the contemporary medium – advertising, protests, publicity stunts, musical 
campaign, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Blogs were envisaged as important 
legitimacy strategies for advocacy due to the globalization of activism. This could 
facilitate a continuum of dialogic, systematic and partisan counter accounts, engagement 
and emancipatory networks that could compel the powerful stakeholders to address harm 
caused at the local arenas (Gallhofer et al., 2006; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Jeacle 
and Carter, 2014; Deegan and Islam, 2014; Bellucci and Manetti, 2017). Unerman and 
Bennett (2004, p.686) argued that ‘the internet is one such mechanism which has been 
seen as useful because of the large number of stakeholders who can potentially be reached 
at relatively little marginal cost, and because of the interactive communication facilities 
embodied within it.’ For instance, Manetti and Bellucci (2016) adopted the stakeholder 
dialogic theoretical framework in exploring the corporate use of social media as disclosed 
in the stakeholders’ section of 322 Sustainability Reports. They concluded that social 
media is becoming a channel through which corporation legitimize their activities. 
Thomson et al., (2015) argued that an assemblage of practices could be deployed by 
activists to engage other activists and to initiate and perpetuate conflicts by providing 
evidence of a breach of regulations or unsustainable practices to the other arena 
participants within the conflict arena or outside it to compel institutional reforms. They 
identified different systematic and partisan counter accounting practices such as ‘breach 
reports by rule enforcers, a scientific document sent to political institutions, a video posted 
on YouTube, press releases, social media messages, launching of a petition, some form 
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of direct action and/or media stunts’ but they could not evaluate how these accounting 
technologies were used to problematize and dialogically engage with other arena 
participants. However, evidence revealed that the laNGOrs employed bridging partisan 
counter accounting technologies which included videos on YouTube, blogs, musical 
campaign, publicity stunts, press releases, evidenced-based or scientific documents sent 
to political institutions and even corporations, launching petition against the corporations 
and using the social media to advocate, sensitize and dialogically co-produce counter 
accounts with other stakeholders to interactively engage in the conversation for 
sustainable environment at the local arenas (see Bellucci and Manetti, 2017; Gallhofer et 
al., 2006). For instance, laNGOr2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 were recognised for their advocacy 
through the social media. For instance  
“We carry out enlightenment in various ways through town halls meeting and 
sometimes through community visit… Those visits also enabled us to feel their 
experiences and then we enlighten them on basic things they need to know as per 
the rights of citizens within such jurisdictions. […] We also engage the media, the 
mass media to also address those issues in terms of enlightenment and 
sensitization.” (laNGOr5) 
“…we have been putting our knowledge or experience in the public domain; …that 
is what we do and we are happy doing it.” (laNGOr12) 
These counter accounting technologies were used to assemble, delocalise, escalate and 
disseminate verifiable information on environmental pollution or human rights violations 
‘at a relatively marginal cost’ to regional, national and international arenas (Bellucci and 
Manetti, 2017; Unerman and Bennett, 2004). Evidence revealed that adopting the media 
platforms encouraged interactive dialogues with large external stakeholders (individuals, 
communities, other NGOs, regulatory agencies or corporations) joining the conversations 
to air their opinions and to dialogically address unsustainable environmental practices 
(Jeacle and Carter, 2014; Bellucci and Manetti, 2017; Brown, 2009; Vinnari and Laine, 
2017).   
“I know they read those reports and they respond to them to a very large extent to 
some of the issues raised in those reports because we do not only publish shining 
reports, we also go on radio and speak about the contents in those reports. We do it 
on TVs. We do it in the social media and elsewhere. In conferences, we engage base 
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on the report and our findings. They respond to them being the kind of corporate 
entity they are, there is no single thing in any report published that they are not 
conversant with already.” (laNGOr6) 
These counter accounting technologies could be envisaged as a powerful dialogic counter 
accounts with stakeholders who might be directly or indirectly impacted by an 
unsustainable practice because they could facilitate advocacies for regulatory or corporate 
governance reforms or facilitate an emancipatory change (Bellucci and Manetti, 2017; 
Unerman and Bennett, 2004). This shift in these alternative counter account mechanisms 
were observed during data collection.  
laNGOs did not only publicise unsustainable practices but adopted these bridging counter 
accounting technologies to attract stakeholders across different arenas in two-way 
dialogues on the everyday struggles of the indigenous people (Manetti and Bellucci, 2016; 
Vinnari and Laine, 2017). The laNGOs through their bridging counter accounting 
technologies took advantage of the dynamic changes in communication and awareness 
creation by using the social media to extensively capture the voices (text, graphics, audios 
or videos) of social media users on the controversial issues within the local arenas where 
unsustainable practices and human rights violations were prevalent (Gallhofer et al., 
2006; Arnaboldi et al., 2017a, b).  
The laNGOs through the support of the iaNGOs have assisted the local communities in 
escalating the conflict to seek environmental justice and the respect of their human rights 
by engaging national and international judicial system (symbolic activism). Due to the 
ineffectiveness of the Nigerian judicial system, the unwillingness of the corporations to 
be transparent and be accountable by disclosing environmental information to shed light 
on the causes and consequences of spills (Amnesty International, 2011, 2013). laNGOrs 
argued that to minimise risk, the corporations ascribed the causes of spillage to third-party 
interference (see chapter 6 and 7). The law did not encouraged compensation where the 
causes of spills were attributed to third-party or sabotage (Oil Pipelines Act, 1990)118 but 
they are statutorily required to contain the leak and remediate the environment 
                                                          
118 Oil Pipeline Act [1990, 11(5c)] claimed “the holder of a licence shall pay compensation… to any person suffering 
damage (other than on account of his own default or on account of the malicious act of a third person) as a consequence 
of any breakage of or leakage from the pipeline or an ancillary installation, for any such damage not otherwise made 
good.” 
294 
 
(EGASPIN, 2002).119 This implies that they could get away with negligent or breach of 
their duty of care to prevent an act of third party interference to their infrastructure, which 
might result in the release of hazardous pollutants that are inimical to sustainable 
development, respect for human rights and a healthy environment (Amnesty 
International, 2013; Steiner, 2010). The laNGOrs expressed their frustration on the 
ineffectiveness of the remediation process even when they were not ascribed as sabotage 
due to the absence of the duty of care 
“They keep telling us that ‘yeh’ it is sabotage. …some of them are sabotage but 
how, how? In Bodo, the spill was left for 72days. Is that sabotage? […] The Bonga 
oil spill was it a sabotage issue? […] Do you have an idea where the Bonga oil is? 
It is in the deep sea. […] It is not where speedboat will go. So, what happened? […] 
The Bonga oil spill that ravaged all the communities from Ondo State up to Rivers 
State, what happened? …Even when there is sabotage, what effort have they done 
to clean up the environment immediately?” (laNGOr4)  
Nevertheless, the laNGOs have reframed their counter accounts by escalating the need 
for human rights and environmental justice from the local arenas to international courts 
or the judicial systems where the corporations were registered through their counter 
accounts. This was observed in another case of four farmers that sought judicial redress 
in the Dutch court through the support of the laNGO – ERA and their international 
affiliate -Milieudefensie/Friends of the Earth Netherland (Friends of the Earth 
Netherland, 2015).  
“We have had communities come to us to complain and we have been able to assist 
some communities to go to court outside the country. The one we had in The Hague 
Netherland, we got justice for just one community out of about four farmers from 
three communities. The other ones were told that the oil spill was because of 
sabotage. …we do not accept that judgement though we won in one of the 
                                                          
119 EGASPIN [2002, 4(1)] claimed “an operator shall be responsible for the containment and recovery of any spill 
discovered within his operational area, whether or not its source is known. The operator shall take prompt and adequate 
steps to contain, remove and dispose of the spill. Where it is proven beyond doubts that an operator has incurred costs 
in cleaning up a spill for which he is not responsible, the operator shall be reasonably compensated, up to the extent of 
recovering all expenses incurred, including reimbursement of any payments for any damage caused by the spill, through 
funds established by the Government or the oil industry for that purpose.” 
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community… little litigations like that are part of the ways we try to assist 
communities.” (laNGOr4) 
Amnesty International (2013) argued that the Dutch court found that Shell breached its 
duty of care to take reasonable preventive measures to monitor and safeguard its 
infrastructure from sabotage or third-party interference, hence they were found liable for 
the destruction of the farmers’ means of livelihood (Amnesty International, 2013). 
However, the Dutch Appeal Court in December 2015 have agreed to re-examine the case 
of the three farmers that were denied justice in 2013 due to the availability of additional 
evidence (Deutsch, 2015). The court ruling, in this case, was a landslide because it implies 
that the corporate veil between a corporation and its supply chain could be uncovered to 
address the duty of care and accountability where the corporations are officially 
registered (Lopez and Shea, 2016; Friends of the Earth Netherland, 2015)  
“This case is especially important as it could pave the way for further cases from 
other communities devastated by Shell’s negligence. It is vital that multinationals 
are made to answer for action abroad that would never be accepted in their home 
countries,” (Dummett, 2015 cited in Amnesty International, 2015b). 
“…that is where the change in legal landscape makes it interesting. If you want to 
sue {name of a corporation}, can we sue {name of a corporation} parent because 
they are teleguiding them? They are the ones giving them their directives…” 
(laNGOr1) [emphasis added by author] 
The laNGOs have taken the problem of environmental racism beyond the shore of Nigeria 
through their networks of engagement at the international arena (see section 7.2.3). This 
supports the proposal of the UN Intergovernmental Working Group (see chapter 3) that 
the corporate veil should be lifted, especially where the human rights and environmental 
rights of indigenous people have been violated within their supply chains (de Schutter, 
2016; Ramasastry, 2015). This implies that where the judicial system of the country where 
the corporations operate are not adequate for its citizens to seek judicial redress, the 
international space through the opening of the corporate veil could permit indigenous 
people to seek judicial redress where the multinational corporations are registered. This 
shift in legal landscape for accountability and environmental redress enabled the laNGOs 
to galvanise the indigenous people to seek judicial redress in international courts for 
environmental and human rights violations.  
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“…Communities, now have the courage to take on these multinational companies 
anywhere in the world. […] Many of the communities have taken into court cases 
as a way of redressing their grievance against the oil companies.” (laNGOr4)  
 
8.4.5. IMPACTS OF THE NGOS COUNTER ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY ENGAGEMENT 
Evidence revealed that some community activists were now co-producing counter 
accounts due to their conscientization, thereby helping them to reconstruct their sense of 
powerlessness to drive transformative changes (Brown and Dillard, 2015; Thomson and 
Bebbington, 2005). Evidence revealed that the indigenous people were trained to video 
events in a transmittable format when there are oil spills to ensure that the regional, 
national and international audience are aware of what is happening within the Delta arena. 
This paradigm shift in the co-production of partisan counter accounting could influence 
governance and accountability information system (Bebbington et al., 2007; Lauwo et 
al., 2016). 
“…we try to strengthen the capacities of communities’ folks by giving them tips or 
training them on different aspect of advocacy, lobbying, communities’ 
mobilization, environmental monitoring and exposing them to legal rudiments that 
can assist them in court cases, especially when they go to court either within 
Nigerian or outside Nigeria…” (laNGOr4) 
“…those things all add up. …it is all about adding up. This one is doing this, that 
one is doing that, it does have these mass movement that brings about…change. It 
all adds up.” (laNGOr1)  
The laNGOs’ use of counter accounts were underpinned by the assumption that the 
indigenous people should demand accountability from the corporations and especially the 
government. They believed that the shift in the perception of the local people on the 
corporations to provide their basic infrastructures have made the government abrogate 
their roles in regulating the oil and gas industry. Their activism was to construct dialogic 
networks by building the capacities of the indigenous people to challenge and demand 
accountability in respect of their rights (Contrafatto et al., 2015). laNGOrs unanimously 
agreed that their role in the arena were not only to problematize but to remind government 
to get governance right by addressing unsustainable practices from environmental 
pollution. 
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“…It is for us to remind government that they have to stop it. Ours is just lobbying 
and advocacy, we have to remind government. That is our own role in terms of 
governance. […] We need to stop the oil companies from continuous environmental 
degradations on the Niger Delta region.” (laNGOr4) [emphasis added by author] 
Whilst the laNGOrs did recognised the significant impact of their engagements, they did 
not envisage their counter accounting as becoming the dominant discourse of accounting 
but as a form of intervention into problematic systems of governance, accountability, 
missing information and human rights violations (Dey et al., 2011; Collison et al., 2010). 
The IaNGOs closely problematized the need for effective regulatory regimes by being 
committed to the development of the region either at the Federal, State or the local 
government council level.  
“…it is not about having X, Y, Z ministries or X, Y, Z parastatals…being set up 
other than, would they work? …would the government allow them to work? And if 
the government allowed them to work, are the companies willing to allow those 
commissions to work? […] The government need to wake up… They need to be 
more powerful than the corporations are. …I believe that the oil companies are more 
powerful than the Nigerian government… The government cannot hold them 
responsible, they cannot hold them to ransom by saying ‘hey clean up or get out. 
Do what is right or get out’. They can’t do that as long as the oil keeps coming, the 
blood would keep flowing.” (laNGOr4) [emphasis added by author] 
“…until government begin to protect the rights of citizens in this country…, then 
we will begin to see company respect the rights of citizens but when the government 
that is supposed to protect your right is the government that is sending soldiers to 
them [corporations] to come and kill you [them].” (laNGOr7) 
The laNGOrs confirmed the need to ensure transparency and accountability in the 
management of resources as the motivating factor for their advocacy in the arena. The 
laNGOrs did recognised the need to educate through an effective dialogic engagement 
platform to enable indigenous people to act collectively for inclusive governance that 
would ensure the respect of human rights and the protection of the environment (Brown 
et al., 2015; Kneip, 2013). 
“…we try as much as possible to monitor the manner the oil companies operate in 
relation to the environment, how they protect environmental standards, how their 
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oil exploitation affects the livelihood of the communities because it does adversely. 
[…] Our motto is ‘building solidarity for change’, that solidarity would be built 
with civil society and especially with community people to drive the change we want 
to see. We empower, we enable communities to speak for themselves and where we 
can, we stand on behalf of communities to speak and mostly we do these speaking 
to the extent that their interest is clearly protected…” (laNGOr6) [emphasis added 
by author] 
This dialogic approach to accountability supports the evidence from Joutsenvirta (2011), 
Brown and Dillard (2015a, b) and Freire (2002). The laNGOrs assumed that when the 
indigenous people are aware of their rights and engage the stakeholders, then the 
problems of accountability, governance and sustainable development would have been 
addressed.  
“The citizens in the Delta are not asking their government strong questions. […] 
The first change that needs to happen is in the culture of silence on the part of 
citizens of the Niger Delta. They need to curb that culture. They need to wake up 
and start asking very strong questions… …If oil companies abuse them 
environmentally, socially and otherwise, they should hold the government 
responsible because it is the government that granted them the licence to do that 
[operate] and if the government says they should stop, they stop. I think it starts 
there.” (laNGOr6) [emphasis added by author] 
The advocacy NGOs could be viewed as the dialogic experts helping to problematize the 
conflicts besides establishing dialogic platforms among the arena participants 
(Contrafatto et al., 2015). For instance, Bebbington et al. (2007, p.368) argued that ‘the 
introduction of competing perspectives and problematization of the status quo enables 
actors to examine their realities, where they come from, and how they could be different 
and challenges participants to where they come from, and how they could be different 
and challenges participants to move beyond their own standpoints’. The advocacy NGOs’ 
engagements could be envisaged as dialogic processes for transformative and 
emancipatory changes (Freire, 2002; Brown, 2009). This finding supports Apostol, 2015; 
Cooper et al., 2005; Gallhofer et al., 2011, 2006; Gray et al., 2014b; Tregidga, 2017; 
Laine and Vinnari, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 2017 and Spence, 2009 that in an attempt to 
speak truth to power, deconstruct the sense of powerlessness experienced among the less 
powerful stakeholders as well as to establish an accountability relationships, counter 
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accounting technologies could facilitate dialogic processes among the arena participants, 
thereby providing platforms for unheard voices to be heard, and to uncover truths that 
were covered (Dey et al., 2011; Bakre and Lauwo, 2016). Underpinning the dialogic 
aspiration to speak truth to power by the indigenous people and the laNGOs was an 
ideology that the human rights of the people are inalienable.  
“…I call them citizens [referring to the corporation], like a good citizen, a good 
resident, a good neighbour, you need to show a certain goodwill to those among 
whom you are living. So, if you do not show any such goodwill and you further 
compound things by polluting even the little resources that they have, then nobody 
can consider you a good neighbour at all.” (laNGOr8) 
laNGOrs argued that the corporations would improve their visibilities within the 
communities when they respect the rights of the people to life, healthy environment, right 
to livelihood, right to health and their right to their cultural heritage. The good 
neighbourliness relationship could be achieved through dialogic processes and good 
corporate citizenships that would drive the respect of human rights regardless of the gaps 
in governance (Lauwo et al., 2016; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016).  
“…the time is right for the oil companies to realize that it cannot remain business 
as usual… It is not just about paying taxes to the federal government, it is about 
good neighbourliness. It is about maintaining a good relationship with the host 
communities. They face the brunt of their activities and by getting their social 
licence to operate…, that will cut down the amount of fund they spend on 
conventional security.” (laNGOr10) [emphasis added by author] 
 
8.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter deconstructed the inverted arena framework (see chapter 4) further to 
explore how the iaNGOs and laNGOs use counter accounts and dialogic accountability 
in bridging and building networks of engagement with other co-producers of counter 
accounts to address unsustainable environmental practices in the Delta arena. The author 
was able to theoretically flesh out the use of counter accounting, counter audits and 
counteractions (symbolic activism) by the advocacy NGOs to problematize unsustainable 
practices that affected the lives of the indigenous people. Evidence revealed that they built 
diverse dialogic networks to address the problem of poor accountability practices, 
unequal power relations, institutional and managerial captured phenomenon and in-
300 
 
effective governance regimes, human rights violations and unsustainable practices within 
the Delta arena by de-legitimising the accounts of the regulators and the corporations.  
The laNGOs asserted that the indigenous people were less powerful and oppressed, and 
to address the unequal power relations, there was a need to give them a dialogic voice by 
making visible the unsustainable practices to the co-producers of counter accounts within 
and outside the Delta arena (Bebbington et al., 2007; Freire, 2002; Everett, 2004). Their 
ability to make these unsustainable practices visible resulted in networks and coalition of 
engagements comprising the community stakeholders, shareholders’ activist group, the 
international NGOs, national and international courts, the host government of the 
corporations and supranational organisations acting as co-producers of counter accounts. 
Evidence revealed that the laNGOs engaged these co-producers of counter accounts with 
the intent that they would exert significant leverage on the corporations and even the 
governance regimes to prevent environmental racism or double standards by discharging 
accurate and inclusive accounts of conducts, and by implementing regulatory standards 
as stipulated at the local arenas. 
This chapter critically supports other research that counter accounting is not a single 
technology of engagement but comprises complex and dynamic networks of technologies 
in uncovering what was covered in a local conflict arena across different (regional, 
national and international) arenas to facilitate transformative changes (Brennan and 
Merkl-Davies, 2014; Laine and Vinnari, 2017; Thomson et al., 2015). The advocacy 
NGOs adopted different forms of counter accounting technologies such as systematic, 
partisan and contra-governing counter accounts; dialogic counter accounts through 
shareholders activist groups, social media (such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, 
Twitter; Blogs) to engage different stakeholders group to confront and de-legitimise 
power inequalities, unsustainable environmental practices, ineffectiveness of regulatory 
regimes and the absence of inclusive accountability and governance practices in the local 
arenas of the Delta. Therefore, using these numerous mechanisms of advocacy and 
adopting either a ‘radicalist’ or ‘participationist’ or hybrid radical-participationist 
strategies, they sought to make visible the ‘unthinkable’, delegitimized the accounts of 
the powerful stakeholders and their negative impact on the lives of the locals (Gray et al., 
2014b; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007).  
These counter accounting technologies did not only assemble and disseminate 
accountable information at a less expensive cost but facilitated interactive dialogic 
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engagements across different stakeholders (Manetti and Bellucci, 2016; Bellucci and 
Manetti, 2017; Unerman and Bennett, 2004). These counter accounting technologies were 
considered as emancipatory and participatory platforms to forge common networks and 
coalitions to promote the respect and protection of human rights, effective governance, 
inclusive dialogic accountability, equal power relations and sustainable development at 
the local arenas. However, the last empirical chapter (9) analyse the dialogic approach to 
make sense of the accountability and engagement relations in the advancement of human 
rights, governance and sustainable development from all the arena participants 
interviewed.  
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CHAPTER 9: EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL OF DIALOGIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN THE DELTA ARENA 
“The accountability we are talking about is not in heaven, 
it is not in paradise, it is here. We can account ourselves. 
We can make ourselves accountable. Accountability is not 
in the air, accountability is everywhere. We must learn to be 
accountable…I am doing a public work here and we want a 
better thing for our country. …accountability is between you 
and I. It is the discharge of your responsibility and the 
discharge of my responsibility to the singular goal of the 
wellbeing of all Nigerians irrespective of ethnicity or 
religion.” (NOSDRAr2) 
9.0. INTRODUCTION  
In the previous chapter, the author deconstructed the arena framework to explore how the 
iaNGOrs and laNGOrs use counter accounts and its technologies to bridge accountability 
and governance gaps by building networks of dialogic engagements in the Delta arena. 
This chapter addressed the fourth research question– “To what extent does dialogic 
accountability framework explain the perceived effectiveness of counter accounts for the 
advancement of human rights within their arena?” This chapter draws on the findings in 
chapter 6, 7 and 8 to evaluate the usefulness of the dialogic accountability engagements 
through the inverted arena, and lifecycle and pathways to conflict(s) resolution 
frameworks proposed in chapter 4.  
 
9.1. DIALOGIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENGAGEMENT   
9.1.1. EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF DIALOGIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENGAGEMENT 
PRACTICE 
Researchers have argued that corporations, especially in developing countries have 
appropriated regulatory mechanisms to drive their wealth maximisation and business-as-
usual objectives at the expense of the fundamental rights of the others (Belal et al., 2015; 
Sikka, 2011; Lauwo et al., 2016; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016; Gallhofer et al., 2011). This 
was evident in chapter 6, 7 and 8 but sustainable development should evolve beyond the 
business case rather it should recognise the uniqueness of the others in driving the 
shareholders’ wealth, human rights and sustainability agendas in an arena (Andrews, 
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2013; Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Grubnic et al., 2015; Gray, 2010; Bebbington and 
Larrinaga, 2014). Accountability is the implicit recognition and reflexive actions of 
formal structures for the others and by the others, who might not have a direct agency 
relationship with them (informal) (Parker, 2014; Messner, 2009). The recognition of the 
others implies that the others, who bear the potential negative impacts of unsustainable 
practices should be recognised at the epicentre of the dialogic accountability and 
engagement agenda in an arena (see chapter 4 and 7). Where the others, especially the 
indigenous people, are far removed from the centre of governance then the prospect that 
their concerns would be at the forefront of corporate and regulatory agenda could be 
minimal (Dillard, 2014; Gray et al., 2014b; Lehman, 2007; Shearer, 2002). Evidence 
revealed that the government is a partner in the oil industry and has self-regulated itself. 
This implies that recognising the other stakeholders, especially the indigenous people in 
social, economic and environmental accountability for human rights and sustainable 
development might not be feasible without the possibilities of relinquishing this self-
regulatory position (see chapter 7, section 7.2.5). As evidenced in chapter 6, MOSOP’s 
agitation was that SPDC polluted the environment of the Ogoni communities for over 35 
years without any economic and infrastructural development from the oil multinational 
(SPDC) or the federal government. Although MOSOP emphatically advocated for non-
violence campaigns from its local and international supporters, there were extensive 
campaigns and conflicts in other communities in the Delta for inclusion due to the failure 
of the government to address these conflicts (see chapter 6 – section 6.1). For example  
“…it is the failure of government as far as I am concerned that has led to some of 
those issues repeating themselves again and again and again. So, if we can get 
governance right and get transparency from the oil companies, then it is always 
easier to come to the people and say this is exactly what is there…” (laNGOr8) 
“on the Bonga oil spill… NOSDRA has fined {name of corporation} about ₦5b. 
{name of corporation} has not even said anything about paying. […] Of course, 
if we have a very responsible government, we don’t expect NOSDRA to make 
such a pronouncement and {name of corporation} is still in operation… 
(laNGOr4) 
“Government is falling short of the expectation of the people. The protective role 
that they were expecting government to have on behalf of the community is not 
there. …They care less about the development, welfare and livelihood and the 
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health of our people in the Niger Delta…” (CLs5, focus group, participant 2- 
laNGOr12). 
Moreover, Humphreys (2000, p.130) argued that “the influence of community affairs on 
business practice is not a one-way process” rather it should be multiple representation 
processes (Dillard, 2016; Dillard and Brown, 2012; Gallhofer et al., 2015). These multiple 
representations could facilitate a socially progressive enlightenment, empowerment and 
emancipatory dialogue and debate exploring interconnections and underlying ideologies 
among the differentiated arena participants’ perspectives. It could also ensure that 
policies, accountability and engagement actions are beneficial to all arena participants as 
well as address unsustainable practices. This multiple representation processes could 
result in a platform for dialogue with the dominant corporate hegemony. This platform 
could reveal the weaknesses in the current social arrangement because it could make the 
social order more visible and understandable to the arena participants (Bakre and Lauwo, 
2016; Dillard and Ruchala, 2005; Killian, 2010). The existence of diverse perspectives in 
the dialogue should be the basis for a dialogic accountability to drive favourable 
(intra)intergenerational equity, respect and protection of human rights and sustainable 
development (Brown et al., 2015; Thomson and Bebbington, 2005).  
Dialogic accountability has been argued as recognising the dynamic of engaging the 
others, especially the conscious engagement of the subalterns in any sustainability 
discourse for equality of power, effective governance, accountability, human rights, 
inclusive ownership and engagement (Dillard, 2014; McPhail and Ferguson, 2016; 
Parker, 2014). Brown and Dillard (2015a, p.250) argued that “the aim of dialogic 
accounting is to enable a diverse range of societal actors to account for things that 
traditional accounting ignores and to develop accounting that acknowledges divergent 
ideological positions.” As evidenced in chapter 6, 7 and 8, until the affected indigenous 
people feel they are included in the accountability and governing discourse, any 
developmental measures in the Delta arena by the powerful stakeholders would yield little 
or no impacts. This supports Freire’s (2002, p.94) theory of dialogic actions, through the 
practice of freedom which revealed that the worldview of the oppressed should be 
considered before any revolutionary developmental projects are implemented. Any 
projects that support the worldview of the powerful stakeholders would have no liberating 
impacts on the oppressed. Freire argued that powerful stakeholders should desist from 
bringing a “message of salvation” to the oppressed but through effective dialogue strive 
to understand the “objective situation and their awareness of that situation” to facilitate a 
305 
 
revolutionary transformation that would advance their human rights and sustainable 
environmental needs (p.95). He emphatically contended that “one cannot expect positive 
results from an educational or political action program which fails to respect the particular 
view of the world held by the people” (p.95).  
Finally, the evidence presented in chapter 7 and 8 revealed that advocacy NGOs noted 
the importance of dialogic accounts or bottom-up accounts and engagement as 
instrumental to minimising conflict initiations and escalations in the Delta arena (Apostol, 
2015; Idemudia, 2009; Humphreys, 2000). According to Humphreys (2000, p.130), 
“…the very process of seeking to identify and quantify suitable objectives with a 
community provides a structure within which that community can openly discuss with 
the company its priorities and expectations and is empowered to influence the company’s 
thinking and behaviour.” However, empirical findings revealed that accountability for an 
emancipatory change for human rights and sustainable practices in the Delta arena should 
be relational/dialogic/bottom-up. Evidence revealed that accountability should involve 
the establishment of formal and informal structures for transformative and engaging 
dialogue which would not shut down the ideologies, values, concerns, interests or the 
everyday realities of the common people (Freire, 2002). Nevertheless, it is pertinent to 
highlight that in the Delta arena, consensual or collective dialogic accountability would 
not necessarily have a desirable outcome, if such dialogue obscures the conflicts for 
inclusion or does not recognise the potential of addressing the unequal power relations, 
accountability and governance gaps on human rights, sustainable environment and 
(intra)intergenerational equity (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Dillard, 2016). 
 
9.1.2. EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF COUNTER ACCOUNTS FROM A DIALOGIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENGAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 
The absence of an inclusive dialogic accounts and platforms resulted in the promulgation 
of counter accounts (technologies) to provide an inclusive emancipatory education to 
address the inequality of power, respect and protection of human rights, redistribution of 
wealth, the accountability and engagement for sustainable development (see chapter 8) 
(Dey et al., 2011; Dillard and Brown, 2012). The level of awareness emerging from the 
emancipatory education and dialogic process through counter accounting technologies by 
and on behalf of the indigenous people in this arena have initiated an increasing “practice 
of freedom” to problematize unsustainable practices, empower indigenous people leading 
to a transformative medium to address inequalities of power and confront the dominant 
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status quo in this arena (Brown et al., 2015; Thomson and Bebbington, 2004, 2005; 
Tregidga, 2017). Evidence in chapter 7 and 8 revealed that the voices of the indigenous 
people were not significant in resolving the conflicts rather it resulted in the escalation of 
the conflicts to attract the attention of the powerful stakeholders to the negative 
implications of their operations on their lives through radicalist, participationist and the 
hybrid radical-participationist advocacy NGOs (see section 8.4.1). The dynamics of these 
counter accounting technologies and advocacy approaches could be argued to enable 
engagement that exposed their everyday realities, thereby denouncing the presumed non-
beneficial social order imposed on them through the Land Use Decree and the exclusive 
joint venture agreement. laNGOr16 supported this argument by claiming that the 
community stakeholders within this arena were disempowered and voiceless. 
“they are disempowered because one, it is the federal government that controls 
their resources [referring to the Land Use Decree] […] Citizens don’t have a say 
on how things are done here and at the same time because we over depend on oil 
and that is the only main natural resource…”  
This position was strongly supported by MNOCr1 
“…as a Niger Deltan, I believe that communities’ groups at all times must have a 
say, should have a say in how things happen, should have a say in how they are 
led because it impacts on their various livelihood. Yes, they must have a say. The 
Federal Government exist for the people, not the people for the federal 
government either, so their voice must be heard… Unfortunately, in this space, 
most of the Niger Delta communities have not performed well. There has been 
quite some bit of misdirection of effort which requires a shift for enhanced 
participation. They should think more around how could we galvanize our thought 
[for change]…” (MNOCr1) [emphasis added by author] 
Nevertheless, evidence revealed that there were many pathways to dialogue and often, 
they were due to the engagement of the advocacy NGOs in problematizing the conflicts 
in the local arenas, which were subsequently transmitted to the regional, national and 
international arenas (see chapter 8) to attract the attention of other stakeholders to resolve 
the conflicts at the local arenas (Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Thomson et al., 2015). 
However, the presence of dialogic accountability and engagement platform would 
encourage participatory accountability by preventing or minimising the divide and rule 
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tactic (Freire, 2002 and chapter 7) by the dominant institutional hegemonies which 
hinders the indigenous people from uniting to drive the social and liberating changes they 
desire (see section 7.2.8). laNGOr1 argued that a stakeholder forum was organised for all 
the stakeholders which included SPDC (Shell) and Agip on the 21st March 2013 but the 
oil corporations’ representatives did not attend. There seems to be no single structure for 
dialogic accountability in the Delta arena. Rather it appears that there were multiple 
platforms stemming from the engagement of the advocacy NGOs through their counter 
accounts and actions such as conscientizing the indigenous people on the need for 
dialogue through education and by seeking (non)judicial remedy for themselves. These 
multiple engagement platforms enabled the indigenous people and the grassroots’ 
advocates to engage in the accountability and dialogic activism for human rights and 
sustainable development.  
Within the lifecycle and pathways to conflict resolution, the conflicts could be prevented 
or resolved when the powerful stakeholders, the advocacy NGOs and the community 
stakeholders envisaged that their desire for transformative changes could be better served 
through an inclusive dialogic process (Gallhofer et al., 2015, 2011, 2006; Dillard and 
Roslender, 2011; Burchell and Cook, 2013a, b). For instance 
“Having said that, it is not just only the responsibility of the federal government 
authorities and the oil companies to do what is rights. To correct the imbalance 
in the Delta, the onus is on the people to educate themselves…” (iaNGOr8) 
[emphasis added by author] 
“…it is a matter of collaborations. …NGOs trying to do this without the support 
of the communities would fail. Communities that don’t have a wider reach 
politically, which might be through political parties …through alliances with 
lawyers …through alliances with NGOs but to build that power beyond their own 
locality is very very important and that is hard job.” (iaNGOr3) [emphasis added 
by author] 
As shown above and in chapter 6, 7 and 8, there was no observable dialogic accountability 
platform for all the stakeholders to collectively engage the oil industry and the established 
governance regimes to minimise or resolve the embedded tensions and conflicts within 
the Delta arena. Rather, the advocacy NGOs built networks of engagement within the 
local, regional, national and international arenas to resolve the tensions and conflicts at 
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the local arenas (see chapter 8) to drive dialogic engagement within the arena. However, 
evidence from laNGOr4, one of the radicalist NGOs (laNGOr4) revealed that they have 
engaged NOSDRA to address the conflicts on environmental pollution, human rights 
violations, accountability, and governance gaps in the arena. For example 
“We have embarked on a project that has taken us for over a year now; we noticed 
that part of the causes of conflicts in communities is the lack of understanding of 
the JIVs… We noticed that oil companies and the communities are always at 
loggerheads when it comes to identifying…equipment failure or sabotage or third-
party interference. We identified that as one of the first sources of conflict between 
oil companies and the communities. […] Now, we have been able to engage 
NOSDRA to build communities’ capacity by inviting them into the communities. 
[…] Those are part of the engagement we have tried to use for the past one-year 
or so.” (laNGOr4) 
Furthermore, the OSM online-accountability platform was launched by the advocacy 
NGOs in collaboration with NOSDRA in 2014 to resolve the conflicts emerging from 
environmental pollution, accountability and transparency (Denedo et al., forthcoming). 
In the previous chapters, there are substantial evidence of collaborations with the 
communities in resolving and engaging the powerful stakeholders – corporations, 
government and the regulators. Nevertheless, the community stakeholders despite being 
at the epicentre of the inverted arena do not see themselves as having a voice to directly 
engage the corporations except through the advocacy and developmental NGOs. 
Observation from IP2 and 3 support this   
“…what we call the oil conglomerate conspiracy.  …all of them are merging and 
it is through that type of network that we can free ourselves. Unless there is 
networking within the rank and file of the people, we can’t free ourselves. The 
best thing they do is to create division among the rank and file of all these 
indigenes. […] We must be free. If we are not free. We will always be stagnant.” 
(IP2) [emphasis added by author] 
“We are asking for resource control. It is only when these resources, the mainstay 
of Nigeria is being controlled by the owners. It is only then that we can talk of 
accountability. …nobody is accountable to anybody.” (IP3, focus group 
participant 2) 
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This could be different in other contested arenas. Further evidence is required to 
understand how conflicts through dialogic accountability are collectively resolved in 
other controversial arenas. This could enable potential researchers to explore how or 
whether dialogic accountability could collectively foster transformative changes within 
any controversial arena (Brown et al., 2015; Bebbington et al., 2007; Vinnari and Dillard, 
2016).   
The practice of freedom or empowerment through diverse counter accounting 
technologies are “problematize and contest elements of dominant rules and practices, 
make them work better, and ensure that governors (powerful stakeholders) play the game 
properly” without compromising the ability of the other stakeholders to live sustainably 
(Brown et al., 2015, p.635). Evidence revealed that by problematizing and contesting the 
dominant rules and unsustainable practice in the arena, advocacy NGOs were able to 
exercise leverage on the powerful actors either in the international arena to hold 
corporations and regulatory agencies to account for unsustainable practices (Brennan and 
Merkl-Davies, 2014). For instance, iaNGOr7 argued that  
“…NGOs have an important role to play in exposing violations, in campaigning 
for changes in laws and regulations, in undertaking human rights education but I 
do not think that oil companies can be conveniently and directly accountable to 
human rights organisations, mainly because we produce reports exposing them. 
…what we can do is to exercise leverage over other actors that can hold these 
bodies to account. …the Nigerian government, parliamentarians in Nigeria, the 
UK government in so far as parent company is registered and domiciled in the 
UK. …on their investors to use their influence on oil companies to try to improve 
their social and environmental impact…we try to focus on all the different actors, 
who can influence the situations.”      
The need for a good and effective relationship/engagement cannot be overemphasized in 
the Delta because evidence from the community stakeholders and the NGOs revealed a 
sense of hopelessness, voicelessness and powerlessness in being listened to by the 
corporations and the government resulting in dialogic gaps regardless of the corporation 
arguing that they listen to communities and other stakeholders. This is also evidenced in 
the research conducted by Idemudia (2007) where he argued that the social obligations of 
the corporations and the government to the communities in the Delta have not been met 
rather the subalterns have been confronted with inappropriate representation of facts or 
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the non-disclosure of facts, thereby resulting in tensions and conflicts in the local arenas. 
However, dialogic accountability through effective listening strategies should translate 
into effective and inclusive actions that could drive the protection and respect of human 
rights whilst protecting the quest for wealth maximisation besides prioritizing mutual and 
effective communication among the arena participants (Brown et al., 2015; Thomson and 
Bebbington, 2004, 2005). This is because it proffers democratic and dialogic mechanisms 
to eradicate or minimise inequalities in the social order by facilitating reflective 
emancipatory and transformative social, economic and environmental changes (actions) 
across generations (Brown and Dillard, 2015a, b; Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). For 
instance  
“Accountability is a relational issue and because it is a relational issue, there 
should be mechanisms for holding each stakeholder’s accountable. We reflect on 
these stakeholders being the oil companies, the communities, and the government. 
It is the community that can hold the oil companies and the government 
accountable… …if they are united, then they can easily do that. On the part of the 
community, who holds them accountable? It becomes a role of the government to 
ensure that the community people do the right thing, create an enabling 
environment for the industry to strive...” (iaNGOr9, focus group, participant 2) 
Dialogic accountability involves a reflective accountability through action and 
engagement to galvanise deliberative participation that educates, organises and supports 
the sustainable transformation of (intra)intergeneration (Parker, 2014; Dillard, 2014; 
Thomson and Bebbington, 2004, 2005; Messner, 2009; Shearer, 2002). Dialogic 
accountability without a commitment for a transformative dialogue and sustainable 
transformative change or actions would not advance human rights and sustainable 
development. In the Delta arena, the practice of dialogic accountability and engagement 
should be able to address the expectations of the other stakeholders especially on oil spills 
and gas flaring that have crushed their means of sustenance, besides addressing their 
infrastructural and inclusive ownership needs. For instance 
“Community’s participation is key. Communities must be part of measures put in 
place to address policies that are against them.” (laNGOr7) 
“…we need to go back to the communities so that the engagement truly reflects 
communities’ engagement. […] I think a sense of community needs to bring to 
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bear on any engagement processes that we are talking about. That is what some 
people may call ‘communitization of the engagement processes.” (laNGOr15) 
[emphasis added by author] 
This form of accountability and engagement through actions imply that all arena 
participants should be transparent and accountable for their actions and should be held 
responsible for their implicit and explicit actions that impact on the ability of the others 
to live sustainably (Brown and Dillard, 2015a; Tregidga et al., 2015). Evidence in chapter 
6 and 7 revealed that oil spills and gas flaring have severe health, social, economic and 
environmental consequences on the indigenous people and these have instigated conflicts 
and violence in the communities and among the arena participants. The lack of 
inclusiveness, accountability and engagement of the corporations and government ignited 
criticisms from grassroots, local, regional and international NGOs and other independent 
observers (see chapter 8). Hence, dialogic accountability and engagement could ensure 
that the inequalities in the social order are resolved but it could also ensure that the 
powerful stakeholders are accountable and transparent to all the arena participants. It 
should facilitate reflexive and mutual relationships to bridge the need for an inclusive 
accountability and ensure sustainable transformative change to resolve and prevent 
human rights violations emerging from oil spills and gas flaring. Evidence from the 
hybrid radical-participationist NGOs revealed the significance of dialogic accountability 
and engagement in addressing unsustainable practices in controversial arena 
“No single approach is all-encompassing in terms of yielding the desired results 
but the mode of approach or the mechanisms will actually evolve over time. …it 
will graduate from very aggressive campaign, not that it will be violent in nature 
but stating it bluntly without any form of diplomacy and pointing fingers at the 
perpetrators. It graduates from there to a stage where the violators and the 
campaigners will have to sit together and discuss the issues in a very mutually 
respectable manner and there will be a time lapse to watch and see whether there 
will be an improvement in the way and manner the TNOCs do business here in 
respect to human rights. Back and forth dialogue while also ensuring that 
prerequisite data on human rights are generated in the region…” (laNGOr10) 
[emphasis added by author] 
Dialogic accountability and engagement platform could be predicated for a 
transformative change by not humanizing the dehumanizing human right violations and 
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unsustainable practices (see chapter 6 and 7). Dialogic accountability has the power to 
decolonise or deinstitutionalise vested interests and to initiate change by speaking truth 
to power along with provide the clarity required for emancipatory outcomes especially in 
highly contested arenas (Gray et al., 2014b; Tregidga, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 2017; 
Spence, 2009; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014). Dialogic accountability should evolve 
when there is a mutual and collective requirement for such dialogue among the arena 
participants before any emancipatory outcomes would emerge. This was evident in the 
following quote by NOSDRAr1 
“…the issue is that there is a renewed spirit in getting them [advocacy NGOs] to 
partner with us. […] They could just on their own organise and carry out their 
programmes alone but the collaboration we are having right now is that they now 
involve the agency [NOSDRA] and the agency sees them as partners in progress 
[partners in sustainable development] and then we [NOSDRA] value their 
contribution. They [advocacy NGOs] also volunteer their time and resources to 
ensure that we drive this message right into the eardrums [speaking truth to 
power] of all those that needs to hear them.” [emphasis added by author]  
Other critical researchers could argue that this form of collective or consensual 
accountability might not be achievable especially where the arena participants are unable 
to suspend their differential ideologies, values, assumptions, approaches and the 
inequalities of power asymmetric to be accountable for the common good of all arena 
participants (Archel et al., 2011; Cooper and Owen, 2007). Brown et al., (2015, p.627) 
argued that “they can end up reinforcing the status quo, furthering the interests of 
dominant groups, and denying legitimate aims of marginalized groups.” Without 
discarding this school of thought, the author argued that arriving at a common consensual 
solution, however temporary, would somehow emerge from history of problem denial, 
broken promises, breakdown of trust, breach of regulations, strategies of resistance, 
antagonistic and individualistic perspectives resulting in conflicts and disagreement (see 
chapter 6, 7 and 8) (Brown, 2009; Brown and Dillard, 2013; Apostol, 2015). Hence, non-
action with poor accountability is likely to perpetuate the problem rather than resolve 
them for the common good. Therefore, counter accounts could serve as a bridge to 
enlighten, empower, and problematize these antagonistic and individualistic perspectives 
to make these divergent claims visible to facilitate a dialogic accountability that would 
inspire an emancipatory and transformative change (Gallhofer et al., 2006; Gray et al., 
2014b; Sikka, 2011; Dey et al., 2011; Dey and Russell, 2014). 
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One could argue that the emancipatory potential of counter accounts in serving as a bridge 
along with facilitating a dialogic accountability agenda in the Delta arena have not been 
fully realized. Nevertheless, evidence in the previous chapters revealed that counter 
account is neither a mere “folk-political thinking” rhetoric to oppose capitalism or 
globalization (Li and McKernan, 2016) rather counter account is a centre stage for 
addressing the heightened negative impact of globalization when geared towards a 
dialogic accountability agenda for the advancement of human rights and sustainable 
development especially in controversial arenas (Boyce, 2014; Georgakpoulos and 
Thomson, 2008, 2012; Tregidga, 2013; Vinnari and Laine, 2017). Li and McKernan 
(2016, p.571) argued that counter accounting or ‘anti-accounting’ could have important 
effects on local struggles or those who participate in it or could represent significant local 
intervention but might not be sufficient for systemic emancipatory change “even when 
connection is made to human rights” that affect the lived lives of indigenous people 
(p.584).  
Whilst acknowledging the limitations of the emancipatory potential of counter accounting 
as highlighted by Li and McKernan (2016) and the engagement of the advocacy NGOs’ 
activism by Frankental (2011), Spence (2009), and Gray and Gray (2011) (see chapter 4) 
in driving systemic emancipatory change, the author argued that systemic emancipatory 
change could be a slow, progressive and dynamic processes necessary in influencing 
corporate and regulatory practices and policies for the protection, respect, and the 
advancement of human rights. Nevertheless, Gray and Gray (2011, p.786) argued that 
“accountability which is primarily focused upon the shareholder will continue to ignore 
major social issues which are simply not (financially) material to the organisation itself. 
This may be the reality, but it is neither acceptable nor responsible.” Counter accounts 
could be envisioned as mediating instruments, confrontational, delegitimising and 
perception shaping instruments that communicate knowledge to different institutional and 
ideological networks on the unacceptable practices of corporations and governance, 
thereby galvanizing national and international audience to the ordeal of unsustainable 
practices and human rights violations in which the UN Guiding Principles are engineered 
to prevent and address (see chapter 3) (Dillard and Ruchala, 2005; Sikka, 2006; Cooper 
et al., 2005; Apostol, 2015). For instance  
“All I do know is that our campaigns have led to some policy change and have led 
to some practice change in some areas. Even the fact that {name of corporation} 
has been looking on one method or the other to get into engaging with 
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communities in the Niger Delta, is also for us a sound success of the campaign. 
So, that is what we have seen so far.” (laNGOr15) 
Evidence revealed that counter accounting served as a dialogic platform in the Delta arena 
by problematizing, intervening and in weakening the oppressing or marginalising 
powerful structure (Freire, 2002; Thomson and Bebbington, 2005). Besides facilitating 
relational dialogue within this arena, counter accounts were used to expose, challenge and 
identify the inadequacies of governance and regulatory institutions and unsustainable 
corporate practices in the local arenas (Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007). Thus, rather 
than objectively privileging monologic accounting for human rights as an inscription for 
political action(s) ensuing from the failure of the corporations and the state for adopting 
due diligence procedures on the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles, 
accounting for human rights (see chapter 3) could be envisioned as a dialectic due 
diligence procedures implemented by corporations and the other stakeholders in 
promoting the UN GPBHRs for the increasing pluralistic societies  (Gray and Gray, 2011; 
Sikka, 2011; Gallhofer et al., 2011; Lindsay et al., 2013; Dillard, 2014). For example, 
Gray and Gray (2011, p.788) argued that “…such counter-accounts can be an important 
part of shaping the perceptions and dialogue around accountability and human rights.” 
This is because practitioners, in their attempt to maximise wealth often (un)reflexively 
may not acknowledge the effect of their operations on what they see and report on human 
rights and unsustainable practices to their (non)principal stakeholders (Dillard and 
Ruchala, 2005).  For instance, laNGOr16 argued that  
“Accountability means that you can operate within the confine of the law and that 
your work is opened to any criticisms and the people can demand for change. That 
is what it is [the uniqueness of dialogic accountability].” 
Counter accounts have the potential to foster systemic change by opening and broadening 
the discourses on human rights and sustainable environment/development along with 
giving voices to the ‘others’ (Dey et al., 2011; Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown et al., 
2015; Gray et al., 2014b; Shearer, 2002).    
 
9.1.3. EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF COUNTER ACCOUNTS AS A DELEGITIMISING 
INSTRUMENT IN FACILITATING A DIALOGIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
Accountability involves the giving and demanding of accounts of conduct and reflects 
dialogic and differentiated perspectives would be achieved when all arena stakeholders 
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come to a common consensus that the current social order should be adjusted to reflect 
the others through the universalisation of collective actions. For instance, previous 
research revealed that the inability of corporations to engage did not only have significant 
influence on their reputation but often on their long-run bottom-line because of contingent 
liabilities ensuing from their lack of accountability and engagement rather they strive to 
legitimize their activities at the expense of the other stakeholders’ human rights and 
sustainable development (Adams, 2004; Moerman and van der Laan, 2005; Rodrigue, 
2014). Previous research argued that the legitimisation of their activities through 
disclosure in their annual reports or CSRs may not promote transparency and 
accountability to the other non-financial stakeholders (Owen, 2008; Belal and Owen, 
2007; Boiral, 2013; Deegan et al., 2002). Evidence from chapter 6, 7 and 8 revealed that 
corporations often deny allegations of environmental pollution, particularly when they 
would compensate the affected communities except when there are counter accounts or 
symbolic court actions to compel such environmental pollution disclosure from 
corporations. For example, iaNGOr7 revealed that disclosure might incentivise 
corporations to improve their policies and operational behaviour in the local arenas but 
may not resolve the problem 
“…it is quite possible to see a big improvement in reporting to stakeholders but 
those improvements may help companies to make their reputations better, they 
may help some aspect of the companies’ conduct to improve including the human 
rights but I am not sure that such reporting would really address the number of 
problems [in the Niger Delta]…”  
Stemming from the evidence above and in the previous chapters, such disclosure or 
expression of concern could be used as legitimising-instruments or agenda-controlling, 
impression management or business-as-usual or managerial-capture instruments by the 
corporations to deflect the concerns of the advocacy NGOs in this arena to enable them 
to conduct their operational activities with little or no impact on the other stakeholders. 
This managerial-capture perspective supports the research findings by Adams, 2002; 
Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Bebbington et al., 2008; Rahaman et al., 2004; Owen et 
al., 2000, 2001; O’Dwyer, 2002, 2003, 2005; Baker, 2010; Spence, 2009; Tregidga and 
Milne, 2006; Larrinaga-Gonzalez et al., 2001; Owen, 2008; Belal and Owen, 2007 that 
improved disclosure does not translate into transparency, accountability, and engagement 
with the less economically powerful stakeholders rather it is a business case enhancing 
corporate reputation and their bottom-line because corporations are constrained to comply 
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with the terms of their social contracts. For instance, Rahaman et al., (2004, p.39) argued 
that “…social disclosure is perceived, from such a perspective, as one of the strategies 
employed by corporate entities to seek acceptance and approval of their operations from 
society.” The failure of corporations to act in accordance with their social contract might 
have negative implications on their operations, existence and their bottom-line (Deegan 
and Blomquist, 2006; O’Dwyer, 2002, 2003; Belal and Owen, 2007). To minimise the 
negative implications, they often appear to be stakeholders-oriented by adopting different 
strategies to legitimize their activities either by aligning with developmental NGOs to 
change the perceptions of a particular powerful stakeholders’ groups or by deflecting the 
attention of these stakeholders’ groups from the negative implications of their operations 
by providing infrastructures or communities assistance programmes in the arena (see 
chapter 7). This was evident in this controversial arena (see chapter 7 and 8) because 
improved disclosure or legitimacy might not necessarily translate into transparency, 
accountability, and effective engagement rather it was argued to have resulted in “mutual 
suspicion” (see chapter 7). For instance, laNGOr2 argued that  
“…to really know what the people need; between the people, the communities, 
and the corporations and in fact the government, there has to be mutual trust 
before we can talk of the way forward. Right now, there is mutual suspicion. It is 
just a marriage of convenience between the government and the oil corporations 
because the government needs their resources, the corporations need their profit, 
and the people are like the grass that suffers…” [emphasis added by author] 
In addition, evidence in chapter 7 and 8 revealed that often the corporations portrayed 
their activities as impactful, transparent and engaging but the implication or the extent of 
such engagement and transparency was argued not to be felt by the other economically 
less powerful stakeholders due to their “one way” communication process (Thomson and 
Bebbington, 2004, 2005).   
An emancipatory dialogic accountability within the lifecycle and pathways to conflict 
resolution(s) should facilitate the dynamic stakeholders’ engagement process to address 
the issues discussed earlier (see chapter 6 and 8) from the perspective of the stakeholders 
(Brown and Dillard, 2015a, b, 2013; Dey et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2014b). Furthermore, 
it should facilitate the relational or radical possibilities of holding the powerful 
stakeholders accountable for their negligence, conflict of interest, environmental 
pollution, ineffective governance, exclusion, and lack of transparency, unequal power 
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relations, human rights violation, unaccountability and other unsustainable practices in 
the Delta arena. Besides identifying the problems, dialogic accountability in the Delta 
arena, as highlighted in chapter 4, should be able to resolve and prevent future problems 
through persistent and collective stakeholders’ democratic and deliberative knowledge-
exchange dialogues because it enables the expansion of meaning and understanding from 
different perspectives (Dillard and Yuthas, 2013; Dillard, 2014; Gallhofer et al., 2015; 
Contrafatto et al., 2015). However, in the Delta arena, the author would expect that the 
indigenous people should be able to relate and connect with the oil industry and 
governance regimes resulting in effective collaborative actions and accountability, which 
might minimise the embedded tension and conflicts within this arena. The indigenous 
people and other participants in the arena should be able to engage with the oil companies 
and the regulators and there should be accountability flowing both ways from the different 
arena participants because they would be able to relate with all the arena participants 
without having to use the developmental and advocacy NGOs as the intermediaries for 
accountability (see chapter 7 and 8). For example  
“Without the civil society, NGOs and the international community, I am telling 
you sincerely, we would have been wiped off. We would have been wiped off but 
because they have taken our case outside [to the international audience] …that is 
why we are still living.” (CLs1, focus group, participant 1) [emphasis added by 
author] 
“So, if civil society was not there, those issues [oil spills, gas flaring and human 
rights violations] would not even be spoken of. It was the civil society that had 
put them on the front burner and good enough; the gas flaring issue has gain 
government’s attention, has gained the oil companies’ attention. …the civil 
society has tried to create a kind of public awareness and also draw the attention 
of corporations and government to these issues.” (laNGOr3) [emphasis added by 
author] 
Nevertheless, empirically there seems to be no single observable dialogic accountability 
platform in the Delta arena rather it appears there are multiple dialogic accountability 
platforms through the engagement of the advocacy NGOs networks of engagement (see 
chapter 8). For instance, laNGOr3 argued that  
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“There are two kinds of engagement, the civil society engagement and 
communities’ engagement. What I can tell you is that when it comes to engaging 
with oil companies, communities are not able to effectively engage in a kind of a 
boardroom dynamics…between communities and oil companies. So, I want you 
to understand that…it can significantly limit the level of policies participation, the 
level of information disseminated and what could be derived from that form of 
engagement. So, in the final analysis, it is what the oil companies decide that is 
forced on the communities.” [emphasis added by author] 
Dialogic accountability and engagement in the Delta would enable the arena participants 
to reflectively evaluate the implicit and explicit impact of their actions on the other 
stakeholders through a constructive dialogue thereby restructuring the established 
powerful status quo to a stakeholder dialogic engagement driven status quo in the Delta 
arena. Dialogic accountability framework for the respect and protection of the 
fundamental human rights and transformative sustainable development would enable 
stakeholders to give and receive accurate and timely accounts or information and 
feedback to drive the desired change. This was summarized by iaNGOr7 as  
“The accuracy and the availability of the information are absolutely critical for the 
realisation of human rights. That is one of the points that we have been trying to 
communicate repeatedly. […] We feel that the lack of objective information 
makes it much more difficult for {name of corporation} and other oil companies 
to be held accountable…”  
There is a pressing need for a democratic and deliberative policy framework to drive the 
governance and accountability reforms within which the economically, marginalized, and 
the less powerful arena participants may have an impactful and consistent voice to hold 
the powerful stakeholders to account (Bebbington et al., 2007). Such that, all the 
stakeholders involved would have the necessary information on the issues to drive 
governance and accountability reforms in the Delta arena (Hazelton, 2013; Brown, 2009). 
Freire (2002, p.96) argued that  
“…language of the people cannot exist without thought, and neither language nor 
thought can exist without a structure to which they refer. …to communicate 
effectively, educator and politician must understand the structural conditions in 
which the thought and language of the people are dialectically framed.”  
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The presence of an observable dialogic accountability platform among all the 
stakeholders would enable the powerful stakeholders to envision the economically less 
powerful stakeholders as co-owners, whose interest need to be strategically managed and 
protected to maximise shareholders’ wealth creation. They would be aware of what is 
happening, and that awareness will help in strategizing and in driving an 
(intra)intergenerational equity and developmental agenda. According to Bebbington et al. 
(2007, p.364), this state of consciousness or awareness through dialogue implies that the 
contradiction or differences in worldviews would be resolved by identifying the unique 
contribution of what each stakeholders’ worldview offers towards the advancement of 
human rights and sustainable development. This was summarized as  
“…accountability is a relational issue. If you want it to work efficiently then that 
relational issue should be defined, and we recognise that for it to work effectively, 
it should operate within a policy framework. So, be it at the community level, 
national level, there should be policy framework, guiding and governing that 
relationship and there should be adequate information for all the stakeholders 
involved. In this case, what the oil companies know, the community must also 
know and NGOs must know. So, that when they all come together for negotiation 
on the dialogue table, they will be on equal footing to dialogue and discuss.” 
(iaNGOr9, focus group, participant 2) 
 
9.2. EVALUATION OF THE LIFECYCLE AND PATHWAYS TO CONFLICT(S) RESOLUTION 
THROUGH THE INVERTED ARENA, AND DIALOGIC ACCOUNTABILITY APPROACH 
9.2.1. THE EARLY PHASE OF CONFLICT  
As elucidated in section 4.4, conflicts in contested arenas, however temporary, could 
emerge from history of broken promises, problem denial, breakdown of trust, breach of 
regulations, unequal power relations, dialogic gaps, governance and accountability gaps, 
accidents, human rights violations, marginalization of the subalterns, environmental 
pollution, external circumstances or developments in other conflicts arenas (Thomson et 
al., 2015; Laine and Vinnari, 2017; Tregidga, 2017; Apostol, 2015; Brennan and Merkl-
Davies, 2014). At the early phase of the conflict, the indigenous people felt they were 
being marginalised and oppressed by the corporations and the government, especially 
through the imposition of the Land Use Decree and the exclusive joint venture agreement, 
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which excluded them from participating in the management of the crude oil extracted 
within the Delta arena (see chapter 6 and 7).  
At the conflict emergence stage, the latent conflict resulted in tensions and subsequently, 
emerge and escalated into conflict(s) where they were not constructively resolved. This 
was evident in the Delta arena (see chapter 6 – section 6.2 and 7), especially through the 
emancipatory conscientization of the Ogoni people by the late Ken Saro-Wiwa through 
MOSOP’s counter accounts, engagement of regional, national and international arenas in 
the 1990s and the publication of the “Ogoni Bill of Rights.” The evidence in chapter 6, 7 
and 8 revealed that due to the engagement of the radicalist advocacy NGOs in 
conscientizing the communities’ stakeholders, their worldview of the problems in the 
Delta have changed over time and this influenced their interactions with the other 
stakeholders. 
 
9.2.2. THE OPEN PHASE OF CONFLICT 
This phase was characterised by the escalation of conflicts, confrontation and 
problematization through counter accounting technologies and stalemate/deadlock from 
the non-dialogic engagement phase. Evidence revealed that the shareholders’ activist 
group, international courts, political institutions such as the United Nations, the 
international advocacy NGOs were either used to resolve the conflicts in the local arenas 
or were used to galvanise international audience to the ordeal of unsustainable practices 
at the local arena (see chapter 8). The conflicts escalated from the local arena to the 
regional, national and subsequently to the international arena through the activism of the 
radicalist and the hybrid-participationist advocacy NGOs, with the arena participants 
striving to resolve or perpetuate the conflicts through the amplification of additional 
delegitimising counter accounts or the use of social media or conventional media or by 
adopting different strategies to conflict resolution (see figure 5, p.225). 
In the Delta arena, these counter accounts were aimed to expose and challenge the 
unsustainable practices of the powerful stakeholders and to de-legitimize the compliance 
discourse of the corporations and the governance regimes in order to facilitate dialogues, 
facilitate transformative changes and to engage the communities’ stakeholders, the 
national and international audience (see chapter 6, 7 and 8). For instance, evidence 
revealed that the conflict escalated when Shell was ousted from operating in Ogoniland 
during a mass protest in 1994 and when Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogonis (the Ogoni 9) 
were hanged (see chapter 6). Their execution (Ogoni 9) resulted in a stepwise change in 
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the campaigns particularly against Shell and other MNOCs in Nigeria. This conflict 
escalated from a local dialogue for accountability and institutional change on human right 
violations, healthy environment, effective governance, sustainable development, outcries 
for resource control, to national conflicts for accountability and subsequently to 
international counter accounts and engagements for institutional change and governance 
reforms.  
The stalemate/deadlock stage evolved from the latent, conflict emergence, escalation and 
conflict(s) resolution stage. This was evident in the Delta arena (see chapter 6, 7 and 8), 
especially through the conscientization of the Ogoni people by the late Ken Saro-Wiwa 
in the 90s. Their campaigns and networks for change were at a stalemate when Shell was 
ousted out of Ogoniland in 1994 and this led to the loss of Shell’s social licence to operate 
in Ogoniland (see chapter 6 and 7). Furthermore, stalemate(s) was observed when 
accountability and the causes of oil spills or gas flares and human rights violations were 
denied by the corporations and these cases were taken by the radicalist and the hybrid 
radical-participationist advocacy NGOs to national and international courts for 
adjudications before they were resolved. 
 
9.2.3. THE LATER PHASE OF CONFLICT 
As elucidated in section 4.4.2.3, this stage was characterised by the critical awareness to 
speak truth to power to de-escalate the conflicts or to resolve the conflicts resolving in 
collaborative actions. At this stage, the arena participants were expected to be accountable 
for their actions and to take responsibilities for their actions at all levels of activism (see 
figure 5, p.225) to critically evaluate the causes of the conflicts and to seek accountable 
and dialogic mechanisms to resolve them. As evident in chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9.1, conflicts 
in the Delta arena were resolved through the activism of the participationist and hybrid-
participationist advocacy NGOs with other networks of engagements to broaden and open 
up the conversation for a sustainable environment and the respect of the fundamental 
rights of the indigenous people. Evidence revealed that often, conflicts at the local arenas 
were resolved through the intervention of the judiciaries and shareholders’ activist groups 
by the advocacy NGOs. 
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9.3. CONCLUSION 
The chapter empirically explored the last research question in this thesis. Emphasis was 
paid to the dialogic accountability and engagement (see chapter 4) to understand the 
potential of this framework to critically, empirically and theoretically make sense of the 
accountability and engagement relations for the advancement of human rights and 
sustainable development in the Delta arena. This chapter draws extensively on the 
empirical evidence from chapter 6, 7, 8 and the theoretical lense in chapter 4 to explore 
the implications of dialogic engagement in the Delta arena. It draws reflectively from 
relevant dialogic accountability and arena literature to inductively make sense of the 
lifecycle and pathways to conflict resolution(s) model through an inverted arena and 
dialogic accountability approach. This approach enabled the author to critically explore 
the complex engagement relations for accountability, effective governance, inclusive 
ownership, respect for human rights, power equality in addressing the conflicts for 
sustainable Delta. 
The author observed that the failure of the government to get its governance right and to 
relinquish its self-regulatory role of the oil industry implied that the indigenous people 
fundamental rights, desire for inclusive ownership, accountability and effective 
governance were not effectively protected and respected by the corporations (joint 
partners). The stakeholders argued that the inequality of power and ownership structure 
restricted community stakeholders’ engagement in the arena. They have no significant 
voice to hold corporations and the government accountable for human rights and 
environmental pollution. Their inability to engage, the absence of the voice to speak their 
truth and to hold the powerful stakeholders accountable resulted in diverse conflicts (see 
chapter 6 and 7). This is because they understood (after being extensively conscientized 
by the advocacy NGOs) that their inclusion in the management of the oil industry could 
facilitate a socially progressive inclusive, empowering and emancipatory dialogue 
towards ensuring that policies, accountability and engagement relations are beneficial to 
all the arena participants besides addressing the existing unsustainable practices (Freire, 
2002). 
The absence of inclusive dialogic accountabilities ignited criticisms from grassroots, 
local, regional, national and international arena participants. These criticisms resulted in 
the publication of counter accounts, its corresponding actions (see chapter 8) to address 
the unequal power relations, redistribution of wealth, respect and protection of human 
rights, the accountability and governance gaps for sustainable development, and in NGOs 
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conscientizing the indigenous people to be the drivers of the change they desire through 
participatory accountability (Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Apostol, 2015; Dey et 
al., 2011). The level of awareness emerging from the emancipatory engagement of the 
advocacy NGOs through the proliferation and publication of counter accounts initiated an 
increasing practice of freedom through dialogic accountability to reflect communities’ 
engagement that expose, challenge and identify the inadequacies of the dominant 
corporate hegemony in this arena (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2015; Gray et 
al., 2014b; Blackburn et al., 2014). This is because the arena participants envisaged that 
the practice of dialogic accountability within the arena could initiate change by speaking 
truth to power, provide the clarity required for emancipatory outcomes and address the 
expectations of the arena participants especially on oil spill and gas flaring, thereby 
defusing the embedded tensions and conflicts within this arena. Beyond the dynamics of 
counter accounting discourses in problematizing and amplifying the conflicts emerging 
from the governance and accountability gaps (as highlighted in chapter 6, 7 and 8); the 
conflicts and unequal power relations within this arena could be resolved when the arena 
participants envisaged that their desire for emancipatory and transformative sustainable 
change could be better served through a dialogic policy framework.  
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CHAPTER 10: SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND WAYS FORWARD 
“I think this is a tragedy. The Niger Delta is a true tragedy 
environmentally, socially and economically. It is the kind of 
thing that cannot be let to happen anywhere else ever again. 
…I see this kind of thing going on in a worst severe scenario 
in other places in developing countries, I think the Niger 
Delta crisis needs to be held out as an example of how not 
to develop oil; how not to tell the local communities to 
participate in their economy.” (iaNGOr5)  
10.0. INTRODUCTION 
This study explored the dynamics of counter accounts and accountability in the 
advancement of human rights and sustainable development. In recognising the 
significance of counter accounts in the arena (see chapter 4, 6, 7 and 8), this study adopted 
a dialogic accountability discourse through the lifecycle and pathways to conflict 
resolution(s) in advancing human rights and sustainable development in the Niger Delta. 
The evidence strongly confirms theorization found in the dialogic accounting literature 
(see chapter 4 and 9) but strongly confirm theorization (unexpected findings) found in the 
management review, social movement, in the business ethics, accounting and conflict 
resolution literatures on activism’s ideologies, strategies, tactics and engagement geared 
towards conflict resolutions in contested arenas. This chapter aims to critically analyse the 
overall findings of this study in relations to the research aims and questions by 
highlighting the expected and the unexpected findings, and practices that hinder the 
protection and respect of human rights and sustainable development especially using 
counter accounting technologies. Furthermore, this chapter highlights the contribution to 
knowledge, implications for practice, the limitations of this study and recommend future 
research pathways. 
 
10.1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
To contribute to the dialogic accountability, counter accounting, human rights accounting 
and sustainable development literatures, the research aims and research 
questions/objectives of this study (see section 1.5) were, first – to explore why counter 
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accounts are produced to address and drive accountability, advancement of human rights 
and sustainable development within the Niger Delta conflict arena. The second research 
objective was to critically explore why and how the arena participants perceive the 
underlying accountability and governance gaps, which shaped their interactions to drive 
an emancipatory change through counter accounts. The third research objective was to 
critically explore how counter accounts (social accounts) are used to bridge 
accountability, governance gaps for the advancement of human rights from the 
perspective of the advocacy NGOs’ campaigns against corporate and governance 
practices within this arena and finally, to explore the implications of dialogic 
accountability in exploring the perception of counter accounts for the advancement of 
human rights from the perspective of stakeholders using the arena framework. 
With respect to the first research questions explored in chapter 6, the evidence in this 
chapter and chapter 7, 8 and 9 support the claims that accountability and inclusive 
stakeholders’ engagement should be viewed as essential elements of protecting the 
vulnerable and marginalised people and the other stakeholders without direct agency 
relationships with the corporations. Brown and Fraser (2006, p.107) argued that “the 
capability for stakeholders to both reward and impose sanctions is a key component in the 
accountability process.” The lack of effective accountability and governance mechanisms 
that included the vulnerable stakeholders whose human rights to live sustainably had been 
violated resulted in conflicts and tensions in the Delta arena. In addition, evidence 
revealed that the community stakeholders were campaigning for “accountability through 
actions” to mitigate the negative effect of environmental pollution that affected their 
human rights and sustainable development (Parker, 2014; Robert, 2009; Cooper and 
Owen, 2007; Shearer, 2002; Messner, 2009). The absence of accountability through 
actions and the consistent human rights violations and unsustainable 
(intra)intergenerational practices resulted in problematization in order to give voices to 
the marginalised stakeholders’ group and to speak truth to power by delegitimizing the 
powerful stakeholders’ claims/counter-counter accounts on oil spills and gas flaring (Dey 
et al., 2011; Apostol, 2015; Gray et al., 2014b; Tregidga, 2017; Joutsenvirta, 2011; Kneip, 
2013). 
Evidence revealed that counter accounting(s) were used as a delegitimising technology to 
make visible corporate unsustainable practices and unequal power relations to demand 
accountability and to facilitate dialogic accountability by building the capacity of the 
marginalised stakeholders to seek emancipatory and organisational changes through 
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dialogue (Dey et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2015; Bebbington et al., 2007; Burchell and 
Cook, 2013a, b). Besides serving as a delegitimising instrument, counter accounts and 
corresponding counter actions were used to engage the shareholders’ activist groups and 
to cause reputational damages on the corporations. Counter accounts and corresponding 
actions through court actions were intended to protect the human rights of the indigenous 
people by seeking judicial remedies in national and international courts, especially when 
the corporations denied or abrogated environmental pollution to third-party interference 
without substantial evidence to support their claims. 
The historical documentary analysis revealed that the community stakeholders and the 
advocacy NGOs argued that the Land Use Act 1978 (see chapter 6 and 7) was the 
foundation of colonialism by the Nigerian state through joint venture agreement with 
corporations. Evidence revealed that other conflicts for inclusiveness, accountability, 
human rights and environmental protection emerged because the Land Use Act 1978 
transferred the environmental and human rights of the indigenous people to the “crony 
capitalists” in Nigeria (Bakre and Lauwo, 2016). The advocacy NGOs were not only 
serving as the watchdogs of the oil industry in this arena, but their counter accounts and 
corresponding actions were to challenge the repression and ecocide committed from the 
50’s to problematize and publicise the ecological damage to the national and international 
audience to drive emancipatory changes in the local arenas. In addition, evidence revealed 
that counter accounts and corresponding counteractions were to demand transparency in 
the management of the mineral resources and the environment through effective 
regulatory and accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, counter accounts were used to 
clamour for inclusive community ownership of the mineral resources and the localisation 
of the protection and respect of human rights within the arena (Ako, 2015; Ako and 
Ekhator, 2016; Bob, 2005; Okonta and Douglas, 2003). 
Another interesting finding in chapter 6 and 8, which was not evident in previous research 
(see Dey and Russell, 2014; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Gallhofer et al., 2006; 
Moerman and van der Laan, 2005) but highlighted in Thomson et al., 2015 and Tregidga, 
2017 was the use of contemporary media technologies and evidence-based systematic and 
partisan counter accounts, particularly through physical and verifiable scientific evidence 
to contradict the accounts of the corporations on the cause, the volume, the impacted areas 
and the timing of oil spills in the local arenas. The use of physical verifiable partisan 
counter accounts by the advocacy NGOs was to fill the gaps in accounts published by the 
powerful stakeholders on environmental pollution in the Delta arena (Apostol, 2015; 
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Adams, 2004; Joutsenvirta, 2011). For instance, in chapter 6, 7 and 8, evidence revealed 
that the advocacy NGOs (Amnesty International) through building coalition with an 
independent laNGO (CEHRD) were able to de-legitimized Shell’s account on the 
quantities of oil spilled into Bodo community in 2008 and 2009 in the UK’s court using 
scientific satellite image of the impacted site captured by an expert (Accufacts). 
Furthermore, in chapter 8, findings revealed that pictures and videoed evidence of polluted 
environment and its impacts on the indigenous people or bottle of spilt crude oil were 
transmitted to the international arenas- shareholders’ activist group or the courts, which 
through confrontational and dialogic approach engaged the corporations at their home 
countries to address the conflicts on pollution at the local arenas. 
With respect to the second research question (see chapter 7) which was to explore the 
perception of the arena participants, the author proposed the inverted arena framework in 
the lifecycle and pathways to conflict(s) resolution (see chapter 4) by building on the work 
of Renn, 1992, Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008, 2012; Dey and Russell, 2014; Smith 
et al., 2010; Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2013. The inverted arena framework is 
analogous to the conflict arena model because it is a metaphor that represents the symbolic 
location of engagement associated with a conflict that affects and is affected by a number 
of different arena participants. However, the inverted arena model took cognisance of the 
contested, complex and dynamic interactions for effective accountability and governance, 
and respect for human rights, power inequality and inclusive ownership relations by the 
arena participants along with their different ideologies, values and logic but with the 
community stakeholders at the epicentre of the conflict arena. Previous research using the 
arena framework (see Thomson et al., 2015; Georgakopolous and Thomson, 2008, 2012; 
Renn, 1992) positioned the corporations and the rule enforcers at the epicentre of the arena 
by indirectly depicting that the arena participants are striving to influence outcomes to 
protect the business case argument for shareholders’ wealth maximisation. The inverted 
arena framework argued that centralizing the one causing the harm at the centre of the 
arena, particularly in the Delta arena implies that the other stakeholders, whose 
fundamental rights and (intra)intergenerational environment are being violated are not 
stakeholders in the arena. This implies that the dynamics and complexities of 
stakeholders’ dialogic engagements for accountability, effective governance, respect and 
protection of human rights, power equality and sustainable development discourses could 
be ascribed to the business case argument at the expense of the moral and ethical 
requirement of the other stakeholders to live sustainably (O’Dwyer, 2003; Dillard, 2014; 
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Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Livesey, 2001; Gray, 2006). Using the inverted arena model 
in exploring pluralistic engagements with the stakeholders directly bearing the 
unsustainable environmental and human rights practices at the centre of the conflict arena 
could help in understanding the arena participants’ counter accounts, ideologies, strategies 
and networks of engagement to influence the outcomes on accountability, governance, 
sustainable development, the protection and the respect of human rights for the benefit of 
all the arena participants. 
Using the inverted arena model, the author observed complex engagement in the Delta. 
For instance, previous researchers (Messner, 2009; Shearer, 2002; Parker, 2014; Robert, 
2009; Boven, 2007) recognised that accountability should transcend beyond the principal-
agency relationship to a community-centred approach by embracing the others who might 
not have a relationship with the formal structures of accountability to deflect conflicts and 
tensions between powerful stakeholders and other stakeholders (Gray et al., 2014b; Brown 
and Dillard, 2015a, b; Belal et al., 2015). However, evidence revealed that corporations 
often manage perceptions by adopting strategic impression management tools arguing that 
they listened to the other stakeholders and the respect of human rights was grossly 
embedded in their policy framework and operations in the Delta arena. Nevertheless, 
evidence from the community stakeholders, developmental NGOs and the advocacy 
NGOs argued that double standard was often applied in the Delta because accountability 
and engagement was shrouded in secrecy and were often between the corporations and 
their joint venture partners whilst the community stakeholders were viewed as third party 
despite the exploratory and extraction activities in their immediate environment. 
Furthermore, evidence revealed that “dialogic gaps” often emerge when the corporations 
engaged the community stakeholders or the advocacy NGOs because there were often 
unfulfilled accountability, human rights, and developmental promises made by the 
corporations (Bebbington et al., 2007; Thomson and Bebbington, 2005). Hence, the other 
stakeholders argued that the corporations cannot be held accountable for these dialogic 
gaps because there was no defined agency relationship between them due to joint venture 
agreement and the Land Use Decree of 1978 which ascribed ownership of mineral 
resources to the federal government (see section 7.2.3). This contribute to previous 
research on stakeholders’ dialogic-centred approach to accountability and engagement, 
which should be morally and ethically established with stakeholders to “give and to 
demand accounts of conducts or actions” with the formal structure of accountability 
regardless of whether there is an agency obligation to provide an account (Messner, 2009; 
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Shearer, 2002; Parker, 2014; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007). The absence of an inclusive 
stakeholders’ approach to accountability in the Delta arena created space for iaNGOs and 
laNGOs to problematize the conflicts in this arena. The engagement of these NGOs 
resulted in the publication of systematic, partisan, contra-governing and dialogic accounts 
to give voices to the community stakeholders’ plights by creating awareness in the local 
arenas on how to demand moral, relational and dialogic accountability, besides engaging 
the powerful stakeholders and other arena participants (Thomson et al., 2015; Dey et al., 
2011; O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009) (see chapter 6, 7 and 8). 
Furthermore, using the inverted arena model adopted in chapter 7, the community 
stakeholders interviewed argued that the oil resource was a curse rather than a blessing 
because the negative effect from oil spills and gas flaring does not only affect their health 
but their ways of life, sources of water and means of livelihood. Despite the regulatory 
requirement that oil spills should be accounted for by the corporations within 24hours and 
remediation exercise commenced within that period, systematic and partisan counter 
accounts by the advocacy NGOs and the community stakeholders revealed that it has no 
accountability substance because double standard or environmental racism were applied 
when there are pollutions. When the spills are remediated, they were often inadequate (see 
chapter 7 and 8). Besides the interview evidence, photographic evidence captured by the 
author revealed that the environment has been extensively damaged, and it would require 
the political will of the arena participants and the governance regimes to remediate the 
polluted environment.  
Furthermore, evidence revealed that the advocacy NGO’s published systematic, partisan 
and contra-governing counter accounts (Thomson et al., 2015) to problematize the 
credibility of the regulatory agencies and its JIVs’ exercise (see chapter 7 and 8). For 
instance, evidence revealed that JIVs were unnecessarily delayed and when they were 
finally conducted to evaluate the extent of damage caused from the spills, the corporations 
provided the logistics required for such investigations, which could influence the 
judgement of the regulatory agencies. Empirical findings from the community 
stakeholders and the advocacy NGOs revealed that because of this conflict of interests, 
the outcomes of JIVs have often been attributed to sabotage (see section 7.2.2) even when 
they appeared to have occurred due to controllable factors (see section 7.2.6). This 
subsequently created conflicts and tensions as to the credibility of these exercises and the 
independence of the regulatory agencies to be accountable to the other stakeholders on 
JIVs. This is because the corporations and the rule enforcers (NOSDRA and DPR) view 
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the outcomes of these exercises as binding on all the arena participants. The conflict of 
interests and the outcomes of the JIVs tend to reinforce the need for independent and 
adequately funded regulatory agencies that are accountable and transparent in their 
practices of zero tolerance to negligence from oil pollution to protect human rights and 
sustainable environment. This was because the inability of NOSDRA to implement its 
regulations implied that the corporations and saboteurs would capitalize on the 
governance gaps to further violate the environmental and human rights of the people living 
in the Delta by flouting the regulations. Thus, the advocacy NGOs through cooperation 
with the community stakeholders, their emotional narratives and up-loadable video 
accounts of double standard, use their systematic, contra-governing and scientific partisan 
counter accounts to problematize the cogent need for ‘environmental racism’ and 
‘managerial and institutional capture phenomenon’ emerging from these cosy 
relationships be revised by the policymakers through the PIB (see section 6.1, 7.2.2 and 
7.2.5) to facilitate an effective governance and dialogic accountability for the benefit of 
all the arena participants (Dey et al., 2011; Georgakopolous and Thomson, 2008; 
O’Sullivan and O’Dywer, 2009; Adams, 2004; Baker, 2010). 
Another interesting finding using the inverted arena model was the corporations’ accounts 
on oil spills and gas flaring. Evidence revealed that the corporations projected themselves 
as pragmatically, socially, environmentally responsible and as sustainable corporations 
through their compliance discourse on how they had adhered strictly to the environmental 
regulations governing their operations and their own corporate policies on environmental 
safety in the Delta arena. However, empirical ‘systematic and evidenced-based partisan 
counter accounts’ by the community stakeholders, UNEP 2011, iaNGOs, laNGOs, 
DNGOs and the regulator – NOSDRA argued that these regulations have been flouted, 
especially in relation to the integrity of their pipelines and oil spills investigation and 
corresponding remediation. This empirical finding adequately support Thomson et al., 
2015; Georgakopolous and Thomson, 2008, 2012; Joutsenvirta, 2011; Kneip, 2013 on 
how advocacy NGOs publish and use systematic, partisan and contra-governing counter 
accounts to confront, counter-act and contradict the corporations’ legitimacy accounts of 
being a morally, socially, environmentally and sustainable corporations at the expense of 
the health, human rights and sustainable development discourse of the marginalised 
stakeholders. Evidence in the Delta arena revealed that the corporations’ accounts in their 
sustainability reports and webinar dialogue accounts denied claims of oil spills by 
ascribing them to sabotage or oil theft and when polluted sites are remediated, they were 
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“underpinned by a discourse of compliance” by arguing that they are timely and 
effectively remediated (Adams, 2004; O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009; Apostol, 2015). 
The corporations’ compliance accounts suggested that environmental and human rights 
concern were a factor that defined and legitimised their corporate policies and shaped their 
engagement and operational activities. However, this compliance accounts contradicted 
the systematic and scientific partisan accounts of the other stakeholders who unanimously 
argued that the corporations have flouted the regulations and polluted sites were often not 
remediated to the regulatory requirements stipulated by EGASPIN. However, evidence 
revealed that the reliance of the regulatory regimes on the corporations’ logistics implied 
that the corporations could flout the regulations. Therefore, there is a need for the 
regulatory regimes to be independent, adequately funded, equipped with experts and 
legislatively strengthened to account for compliance, force compliance with the laws and 
enforce sanctions when the laws are flouted by the corporations in order to protect human 
rights and the environment by ensuring zero tolerance to pollution (see section 7.2.5). 
Counter accounts were used to bridge the compliance gaps emerging from the 
ineffectiveness of the regulatory regimes to delegitimise the compliance discourse of the 
corporations. In addition, a coalition of advocacy NGOs in the Delta in collaboration with 
NOSDRA launched an online visual accounting-sustainability platform– OSM. The OSM 
was a response to the consistent counter accounts and symbolic actions by the advocacy 
NGOs that provide the arena participants easy access to information on oil spillage, its 
remediation, and to enable the arena participants to monitor the performance of NOSDRA 
and the corporations on how they protect and respect human rights by conserving the 
environment. 
Evidence revealed that the volume of gas flared and the fines charged for flaring by DPR 
is undisclosed despite its negative impact on the human rights, to health, environmental 
right and economic rights of the people. Furthermore, empirical evidence revealed that 
due to the absence of political-will, gas is consistently flared rather than it being converted 
to power to address poverty in the region and in Nigeria (Hassan and Kouhy, 2013; World 
Bank, 2015c; Vidal, 2012). The absence of the political will by the corporations and the 
government to provide infrastructural facilities to harness gas resulted in numerous 
excuses being issued by the corporations for gas flaring because any disruption to crude 
oil exploration means a disruption of revenue for the joint venture partners. This resulted 
in the problematization and proliferation of counter accounts to contend for stricter 
regulations of the oil industry and for gas flaring to be stopped, reinjected or refined into 
332 
 
liquefied gas (Steiner, 2010; Amnesty International, 2013, 2009). Furthermore, the 
absence of the political will to stop gas flaring led to the conscientization of the indigenous 
people by the advocacy NGOs to drive a dialogic accountability and engagement for a 
transformative change in the Delta arena (Bebbington et al., 2007; Contrafatto et al., 
2015). This advocacy resulted in the development of an online accountability tool – the 
Nigerian Gas Flare Tracker (GFT) to promote transparency and to enable the arena 
participants to monitor the amount of gas flare, hoping it would compel the powerful 
stakeholders to reduce the quantity of gas flare. Evidence revealed that rather than reduce 
or stop gas flaring, the Department of Petroleum Resources removed the paltry fine 
imposed on gas flaring. 
Using the inverted arena model, evidence revealed that the corporations considered 
themselves as corporate citizens often because of its dominant discourse on CSR to 
influence and endear communities’ engagements and loyalties where they operate. This 
was often through their GMOU and their contributions for community developmental 
projects through government parastatals in the Delta. However, evidence from the arena 
participants indicated that NDDC had no significant developmental substance in the Delta, 
which the policymakers should address. Nevertheless, as shown in chapter 7, the GMOU 
was considered a better approach to community development than the MOU where the 
corporations decided what one-off project, which were either not completed or were 
abandoned when completed or were hardly functional after their completion (Aaron, 
2012; Draper, 2010; Idemudia, 2007). The GMOU represented a paradigm shift which 
emerged due to the consistent counter accounts and counteractions from the advocacy 
NGOs clamouring for the corporations to engage the communities to achieve a safe, 
healthy and sustainable Delta. Regardless of the significance of this initiative, the 
advocacy NGOs and the community stakeholders argued that it was a silencing strategy 
employed by the corporations to capture, silence and marginalise the community 
stakeholders from speaking their truth to power (Gray et al., 2014b; Tregidga et al., 2015). 
Evidence from the corporations revealed that the GMOU was a transparent process meant 
for an enhanced relationship, which contradicted the evidence from the DNGOrs, 
iaNGOrs, laNGOrs and the community stakeholders. This subsequently resulted in the 
“publish what you pump campaign” and “publish what you pay campaign” by the 
advocacy NGOs to drive dialogic accountability and transparency in the oil industry.   
Another obvious empirical finding in chapter 7, which also contributes to the dialogic 
theory is the “divide and rule tactics” which Freire (2002, p.141) described as the “theory 
333 
 
of oppressive action.” Freire argued that the tactics is often in the interest of the oppressor 
because they manipulate the people by giving them(oppressed) the impression that 
they(oppressor) are helping them through the provision of infrastructures. Freire argued 
that in exchange for the provision of infrastructures, the oppressed become easy prey for 
manipulation and domination because it prevents the oppressed from organising 
themselves for transformative changes. Evidence revealed that the powerful stakeholders 
adopted this “divide and rule tactics” to violate and engineer conflicts within the 
communities, especially where they were required to be accountable and transparent. The 
community stakeholders argued that because of this strategy they could not air their views 
on issues that affected their environment and human rights when it relates to oil 
exploration and extraction in the local arenas. However, the community stakeholders 
argued that the advocacy NGOs have not been able to eradicate these conflicts despite the 
consistent counter accounts and actions in the Delta arena, but they have been able to 
reduce it by conscientizing the people to understand that their human rights and the 
environment need to be protected and respected. 
With respect to the third research question explored in chapter 8, the iaNGOs and laNGOs 
argued that the oil corporations and even the Nigerian government pay lip-service to the 
implementation of national and international regulatory frameworks in the Delta arena 
rather they were ratified for diplomatic and legitimacy purposes, thereby creating gaps in 
governance and accountability. Evidence from the advocacy NGOs revealed that by 
confronting and speaking truth to the powerful stakeholders through their counter 
accounts, counter audits and counter-actions, they provided accountable information to 
delegitimise the institutional works of the State and the corporations (Lauwo et al., 2016; 
Tregidga 2017; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). Thereby compelling governance to get 
governance rights and to drive the respect of human rights from the corporations in the 
Delta arena. 
Furthermore, empirical findings revealed that there were different approaches to counter 
accounting and activism in the Delta arena – the radicalist, the participationist and the 
hybrid approaches to activism. The radicalist adopted complete boycott, antagonistic and 
confrontational strategies as a mechanism of engaging and facilitating transformative 
change at the local arenas while the participationist adopted a dialogic accountability and 
engagement strategy. The characteristics of the radicalist and the participationist 
approaches in this study are similar to the approaches identified in the management review 
and social movement literature, particularly by den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Fitzgerald 
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and Rodgers, 2000. However, empirical evidence revealed that there is also the hybrid 
radical-participationist approach in the Delta arena. The hybrid combined the radical and 
the participationist approach to advocate and engage with the powerful stakeholders at 
different conflict arenas (figure 6 [see p.246] and section 8.4). 
Furthermore, evidence revealed that counter accounting and its technologies were used by 
laNGOs to build coalitions and networks of engagement for human rights, accountability, 
governance, unequal power relations, sustainable development in an arena to give voices 
to the marginalized indigenous groups (Gallhofer et al., 2006, 2011; Georgakopoulos and 
Thomson, 2008; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009). 
Evidence revealed that engagement for transformative changes by the laNGOs were 
within different conflict arenas – the local, regional, national and international arenas to 
address unsustainable practices at the local arenas. This supports the evidence by 
Thomson et al., 2015; Kneip, 2013; Cooper et al., 2005 that activists engage at different 
conflict arenas to cause legitimate transformative changes on behalf of the other 
stakeholders, who may not have the voice to engage at these conflict arenas. Their ability 
to make the unsustainable practices in the local arenas visible resulted in networks and 
coalition of engagements comprising the community stakeholders, shareholders’ activist 
group, the iaNGOs, national and international courts, the host government of the 
corporations and supranational organisations acting as co-producers of counter accounts. 
In addition, evidence revealed that there was a need to enable the indigenous communities 
to become more powerful and less oppressed. Part of that process was to help them find 
their collective dialogic voice and enable them to co-produce counter accounts of their 
lives and causes of suffering, and communicate these accounts to others (Bebbington et 
al., 2007; Cooper et al., 2005; Everett, 2004; Freire, 2002; Spence, 2009). In addition, the 
laNGOs use counter accounts, counter audits and counteractions to build the capacity of 
the indigenous people to advocate for/on behalf of themselves (Contrafatto et al., 2015; 
Thomson and Bebbington, 2005). The conscientization of the indigenous people by the 
laNGOs allowed the community stakeholders to participate in speaking their truth to 
power through numerous communication platforms to rebalance the unequal power 
relations, the need for an inclusive and accurate accountability, and effective governance 
in the local arenas (Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Gray et al., 2014b; Tregidga, 2017; 
Vinnari and Laine, 2017). 
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Empirical findings revealed that the advocacy NGOs used counter accounting 
technologies such as the use of partisan and systematic physical evidence, symbolic 
activisms through local and international court actions, protest and publicity stunts, 
lobbying, and the use of media such as TV, radio, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
Instagram, blogs, press releases to bridge human rights, accountability, unequal ownership 
and power relations, governance and dialogic gaps within the Delta arena. Counter 
accounting technologies were used to escalate problematic and unsustainable practices to 
galvanise local, regional, national and international arena participants to confront 
corporations and governance regimes on the ordeal of unsustainable practices and human 
rights violations within the local arenas (Thomson et al., 2015; Unerman and Bennett, 
2004; Vinnari and Laine, 2017; Deegan and Islam, 2014). Through these numerous 
counter accounting technologies, the advocacy NGOs have sought to make visible the 
‘unthinkable’ impacts of environmental and human rights violations on the lived lives of 
the indigenous people who depend on the natural resources in the Delta for their 
subsistence and to delegitimize the accounts of the powerful stakeholders (Kneip, 2013; 
den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Lauwo et al., 2016; Joutsenvirta, 2011). These counter 
accounting technologies were envisaged by the advocacy NGOs as important legitimacy 
strategies for advocacy due to the globalization of activism. These counter accounting 
technologies did not only efficiently assemble and disseminate information at a less 
expensive cost but enabled interactive dialogic engagements across different stakeholders 
to problematize, make known and address environmental pollution and human rights 
violations at the local arenas of the Delta (Manetti and Bellucci, 2016; Bellucci and 
Manetti, 2017; Gallhofer et al., 2006; Jeacle and Carter, 2014). These counter accounting 
technologies forged common networks and coalitions to promote the respect and 
protection of human rights, effective governance, inclusive dialogic accountability, equal 
power relations and sustainable development at the local arenas. However, further 
research is required to understand the implications of these counter accounting 
technologies in the Delta arena. 
Finally, evidence in chapter 9 revealed that discourse for the equality of power, effective 
governance, accountability, human rights, inclusive ownership and engagement should be 
dialogic to facilitate a socially progressive enlightenment, empowerment, emancipatory 
and transformative dialogue that exposes differences in ideologies, values, concerns, 
interests among the arena participants towards ensuring that policies, accountability and 
engagement actions are mutually beneficial (Bebbington et al., 2007; Cooper and Owen, 
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2007; Brown et al., 2015; Thomson and Bebbington, 2005). However, where formal 
accountability processes are considered inadequate, counter accounting could enable 
arena participants to criticise and evaluate whether their values and interests are 
considered, protected, respected and accounted for by the others (Apostol, 2015; Belal et 
al., 2015; Dey et al., 2011; Paisey and Paisey, 2006; Sikka, 2006; Thomson et al., 2015). 
Evidence revealed that in the Delta arena, the practice of dialogic accountability could 
address the expectations of the other stakeholders, especially on oil spill and gas flaring 
when there is a commitment for a transformative dialogue and sustainable change or 
actions to advance human rights and sustainable development.  
 
10.2. CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE  
This study adopted an interdisciplinary approach to critical and social accounting research 
by bringing together human rights, sustainable development, dialogic accountability and 
governance discourses by gathering data from an under-researched developing nation 
context in the accounting literature. Previous studies on the Delta have explored the 
impact of the oil industry on environmental pollution, focused on CSR initiatives by the 
corporations, ineffective regulatory frameworks, inadequate enforcement of laws and 
standards, human rights abuse, social conflicts, rates of poverty; health; biodiversity 
reduction in the Niger Delta (e.g. Akpan, 2008; Aroh et al., 2010; Dokpesi, 2013; Eregha 
and Irughe, 2009; Frynas, 2003; Kadafa, 2012a; Konne, 2014; Idemudia, 2007, 2010; 
Ndubuisi and Asia, 2007; Ogula, 2012; Omeje, 2005; Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010; Pegg 
and Zabbey, 2013; Zalik, 2004). These studies have been largely critical of corporate 
practices without laying clear emphasis on dialogic accountability and the implication of 
counter accounting for the advancement of human rights and sustainable development. 
This study extended prior research on counter accounting by developing conceptual and 
empirical insights into the use of counter accounts to enable effective accountability, the 
respect and protection of human rights and the environment; and in the reform of the 
governance processes associated with oil exploration in the Delta. 
This study draws on a combination of methodological approaches comprising 
documentary analysis and 57 in-depth interviews from different stakeholders’ groups to 
respond to calls for research by Apostol, 2015; Adams, 2004; Bebbington et al., 2007; 
Bellucci and Manetti, 2017; Brown et al., 2015; Contrafatto et al., 2015; Gallhofer et 
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al., 2006; Manetti and Bellucci, 2016; Moerman and van der Laan, 2015; Rodrigue, 
2014; Spence, 2009; Tregidga, 2013, 2017; Laine and Vinnari, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 
2017; Tregidga et al., 2012, 2015; Thomson et al., 2015; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 
2008; Gray et al., 2014b; Sikka, 2011; Belal et al., 2015; Owen, 2008; Spence, 2009; 
O’Dywer and Unerman, 2016. These methodological approaches were adopted to 
understand the strategies adopted by non-shareholders to interpret corporate accounts, 
challenge, resist and improve corporate and government accountability and engagement, 
and to what extent such interactions have improved human rights and sustainable 
development for the benefit of the subaltern groups considered powerless, marginalised 
or voiceless within a contested arena (Gallhofer et al., 2011; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016; 
Spence et al., 2010; Cooper et al., 2005; Belal et al., 2015). This study adopted an in-
depth interpretive and qualitative methodology to enhance the understanding of meaning, 
accountability and engagement implications of NGOs activism from different 
stakeholders’ group perspectives, which included evidence from the producers of counter 
accounts (iaNGOs and laNGOs), oppressed groups, corporation, regulatory agencies and 
the DNGOs. This study contributes to knowledge by revealing that the advocacy NGOs 
(international and local) considered their counter accounts and dialogic engagements as a 
problematizing tool in addressing environmental and human rights unsustainable 
practices and in problematizing the need or societal expectations on the corporations to 
give and discharge ‘accurate’ accounts. This study also contributes to knowledge by 
indicating that advocacy NGOs build the capacities of indigenous communities to co-
produce counter accounts and by build networks of counter accountors to give greater 
visibilities to unsustainable environmental, accountability and governance practices. 
This study was informed by the arena framework of Renn, 1992; Georgakopoulos and 
Thomson, 2008, 2012; Smith et al., 2010; Dey and Russell, 2014; Thomson et al., 2015; 
Tregidga, 2013 to enhance our understanding of the nature of the NGOs’ activism and 
accountability engagement for human rights and sustainable development in the Delta. 
The arena approach enabled the author to make sense of the complex accountability and 
engagement interactions in the giving and receiving of accounts of conducts to bridge the 
accountability and governance gaps in the Delta arena. The arena approach enabled the 
author to contribute to knowledge by contextualising, analysing and understanding the 
arena participants’ ideologies, values and beliefs, engagement and accountability 
practices, patterns of interaction and communication channels, and the assumed 
knowledge of the power dynamics associated with the Delta arena. However, instead of 
338 
 
situating the corporations at the centre of the arena whilst the community stakeholders or 
the general public is placed at the periphery of the arena as evidence in previous research, 
the author extended the arena concept by proposing the inverted arena concept, which 
recognised the engagement of the community stakeholder at the centre of the arena. The 
interaction among the arena participants should recognised the impact of their 
ideologically, antagonistic, confrontational, and co-operative resistance or engagement 
for improving corporate and government accountability and engagement on the 
indigenous and marginalized stakeholders group. This could be considered as partial and 
biased by other critical researchers but this study contribute to knowledge by arguing that 
situating the corporations at the centre of the Delta arena implies that engagements among 
the arena participants were to promote the business case argument without considering 
the implications of the activities of the powerful stakeholders on the other arena 
participants whose voices could be submerged by the unequal and non-inclusive 
engagements of the powerful stakeholders in the Delta arena. 
Furthermore, this study contributes to the broadening and opening of the dialogic 
accountability literature which is still in its emerging phase by exploring the dynamics of 
counter accounting and accountability for the advancement of human and sustainable 
development in a developing and highly controversial arena. Accountability was 
considered a moral relational obligation to give and to demand accounts of conducts or 
actions by all stakeholders regardless of whether there was an agency obligation for such 
actions (Parker, 2014; Shearer, 2002; Schweiker, 1993; Gray, 2010; Messner, 2009; 
Robert, 2009; Gray et al., 2014a, b). This study contribute to knowledge by revealing that 
for a moral relational accountability to exist, especially in contested arenas, such account 
giving and demanding rhetoric should be dialogic. The existence of diverse perspectives 
should be the basis for a dialogic accountability to drive transformative and sustainable 
(intra)intergenerational equity, respect and the protection of human rights, effective 
governance, inclusive engagement, and sustainable development. However, where 
dialogic accountability is not present, its absence could result in an increasing practice of 
freedom or empowerment through the activism of the counter accountants to problematize 
certain arena unsustainable practices and to conscientize the oppressed groups to demand 
accountability. This study respond to calls for research in the dialogic accountability 
discourse (Brown et al., 2015; Brown, 2009; Dillard, 2014, 2016; Brown and Dillard, 
2015a, b; Bebbington et al., 2007; Contraffatto et al., 2015; Gray et al., 2014b; Thomson 
and Bebbington, 2004, 2005; Blackburn et al., 2014; Dillard and Yuthas, 2013; Dillard 
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and Roslender, 2011; Gallhofer et al., 2015) by linking dialogic accounting to counter 
accounting and human rights accounting (see chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9) (Gallhofer et 
al., 2006, 2011; Sikka, 2006, 2011; Thomson et al., 2015; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 
2008; Apostol, 2015; Hazelton, 2013; Dey et al., 2011; Dey and Russell, 2014; Tregidga, 
2013, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 2017; Adams, 2004; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016; McPhail 
and Ferguson, 2016; Cooper et al., 2005, 2011), which is substantially underplayed or 
criticized as a folk-political thinking in the accounting literature (Spence, 2009; Gray and 
Gray, 2011; Li and McKernan, 2016). Without underplaying the partiality of imposing the 
advocacy NGOs counter accounts and their worldview on the other stakeholders, 
especially the indigenous people (Contrafatto et al., 2015; den Hond and de Bakker, 
2007), this study contribute to prior studies that posited that counter accounts are used to 
speak truth to power or empower the marginalised groups to demand accounts and 
inclusive engagement. The evidence in this study revealed that counter accounts make 
eminent potential conflicts of interest for human rights, accountability, governance, 
unequal power relations and unsustainable practices in the pursuit of profit by the 
powerful stakeholders as a result of the absence of accountable and verifiable information 
to facilitate a dialogic process. Therefore, the documentary analysis and interviews’ 
evidence from 57 participants contribute to knowledge by revealing that counter 
accounting(s) were used as delegitimising tactics to make visible corporate unsustainable 
practices and the unequal power relations to those with power over the corporations to 
demand accountability and to facilitate dialogic accountability besides building the 
capacity of the marginalised stakeholders to seek emancipatory and organisational 
changes through dialogue (Bebbington et al., 2007; Blackburn et al., 2014; Brown et 
al., 2015; Burchell and Cook, 2013; Dey et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, this study contributes to knowledge by revealing that accountability goes 
beyond corporate self-justification accounts and actions through compliance discourse 
justifying why double standard were applied for gas flaring and oil spills in the Delta 
arena. The documentary evidence revealed that “accountability rendered through actions” 
of “good works in the service of the others” (Parker, 2014) by the powerful stakeholders 
should reflect moral and ethical sustainable community development and environmental 
protection agenda. In addition, this study contribute to knowledge by revealing that 
accountability should recognise, promote stakeholders’ engagement and account for 
sustainable environment across generations and not to promote accounting for legitimacy, 
agenda-controlling, impression management or business-as-usual or managerial-capture 
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discourses to deflect the concerns of the community stakeholders, the advocacy NGOs 
and the shareholders’ activist groups. This study contributes to the research findings by 
Adams, 2002; Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Deegan and Islam, 2014; Rahaman et 
al., 2004; Owen et al., 2000, 2001; O’Dwyer, 2002, 2003, 2005; Baker, 2010; Tregidga 
and Milne, 2006; Larrinaga-Gonzalez et al., 2001; Owen, 2008; Belal and Owen, 2007 
that improved disclosure did not translate into transparency, accountability and 
engagement with the less economically powerful stakeholders rather it was a business 
case enhancing corporations’ reputation and their bottom-lines. This study highlighted 
that accountability by the powerful stakeholders should not be through discourses for 
wealth maximisation but through inclusive stakeholders’ engagement and moral actions 
towards advancing human rights and sustainable environment for the common goods of 
the other stakeholders. This finding contributes to previous findings by Parker, 2014; 
Gray et al., 2014b; Brown, 2009; Bebbington et al., 2007; Cooper and Owen, 2007; 
Shearer, 2002; Sinclair, 1999; Messner, 2009; Schweiker, 1993; Thomson and 
Bebbington, 2005; Gray and Bebbington, 2003 that accountability should reflect the 
engagement of the other stakeholders without principal-agency relationships with the 
corporations. It implies that the corporations and the government operating the joint 
venture in this arena are envisaged by the other arena participants, especially the 
community stakeholders, the advocacy NGOs and the media as moral and ethical agents 
responsible for the other stakeholders. This is because they do not operate in a vacuum 
and their identities or reputations as responsible organisations are shaped by the 
perceptions and discourses of these other stakeholders (Joutsenvirta, 2011; Thomson et 
al., 2015; Kneip, 2013; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Gray et al., 2014a). 
Accountability by these arena participants are perceived as a moral responsibility and 
ethically inclusive relationships by the corporations and government with the indigenous 
people on the protection of their environment, biodiversities, and the respect and 
protection of their human rights. 
Another exciting finding in chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9 that explicitly contribute to the dialogic 
accounting literature is the use of evidence-based dialogic-inspired accounts and activism 
(actions) to challenge the everyday realities of the indigenous people(oppressed). In this 
study, these dialogic inspired accounts and activism were used to expose the oppressed 
stakeholders to the causes and consequences of unsustainable practices, and to 
their conscientization through their local dialects (language familiar to them) to 
challenge, engage and co-produce accounts in Ogoniland, which was later applied in other 
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communities in the Delta arena by the advocacy NGOs (Friere, 2002; Contrafatto et 
al., 2015; Thomson and Bebbington, 2004, 2005; Bebbington et al., 2007; Dillard and 
Roslender, 2011). Evidence revealed that because of the dialogic engagement of the 
advocacy NGOs, the indigenous people argued that they are more aware of the need for 
their fundamental rights to be protected, respected and accounted for by the arena 
participants. This finding support Freire (2002) and Contrafatto et al., (2015) dialogic 
actions argument that liberation from oppression would be experienced, when the 
oppressed are conscientized to recognise the causes and consequences of unsustainable 
practices in the language familiar to them, thereby empowering them to resist 
the prescription of unsustainable practices by the oppressor that affect their ability to live 
sustainably by waging a struggle for freedom. For instance in the Delta arena, this 
approach was adopted by MOSOP’s in the 1990s to attract the support of the indigenous 
people in liberating themselves from the perceived oppressive activities of the powerful 
stakeholders (corporations and government) through its national and international 
campaigns for accountability, inclusive ownership, self-determination, sustainable 
development and environment because they were conscientized/educated in their local 
dialects to engage non-violently in speaking their truth to power through 
dialogue (Gray et al., 2014b; Tregidga et al., 2015). Furthermore, these dialogic actions 
were observed by the author during her fieldwork, especially when the interviews with 
the community stakeholders were conducted. The interviews were conducted in English, 
but some community stakeholders not only answered the research questions in their native 
dialects but also through pidgin English in projecting their accounts of unsustainable 
practices, human rights violations and what was done to resolve them through the 
engagement of the advocacy NGOs in the Delta arena. Despite this level of 
conscientization by the advocacy NGOs, evidence revealed that little or nothing have been 
done by the rule enforcers (NOSDRA and DPR) to conscientize the indigenous people to 
understand when their rights have been violated and what judicial procedures to adopt to 
ensure that they are accounted for and subsequently respected and protected. 
Another interesting contribution to established theoretical and empirical knowledge (such 
as Rodrigue, 2014; Tregidga, 2013, 2017; O’Sullivan and O’Dywer, 2009; 
Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Thomson et al., 2015; Dey et al., 2011; Boyce, 
2014; Jontsenvirta, 2011; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Kneip, 2013); counter accounts, 
its technologies and activism were used to perpetuate, escalate, confront the powerful 
arena participants, counter-act and co-operate with other arena participants at the regional, 
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national and international arenas to bring about transformative reforms in the local arenas. 
For instance, in their struggle for equal power and dialogic accountability and 
participation, re-distribution of resources and effective governance, the advocacy NGOs 
confronted governance and corporations on gas flaring and oil spills by building networks 
of engagement to address these unsustainable practices at the local arenas. The advocacy 
NGOs used their counter accounts, counter audits, and counteractions to co-operate with 
the community stakeholders by building their capacity to advocate for/on behalf of 
themselves or to engage in dialogue from a point of knowledge either by generating an 
evidence-based systematic accounts of environmental pollution on oil spills and gas flares; 
and sending them to the regional, national and international arena through the laNGOs or 
by taking part in speaking their truth to power through numerous media platforms 
(Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown and Dillard, 2015a, b). This implies that 
greater prospects for emancipatory and sustainable changes in an arena prone to 
unsustainable practices could emerge when, with the support of other stakeholders, 
vulnerable and marginalized indigenous people could cooperatively challenge prevailing 
governance and accountability structures (Belal et al., 2015; Thomson and Bebbington, 
2005; Contrafatto et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, building on the dynamic inverted arena framework (Thomson et al., 2015; 
Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008, 2012; Renn, 1992; Tregidga, 2013), there are 
different radical and reforming stakeholders’ operating at different accountability and 
engagement arenas to facilitate a transformative and emancipatory changes within and 
outside the Delta arena to address the conflicts with evidence-based counter accounting 
technologies (see chapter 8). This study contributes to knowledge by revealing that 
these networks of transformative engagements were established to cooperatively address 
and connect the conflicts in the local arenas at a different level of arenas. Drawing 
extensively from the evidence gathered from this study and prior research, this study 
developed a framework (titled – levels of activism, accountability and engagement in a 
conflict arenas: nature of conflicts, types of counter accounts and the approaches) by 
identifying different conflict arenas -local, regional, national and international arenas 
along with identifying different arena actors, the nature of conflicts the actors are striving 
to address, the types of accounts and their strategies/approaches (see figure 5, 
p.225). Besides classifying accounts, accountability and engagement discourses into 
different conflict arenas, this study contributes to knowledge by identifying three 
strategies to activism. The radicalist and the participationist approaches are synonymous 
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to the radicalist and reformative strategies to activism as theorized in the management 
review, business ethics and social movement literature by den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; 
Fitzgerald and Rodger, 2000; Joutsenvirta, 2011; Kneip, 2013 and in the accounting 
literature by Thomson et al., 2015, O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009; Georgakopoulos and 
Thomson, 2008; Tregidga, 2013, 2017; Rodrigue, 2014; Adams, 2004; Apostol, 2015 to 
delegitimise, co-operate and confront corporate and governance regimes to cause a 
legitimate transformative changes on behalf of the other stakeholders, who may not have 
the voice to engage at these different conflict arenas (Cooper et al., 2005). The point of 
divergence is on the introduction of the “hybrid radical-participationist approach to 
activism,” which was evident in this contested arena but has not been empirically and 
theoretically discussed by prior research (known to the author). Although, this theoretical 
framing was developed from the evidence gathered in the Delta arena, future research 
could adopt and further develop this model in exploring other conflict arenas that are 
focused on inclusive engagement discourses for (intra)intergenerational equity, power 
equality, effective accountability and governance regimes, respect and protection of 
human rights and sustainable environmental practices. 
This study critically contribute to previous research that counter accounting is not a single 
technology of engagement but comprises complex and dynamic networks of technologies 
in uncovering what was covered across different (regional, national and international) 
arenas to facilitate transformative changes at the local arenas (Gallhofer et 
al., 2006; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Collison et al., 2010 Spence, 2009; Vinnari 
and Laine, 2017). The laNGOs adopted different forms of counter accounting 
technologies by building dialogic and counter accounts with indigenous people, and 
coalitions of NGOs across different arenas, systematic and partisan physical counter 
accounts; bridging counter accounting through shareholders activist groups, social media 
(such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Twitter; Blogs) to engage different stakeholders 
group to confront and de-legitimise power inequalities, unsustainable environmental 
practices, ineffectiveness of regulatory regimes and the absence of inclusive 
accountability and governance practices in the local arenas of the Delta. 
Finally, building on prior research on dialogic accountability, counter accounting and 
human rights accounting, the inverted arena concept, the levels of activism and the 
empirical findings in this study, the author reflectively contribute to knowledge by 
proposing the lifecycle and pathways to conflict(s) resolution. This theoretical and 
methodological framework is proposed based on the arena engagement of the advocacy 
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NGOs and the communities, government, corporations, media, regulatory agencies, 
national and international stakeholders in addressing conflicts on the human and 
environmental rights of the indigenous people living in the Delta. This model is classified 
into three (3) phases – early, open and the later phase of conflict, accountability and 
engagements. This proposed model reflects how conflicts could emerge and resolved 
through dialogue and by conscientizing or reshaping identities that could transform the 
dominant syntax or institutional or governance regimes through collaborative actions. 
Further research is required to understand the implications of this model on other conflict 
arenas. This could enable researchers to explore the emergence of conflicts in 
controversial arenas from the perception of multiple stakeholders and how they are 
prevented or resolved through a dialogic accountability mechanism by facilitating value-
chain collaborative actions. 
 
10.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE: WAY FORWARD 
This study explored the dynamics of counter accounting and accountability in the 
advancement of human rights and sustainable development in a controversial developing 
country oil exploratory and extractive arena. The study could be used by policymakers to 
understand how oil and gas should not be explored in this arena and in other 
conflict arenas by considering the implications of a non-inclusive engagement and 
accountability policy framework to the detriments of the indigenous people. The dialogic 
accountability discourse in this study revealed that the community stakeholders are 
considered as the third party due to the joint venture partnership between the corporations 
and the government. Evidence revealed that accountability and engagement had always 
been between the corporations and the government whilst the community stakeholders 
were excluded from such accountability and ownership engagement, despite the negative 
implications of the exploratory and extractive activities on their ability to live sustainably. 
This is because ascribing ownership of the resources on the community stakeholders 
would not only ensure that (intra)intergenerational interests are protected but it would 
drive dialogic accountability and engagement for human rights, sustainable environment, 
and development at the local arenas. This study reinforces the need for policymakers and 
corporations to engage the other stakeholders in dialogues and collaborative engagements 
that ensure political and power dynamics are inclusive to protect human rights and 
sustainable development, especially in an arena prone to conflicts. There should be the 
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power of agency to give and demand accounts of conducts by all stakeholders through a 
dialogic policy framework to mitigate against extensive environmental pollutions and 
unsustainable practices that could affect the ability of others to live sustainably. 
Furthermore, evidence revealed that the regulatory regimes in this contested arena are 
grossly underfunded and often depend on the corporations to regulate. The empirical 
findings could be used by political institutions, public sector organisations, NGOs and 
corporations to influence policymakers to improve the regulatory engagement of 
governance or the regulatory agencies from being institutionally captured by the 
corporations. The effective enforcement of regulations could eradicate the application of 
the double standard in this arena by ensuring prompt disclosure of spills, effective joint 
investigation of environmental pollution and standardize remediation of polluted sites. In 
addition, evidence revealed that human rights to life, work, water, safe and healthy 
environment, education, self-determination, hold opinion, freedom of information and its 
expression and adequate standard of living have been violated due to the inability of the 
powerful stakeholders to protect and respect the environmental right of the indigenous 
people. Evidence revealed that this arena has been extensively damaged, and it would 
require the political will of the governance regimes, indigenous people and the 
corporations to address this anomaly to drive sustainable development. This study could 
improve policymaking by empowering the regulatory agencies to independently enforce 
the regulations through effective regulatory mandates to perform and ensure corporations 
adhere strictly to regulations. Policymakers could empower the regulatory agencies to 
protect the environment by ensuring that the corporations respect the human and 
environmental rights of the indigenous people as practiced in other countries where they 
operate and as stipulated in the regulatory frameworks. 
This study explored counter accounting as a human rights and sustainable development 
technologies, which bridges human rights, accountability, governance, and stakeholder 
engagement gaps to give voices to the marginalised indigenous groups, to drive 
stakeholder’s engagement/dialogue and the need for sustainable development in the Delta 
arena of Nigeria. The absence of an effective dialogic accountability and governance 
regimes in the Delta arena created a platform for the advocacy NGOs 
to delegitimise corporate and governance unsustainable practices that violate human and 
environmental rights of the local people. This study could be used in other 
controversial arenas to understand the implications of not getting governance rights and 
how community stakeholders could influence governance practices, and corporate 
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reputations and profitability by engaging advocacy NGOs, with the capacities to build 
network of engagements to problematize their everyday realities to galvanise 
confrontational and cooperative actions from regional, national and international audience 
to clamour for transformative changes in their communities. 
This study could influence policymakers, corporations, NGOs and community 
stakeholders in conflict-driven or controversial arenas to understand how exploratory and 
extraction activities should not be conducted to protect (intra)intergenerational equity, 
environment, and development (Grubnic et al., 2015; Gray, 2010). Understanding the 
intentions and desired outcomes of the advocacy NGOs activism within this arena implies 
that for there to be transformative changes in this conflict arena, engagement for 
(intra)intergenerational equity, sustainable environment, and development should be 
dialogic. Dialogic accountability and engagement could ensure that policymakers, the 
corporations, and even the community stakeholders take collaborative actions to protect 
human rights and the environment by listening to the concerns of all the arena participants. 
Furthermore, dialogic accountability implies that all stakeholders should be included by 
having access to information to make decisions that could affect their ability to live 
sustainably, which would subsequently prevent tensions and conflicts (Brown and Dillard, 
2015; Hazelton, 2013; Killian, 2010; Sikka, 2011; Thomson and Bebbington, 2005). This 
engagement would ensure that corporations adhere to laws to respect human rights, the 
government get its governance rights by establishing independent regulatory agencies to 
protect human rights and the community stakeholders to take adequate actions to prevent 
third-party interference to protect their human and environmental rights whilst demanding 
accountability and governance from the corporations and the governance regimes. This 
implies that there is a need for formal and informal structures of governance and 
accountability systems to facilitate transformative dialogue which does not silence the 
voices of any groups to engage and get their voice heard within this arena (Blackburn et 
al., 2014; Dillard and Yuthas, 2013). 
The governance needs to get its governing rights by ensuring that there are adequate 
procedures to remediate the polluted environment to protect (intra)intergenerational 
equity and sustainable environment (Bebbington et al., 2014; Weiss, 1992). The failure to 
remediate the environment implies that the ability of future generations to live sustainably 
would be affected by the unsustainable practices of this present generation and corporate 
unsustainable practices (Gray, 2010; Grubnic et al., 2015). Policymakers need to take 
adequate measures not only to remediate the Ogoniland but the entire Niger Delta from 
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the pollution that has destroyed their means of livelihoods. This study could influence 
policymakers to ensure that adequate measures are in place to redistribute the wealth from 
the Delta by developing the region to address the tensions, sense of hopelessness, poverty 
and siege mentality within this arena. 
In addition, placing the community stakeholders or indigenous people at the centre of the 
Delta arena would enable corporations and policymakers consider the implications of their 
activities and policies on the community stakeholders/indigenous people who are 
considered as the third party. Situating the indigenous people at the centre of the arena 
would enable practitioners to understand that the concerns, the wellbeing and the human 
rights of the indigenous people should be at the epicentre of any policies that involves 
wealth maximisation and the environment. Hence, practices and policies that would not 
protect and respect the fundamental human rights of the community stakeholders should 
not be considered or should be adjusted to reflect the concerns of the marginalised groups. 
Furthermore, this study could help act as counter accounts by making visible the human 
rights violations, environmental pollutions, exclusive accountability relationships and 
ineffective governance practices that affect the ability of the indigenous people to live 
sustainably in the Delta arena. Placing the community stakeholders at the centre of the 
arena, the author would use this study as a counter account to expose the injustices and 
exclusive accountability relationships existing in the Delta arena. In addition, the author 
and potential users of this thesis could use this study to give voice to the 
voiceless/marginalised group by furthering the activism of the advocacy NGOs and the 
indigenous people in the annual general meetings (AGMs) of corporations or other policy-
making platforms. Finally, the author implore potential users of this thesis to discuss and 
make visible the problematic and unsustainable practices revealed in this study until it 
gets to the right practitioners, policymakers, corporations, individuals, investors or 
organisations that would influence or drive emancipatory, transformative and sustainable 
changes in the Niger Delta that could protect current and future generations’ equity and 
environment. 
 
10.4. LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
Given that the arena framework was adopted in contextualising the empirical site, this 
framework requires data to be gathered from different perspectives. However, the author 
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could not explore the perspectives of all the corporations and the regulators beyond the 
restricted access granted by one oil corporation and the regulators during data collection 
despite fulfilling their mandatory requirements before going to the field for data 
collection. The other corporations refused to participate despite several calls and 
correspondence. To address these limitations, the author explored other secondary sources 
such as sustainability reports, press releases, web dialogues, newspapers and 
documentaries from/on the corporations to contradict or support the evidence from the 
other stakeholders interviewed. This lack of engagement with the author by the 
corporations despite the calls and correspondence critically reflect and support the 
empirical evidence by the advocacy NGOs, developmental NGOs, and even the 
indigenous people that the corporations do not engage with the other stakeholders without 
a direct agency relationship with the corporation. This limitation reflects that access to 
accurate information is restricted to those that have direct agency relationships with the 
corporations.  
In addition, the limitation above supports the empirical evidence that revealed that 
information is not published or provided to enable stakeholders make an informed 
decision. This lack of access to corporations operating in the Delta arena is a gross 
limitation of this study because the author was compelled to rely on secondary sources to 
complement the evidence from the other participants of this study. The inability of the 
author to access the corporation(s) to verify her findings revealed that the corporations are 
often not willing to disclose information when they are aware that they are not complying 
with regulatory requirements. This also post a problem for dialogic engagements, 
particularly where accurate information is not discharged to stakeholders by the 
corporations and even the government to enable all the stakeholders (recognised and non-
recognised) make an informed decision and eloquently contribute in dialogues that would 
curb unsustainable practices. 
In addition, the author could not explore the perspectives of policymakers for this 
research. This is a crucial area for future research. Future research could explore the 
implications of counter accounting in delegitimising the unsustainable corporate and 
governance practices from their perspective, what policies have been enacted to address 
the problems and their engagement or interactions with other arena participants. The 
inclusion of the policymakers could provide wholistic perspectives on the use of counter 
accounts and its implications for dialogic engagements and accounts among diverse 
stakeholders in the Delta arena. 
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As highlighted in Denedo et al., (2017), the interviews in this study cannot be sufficiently 
relied on to predict or represent future development at the local arenas rather the evidence 
presented in this study is a snapshot of the dynamic and deep-rooted conflicts. In addition, 
the analysis is the author’s subjective perspective of the dynamic and deep-rooted 
conflicts for the protection and respect of human rights, effective environmental 
remediation, inclusive accountability and effective governance from the documentary 
analysis and the interviews. The counter accounts explored in this study and the empirical 
evidence from the anonymized participants could be used to problematize and make 
visible the unsustainable practices in this arena to bring about political and emancipatory 
changes. However, they cannot be used to predict future conflicts or development in the 
Delta rather they can only be used to make visible the problem and to inform policies and 
practice. 
Finally, the author is unable to link specific counter accounts to the interviewees due to 
legitimate concerns over the breach of the confidentiality and anonymity agreements. 
Although, this might not have any direct implications on the use of this study or the 
impacts on policies and practice, but critical researchers could argue that it could affect 
the credibility of the evidence from the participants of the study. The 
author recognised this limitation but choose to abide by the confidentiality and anonymity 
agreements negotiated with the participants of this study. 
 
10.5. FUTURE RESEARCH PATHWAYS 
This study explored counter accounting as a human rights and sustainable development 
technology, which bridges human rights, accountability, governance and stakeholder 
engagement gaps within an arena to give voices to the marginalised indigenous groups, to 
drive stakeholder’s engagement/dialogue and the need for sustainable development in the 
Niger Delta arena of Nigeria. Future research could explore the wider societal context in 
which human rights accountability through counter accounts are situated especially in 
controversial arenas before the findings in this research could be generalized. This is 
because enabling freedom of speech, reconceptualising ownership rights and the 
involvement of the communities and the other stakeholders in the governance of the 
natural environment is crucial for sustainable development and in preventing human rights 
violations (Bebbington et al., 2014; Denedo et al., 2017; Gray, 2010). As discussed in 
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chapter 4, future research could adopt the lifecycle and pathways to conflict(s) resolution 
framework using dialogic accountability and the inverted arena model to make another 
important contribution to knowledge on the dynamic of NGOs’ activism as a mediating 
instrument to constructs values, concepts, ideologies and networks of engagement in 
facilitating transformative changes from different perspectives and methodological 
approaches, especially in a contested arenas (Kurunmäki, et al., 2011; Thomson et al., 
2015; Tregidga et al., 2015; Gray et al., 2014b).  
Drawing from Vinnari and Laine (2017), Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2014), Davison 
(2007), Deegan and Islam (2014); Gallhofer et al., 2006 and Thomson et al., (2015), the 
author identified the use of an extensive netnography approach to activism in the Delta 
arena (see chapter 8) to confront the powerful stakeholders and to escalate the conflicts 
from one arena to another. Furthermore, this research identified the use of the visual 
approach to activism (video, picture posters, publicity stunts) to influence the government 
or the corporations, and those that have significant leverage to influence their policies and 
activities in contested arenas. However, this research could not analyse the content of such 
engagement and the transformative impact of such engagement. Future research could 
adopt an interdisciplinary approach by integrating discourses on visual art, human rights 
and activist approaches to analyse the conversation, the accountability and engagement 
embedded in the use of these alternative counter accounting technologies to facilitate 
potential transformative changes. This study could adopt institutional change perspective 
or media agenda setting theory to explore the dynamics of using this alternative approach 
to activism to influence corporations and governance regimes in the Delta or in other 
controversial arenas (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Ader, 
1995). 
Future research could explore the use of counter accounts in this context and other 
contexts by capturing and analysing the social media conversations of the advocacy 
NGOs with other stakeholders at the local, regional, national or international arenas. 
These studies could support calls for research in accounting on the power and the dynamic 
use of social media by advocacy NGOs to mobilise users/stakeholders to challenge 
dominant hegemonies in conflictual arenas (see Agostino and Sidorova, 2017; Arnaboldi 
et al. 2017a, b; Bellucci and Manetti, 2017; Brivot et al., 2017; Jeacle and Carter, 2014; 
Manetti and Bellucci, 2016; Unerman and Bennett, 2004).  
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Finally, research in the accounting literature (Thomson et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2008; 
Khan, 2014) and in the human geography literature (Sieber, 2006; Peluso, 1995; Brown 
et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2001) have shown that online 
accountability technology (countermapping) could improve knowledge and ascribe 
power of agency to the other stakeholders to question policymaking, and to demand 
(intra)intergenerational equity and sustainable development (Grubnic et al., 2015; 
Bebbington et al., 2014). Future research could build on Denedo et al., (forthcoming), 
Miller et al., 2008; Thomson et al., 2014 to explore the content of the Oil Spill Monitor 
(OSM) (further) and Gas Flare Tracker (GFT). This research could explore the 
interactions and the practice(s) emerging from the online accountability visual mapping 
technology among the stakeholders that participate in such engagement to improve social, 
economic, governance, ethical and environmental concerns of the people in the Delta or 
in other arena with electronic-visual mapping technologies. In addition, this research 
could explore whether the stakeholders did use the information on these platforms to 
inform their actions. This research could adopt Paulo Freire (2002)’s critical 
consciousness dialogic discourse or the theory of intergenerational countermapping 
(Eades and Zheng, 2014) along with the arena model (Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 
2008; Renn, 1992; Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2013) to explore the dynamics of the 
online accountability technology.   
  
10.6. CONCLUSION  
This study extended prior studies on dialogic accounting by making a significant linkage 
between counter accounting, human rights and sustainable development with data from a 
controversial arena. It explored the implications of counter accountings in improving the 
lives of the stakeholders with restricted power and voice to speak their truth to power on 
the unsustainable practices that affect their ability to live sustainably in the Delta. 
Regardless of the engagement of the advocacy NGOs, the absence of governance was 
argued to be the bedrock for the unsustainable practices and human rights violations in 
the Delta. Nevertheless, considering the national and international regulations which the 
Nigerian government has ratified, the government is required to protect the interest of its 
citizens whether there is a joint venture agreement or not, but evidence revealed that is 
often not the case due to the cosy relationship existing between the corporations and the 
government, and between the corporations and the regulatory agencies. Evidence revealed 
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that the community stakeholders have been excluded from the ownership structure and 
there is no direct agency relationship with the corporations. On the other hand, 
accountability to them (communities) was considered by the community stakeholders, the 
regulators, the developmental and advocacy NGOs (iaNGOs and laNGOs) as a moral, 
relational and dialogic accountability to engage and to give accounts of conducts to 
them(oppressed) by the powerful stakeholders. Thus, the government is expected to 
change its approach to governance to protect the community stakeholders in order to 
compel corporations to adjust their business case approach to reflect a moral dialogic 
approach. However, as far as this thesis is concern, the author leaves the concluding 
statement to the indigenous people – IP9  
‘You have come to Niger Delta. You have seen us and you have seen 
that we don’t have all that we ought to have and our people don’t have 
a lot of voice to say this is what is happening to us. So, as you go out 
and conclude your research, I believe if you tell our story the way you 
see it. It will help us. At least you are aware of what we are going 
through now, if you tell your mate there, perhaps, 10 persons that 
[would] have heard. So, if they keep on telling people that this is what 
is happening in the Niger Delta when it gets to the right ears, maybe 
one day, one day, we will have that relieve that we are praying for and 
the change might come.” (IP9, focus group, participant 1) 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
Research Information Guide 
 
                                    Date: 30th June 2015.  
Sir/Madam,  
Research Participants Interview Guide on the ‘Dynamics of Counter Accountability’   
Many thanks for accepting to participate in this research. I appreciate your support. My name is Mercy Denedo. I am a 
PhD student of Accounting at Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh. I am conducting a research on the dynamics of 
counter accountability and accountability by different organisations. Counter accounts are social reports produced to 
highlight, commend or challenge the (un)sustainable social and environmental accountability impacts of an 
organisation on others in order to facilitate stakeholders’ dialogue and institutional change within any arena e.g. the 
Niger Delta arena. These social reports are prepared by individuals, reforming NGOs and the media. Consequently, I 
am envisaging that the interview should be between 30 minutes and 90 minutes. Therefore, this document highlights 
the objectives of the study, the data collection methods and my targeted research participants, the research ethics, the 
confidentiality of the data, how the data generated would be used and the synopsis of the research questions for your 
guide.  
Objective of the study  
This research centres on the dynamic nature of the social reports (accounts) prepared by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) for the advancement and accountability of human rights among stakeholders, especially within 
the Niger-Delta region in Nigeria. Furthermore, this study aims to explore how these social reports have improved the 
notion of accountability by the oil-drilling corporations and other stakeholders such as the regulators, the communities, 
supportive and reforming stakeholders. It aims to explore how these social reports have contributed to stakeholders’ 
dialogue and accountability for the advancement of human rights within the region. Subsequently, I aim to contribute 
to the emerging body of research on accounting, corporate accountability and human rights. Finally, this research aims 
to improve our understanding of the current and future implications of accountability in various formats and 
mechanisms for the advancement of human rights.  
Data collection methods and targeted research participants  
Consequently, I am hoping to conduct these interviews from August to September 2015. I envisaged that each 
interview would last between 30 minutes and 90 minutes. Furthermore, my targeted research participants include the 
followings:  
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1. Key management team, especially on accountability, environmental and sustainable development in the 
Niger Delta.  
2. Community engagement/relations, social and environmental crisis management team in the Niger Delta.  
3. Non-governmental organisations, especially on environmental degradation and pollution issues within 
the Niger Delta region.   
4. Key communities’ members and regulators.  
Research ethics  
Full research ethical approval has been obtained from Heriot-Watt University for this study. I am aware of the ethical 
implications of the nature of this study, therefore my findings would be treated with utmost confidentiality, anonymity 
and participation is strictly voluntary. The identity of my research participants would only be disclosed if the consent 
to disclose were given by them. Finally, you do not have to answer all the questions, if you do not want to and if you 
wish to withdraw from the study, you are free to do so.  
Confidentiality of the potential data to be collected  
According to Heriot-Watt University’s research ethics, it is my intention to audio-record the interview in order to ensure 
that your responses are captured as clearly as possible for research purposes only. However, if you do not wish to be 
taped, a note of our conversation would be taken. All data generated from this study would be password encrypted, 
anonymized, confidentially kept and strictly used for research purposes only. Furthermore, the researcher and her 
supervisor would be the only persons with access to the data to be collected and excerpt of the transcripts would be 
used for future publications. Finally, an excerpt of the transcripts that could result in the identification of my research 
participants will be deleted from the study. Once the interviews are transcribed, a copy will be sent to my participants 
to provide the opportunity for him/her to add changes needed to make him/her comfortable with what s/he said during 
the interview.  
Conclusion  
I hope you would be able to assist by participating in this study and would be grateful if you do. Could you let me know 
by replying via e-mail to med1@hw.ac.uk to arrange a suitable time and date for the interviews, please? Furthermore, 
if you require additional information, you can contact me via med1@hw.ac.uk or my supervisor - Professor Ian 
Thomson via ian.thomson@hw.ac.uk or +44(0)131 451 4342.  However, if you would not be able to participate, could 
you pass it on to someone else, who should be able to participate in this study, please?  
Thank you for your favourable response.  
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Appendix 2 
Research Question Themes and Guide 
The followings are the interview questions for your review:  
Section 1: Opening Questions:  
 -  Background information on the interviewee e.g.  
o Educational background, designation, years of experience on the related research topic. 
O The role of your organisation in facilitating organisational change towards sustainable development 
and the advancement of human rights. How has your organisation been able to address or curtail non-
corporate accountability and corporate abuses of human rights? 
Section 2: Main Questions:   
a.  Corporate Accountability and social reporting   
Accountability is relational in nature and is constructed through an inter-and-intra organisational relationship. 
Therefore, accountability processes include the ability of stakeholders to hold corporations and other stakeholders 
(regulators, communities, NGOs) responsible for their actions and on the other hand, accountability implies the ability 
of the corporations and the other stakeholders to take responsibility for their actions resulting from democratic 
stakeholder’s engagement processes. The ability of other stakeholders to hold corporations legally and socially 
accountable for human rights is the bedrock of encouraging stakeholders’ accountability, counter accountability and 
encouraging business respect for human rights. Therefore:  
1. What does your organisation consider as an effective accountability and engagement mechanisms for the 
advancement of human rights, especially within the Niger Delta? 
2. What are the various accountability mechanisms adopted by your organisation to engage with its 
stakeholders? /What are the various formats or medium through which the key stakeholders discharged their 
accountability to its stakeholders?   
3. How have the key stakeholders been subjected to continuous accountability review and questioning by its 
stakeholders e.g your organisation? 
4. What are the driving forces behind your organisation’s policies and practices towards environmental issues? 
/What are your underlying assumptions for counter accountability and non-violations of human rights on 
stakeholders’ dialogue to facilitate an emancipatory and institutional change within the Niger Delta arena? 
5. How would you describe your oil spill monitoring or oversight responsibility? Could you relate your oil 
oversight responsibility to stakeholders’ accountability, engagements and dialogues within the Niger Delta 
arena?  
6. What would constitute ideal stakeholders’ dialogue and human right accounting system between your 
organisation and the other stakeholders?  
356 
 
7. How has your organisation been able to bridge the perceived accountability and transparency gap within the 
Niger Delta arena?  
8. Has social/counter accounting influenced your accountability and stakeholders’ engagement mechanisms 
within the Niger Delta arena? Alternatively, how would you describe the impact of counter accounts prepared 
by NGOs to problematize regulatory oversight, transparency and compliance activities for the advancement 
of human rights and sustainable development within the Niger Delta arena? 
9. Do you consider these externally produced social reports to be helpful in stakeholders’ engagement practices 
within the arena?   
10. Could you provide an example of what you consider an effective social report?   
11. Could you give examples of what you consider effective corporate-stakeholder engagement/dialogue within 
the Niger Delta arena?  
12. Are there examples of where externally produced social reports have brought about any organisational change 
in policies or practices in relation to the advancement of human rights and sustainable development within 
the Niger Delta arena?  
13. Do you consider there is a need for improved accountability amongst corporations, community groups, NGOs 
and regulators within the region? 
14. There were numerous business and human rights accountability frameworks to help the state (regulators), 
corporations and other business enterprises in their conquest to protect and respect human rights geared 
towards sustainable development. Would you consider them a relevant tool in the Niger Delta arena? 
If yes could you explain your rationale for this assertion? If no why?  
15. Given the increased pressure on businesses and state (regulators) to take responsibility for the advancement 
of human rights, do you think there are any conflicts between corporate profitability, transparency and 
regulatory compliance on human rights and sustainable development in the Niger Delta region?  
 b.  Corporate and stakeholder’s accountability  
1. Which stakeholder groups do you consider as the most important for your organisation and why? – your 
donors, the operators, regulators, employees, competitors, public, media, local communities and other 
communities’ grouping or others (specify please)? 
2. How effective do you consider your stakeholder accountability and engagements practices or mechanisms? / 
How effective is your stakeholders’ accountability, engagements and dialogues on the way your organisation 
and other stakeholders conduct their affairs and account for them within the arena?   
3. How would you evaluate the extent with which the key stakeholders’ responsibility for human right 
advancement, especially in the Niger Delta are underpinned by stakeholders’ accountability, engagement and 
dialogue?  
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4. How often do the operators and the regulators consult the other stakeholders including the local communities 
and human rights and environmental advocacy NGOs, when addressing issues relating to their welfare? How 
do they select the participants?   
5. What roles do community groups play in shaping your practices in the Niger Delta?  
6. Do you think that community groups should have a strong participatory voice on sustainability issues in the 
Niger Delta?  Alternatively, should sustainable development be policy driven? 
7. How did your organisation and the key stakeholders respond to community groups’ concerns in relation to 
their welfare and environmental issues when formulating your policies and operations?  
8. Could you give an example of where human rights and sustainable development have become part of your 
stakeholders’ accountability in relation to community development and production procedures?  
9. How would you evaluate the ability of the stakeholders to hold corporations legally and socially accountable 
for human rights and sustainable development within the Niger Delta arena? 
10. Could you explain the relationship between your responsibility and other stakeholders’ responsibility for 
human right advancement, especially in the Niger Delta and stakeholder engagement and dialogue?  
11. Could you give an account of an effective stakeholders’ dialogue that influenced policies and practices within 
the region?  
12. How could regulatory and communities’ accountability, stakeholders’ activism, dialogue and engagement be 
improved?  
13. Are there any planned developments in your approach to human rights advancement, sustainable 
development, stakeholders’ accountability and engagements on business and human rights issues within this 
region?  
14. Has the recent financial settlement by SPDC changed your regulatory and compliance accountability and 
dialogic processes within the Niger Delta?   
  c.  Stakeholders, corporate and regulatory accountability  
1. How effective do you consider the regulatory framework within Nigeria in relation to enforcing human rights?   
2. How effective is the EGASPIN Act in promoting accountability, non-violation of human rights and 
sustainable development within the Niger Delta arena? 
3. Are there any conflicts between the operators’ strategic objectives and regulatory frameworks in the Niger 
Delta? Could you give an example of any of such conflicts? 
4. To what extent do international regulations or global company policies impact on local practices in the Niger 
Delta?    
5. How effective is the Global Memorandum of Understanding between the other operators and the local 
communities in the Niger Delta?  
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6. Could you suggest ways in which the regulation of the key stakeholders’ operations in relation to Human 
Rights could be improved? 
Section 3: Closing questions  
Considering the critical importance of counter accountability and human rights issues for promoting corporate 
responsibility accountability and sustainable development as well as the multiple challenges and risk confronted by 
your organisation while conducting its business.  
1. What are your aspirations for the future of the Niger Delta?  
2. What would be your organisation’s role in facilitating future sustainable development in the region?  
3. Please, do you have any other issues that you would like to raise in connection with this topic, probably that 
I have not included considering the importance of this field of research? (if yes) please, could you elaborate? 
4. Would you recommend that I speak to someone else who could provide additional insights into these issues 
either within your organisation or elsewhere? 
Thank you for your support.  
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INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
  
Title of the research project:          Dynamic of Counter Accountability.  
  
Name of Researcher:                Mercy Ejaita Denedo (PhD Accountancy)         
                                          Please tick box  
                              Yes             No  
I confirm that I have read and understood the study information     
sheet provided  
 
  
I have had the opportunity to ask questions            
  
I understand that taking part in this research project will include     
being interviewed.  
  
I understand that participants’ conversation will be audio-recorded  
  
 
I understand that participation is strictly voluntary and I can withdraw at any  
time without giving any reason for withdrawal  
  
I understand that my personal details will not be revealed to people  
outside the project except consent to disclose is given by me  
  
 
I understand that my words may be quoted in the thesis and other  
research outputs emanating from this project.  
  
I agree to participate in this research project.  
   
 
Name of Participant:            Signature:    Date  
  
 
Mercy Ejaita Denedo (researcher)        Signature:      Date  
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